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Abstract

The rise of China as a regional maritime power is having profound consequences for
international security in East Asia. China's growing national strength has increased the
intensity with which it attempts to influence its external environment, and improves its
ability to operationalize its regional ambitions. Those ambitions are distinctly revisionist
and expansionist: China seeks to overturn the regional geopolitical status quo by
restoring its long lost primacy in Asia at the expense of regional major power rivals, and
by reducing the influence and presence of the United States. Because its foremost
territorial claims are maritime in nature - Taiwan, the Senkaku Islands in the East China
Sea, and the disputed territories and waters of the South China Sea - and because East
Asia is primarily a maritime region, China has been required to develop both its
maritime power and a new maritime strategy.
China has rapidly expanded its maritime economic interests since the reopening
of the Chinese economy, in turn generating a greater interest in maritime security and
naval development. China's sea dependence remains low, however, with the important
exception of oil supplies imported by sea, especially from the Persian Gulf.
Nevertheless, China's maritime-strategic modernization has gathered pace as its
economy has grown rapidly over the past 20 years, particularly since the 1985
enunciation of a new strategic emphasis upon China's maritime periphery. Initially, the
development of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy was spurred by China's
territorial claims in the South China Sea and the desire to exploit the Sea's marine
resource potential. Since the Taiwan Strait missile crises of 1995-1996, however,
China's primary strategic focus has been Taiwan, thus altering the emphasis of the
PLA's maritime strategy and force structure development. Whereas planning for South
China Sea operations required the development of sea control and power projection
capabilities for limited contingencies against smaller adversaries, a focus on Taiwan has
required development of sea and access denial capabilties for contingencies involving
high-technology maritime adversaries, especially the United States.
Although China remains primarily a continental power by geopolitical
disposition, its maritime interests and regional ambitions have nonetheless led it to
develop a maritime strategy typical of great continental powers - including the
integration of land-based forces. With its foremost strategic interests close to the
Chinese coast, at a minimum China aspires to be able to defeat the region's leading sea
powers at sea within the East Asian littoral, especially throughout the semi-enclosed
seas of Northeast Asia. That aspiration has led to a highly focused programme of PLA
force modernization for offensive littoral warfare; a direct challenge to the U.S.-Ied,
maritime-based, regional security order. As a consequence, the leading maritime powers
in Asia and some coastal states are undertaking cautionary measures to counter, or
hedge against, China's maritime expansion. The underlying regional dynamic of
China's maritime challenge thus is generating a heightened, potentially dangerous level
of great power competition in East Asia and throughout its contiguous seas.
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Introduction: The Dragon and the Sea

China has become a maritime power. China's navy is now an important factor in the
strategic equation in the Western Pacific. Its merchant marine is one oftbe largest in the
world. Yet China's development as a maritime power is just beginning. The two key
items on China's national agenda, economic growth and the "hoeration" of Taiwan,
each have important maritime elements. The common picture of ... (ChinaJ ... as solely
a continental power is no longer accurate. To understand Chinese strategy, economics,
and foreign policy in the years ahead, it will be necesSIU'}' to understand the new
maritime elements of China's national interests and national power. 1

CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY IN EAST ASIA

In 1994 Cnlin Gray argued that the uncertain, transitional period in world politics
fullowing the end of the Cold War would give way to an identifiably new international
order by the turn of the century.' In East Asia, the post-Cold War transition has already
been supplanted by a new era of strategic competition, driven primarily by the rise of
China. In a 1995 analysis Gerald Segal identified two overriding "common concerns"
for the future security of the East Asian region: "a looming China and maritime
security.'" Segal argued that the two conceros were the only common features of
international security in a large and disparate geogrspbica1 area:
First, ... much of what we call East Asia is not far from the Pacific Ocean ". [such that]
it is useful to think of East Asia as concerned with maritime issues .•. Military concerns

will have a large role for naval and air power, and relatively less for land forces ...
Second. is the fact that one country - China - dominates East Asia ... China, or Chinese

I
2

David G. Muller, China as a Maritime Power, WestviewPress, Boulder, CO, 1983, p. 1.
Colin S. Gray, Villains, Vzetims and Sheriffs: Strategic Studies and Security for an Inter-War Period,

University of Hull Press, Hull, 1994, pp. 22~23.
3 Gerald Segal. ''What is Asian about Asian Security?" in Jim Rolfe, ed, Unresolved Futures:
Comprehensive Security in the Asia-Pacific, Centre for Strategic Studies, Wellington, 1995, p. 109.

I

occupied land, is within 700lan of every East Asian stale oxcept Singapore. China has
tmitorial disputes with every Eaot Asian state except a few ASEAN statco. In short,

China looms1arac in it! home region. 4

This dissertation oombines the two factors identified by Segal to investigate one of the

leading strategic issues of our times: the implications of the rise of China and its
expansion into maritime East Asi•. It is important to note at the outset th.t the maritime
environment and issues of maritime security do not represent autonomous geopolitical
realms: they can only have political and strategic meaning when related to terrestrial
fiIctors since, as the British naval strategist Sir Julian Corbett observed in 1911, "men
live upon the land and not upon the sea.'" Maritime power and maritime strategy must,
therefore, be viewed within a wider geopolitical context.
Mop 1.1 CIIiaa aDd It. Admi.lst...tlve R<gioIU

... ,
'""'"

•

-..

s

4 Ibid.. p. 108.
, luliaa S. Cotbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. with an introduction and notes by Eric J.
Grove, Naval lnatilUle Pres', AnIlapolis, MD, 1988 (first pub. 1911), p. 16.

2

As signified by the tenn "Middle Kingdom,''' China straddles both the northeast
and southeast maritime sobregions of Asia,? as well as being connected to the vast
expanse of continental Asia by an extensive land frontier (see Map 1.1 above).
Geographically, East Asia is linked by a continuous series of semi-enclosed seas,'
archipelagos and straits, stretching from the Sea of Okhotsk in the northeast to the

Andarnan Sea and Bay of Bengsl in the west (see Map 1.2 below). The Malacca Strait
serves as the main link between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, part of the vital
''maritime highway" for trade between East Asia and both Europe and the Middle East.'
The importance of the world's vital sea lanes were ably expressed by the great
American naval theorist and strategist, Alfred Thayer Maban:
The first and most obvious light in which the sea presents itself from the political and
social point of view is that of a great highway; or better, perhaps, of a wide common,
over which men may pass in all directions, but on which some well-worn paths show

that controlling reasons have led them to choose certain lines of travel rather than
others. These lines of travel are called trade routes; and the reasons which have

determined them are to be sought in the history of the world. 10

The wrrestricted flow of trade through Asia's sea lanes is an essential national security
concern for regional states. A singularly important aspect of this trade is the reliance of
the economies of Northeast Asia upon energy imports and, in particular, Persian Gulf
oil. Japan is especially vulnerable, but South Korea, Taiwan and, increasingly, China,
also depend on imported oil.

The term "Middle Kingdom" is a literal translation of the name China (Zhongguo), and reflects a
traditional Sino-centric Weltanschauung that placed Chinese civilization at the centre of the (worldly)
universe. In the contemporary era. although China may not lie at the centre of the world, it nevertheless
dominates, geographically, the area we call "Asia" and, in particular. East Asia.
7 Northeast Asia consists of China, lapan, the Koreas, the Russian Far East and Taiwan. Southeast Asia
consists of the ten Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members: Brunei, Burma
(Myanmar), Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao', Malaysja, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand aad Vietnam.
China (Hainan, the Paracels and certain reefs in the Spratlys) and India (the Andaman and Nicobar
Islands) both possess island territory in Southeast Asian waters.
8 A semi-enclosed sea has been described as one which "stretches contiguously with a continent and is
linked with the open ocean by a broad entrance or by several passages between the islands of an insular
line marldng the boundary with the ocean," Milan N. Vego, Naval Strategy 01UI Operations in Narrow
Seas, Prank Cass, London, 1999, p. 5.
9 8ee 10hn H. Noer with David Gregory, Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia,
6

NDUPress, Washington,D.e., 1996.

A.T. Malum, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783,
Yorl<, 1987, (5& ed. firs.puh. 1894), p. 25.
10

sm ed., Dover Publications, New
3

Map 1.2 China in East Asia

RUSSIA

MONGOLIA

C H I NA

The ability of anyone state to dominate both the continental and maritime
geostr.tegic environments in East Asia would equate to geopolitical control of the entire
region. China is the dominant East Asian land power, whilst the United States, together
with its regional allies (especially Japan), is the foremost sea power in East Asia. That
geostrategic balance is being challenged by Chin.'s long-term ambitions to become the

4

leading power in Asia. Because East Asia is predominantly a maritime region, China
must be able, at least, to challooge the lesding sea powers by developing its own
maritime power if it is to achieve that goal." The developmoot of China's maritime
power is also inextricably linked to Beijing's sovereignty claims over Taiwan, the
Senkaku island group in the East China Sea and the Spratly island group and the waters
of the South China Sea, and the growing importance of the sea to China's economic
development
As the opening quote of this chapter noted, China had already become •
maritime power of note by the early 1980s. Since that time, China's maritime interests

and maritime power have increased markedly. And, increasingly, China's new strategic
emphasis upon its maritime periphery and expansion into the maritime reahn is creating
clashes and crises along the East Asian littoral. I' That expansion in many ways can be
seen to represoot the wider challenge of a rising Chin.: because China's foremost
external secnrlty interests and ambitions lie in a distinctly maritime region, Beijing has
been obliged to pursue • grand strategy that requires the development of maritime
power and • maritime strategy.

CHINA AS A MARlTIME POWER

It has been more than five centuries since China was last a major sea power. At that

time, during the early Ming dynasty (betweoo 1405-1433), China maintained the
greatest ocean-going fleet the world had at that time ever known.13 During that perlod
great Chinese fleets commissioned by the Yongle emperor, Zhu Di, and commanded by
the l'Wluch admiral Zhoog He, sailed throughout East Asian seas and across the Indian

11 The terms "sea power" and ''maritime power" are used interchangeably throughout the dissertation, and
generally refer to the comprehensive sum total of a state's maritime capabilities and interests, rather than
simply naval (or other maritime-relevant military) power. See Chapter 4 for further discussion.
12 The littoral has been defined as the "areas to seaward of the coast which are susceptible to influence or
support from the land and the areas inland from the coast which are susceptible to influence or support
from the sea." Royal Australian Navy, Australian Maritime Doctrine, RAN Doctrine 1, Department of
Defence, Canberra, 2000, p. 154.
13 See Louise Levatbes, When China Ruled the Seas: The Treasure Fleet of the Dragon Throne, 14051433, Oxford University Press, New York, 1994; Bruce Swanson, Eighth Voyage of the Dragon: A
HlStory of China's Quest for Seapawer. Naval Institute Press. Annapolis, :MD, 1982, Ch. 3; and Nicholas
D. Kristof. "Why We Don't Speak Chinese," Good Weekend: The Sydney Morning Herald Magazine, 27
Octob... 1999, pp. 4147.

5

Ocean as far as the Persian Gulf and the east coast of Africa, 14 conducting trade,
exacting tribute, and impoaing the will of the Chinese emperor.
At the height of China's seaborne imperial power," its "treasure fleets" were
able to dominate not only maritime East Asia but also much of the Indian Ocean littoral.
Yet damaging internal power struggles between the pro-trade, but largely corrupt court
eunuchs, and the more traditional, conservative and isolationist Confucian scholarofficials, led to the rapid decline of Chinese sea power and, ultimately, the end of the
Chinese imperium over maritime Asia. Confucian officials obstructed China's seaborne

trade and related maritime industries as a way to restrict the somces of eunuch wealth,
and thus also power. Combined with hard economic times and landward threats from
the Mongols, the reimposition of an inward-looking Confucian ethic had largely
succeeded in curbing the seaborne projection of Chinese power and influence by the end
of the fifteenth centory. Less than a century after the death of the Xusnde eroperor, Zhu
Zhanji, in 1435, Chioa's sea power had disintegrated: seaborne trade and the
cons1ruction of ocean-going vessels were banned, and sea-fariug and ship construction
sk:i11s, as well as Chioa's overall technological superiority, were progressively lost. The

Ming dynasty continued its declioe notil overthrown by the Manchu in 1644 and, along
its lengthy coastal frontier, Chioa became a relatively powerless victim of repeated
attacks from 1apanese pirates and, later, from both Europesn imperial powers and

Japan. 16
Thus, the decline of Chinese sea power, the withdrawal from seaborne tradiug
activities and subsequent Inrch towards strategic and technological backwardoess were
largely self-inflicted. Chioa never entirely withdrew from the sea, however, with coastal
trading, smuggling, piracy and fishing still common activities doring the Qing dynasty

(1644-1911).17 China even imported a modern navy in the second balfofthe nineteenth

14 A new book by a retired Royal Navy officer claims that Zheng's fleets actually sailed much further,
discovering the New World in 1421. See "Goodbye, Columbus'" The New York Times (online ed.), 5
January 2003. The book is Gavin Menzies, 1421: De Year China Discovered the World. Bantam. Press,

London,.2002.
15 Gang Deng asserts that China's "ocean~going" activities in fact climaxed during the Song and Yuan
dynasties, prior to the Ming period. See Gang Deng, China's Maritime Activities and Socioeconomic
Development. c.2100 B.C.-1900 A.D., Greenwood Press, Westport, CT,1997, pp. 57-58.
16 On the withdrawal of China from the sea and the loss of its overseas imperium, see Levathes, When
China Ruled the Seas, pp. 173-18l.
17 See Gang Deng, Maritime Sector, institutions, and Sea Power ofPremodern China, Greenwood Press,

Weslport, cr, 1999.
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century,18 yet the Qing lacked the impetus to develop China into a major sea power in
the face of domestic decline and upheaval, and fureigo naval dominatiou. Contemporary
Chinese strategists recognize the policy errors of those, earlier times and have elevated
the role of the sea in China's overall national interests. It has not gone unnoticed in
China that Westem imperial powers and Japan relied upon their naval, economic and
technological might to "open" a backward and corropt China,19 Although corruption
and the threat of social instability are yet again major domestic problems, China's rising
power and targeted strategic modernization, with a distinct maritime focus, nevertheless
threaten to upset the strategic balance between the major powers in East Asia,
The Study ofthe Rise of China as a Maritime Powe,

The slow growth of China's maritime power during the 1970s and Beijing's evident
maritime ambition were the sobject of three ground-breaking stodies in the early 1980s
- by David Muller,2. Bruee Swanson,21 and Marwyn Samuels,'2 although these volumes
are now relevant mainly as historical background for the developments of the past two
decades. Another, more specialized vol1llI1e appeared in 1989 on the commercial aspects
of China's maritime power?3 Beijing's new strategic focus on its maritime periphery,

first enunciated in 1985, resulted in an enhaoced pace of naval development and new
thrusts into the South China Sea. That new maritime strategic emphasis led to a new
wave of poblications, particularly from Hong Kong, Taiwanese and expatriate Chinese
scholars. 24
The rise of China as a maritime power elicited a growing number of studies in
the mid 1990s as the maritime consequences of China's economic modernization

See ibid, pp. 192-196; and Richard N.), Wright, The Chinese Steam Navy, 1862-1945, Cbat1uun
Pub100rlng, London, 2000,
19 See, for example, General Liu Huaqing, ''Defense Modernization in Historical Perspective," in Michael
Pillsbury, ed., Chinese Views ofFuture Warfare, rev. ed., NDUPress, Washington. D.e., 1998.
20 Muller, China as a Maritime Power.
21 Swanson, Eighth Voyage ofthe Dragon.
22 Marwyn S. Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, Metbuen, New York, 1982. Despite its title. this
book is as least as much about the rise of China as a maritime power as it is about the South China Sea
disputes,
18

1.3

Irwin Millard Heine, China's.ruse to Commercial Maritime Power, Greenwood Press, Westport, cr.

1989.
24 See, respectively, Tai Ming Cheung, Growth ofChinese Naval Powe,.: Prio,.ities, Goals, Missions, and
Regional Implications, Pacific Strategic Paper 1, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Singapore, 1990;
Yann-huei (Billy) Song, "China and the Military Use of the Ocean," Ocean Development and
International Law, Vol. 21, No. 2, April-June 1990; and You Xu and You Ji, In Search of Blue Water
Powe,.: The PLA Navy's Ma,.itime Strategy in the 19903 and Beyond, SDSC Working Paper No. 222,
Strategic and Defence Studies Cen1re, The Australian National University, Canberra, December 1990.
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became more evident. The impact of China's growing sea power also became a more
pressing issue for international security in East Asia in the post-Cold War, post-Soviet
era. The resulting strstegic uncertainty created heightened concerns over Chinese
ambitions in the South China Sea and elsewhere, and was exacerbated by the enactment
of China's 1992 territorial sea law, which formalized Beijing's extensive maritime
claims in East Asian seas. The most important study was Alexander Huang'. 1994
Ph.D. dissertation, which examined the maritime dimensions of China'. national
development fullowing Deng Xianping's reopening of the Chinese economy to the
outside world, and how naval modernization accompanied that maritime development 25
Huang concluded that such maritime development may make China both a stronger
power and more ''maritime'' in natore, and that naval forces would likely play a larger
role in China'. futore national security.26 Other, shorter studies focused on China's
naval modernization and the development of an offshore emphasis to China's strategy
fur maritime defence, often with a focus upon both the territories and resources of the
South China Sea, and the importance of China's then navy commander, General Liu
Huaqing, to those developments." Other studies focused on the development of China's

marine economy and ocean policy,28 China's naval and maritime strategic evolution in
the context of its development of sea-going nuclear forces,2' and China's current naval
capabilities and future options.'·
as Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang, "Chinese Maritime Modernization and Its Security Implications: The
Deng Xiaoping Era and Beyond," Ph.D. dissertation, George Washington University, 1994.
"lbid, pp. 404-416.
See Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang, '"The Chinese Navy's Offshore Active Defense Strategy:
Conceptualization and Implications," Naval War College Review, Vol. XLVII, No. 3, Swnmer 1994; Jun
Zban. ''China Goes to the Blue Watenl: The Navy, Seapower Mentality and the South China Sea," The
Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 17, No. 3, September 1994; Shigeo Hiramatsu. "China's Naval
Advance: Objectives and Capabilities," Japan Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2, Spring
1994; Tai Ming Cheung. ''China's Perception of Security in Asia and Its Naval Policy," in Choon Kun
Lee, 00., Sea Pqwer and Korea in the 2r' Century, The Sejong Institute, Seoul, 1994; John W. Garver,
"China's Push Through the South China Sea: The Interaction of Bureaucratic and National Interests," The
China Quarterly, No. 132, December 1992; Paul H.B. Godwin, "From Continent to Periphery: PLA
Doctrine, Strategy and Capabilities towards 2000," The China Quarterly, No. 146, June 1996; John
Downing, "China's Evolving Maritime Strategy. Part 1: Restructuring Begins," Jane's Intelligence
Review, Vol. 8, No. 3, March 1996; John Downing, "China's Maritime Strategy. Part 2: The Future,"
Jane's Intelligence Review, VoL 8, No. 4. April 1996; and Jeffe'Y B. Go1dman (!.cdr, USNR), "China'.
Mahan," U.S. Navallnstitute Proceedings, March 1996.
" See the relevant China chap_ of Dalchoong Kim. Jin-Hyun Pail<, Jiao Yongke and Chen Degong,
eds., Ocean Affairs in Northeast Asia and Prospects jor Korea-China Maritime Cooperation, East and
West Studies Series 32, Seoul Press for the Institute of East and West Studies, Yonsei University, Seoul,
1994.
29 John WilSOI1 Lewis and Xue Litai, China '8 Strategic Seapawer; The Politics ofForce Modernization in
the Nuclear Age, Stmford University Press, Stanford, CA. 1994, esp. Ch. 9.
30 Christopher D. Yung, People's War at Sea: Chinese Naval Puwer in the Twenty-first Century, CRM
95-214, Center fur Naval Analyse•• Alexandria, VA, March 1996.
27
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Since the mid 19908 the subject has continued to generate English-language
studies from Chinese scholars such as Ji Guoxing,31 and Australia-based expatriate, You
Ji.32 However, the growlh of Chinese sea power and evolution of Chinese maritime
strategy have played an increasingly promineot role in western debates on East Asian
security," particularly since the Taiwan Strait missile criaea of 1995-1996. These
missile crises in some ways symbolized China's arrival as a

non~status

quo strategic

player with extensive maritime ambitious in East Asia, and palpably increased the
potential for major power conflict As part of a rapidly expanding research focus upon
China's military strategy and armed forces (the People's Liberation Anny - PLA), in
general, the snbject of China as a maritime (and naval) power continues to grow in
importance. For example, an American think tank, the CNA Corporation (formerly the
Ceoter for Naval Aoalyses), now run, annual conferences on the PLA Navy (pLAN).34

31 Ji Guoxing, "Missions and Contributions of the PLA Navy in the Post-Cold War and the EEZ Era," in
Choon Kun Lee. cd., The Muldle Power Navies: Roles and Missions in the Post-Cold War and the EEZ
Era, The Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy, Seoul, 1999; and li Guoxing, Asian Pacific SLOe

Security: The China Factor, Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Centre Working Paper No. 10, RAN Sea
Power Centre, RAAF Fallbahn, Canberra, April 2002.
32 Yon Ii, "A Blue Water Navy: Does It Matter?" in David S.G. Goodman and Gerald Segal, eds., China
Rising; Nationalism and Interdependence, Routledge, London. 1997; You Ji. ''The Chinese Navy and
Nationallnterest," in Jack McCaffrie and A1an Hinge, eds., Sea Power in the New Century: Maritime
Operations in Asia-Pacific beyond 2000, Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force
Academy, Canberra, 1998; and You Ji, The Armed Forces of China, AIlen and Unwin, St Leonards,
NSW, 1999, Cb. 6.
33 See, for example, John Downing, '''Maritime Ambition: China's Naval Modernisation," Jane's Navy
International, Vol. 103, No. 4, April 1998; Ebsan Abrari, "China's Naval Forces Look to Extend Their
Blue-water Reach," Jane's Intelligence Review, VoL 10, No. 4, April 1998; David W. Glazier,
''Breaching the Great Wall," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March 2000; Peter Jensen, ''Chinese Sea
Power and American Strategy," Strategic Review, Val. XXVIII, No. 3, Summer 2000; Bemard D. Cole,
"China's Maritime Strategy," in Susan M. Puska, ed., People's Liberation Anny after Next, Strategic
Studies IDstitute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, August 2000; Bemard D. Cole, 'The
OrganiWion of the People's Liberation Army Navy (pLAN)," paper prepared for the CAPS-RAND
Conference on the PIA. Warren:ton, VA, 4-6 August 2000 (permission to cite received): Andrew R.
Wilson, ''Chinese Seapower in the Twenty-first Century: Aspirations and Limitations," in Geoffrey Till,
ed., Seapower at the MUlennium, Sutton Publishing, Phoenix Mill. Gloucestershire, 2001; and Bruce
Elleman, "China's New 'Imperial' Navy," Naval War College Review, Vol. LV, No. 3, Summer 2002.
See also the following articles originally delivered. at a conference on Taiwan's maritime strategy and
security and published in Taiwan Defense Affairs, VoL 2, No. 2, Winter 2001/02: Te-Men Chen,
"Assessment of the PLA Navy Modernization Based upon Its Development of Naval Strategy"; Sam
Batentan and Chris Rabman, "The Rise of the PLAN and the Implications for East Asian Security"; and
BemardD. Co1e, "The Modernizing People's Liberation Army-Navy and Taiwan's Security."
34 See Micbael McDevitt, ''The PLA Navy: Past, Present, and Future Prospects," report of the Conference
on the PLA Navy, Washington, D.e., 6-7 April 2000, The CNA Corporation, Alexandria, VA, May 2000;
Kenneth W. Allen, "PLA Navy Building at the Start ofa New Century," report of the Second Conference
on the PLA Navy, Alexandria, VA, 28-29 June 2001, The CNA ColJlOration, Alexandria, V A, July 2001;
and Bemard D. Cole "'Active Offshore Defense' and China's Navy." paper prepared for the Second
Center for Naval Analyses Conference on the PLA Navy, Alexandria, V A, 28-29 June 2001 (permission
to cite received).
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The current salience of the subject has also spurred several historical studies of Chioese
seapower,3S and studies on China's maritime territorial claims. 36

The most significant recent work is Beroard Cole's book, The Great Wall at
Sea. 37 Cole argues that China is not developiog an ocean-goiog navy and that its naval

programme is only aimed at "ensuring coastal defense and the soccess of discrete, welldefined campaigns to enforce sovereiguty claims." That argument is qualified, however,
by the assertioo that "even a regionally capable PLAN would have to be iocluded io
caleolation of global strategic forces, given East Asia's size, population, and economic
importance.,,38

The Contribution olthe Research

This dissertation addresses several ioterrelated questions. Firstly, the research provides
anempirical evaluation of China's maritime power. In many ways it updates A1exaoder
Hu."g's 1994 dissertation, although that work focused on the implications of Chinese
maritime modernization for China's national security, rather than on the wider

international strategic consequences aod implications. The current research suggests
that, despite the rapid growth in China's maritime interests, its sea dependence reroains

relatively low.
Secondly, to what extent is maritime power becoming a leading iostrnment of
Chioese grand strategy? Whereas Bernard Cole concludes that Beijiog "apparently does
not believe current maritime concerns are serious enough to change China's historic
dependence 00 continental power" or to build a navy able to dominate the region,39 this
study makes a different argument based on an assessment of China's foreigu policy
objectives aod grand strategy. Whilst Chioa remains primarily a continental power, its
regiooal goals and ambitions and economic interests have increasingly drawn it to the
See, for example, Levathes, When China Ruled the Seas; Deng, China '$ Maritime Activities and
Socioeconomic Development, c.2100 B.C.-1900 A.D.; Deng, Maritime Sector, Institutions, and Sea Puwer
t(.Premodern China; and Wright. The Chinese Steam Navy, 1862-1945.
The most extensive combined study of the Paracel, Spratlyand Senkaku island disputes is Greg Austin,
China '9 Ocean Frontier; International Law, Military Force and National Development, AlIen and
Unwin, SI Leonards, NSW, 1998.
37 Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea; China's Navy Enters the Twenty-first Century, Naval Institute
Press, Annapolis, MD, 2001. Two other books have been published on Chinese naval/maritime power in
recent tinies, but could not be obtained in time for inclusion in this dissertation: Srikanth Kondapalli's
China's Naval Power (Knowledge World, New Delhi, 2001); and Thomas M. Kane's Chinese Grand
Strategy and Maritime Power (Frank Cass, London, 2002). On the Kondapalli book., see Bruce
EUeman's review essay, ''China's New 'Imperial' Navy," esp. pp. 147-150; and on Kane's book, see Eric
A. McVadon's bookreviewin U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March 2003, pp. 115-116.
38 Cole. The Great Wall at Sea. pp. 187-189.
35
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sea. The geopolitical focus of China's regional ambitions has become fixed primarily,
albeit not exclusively, on its maritime periphery, where the two territories (or areas)
most coveted by Beijing are located: Taiwan and the South China Sea.
The dissertation argnes that one of China's long-term policy goals is to become
the leading state atop the hierarchy of powers in Asia. Because East Asia is a maritime
region, China must develop maritime power and a maritime strategy to achieve those
regional ambitions. This thesis contends, therefore, that Beijing is developing maritime
power and a maritime strategy as part of its grand strategy to win regional primacy, but
in the manner of a traditional continental (rather than maritime) power. In that respect,
Cole's conclusions may be sonnd (in that China is not yet developing a blue water
navy), but not necessarily for the right reasons. As a continental power, China is not
obliged to follow a similar path of maritime strategic development to traditional sea
powers such as Japan or the United States: to be a major force in East Asia China does
not need a world class navy with global reach. Rather, China needs only sufficient
maritime capabilities to be able to deter or prevent the leading maritime powers from
interfering with its regional interests and objectives.
A third question assessed by the research involves the reactions of regional

states to China's maritime expansion. In particular, how are those states countering
China and what are the implications for regional security? The dissertation also
addresses the following subsidiary questions: what is the role of Taiwan in China's
regional strategy? What is the role of the South China Sea in China's strategy? What
strategies has China pursued to ''recover'' those territories? Are the strategies being
followed by China consistent with its policy goal (as argued in the dissertation) of
regional primacy? These questions are posed within the context of the debates on a
rising China, the extent to which China poses a threat to international security, and

whether China has hegemonic intentions. Those issues are investigated under the
gniding assumption of neoclassical realist theory:40 that states seek to enhance their
external influence to the extent that they are able, dependent upon their relative material
power capabilties. It is argned that China, as the region's rising major power, is
attempting to expand its regional influence at the expense of Japan, the United States
and India.

p. 189.
See Gideon Rose, ''Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," World Politics, Vol. 51, No.
1, October 1998.

39 Ibid.,
40
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In fact, context is the guiding principle of the dissertation, and it is intended that

its main contn'bution to the literature will be to place China's maritime and naval
developments within a broader geopolitical and geostrategic context: that is, to pose the
central question, what does the rise of China as a regional maritime power actually

mean fur international security'lln this regard, it is argued throughout the dissertation
that China's maritime expansion increasingly sets the agenda for international security
in East Asia, and that its implications are less than benigu: new tensions and a high level

of strategic competition. Even so, China's path to maritime power and expansion is
fraught with obstacles and is not foreordained to be ultimately successful.

Method and Sources
The research project is primarily an empirical study of a leading contemporary strategic

issue, guided by aspects of theory. It is not intended to be a work of Sinology. Rather,
the project falls into the field of strategic studies: the study of the use or threat of force
in international politics." The study also follows the tradition of Anglo-American
geopolitical theory.42 Geopolitics, as stated by Saul Cohen, is ''the relation of
international political power to the geographical setting.'''' It is particularly importsnt to
be able to understand the effects of continental China's maritime expansion within a
theoretical context which delineates the key geopolitical interests of continental, as
opposed to maritime, powers." In East Asia, China's maritime amhitions inherently
challenge the security of the leading maritime powers and the lesser archipelsgic states.
The dissertation uses five types of sources: official policy documents and
ststements (from China and elsewhere), Chinese secondary source material in
translation,4S non-Chinese secondary sources, news reports and interviews with
aeademics, officials and other analysts in the field. Chinese docwnentation includes
41 See, for example, Richard K. Betts, "Should Strategic Studies Survive?" World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1,
October 1991; Lawrence F~ ''International Security: Changing Targets," Foreign Policy, No. 110,
Spring 1998; Colin S. Gray, Strategic Studies: A Critical Assessment, Greenwood Press, Westport, cr,
1982; Colin S. Gray, MOlkrn Strategy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999; and Gray, Valains,
V/CIims and Sheriffs.
42 On geopolitical theory see, for example, Colin S. Gray and Geoffrey stoan, eds., Geopolitics,
Geography and Strategy, Frank Cas~ Londoo, 1999; Mackubin Thomas Qweo', "In DefeJlse of Classical
GeopoU*s," Naval War College Review, VoL Ll1, No. 4, Autumn 1999; and Colin S. Gray, '"The
Cootinued Primacy of Geography," Orbl>, Vol 40, No. 2, Spring 1996.
43 Saul B. Cohen, Geography and Politics in a World Divided, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, New
York, 1973, p. 29.
44 For discussion of the continental power-maritime power dichotomy, see Colin S. Gray, "Seapower and
l.8ndpower," in Co1in S. Gray and Roger W. Barnett, od•. , Seopower and Strategy, Naval Institute Press,
Annapoli., MD, 1989.
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defence and marine policy white papers, maritime laws, and fue statements and
published interviews of CWoese officials. A caveat must be placed over all Chioese
sources. Alfuough contemporary China is not a closed society in the manner of the old
Soviet Union, information is never1heless strictly controlled, particnlarly when it comes
to military matters. It is likely iliat most available published material has been
intentionally released, and may serve propaganda or deception purposes. And, despite
fue large amount of secondary source material now available on fue PLA, fuere is a real
sense iliat our understanding of China's armed forces and strategic thinking remains
bofu limited and contested.46 Mnreover, some CWoese writings on military subjects,
especially those concerning modern military technologies, often are highly derivative of
Westero writings, at times even blatant copies.47
Anofuer caveat mnst be registered over some Western, especially American
secondary sources. The number of analyses on Chioese military affairs is growing
rapidly. However, a good deal of fuose analyses represent fue research output of
academics and experts working for, or thinks tanks contracted by, fue U.S. government

and its agencies.48 In some cases, leading experts work directly for government agencies
and are in a positiou to influence government policy. For exarople, fue work of Michsel

Pillsbury (who works in fue Office of Net Assessments in fue Office offue Secretary of
Defense and advises Defense Secretary Rumsfeld on China)," and Mark Stokes (a
serving officer in fue U.S. Air Force who leads PLA research at the Pentagon),'o is
clearly evident in the Department of Defense's latest report to Congress on Chinese
military power." As leading Sinoiogist, D.vid Sharobaugh, argues, a1fuough fuose

.u Only translated and English~language sources are used
46 See, for example, lames C. Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang, eds" Seeking Truth.from Facts: A
Retrospective on Chinese Military Studies in the Post-Mao Era, CF-I6O-CAPP. RAND, Santa Monica,
CA, 2001.
47 See, for example, James Mulvenon, ''The PLA and Information Warfare:' in lames C. Mulvenon and
Richard H. Yang, ed8., The People's Liberation Anny in the Information Age, CF-145-CAPP/AF, RAND,
SantaMonica, CA, 1999, pp. 181-182.
4B The U.8. Department of Defense is both a producer of, and client for, such works. A particularly
prolific producer of work on the PLA is the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, whilst
the RAND Corpomtion is a leading think tank which produces a great deal of research on the PLA,
mostly for the U.S. Air Force.
49 Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment, NDU Press. Washington. D.e.,
2000.
so Mark Stokes, China 'a Strategic Modernization: /mplicationafor the United States. Strategic Studies
institute, U.S. Anny War College, Carlisle, PA, September 1999.
SI (U.s.) Department of Defense, "Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of
China," Report to Congress P ....uant to the FY2000 National Def..,. Authorization Act, July 2002.
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researchers often produce excellent contributions to the field, the research agendas of
such analysts ''inevitably ... are somewhat influenced by the needs of their sponsors.'''2
Whilst it is important to acknowledge Shambaugh's point, such contributions
remain valuable as long as long as they are not considered in isolation from other work

within the field. Furthermore, there is a flip side to this point. The work of some
academic Sinologists can be somewhat Sino-centric and unsympathetic to the interests
or perspectives of other states, or to regional dynamics, and too often is not grounded in
an understanding of strategy. It is important, therefore, for any geopolitical analysis to
take as holistic an approach as is reasonahly possible.
Interviews were undertsken during fieldtrips to Northeast Asia in July-August
2000, and Singapore and Malaysia in November 1998. In China, interviewees included
academics specializing in maritime security, China and the law of the ses, the South
China Sea; and a serving mid-ranking (Commander) PLA Navy officer. Other meetings
involved senior members of the China Institute for Marine Affairs (CIMA), State
Oceanic Administration; and members of the Division of South aod Southesst Asia
Studies at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), a

researeh centre which provides intelligence analysis for government officials and
agencies, and which has been described as ''the msin intelligence research organisation

in China."S3
In South Korea, meetings were held with maritime security and China specialists
from the Ministry of Foreigu Affairs and Trade's Institute of Foreigu Affairs and
National Security, the Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy and the Korea Institute for
Defease Analyses. In Japao, meetings were held at the National Institute for Defense
Studies (part of the Japan Defease Agency), and with several retired Japan Maritime
Self Defeose Force (JMSDF) admirals working in the maritime security/maritime
strategy area, including meetings at the Mitsubishi Research Institute aod the Oka2aki
Institute, a lesding Japanese think tauk. In Taiwao, interviews were conducted with
academics and researchers from the Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies,
Chinese Cultural University, National Chengchi University, Acadernia Sinica aod the
Republic of China Air Force Academy. In Singapore regional security experts from the
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at Naoyang Techoological University, and the
52 David shambaugh, "PLA Studies Today: A Maturing Field," in Mulvenon and Yang, eds., The
Poop/e's Liberation Army in the ltiformation Age, p. 11.
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Institute of Southeast Asian Studies were ioterviewed. And, io Malaysia, regional and
maritime security experts were ioterviewed, including at the Maritime Institute of
Malaysia. In addition to the ioterviews camed out during fieldtrips, a number of other
discussions have been held with relevant officials, academics and naval officers at a

range of conferences and meetings.
As a general rule, the ioterviews served a useful auxiliary function, providing
some iosights but for the most part supporting the broader research: none of the maio
argmnents made io the thesis are dependent on views attribotable solely to ioterviews

and private conversations.
Chapter Structure
The next chapter sets the broader context for the dissertation: the rise of Chioa io the
international system. The chapter assesses the rise of Chioa in the theoretical terms of
the realist tradition. In particular, it nses the neoclassical realist theory of foreign policy
to frame Chios's strategic behaviour. The component parts of the analysis involve
general assessments of Chioa's material power capabilities, including raw resources,
economic strength and military power and technology; and domestic factors that affect
the translation of material power into external behaviour, including leadership
perceptions, state effectiveness and strategic culture.
Chapter 3 estsblishes the political framework for the research, identifying
Chios's foreign and security policies, grand strategy and military strategy, and their

relation to maritime factors. It argues, firstly, that China's three main foreign policy
objectives of "restoring" territorial integrity and sovereign rights, economic
development and regional primacy require the development of a strong maritime power
component to Chinese grand strategy. Secondly, the maritime foens of China's exteroal
policies and interests is destabilizing the extant regional security order.
Chapter 4 evaluates the non-military dimensions of Chioa's maritime power
nsing a neo-Mahaniao analysis, and begins with a discussion of the concept of maritime
power itself. It explores geographical, economic and political factors to demonstrate that
Chios has already become a significant maritime power, but one which remaios
continentalist in nature, with only a marginal level of sea dependence. The fifth chapter
completes the assessment of China's maritime power with a detailed analysis of its
S3

Rex Li, "Partners or Rivals? Chinese Perceptions of Japan's Security Strategy in the Asia-Pacific
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military components. Those components ioclude not only the PLA Navy, but also other
PLA capabilities that may contribute to China's overall matitime-strategic power.
Chapter 6 charts the development of Chios's matitime strategy, iocludiog the important
iofluence of Liu Huaqiog, and the roles played, firstly, by the South China Sea and,
secondly, by Taiwan, io the evolution of the strategy.
Chapter 7 examines the application of Chioese matitime power and strategy io
Southeast Asia, inclodiog Chios's expansion into the South Chioa Sea over the past 30
year.. The chapter also analyses Chios's ioterests and strategies io the Indian Ocean
and, as part of Beijiog's quest for regional primacy, Chios's strategic engagement with
Southeast Asia. Chapter 8 follows a similar model for matitime Northeast Asia,
focusing on the importance of Taiwan for Chioese strategy and the clash of ioterests
with Japan io the East Chios Sea. And, Chapter 9 demonstrates how Chios's matitime
expansion has led to (largely uncoordinated) attempts by regiooal states (and external
actors such as the Utrited States) to counter Chinese matitime ambitions.
The fina1 chapter concludes that the evidence to date supports the contention that
Chios is developiog comprehensive matitime power as an instrument to achieve its

externa1 policy goals and that the PLA's strategic development has become focused on
combatiog U.S. regiooal matitime domioance. The central importance of Taiwan is
stressed, both for China's strategic modernization and its looger term matitime strategy.
The conclusion outlioes the strategic implications both of Chios's matitime advance and
its consequences, arguiog that the Chioese challenge to the major maritime powers io
East Asia is resulting io heightened strategic competition and a potentially dangerous
loog-term genpolitical contest for regional primacy. FInally, it is argued that regional
order can ouly be assured by dedicated deterrence and defensive efforts by the United
States and its maritime coalition.

Region," The Journal a/Strategic Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4, December 1999, p. 3.
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2

China's Challenge to East Asian Security: Theory and
Context

The rise of China over the last quarter century provides the essential context for the
more specific analysis of China's maritime expansion. The challenge to international
security in East Asia posed by the growth of China's material power has become a
leading topic for strategic enquiry. For example, two China experts open a book on the
topic of a rising China thus: "For those with an interest in thinking strategically about
modem international affairs, there is no more important challenge than to understand
the nature and implications of a rising China.',l
The approach of this chapter is, firstly, to use realist theory to illustrate how and
why a rising state such as China can pose a challenge to the established regional (and
international) order, and why it is important to gain an understanding of such leading
actors in the international system in order to be able to understand the dynamics of the
system as a whole. The second section assesses China's national power capabilties,2
whilst the third section outlines the non-material factors which detennine how
effectively China's national power can be brought to bear upon the external
environment. Finally, the chapter concludes with an overall assessment of China as a
rising power,

I Gerald Segal and David S.G. Goodman, "Introduction: Thinking Strategically about China," in David
S.G. Goodman and Gerald Segal, eds., China Rising: Nationalism and Interdependence, Routledge,
London, 1997, p. 1.
2 An evaluation of the specifically maritime aspects of China's national power, both military and nonmilitary, is the focus of subsequent chapters of the dissertation.
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REALIST THEORY AND THE RISE OF CHINA

The Realist Tradition in International Political Theory
Theory plays an important role as a contextual guide to both the analysis and
understanding of international politics, as long as it is treated pragmatically and remains
relevant to the practice of statecraft and strategy in the "real" world. 3 Stephen WaIt
argues, convincingly, that theory is not a matter solely for scholarly debate within the
ivory towers of the academy, because policymakers and other non-academics are
influenced by theories of international relations, even if they do not always consciously
recognize the fact. 4 In other words, everyone has a belief system about international
politics which is influenced by the assumptions of one theory or another. However,
amongst those many theories, one tradition, realism,S has long dominated the discipline
and, despite the efforts of its many detractors and opponents, continues to do SO. 6
Whilst contemporary university instruction in international relations may
mistakenly create the impression that all theories are of similar value~ quite clearly that
is not the case. 7 For realist and non-realist theorizers alike, realism, as the dominant
tradition, remains the central point of reference for theoretical debate on international
politics; alternative theories do not simply "coexist" with a broad equivalency to
realism, but rather must be posited with reference to, and as alternatives specifically to,
3 Colin S. Gray aptly reminds us that strategy (including strategic theory) is a "practical subject" which
must deal with real world political events and problems, in Strategic Studies: A Critical Assessment,
Greenwood Press, Westport, eT, 1982, pp. 7-8.
4 Stephen M. Walt, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories," Foreign Policy, No. 110,
Spring 1998, p. 29. Note, however, Paul Dibb's observation that, in his experience (as a defence
''practitioner''), the concept of the "balance of power" is more widely accepted amongst the foreign and
defence policymaking elite than within the academic community. Dibb, Towards a New Balance of
Power in Asia, Adelpbi Paper 295, Oxford University Press for the IISS, London, May 1995, p. 75, Ch. 1,

n.1.
5 A good sampling of contemporary realist thinking can be found in Benjamin Frankel, ed., Roots of
Realism, Frank Cass, London, 1996; Benjamin Frankel, ed., Realism: Restatements and Renewal, Frank:
Cass, London, 1996; and Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, 008., The Perils
of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security, MIT Press, Cambridge. MA, 1995. (The
first two volumes originally were published as special issues of the journal Security Studies, whilst the
third is a collection from International Security: these two joumals are leading outlets for current debates
on realism.) Also useful, from the perspective of the foreign policies of individual states, is Etha.ll. B.
Kapstein and Michae1 Mastanduno, eds., Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold
War, Col~ia University Press, New York, 1999.
6 The liberal tradition (with its institutionalist, democratic peace and economic interdependence strains)
remains the main rival to the realist tradition. See Walt, "International Relations"; and Timothy Dunne,
"Liberalism," in John Baylis and Steve Smith, eds., The Globalization of World Politics: An Introductl"on
to International Relations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997.
7 On this point, see Colin S. Gray, "Clausewitz Rules, OK? The Future Is the Past - with GPS," Review of
International Studies. Vol. 25, Special Issue, December 1999, p. 165.
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the dominant tradition. Benj amin Frankel thus explains why realism retains its position
of theoretical primacy: "Realism has consistently provided the most reliable guidance
for statecraft, and it has consistently offered the most compelling explanations of state
behaviour.,,8 Perhaps most importantly for this dissertation~ strategic studies - the study

of the use or threat of force - explicitly falls within the realist tradition.9 Moreover,
China's dominant Weltanschauung is indisputably a realist one. 10

The Western tradition of realist thinking on international politics can be traced
back 2,500 years to Thucydides' contemporary history of the Peloponnesian War, 11
whilst Sun Tzu~s Art of War represents a similarly ancient Eastern tradition of realist
statecraft and strategy.12 Realism in the Westem tradition paints a sombre picture of
international political life, in which the international system is anarchical, with no
supranational source of authority; where polities constantly compete one against another
(or in coalitions) to further the ''national interest" as far as the prudential limitations of
their respective national power capabilties allow; 13 and where conflict and war are
natural rather than abnormal events, consequences of the inevitable clashes of those
national interests which are inherent in an ungoverned, anarchical system.
A central concern of realism has been the distribution of power within the

international system and, in particular, the geopolitical and strategic effects of changes
in that distribution of power over time. Such periods of redistribution of relative
material power within the international political system can alter the hierarchy of states,
often leading to conflict between ascending and declining great powers as each
competes for maximum control oyer the international system. 14 Such great power
competitions thus can be characterized as efforts to either alter or sustain the
geopolitical status quo. 15

"Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction," in Frankel, ed., Realism, p. ix.
for example, Gray, "Clausewitz Rules, OK?"
10 Discussed in a later section, below.
JI Robert B. Strassler, ed., The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian
War, rev. ed. of the Richard Crawley trans., The Free Press, New York, 1996.
12 Sun Tzu, The Art o/War, trans. and intro. byRalphD. Sawyer, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1994.
13 On the contested nature of the concept of the "national interest," see Arnold Wolfers, "National
Security as an Ambiguous Symbol," in Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on
International Politics, The Jobns Hapkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 1962.
14 Two leading studies in this vein, from an historian's and a political scientist's perspective, respectively,
are Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall o/the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict/rom
1500 to 2000, Random House, New York, 1987; and Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981.
15 See, far example, Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace,
brief ed. (of 6th 00.), rev. by Kenneth W. Thompson, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1993, Part 2; and also
8 Benjamin Frankel,

9 See,
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One of the consequences of the end of the Cold War has been the refocusing of
major power competition from global to regional priorities. 16 At the global level, the
United States is now the sole player, but strategic relations at the regional level are
increasingly multipolar. 17 However, a cautionary note should be registered when
employing the tenninology of polarity. Randall Schweller argues that the classification
both of systems, in terms of polarity, and of states, in tenns of whether or not they
constitute "poles" in the system, is overly simplistic and unrepresentative of reality.
Rather, the international system is better viewed as one of "diverse stratification in
terms of the types of prestige and status, over which the great powers compete and
define their identities.,,18 Although pitched at the global level, such a conceptualization
also is valid at the regional level of analysis (one might also add power to prestige and
status for a more complete concept). In Asia today, that hierarchy of power, prestige and
status is being actively challenged by an ascending China. 19
The tradition of realism does not represent a single theory, however, although
realist theories do share "a common cen.ter of philosophical gravity: they are all
grounded in an understanding of international politics ... as a constant struggle for, and
conflict over, power and security.,,20 Even the great tradition of "classical" realism
involves variations of emphasis and often divergent policy recommendations for great

Randall L. Schweller, ''Neorealism's Status-quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" in Frankel, ed., Realism,
fp· 98- 10 1.
Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International
Security, Vol. 18, No. 3, Winter 1993/94, p. 5.
17 Richard K. Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War."
International Security, Vol. 18. No. 3, Winter 1993/94, p. 41; and Friedberg, «Ripe for Rivalry."
18 Randall L. Schweller, "Realism and the Present Great Power System: Growth and Positional Conflict
over Scarce Resources," in Kapstein and Mastanduno, eds., Unipolar Politics, pp. 4142. Schweller errs,
however, by suggesting that great power competition now takes place primarily in the economic, rather
than political and strategic realm (p. 47). That argument is similar to Edward Luttwak's contention that
the competitive practice of geopolitics has been replaced by great power competition of the "geoeconomic" kind. See Edward N. Luttwak, "From Geopolitics to Geo-economics: Logic of Conflict,
Grammar of Commerce," The National Interest, No. 20, Summer 1990. Rather, the pursuit of national
economic interests represents just one dimension of competitive state behaviour. Moreover, a certain level
of economic power generally is a necessary precursor to the development of a great power quality of
military strength. Rapid economic growth and technological development by one major power relative to
others thus can create military advantages both in peacetime and in war; over time, favourable relative
growth rates tend to facilitate favourable advantages in the strategic realm, thereby accounting for
changes in the hierarchy of great powers. That is the theme ofKennedy. The Rise and Fall of the Great
Powers.

See. for example, Rajan Menon and S. Enders Wimbush, "Asia in the 21 st Century: Power Politics
Alive and Well," The National Interest, No. 59, Spring 2000.
20 Benjamin Frankel, "Introduction." in Benjamin Frankel, 00., Roots of Realism, p. ix. Robert Gilp-in has
also described realism as being a "philosophical tradition" rather than a "scientific theory." Robert G.
Gilpin, ''No One Loves a Political Realist," in Frankel, ed., Realism, p. 6.
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power action (at least for specific powers in particular times/situations).21 However, it
should be noted that the realist tradition has been diverted down the blind alley of
structural realism (or neorealism),22 which has dominated the academic world of
international relations theory for much of the past 20 years. Rather than a concentration
upon the traditional realist preoccupation with power,23 the neorealist theory of Kenneth
Waltz and his followers instead has created a highly abstract world in which states seek
to maximize not power, but "security,,,24 where the number of poles (great powers)
detennines the "stability" of the system, where power tends to be balanced almost
mechanistically within the system, and which does not discriminate between revisionist
and status quo states. 25
Without providing an exhaustive list, subsequent to Thucydides, the classical realist tradition includes
such disparate theorists as: Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. and intro. by George Bull, Penguin,
London, 1961; Cad von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Pacet,
Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1976; RH. Care, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939, intro.
by Michael Cox, Palgrave, Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, 2001 (text a reissue of 1981 ed.);
Morgenthau, Politics among Nations; Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration; Raymond Aron, Peace and
War: A Theory 0/International Relations, trans. by Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox, Weidenfeld
and Nicolson, London, 1966; Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study o/Order in World PolitiCS,
Macmillan, London, 1977; and Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics.
22 The seminal neorealist work is Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Addison-Wesley,
Reading, MA, 1979.
23 See, for example, Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, esp. Parts 2-3.
24 There are two broad strands of neorealist thought: offensive (or aggressive) realism; and defensive
realism. Offensive realism argues that stability during the Cold War depended upon a bipolar distribution
of military power and the possession by each pole of large quantities of nuclear weapons. Under
supposedly less stable systemic conditions (i.e., multipolarity). however, states are forced to aggressively
maximize their own relative power, thus intensifying security competition and, consequently, the
likelihood of conflict. See, for example, John J. Mearsheimer, ''Back to the Future: Instability in Europe
after the Cold War," in Brown et al., ed8., The Perils of Anarchy; JoOO J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of
Great Power Politics, W.W. Norton, New York, 2001; and John J. Mearsheimer, ''The Future of the
American Pacifier," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 5, September/October 2001. Defensive realists, on the
other hand, argue that security in the international system is plentiful rather than scarce and that, because
states seek security rather than power, they need only to ''balance'' against the threat posed by the
occasional malign actor when such threats occur. The outbreak of war is usually blamed either on states
misperceiving the relatively benign nature of their external environment, or due to situations when a
supposed balance of military technology is believed to favour offensive military strategies over defensive
ones, thus making conquest easier (referred to as offence-defence theory or security dilemma theory).
See, for example, Stephen M. Walt, The Origins ofAlliances, Comell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1987;
Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self.help," in Brown et al., eds., The Perils of
Anarchy; and Stephen Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," International Security,
Vol. 22, No. 4, Spring 1998.
25 See Waltz, Theory of International Politics; and Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold
War," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1, Summer 2000. For a general critique ofWaltzian neorealism
see, for example, Schweller, "Neorealism's Statusequo Bias"; Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for
Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," in Brown et al., eds., The Perils of Anarchy; and Paul
Schroeder, "Historioal Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory," in ibid. For a critique of Waltz's contention that
bipolarity is inherently more stable than multipolarity, see Dale C. Copeland, "Neorealism and the Myth
of Bipolar Stability: Toward a New Dynamic Realist Theory of Major War," in Frankel, ed., Realism.
More convincing treatments of the concept of the balance of power include Amold Wolfers, ''The
Balance of Power in Theory and Practice,·' in Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration; Morgenthau; Politics
among Nations, Part 4; and Bull, The Anarchical SOciety, pp. 101-126.
21
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Moreover, because Waltz's neorealism reveres parsimony in theory building at
all costs, he reduces his theory to a singular focus on structural, or systemic, factors, so
to generalize about the interactions of major powers, whose identities, political nature
(i.e., regime character) and attitude toward the geopolitical status quo largely become
irrelevant. Unfortunately for neorealism, the real world is complex rather than abstractly
simple, and is made up of real states, with real and varied foreign policies and security
strategies, the interaction of which are of intrinsic importance to the character of the
international political system at any given time or place. Because politics at the
international level is "done" by states (i.e., at the unit level), in order to understand the
specific dynamics of any given system, we must, therefore, also understand the foreign
policies of, at least, the most important states (great powers) within the system. In other
words, explaining and predicting the actions of the leading states through theories of
foreign policy is vital for explaining and predicting the dynamics of the system as a
whole. 26

The Rise of China
The most enduring and strategically troublesome feature of the current Asian
geopolitical environment is the rapid development of the material power capabilities of
the region's largest state: China. Even at the nadir of its international fortunes, China

has always possessed the power potential, in terms of natural assets and resources, to reestablish hegemony over East Asia. That potential, and its international implications,
was recognized over a century ago by the great American theorist of sea power~ Alfred
Thayer Mahan:

Far as the result lies beyond our present horizon, it is difficult to contemplate with

equanimity such a vast mass as the four hundred millions of China concentrated into
one effective political organization, equipped with modem appliances, and cooped
within a territory already narrow for it. 27

26 On theories of foreign policy, see Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign
Policy," World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1, October 1998, p. 145. For the debate over whether neorealist
theory can also be used as a theory of foreign policy, see the following article and arguments in Security
Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, Autumn 1996: Colin Elman, ''Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of
Foreign Policy?"; Kenneth N. Wrutz, "International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy"; and Colin Elman,
"Cause, Effect, and Consistency: A Response to Kenneth Waltz."
27 AT. Malum, "The Problem of Asia," in AT. Mahan, The Problem of Asia and Its Effect upon
International Policies, Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, 1900, p. 88.
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As we now know, for the first half of the ensuing century the Chinese people were
unable to effect a united and effective polity and, until the economic reforms of Deng
Xiaoping began to bear fruit, China also lacked for "modem appliances," both civilian
and military. The rapid growth path established as a result ofDeng's reforms, combined
with China's consequent strategic modernization, has altered the regional geopolitical
equation in ways that are all too predictable; creating an expansionist urge which
inevitably challenges the regional political status quo and arouses fear and insecurity
throughout much of China's international neighbourhood. 28

Neoclassical Realism, and Foreign Policy and Strategic Behaviour
Neoclassical Realism

Theory is required to take into account the actions of real states, each with its own
unique set of circumstances and idiosyncrasies, in order to make useful judgements and
predictions of international political dynamics; the standard structural explanation of
international politics simply is inadequate. Instead, theory must be able to explain "what
[particular] states try to achieve in the external realm and when they try to achieve it."
To accomplish this theoretical objective Gideon Rose has drawn upon the traditions of
classical realism to develop what he has coined a "neoclassical realist" theory of foreign
policy.29 By taking as its independent variable the relative material power capabilities of
states within the hierarchical international system, Rose's neoclassical realism retains
the key tenet of the classical realism in which his theory is rooted,30 explicitly noting
Thucydides' pessimistic observation,on the (very human) nature of international politics
that ''the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. ,,31
The underphming assumption of neoclassical realism is that "states respond to
the uncertainties of international anarchy by seeking to control and shape their external
environment ... and pursue such influence to the extent that they are able to do so."
Therefore, as states grow more powerful their international ambitions and attempts to

For a different view arguing that China is not expansionist, see, for example, Avery Goldstein, "The
Diplomatic Face of China's Grand Strategy: A Rising Power's Emerging Choice." The China Quarterly,
No. 168, December 2001, pp. 862-863; David Shambaugb. "Chinese Hegemony over East Asia by
20157" The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. IX, No. 1, Summer 1997; and Nicholas Berry,
"China Is Not an Imperialist Power," Strategic Review. Vol. XXIX, No. 1, Winter 200l.
29 Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," p. 145. Rose has coined the new term.
because there exists "no simple. straightforward classical realism" (p. 153) - as opposed to the expansive
range of highly diverse literature and thinking within the tradition,
30 Ibid, , p. 146,
31 Strassler, ed" The Landmark Thucydides. 5.89, p. 352,
28
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influence the outside world will expand, whilst those ambitions and actions ought
(eventually) to shrink as their relative power declines.

32

In turn, by successfully

expanding their influence and control over the external environment, rising states may

further increase their national power as new resources are brought under their
domination. 33 The process of influence maximization is neither mechanistic nor
necessarily obvious (in the short tenn) or gradual) however.

34

Accordingly, neoclassical

realism does not draw a direct causal linkage between the distribution of power within
the international system and the foreign policy of individual polities. Rather, those
Hsystemic incentives" must pass through a set of intervening, unit-level variables before

emerging as policies and strategies of particular states. 3S Rose identifies two such
intervening variables: the perceptions of national decision-makers and the strength and
effectiveness of state power.

The first variable points out that a state's foreign policy behaviour depends upon
the perception of its relative power in the international system by its policymaking elite.
Because national power cannot be measured in a mathematically accurate way, it is
often not possible to know with any precision, save with the benefit of hindsight, the
relative power of a particular polity. In practice, therefore, according to Rose, "the
translation of capabilities into national behaviour is often rough and capricious over the
short and medium tenn. ,,36 The problem is not simply one of inadequacy on the part of
political leaders and state officials, however, but is due to the inherent difficulty of

gauging something (power) that is both relative, rather than absolute, in nature, and
subject to constant change. 37

Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," pp. 152 and 167. Not all major powers in
relative decline are prepared to relinquish their external control peacefully, however, potentially leading
to military action to forestall the progress of the rising competitor. See GiJpin, War and Change in World
Politics, Ch. 5.
33 Ibid., p. 106.
34 Rose, ''Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," p. 167.
35 Rose identifies Thucydides as the "neoclassical realist archetype": Thucydides thus explained how the
differential growth mtes of power between Athens and Sparta, favouring Athens, created alarm amongst
the Spartans, and how those "systemic incentives were translated through unit-level variables into the
forei~ policies of the various Greek city-states." Ibid., pp. 153-154. For the relevant passage in
Thucydides, see Strassler, ed., The Landmark Thucydides, 1.23, p. 16. Offensive realism. on the other
hand, directly links systemic factors to foreign policy behaviour, whilst defensive realism links either the
international system or (malevolent) domestic factors directly to external behaviour. See the discussion in
Rose, ''Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," pp. 149-154.
36lbid., p. 158.
37 On the inherently relative and dynamic nature of power, see Morgenthnu, Politics among Nations, pp.
170-174.
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Rose's second intervening variable identifies the importance of a strong and
effective state (Le., government) on external behaviour. To be effective in the external
realm, a government must first be able to effectively harness its own national power
resources and direct its people to the desired ends of policy: in other words, both state
power and national power matter. 38 A third influence upon external behaviour,
identified by Randall Schweller, is whether a state has revisionist or status quo foreign
policy objectives. 39 To risk stating the logically obvious, states with expansionist goals
tend to drive change in the international system and, in keeping with the basic
assumption of neoclassical realism, as the material power of dissatisfied states grows,
the more likely it is that their appetite for forcing revision in their own favour also will

grow. Such change may take the fonn of the physical acquisition of territory or
resources, or in terms of the reordering ofprestige,40 status and influence.
One further factor that may affect the way that unit-level influences translate
material power into foreign policy and strategic behaviour is political and strategic
culture. 41 Strategic culture has been defined as "a distinctive and lasting set of beliefs,
values and habits regarding the threat and use of force, which have their roots in such
fundamental influences as geopolitical setting, history and political culture. ,,42 Rather
than being thought of as a factor that can be isolated in order to explain some sort of
causal effect on a state's external behaviour,43 the role of culture is probably best
viewed as a somewhat all-encompassing and inescapable context for the study of the

foreign policy and strategic actions of a particular polity. 44

Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," pp. 161-162.
See Schweller, ''Neorealism's Status-quo Bias." Competition over the distribution of power in the
international system between the forces of the status quo and revisionism (termed "imperialism") is also
central to the theorizing of Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, Chs. 4~5.
40 Robert Gilpin states that "Prestige, rather than power, is the everyday currency of international
relations, much as authority is the central ordering feature of domestic society." Gilpin, War and Change
in World Politics, p. 31.
41 Rose, ''Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," pp. 168-169.
42 Alan Macmillan, Ken Booth and Russell Trood, "Strategic Culture," in Ken Booth and Russell Troad,
eds., Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region, Macmillan, London, 1999, p. 8 (emphasis removed).
43 The favoured methodological approach of Alastair lain Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture,"
International Security, Vo!. 19, No. 4, Spring 1995. Jobnston identifies three generations of strategic
cultural thinking, of which he is part of a third generation that views strategic culture as an identifiable
causal variable for explaining state behaviour. For similarly ''third generation" perspectives favouring the
role of culture, as well as other sociological and ideational influences in explaining the external behaviour
of states, see Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World
Politics, Columbia University Press, New York, 1996.
44 See Colin S. Gray's rebuttal of Johnston's third generation arguments, "Strategic Culture as Context:
The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back," Review of International Studies, Vol 25, No. 1, January
1999. But note also, Alastair lain Jolmston, "Strategic Cultures Revisited: Reply to Colin Gray," Review
ofInternational Studies, Vo!. 25, No, 3, July 1999.
38
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Neoclassical Realism and the Challenge of a Rising China

Applying neoclassical realist theory to the rise of China, therefore, the following section
evaluates the state of China's material power capabilities. Next, the analysis
demonstrates how China's leaders and policymaking elites perceive the relative power
of China and assesses how effectively the Chinese state can bring its national power to
bear on the external environment. The analysis then places China's growing material
power within a context of Chinese political and strategic culture. Finally, the chapter
will offer some conclusions on how the above factors combine to place China at the
centre of the international political dynamics of East Asia, and on how effective a great
power China is becoming.

CHINA'S NATIONAL POWER: AN ASSESSMENT

It has become widely accepted that the rise of China poses the most serious challenge (if

not always necessarily a threat) to the extant international system, and particularly to the
45
regional order in East Asia. But, to what extent should China be called a "great
pOWer'~?46 - itself a rather nebulous term. 47 Perhaps the most fitting way in which to
treat the concept of power is to view it in relational terms, in the ability of a state to
influence others and to withstand attempts at influence or coercion by others. Power, in
this manner, is a relative and contingent factor at play in the game of international
politics. Raymond ATon thus defines power

as the capacity of a political unit to impose its will upon other units. In short, political
power is not an absolute; it is a human relationship .... All international politics involves

a constant collision of wills, since it consists of relations among sovereign states which
claim to rule themselves independently. So long as these units are not subject to external
law or to an arbiter, they are, as such, rivals, for each is affected by the actions of the
See, for example, Gerald Segal, ''East Asia and the 'Constrainment' of China," International Security,
Vol. 20, No. 4, Spring 1996; Kim Tacho, "A Reality Check: The <Rise of China' and Its Military
Capability toward 2010," The Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol.
No. 2, SummertFall 1998; Taeho
Kim. "~e China Factor: The Underlying Driver in East Asia's Future Strategic Configuration," paper
prepared for the 29dL Sino-American Conference on U.S.-China Relations in the Year 2000, Taipei, 28-30
May 2000; and David Shambaugh, "Growing Strong: China's Challenge to Asian Security," Survival,
Vol. 36, No. 2, Summer 1994.
46 For just two examples of a burgeoning literature, see Samuel S. Kim, "China as a Great Power,"
Current History, September 1997; and Avery Goldstein, "Great Expectations: Interpreting China's
Arrival," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3, Winter 1997/98.
4$
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others and inevitably suspects their intentions. But these interacting wills do not
necessarily set up a potential or real military rivalry. Relations among political units are
not always bellicose, and peaceful relations are influenced, but not determined, by past
or future military accomplishments. 48

This description of a clash of wills seems to owe much to Clausewitz's definition of war
as "an act offorce to compel our enemy to do our Will.',49 However, in practice, the
relational view of power rarely offers predictive enlightenment about the outcome of

any particular struggle of wills or competition for influence between polities, except
with the benefit of hindsight. The material elements and instruments of power, on the
other hand, can be approximated to demonstrate, albeit roughly, how a polity is gaixring
or losing in both absolute and relative power resources and capabilities. Neoclassical
realism explicitly favours such a material definition of power over the relational one. 50

The Material Elements o/China's National Power
There exist numerous analyses of the various elements that comprise national power,
each with its own variations on the common theme. 51 It is not intended to provide an
exhaustive analysis of China's material power capabilities in this dissertation. Rather,
the following discussion serves as part of the theoretical scene setting for subsequent
chapters, which include a more comprehensive analysis of China's maritime power. The
great expanse of China's continental tenitory and huge population are a given, as
already indicated by Mahan over a century ago, and the following assessment of
China's material power will focus on three specific, albeit broad, elements: raw
resources; economic strength; and military power.

Raw Resources
China is, as one would expect for a large continental state, relatively well endowed in
tenns of natural resources. The potential value of China's terrestrial mineral resources
ranks it as having the world's third richest national store. However, due to its huge
For a discussion of the term "great power," see Bull, The Anarchical Society, pp. 200-205.
Aron, Peace and War, pp. 47-48.
49 Clausewitz, On War, 1:1, p. 75 (original emphasis).
47

48

Rose, ''Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," p. 151, esp. n. 15.
See, for example, Aron, Peace and War, pp. 52-57; Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, Ch. 9; and,
for a more recent attempt, Ashley J. Tel1is, Janice BialIy, Christopher Layne and Melissa McPherson,
Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age, MR-III0-A, RAND. Santa Monica, CA, 2000, esp.
Ch. 4.
50
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population, its per capita levels of territorial mineral resources, land area and fresh
water fall far below world averages. 52 Poor agricultural (and industrial) practices have
led to the degradation of the environment, including the loss of arable land and serious
water shortages in northern China. Basic land-based resource scarcities, including those
impacting directly upon food security, are prominent issues for Beijing. 53 One official
Chinese estimation in 1996 suggested that, due both to increasing demand and
depletion, supplies of almost half the different types of major mineral resources
produced in China would fail to meet expected demand in the early twenty-first
century. 54 China is thus increasingly looking to the sea with a view to boosting its
exploitation of both food and mineral resources,55 a point dealt with in some detail in
Chapter 4.
Energy resources are of particular concern to Beijing. China possesses
significant energy resources, including the world's third largest verified coal reserves. 56
However, in terms of proven oil and gas deposits China is relatively poor, with supply
unable to keep up with demand since 1993, when China became a net importer ofliquid
fuels. 57 Around 90 per cent of China's oil production occurs onshore, predominantly in
the mature oilfields of northeastern China. Beijing hopes that developments of new
fields in western China, especially in Xinjiang, will add significantly to the national
production of oil and natural gas. 58 However, the promising Tarim Basin in Xinjiang
has yet to deliver on its potential due to exploration and exploitation difficulties caused
by its extremely inhospitable terrain and climatic conditions, complex geological

52 A Chinese marine policy document quotes the following figures: China's per capita mineral resources
equate to less than half the world avemge; its land area per capita is roughly one·thirty-eighth of the
world average; and its per capita resource of fresh water is only one quarter the world average. See State
Oceanic Administration, China Ocean Agenda 21, China Ocean Press, Beijing, 1996, pp. 3-4.
S3 See, for example, Alan Dupont, The Environment and Security in Pacific Asia, Adelphi Paper 319,
Oxford University Press for the IISS, London, June 1998, pp. 44-46 and 64-65; Thomas F. Homer-Dixon,
"Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases," International Security, Vol. 19,
No, I, Summer 1994, pp. 36-39; John Orme, "The Utility afForce in a World of Scarcity," International
Security, Vol. 22. No. 3, Winter 1997/98, pp. 159-161; Thomas M. Kane and Lawrence W. Serewicz,
"China's Hunger: The Consequences of a Rising Demand for Food and Energy," Parameters, Vol. 31,
No. 3, Autumn 2001, pp. 68-69; and Martin Walker, "China and the New Era of Resource Scarcity,"
World Policy Journal. Vol. XIII, No. 1, Spring 1996.
54 China Ocean Agenda 21, pp. 3-4.
ss See, for example. China's marine policy white paper. Information Office of the State Council of the
People's'Republic of China, "The Development of China's Marine Programs," Beijing, May 1998; and
China Ocean Agenda 21.
56 Vaclav Smi!. "China's Energy and Resource Uses: Continuity and Change," The China Quarterly, No.
156, December 1998, pp. 935-936.
s'lbid., pp. 936 and 942-944.
S8 See V.S. Energy Information Administration, "China Country Analysis Brief," April 2001,
ht1p:/lwww.eia.gov/emeu/cabs/china.html.
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structures and distance from the centres of oil demand. 59 All of these factors mean that it
will be an extremely expensive and slow process to develop the area's oil potential and
establish the infrastructure to transport the oil to 'refineries in the industrial and
commercial regions of China. Therefore, the gap between domestic supply and demand

will continue to widen, and China will be increasingly less able to fuel its own economy
and meet the strategic demand for petroleum products, thereby creating a real
dependency problem, especially on Middle Eastern oil. 60

Economic Strength
Since Deng Xiaoping began China's economic reforms in 1979 and reopened the
Chinese economy to the outside world, it has been transfonned, growing fivefold over
those 20 years, with incomes increasing fourfold. And, although growth statistics
probably are not reliable, the growth trend is reliably and consistently positive,61 and
can not be ignored either in absolute terms or relative to other states. In the decade from
1990 to 2000, China's GDP grew from less than U.S.$400 million to over U.S.$1
trillion. 62 In 2001 China's GDP reached U.S.$1.16 trillion, the sixth largest in the world
compared to only tenth in 1990, whilst China has also become the world's sixth largest
63
trading state, with the world's second largest foreign currencyreserves.

It is easy, of course, to mistake the gleaming and impressive new high rise
skyline of Shanghai's Pudong district as being representative of modern China. Yet
China remains a country with a two-thirds rural population living largely in poverty.

59 Mamdouh G. Salameh, "China, Oil and the Risk of Regional Conflict," Survival, Vol. 37, No. 4,
Winter 1995-96, pp. 138-139.
60 See, for example, "China Struggles to Cut Reliance on Mideast Oil," The New York Times (online ed.),
3 September 2002.
61 "China's Economic Power: Enter the Dragon," The Economist, 10 March 2001, pp. 21-22. China's
annual GDP growth is claimed to be in the seven to eight per cent range. See, for example, "China's
Economy to Grow at 8 Percent in 2006: Economists," People's Daily (onIine ed.), 3 September 2002; and
"Bright Outlook for China," BBC News (online), 9 April 2002. For a sceptical view of China's economy,
see Gordon G. Chang, The Coming Collapse o/China, Arrow, London, 2002 (first pub. 2001); and Arthur
Waldron, "China's Economic Facade," The Washington Post (onIine 00.), 21 March 2002.
62 Defence Intelligence Organisation, Defence Economic Trends in the Asia-Pacific 2000, Department of
Defence, Canberra, 2001, p. 29.
63 "China since 1990: Facts and Figures Ten of Rising Prosperity," People's Daily (onIine ed.), 16
September 2002. In becoming the world's sixth largest economy China surpassed Italy in the world
rankings, whilst it is expected to overtake France in 2002 and the United Kingdom by 2005-2006.
"China's Economy 'Overtakes Italy's,'" BBC News (online), 31 December 2001. As impressive as that
may seem at first glance, none of those European states, individually, can be deemed to be great powers,
economic or otherwise, in the contemporary international system. A senior statistician from China's
National Bureau of Statistics, XU Xianchun, predicts that China's GDP will not outstrip Gennany's until
2020, or Japan's until 2050, to become the world's second largest economy. "How Big a Step Will China
Take in GDP in the New Century?" People's Daily (onIine ed.), 15 November 2002.
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Average annual per capita income is only U.S.$950,64 whilst growing numbers of
unemployed, a large itinerant worker population (perhaps as high as 130 million),

rampant corruption, a large number of inefficient state-owned enterprises (the stateowned sector still probably accounts for between 50-70 per cent of the total economy); a
financial system crisis (including a huge bad loans problem); and growing income
inequality, all of which have the potential to create social unrest, need to be taken into
perspective when considering the Chinese economy. 65
As with other developing economies in East Asia, there has been no Chinese
economic miracle. Rather than resulting from some astounding increase in productivity
(efficiency gains) or the purported benefits of an "Asian way" of central economic
planning and socio-political control, the rapid economic growth of China can be
explained by steadily increasing factor inputs of capital, employment and education
levels. 66 Thus, according to one assessment, the easy, catch-up economic growth that
began from a desperately low base is possibly already over; the hard task of creating a
truly free market economy (as opposed to the current state-led capitalist one) that can
achieve growth through genuine efficiency gains remains ahead. 67 Having stated as
much, it ought not to be forgotten, however, that despite China's relative poverty in per
capita tenns, because "its population is so huge ... it will become a major economic
power if it achieves even a fraction of Western productivity levels." Therefore, even if
China does not continue to produce the very high growth rates of the last two decades, a
moderately growing Chinese economy still "will change the geopolitical outlook
substantially. ,,68
It has been argued, however, that to assess national economic power in the
postindustrial era, at least when considering great powers with hegemonic potential, one
also needs to assess their ability to "dominate the cycles of innovation in the world
economy." That means, in the current ''information age," that an aspiring great power or
hegemon must be able to harness the benefits of the revolution in information and
"China's Economic Power: Enter the Dragon," The Economist, 10 March 2001, p. 21.
See "Now Comes the Hard Part: A Survey of China," The Economist, 8 April 2000; "Another Asian
Nation Battling a Crisis," The New York Times (online ed.), 26 October 2002; and "China Races to
Defuse Time Bomb," The Straits Times (onIine ed.), 28 October 2002.
66 A leading academic economist thus draws a parallel between the rapid economic growth rates in recent
decades of some Asian states and those of the Soviet Union in the 1950s. Once the available input factors
were fully employed, however, the socialist economy of the Soviet Union (predictably, with hindsight)
was unable to match Western economic perrormance. See Paul Krugman, "The Myth of Asia's Miracle,"
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 6, NovemberlDecember 1994.
67 ''Now Comes the Hard Part: A Survey of China," The Economist, 8 April 2000, esp. pp. 3-4 and 20.
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communication technologies for both economic and (through a capacity to convert such
technologies into military capabilities) strategic power. 69 In this respect also, the relative
state of China's economic power is mixed.
By the 19808 China's "military-technical eUtes" fully understood that, unlike in
the past, when breakthroughs made in military technology were spunwoff into the
civilian world, new technologies from the civilian economy were now driving not only
economic growth in the rich countries, but also technological innovation in the strategic
realm. Those senior scientists, who had been involved in China's strategic research
programmes (primarily nuclear weapons and their delivery systems), convinced Deng
Xiaoping to alter national strategic science and technology investment from a
preoccupation with weaponry to a focus upon a wider range of critical technologies
deemed vital for the development and modernization of both the Chinese economy and
China's armed forces. The result, fonnulated in 1986, was the 863 programme, an
ambitious state-directed project to develop China's capabilties in seven of those critical
technologies: automation, information technology, space technology, advanced
materials, lasers, energy and bioteclmology.70 Moreover, in the Ninth Five-Year Plan
(1996-2000), the advancement of China's electronics teclmology was further prioritized,
including the 909 programme for semiconductor development. 71
Such programmes undoubtedly have had some success, with a rate of
technological advancement during the 1980s and 1990s several (perhaps four) times
higher in China than in the developed world. 72 Nevertheless, the state-directed Chinese
science and technology research and development system has been described as
"endemically noninnovative" by one analyst, with only limited participation by
industry. The limits of this state-led approach has thus spurred parallel efforts to
promote "entrepreneurialism and venture finance" in order to foster the types of
commercially oriented research that has been so productive in the West.
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Krugman, "The Myth of Asia's Miracle," pp. 75-76.
Tellis et aI., Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age, pp. 36 and 44-45. On the importance
of technological innovation as a driver of changes in relative advantage between states in the modem era,
see also Gilpin, War and Change in World PolitiCS, Ch. 2.
70 Evan A. Feigenbaum, ''Who's Behind China's High-Technology 'Revolution'? How Bomb Makers
Remade Beijing's Priorities, Policies, and Institutions," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1, Summer
1999, pp. 97 and 109-111.
71 Evidently, an amount up to the equivalent of U.S.$70 billion was to be allocated to improve that
technology during the tenn of the Plan. See Roger Cliff, The Military Potential of China's Commercial
Technology, MR-1292-AF, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2001, pp. 11-12.
72 Ibid., p. 61.
73 Feigenbaum, "Who's Behind China's High-Technology 'Revolution'?" pp. 121-125.
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In addition~ many advanced (civilian-military) dual~use technologies are
available to China in the international marketplace or are used by China-based
manufacturers to produce electronic and other goods for both export and, increasingly,
domestic consumer markets. It is not clear, however, whether enterprises that assemble
high-technology products from imported components or manufacture high~technology
componentry using imported capital goods (such as lithography tools used to etch
computer microchips) are able to "capture the critical technologies embodied in these
goods" for national technological and strategic advancement.

14

There also remains some

conjecture over the degree to which China is becoming a destination for hightechnology as well as low-technology manufacturing. On the one hand, for example, a
report by international finance house, Goldman Sachs, suggests that: "Far from taking
over high value-added manufacturing industries, China is still very specialized in laborintensive exports, and a large importer of higher-end goods and natural resources.,,75 On

the other hand, there is evidence that China is progressively moving into the hightechnology sector, whilst Japanese companies are investing in research and
development laboratories based in China to take advantage of the large pool of cheap
engineers; a senior Japanese businessman thus agonizes that "China is quickly
becoming a country oflow wage and high tech.,,76
However successful the transfer of such foreign commercial technology to
"China Inc" mayor may not be, there is little question that China has made significant
progress in certain areas of dua1~use teclmology, including computing, semiconductors,
telecommunications and satellite and other space technologies. 77 Nevertheless, China
will not likely "dominate the cycles of innovatiorr' any time soon. Whilst it will

74 Cliff, The Military Potential a/China '3 Commercial Technology, p. 30. As an example of how Chinese
manufacturers are using imported technology to catch up quicldy. CHff noted that by the late 1990s China
intended to introduce computer chips with 0.5 micron-width circuitry at a time when the West had moved
to superfine 0.18 micron technology (p. 12). However, two Shanghai-based semiconductor plants will
soon begin production of chips with very advanced 0.13 micron-width circuitry, using lithography tools
purchased from Europe and Japan. See "China Makes Progress on Chips," 'Ihe New York Times (online
00.), 6 May 2002.
75 Quoted in "Reports Say China Not a Big Threat," Taipei Times Conline ed.), 17 July 2002.
76 Yotaro Kobayashi, chairman ofFuji Xerox, quoted in "Japan Braces for a 'Designed in China' World,"
The New York Times (online ed.), 21 Apri12002.
77 See Wendy Frieman, ''The Understated Revolution in Chinese Science and Technology: Implications
for the PLA in the Twenty-first Century," in James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh, eds., China's
Military Faces the Future, AEI and M.E. Sharpe, Washington, D.C. and Armonk, NY, 1999. Of eight
categories of technology examined in one study (microelectronics, computers, telecommunications
equipment, nuclear power, biotechnology, chemicals, aviation and space), Roger Cliff concludes that
China has "significant production capabilties in all but one (biotechnology)." Cliff, The Military Potential
a/China'S Commercial Technology, Ch. 3, esp. p. 30.

32

continue to slowly catch up to the developed world, China is unlikely to match Western
levels of technological prowess across the board for decades to come. 78

Military Power
The story of China's military power is also somewhat two-faced. The People's
Liberation Anny (PLA) is the world's largest armed force, but remains by far the most
backward military of any of the major powers. The mostly obsolescent PLA is a
military machine traditionally dominated by ground forces designed to fight large-scale,
positional battles on Chinese continental territory against invading annies (from the
early 1960s into the 1980s that meant, essentially, the Soviet Union). Military refonn
begun in 1985 sought to change the traditional strategic orientation of the PLA to focus
more upon the Chinese periphery, and especially on the territorial and resource disputes
on China's maritime periphery.'9 Those refonus began a process to refocus the PLA on
the types of more advanced combat capabilities required to fight in the maritime
environment. To both offset the costs of the new strategic emphasis and to create a
slimmer, more efficient and professional military, large reductions in manpower and
force structure were progressively implemented. 8o And, as threat perceptions evolved
during the latter half of the 1990s, PLA development increasingly focused on fighting
high-teclmology opponents over the status of Taiwan.
Between 1985 and 1987 Deng Xiaoping reduced the size of the PLA from 4.2
million to 3.2 million personnel, followed by a series of further cuts which, by the end
of 1999, had reduced the active force PLA to around 2.5 million. However, as David
Shambaugh points out, that figure is

misleading~

as many of the ground force divisions

and other components that were nominally cut from the PLA in fact have merely been
transferred to the paramilitary People's Armed Police (pAP - created around the time of
Deng's initial reductions), whilst a reserve force was re-established and the militia
reactivated and linked to the PAP. All of these organizations are part of the armed
forces - meaning that, despite the reductions in PLA active force units, total forces
available to China's military and political leaders may actually be upwards of 4.6
Ibid., p. 61.
See, for example, Paul H.B. Godwin, "The PLA Faces the Twenty-first Century: Reflections on
Technology, Doctrine, Strategy, and Operations," in Lilley and Shambaugh, eds., China's Military Faces
the Future.
S(I On the military reform process, see David Shambaugh, "The People's Liberation Army and the
People's Republic at 50: Reform. at Last," The China Quarterly, No. 159, September 1999; and You Ji,
The Armed Forces ojChina, Allenand Unwin, StLeonards, NSW, 1999, Ch. 2.
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million.8i By transferring force structure from the PLA to the PAP, Beijing is both
saving money, which can be reallocated to priority spending areas, and bolstering
internal security.82 Presumably, the PAP and other forces dedicated to ensuring internal

order have taken on greater importance since the Tiananmen massacre, and due to
continuing separatist dissent in Xinjiang and Tibet.83
China's defence spending itself is not a particularly useful indicator of military
power. The real levels of Chinese defence spending are impossible to know with any
assurance. The official defence budget does not include defence-related expenditure
covered by other budget portfolios; nor does it include defence spending derived from
the income of PLA~owned enterprises (including foreign arms sales).84 It is true, of
course, that the officially stated level of Chinese defence spending lags a long way
behind that of potential rivals such as the United States and Japan,85 but such
comparisons are not necessarily indicative of military or strategic effectiveness; nor do
they take into account the likelihood that a given amount spent domestically in China on
defence buys significantly more than comparable amounts spent in higher-cost
developed countries_ 86 What seems clear, however, is that after declining in the 1980s to

81 Shambaugh, ''The People's Liberation Army and the People's Republic at 50," pp. 663-664. One
Western source has estimated that the active force PLA numbers just under 2.5 million, the reserves
another 1.2 million plus, and the PAP 1.1 million - adding up to around 4.8 million (not counting the
militia)! See International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). The Military Balance 1999-2000, Oxford
University Press for the IISS, London, 1999, pp. 186 and 189.
S:lyou, The Armed ForcesojChina, p. 37.
83 China's 2000 defence white paper states that the reserve force is "incorporated into the PLA's order of
battle ... and helps to maintain social order"; the People's Armed Police "undertakes the task of
maintenance of security entrusted by the state ... and consists of internal security forces, and gold mine,
forest, water and power, and transportation security forces"; and the militia, ''under the command of
military organs, perform combat readiness support and defensive operations, and help to maintain social
order." Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, "China's National
Defense in 2000," Beijing, October 2000, supplement to Beijing Review, 23 October 2000, p. iv.
84 For an extended discussion, see Bates Gill, "Chinese Defense Procurement Spending: Detennining
Intentions and Capabilities," in Lilley and Shambaugh, eds., China's Military Faces the Future. Some
items not funded from the defence budget include the PAP, both nuclear weapon and "strategic" rocket
programmes, demobilization expenses and PLA pensions, some regional costs for both the PLA and the
militia, foreign weapon procurement, defence research and development and defence industry subsidies.
See ibid., pp. 202-203.
ss A point the Chinese frequently like to make. See "China's National Defense in 2000," pp. v-vi. The
official defence budget in 2000 amounted to the equivalent ofU.S.$14.6 billion, or only 1.31 per cent of
GDP (1999 figure). By early 2002 Beijing was admitting to an official defence budget ofU.S.$20 billion;
however, the U.S. Department of Defense estimates actual military spending may be as high as U.S.$65
billion annually, which would make China the second largest military spender in the world and by far the
largest in Asia. (U.S.) Department of Defense, "Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's
Republic of China," Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act,
July 2002, p. 38. (The U.S. defence budget is almost U.S.$380 billion and Japan's is around U.8.$45
billion.)
86 One analysis, for example, cites the president of China Aerospace Corporation's Third Academy, who
has stated that cruise missile production costs are up to 30 per cent lower in China than elsewhere. See
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allow all possible state resources to be concentrated upon economic development,
defence spending grew again in the 1990s as the fruits of that development expanded
state coffers. 87 Those increases may reflect the growing importance of military power to
Beijiug resulting from, in particular, the heightened tensions across the Taiwan Strait
since the mid 19908 and, more generally, its revisionist agenda. Whilst some argue that
even the highest estimates of Beijing's defence spending only indicate that China still
lags well behind American capabilties and that it will not likely be able to catch up any
time soon,88 others make the important point that "trends count," and are perhaps
indicative of an intention to make genuine advances in military capabilities to further
Beijing's revisionist ambitions. 89 Significantly, the trend is for steeply increased rates of
defence expenditure in the declared budget that are more than double the claimed rate of
economic growth; the official defence budget grew by an impressive 17.7 per cent in
2001 and by another 17.6 per cent in 2002. 90
China's defence modernization programmes since the mid 1980s have focused
on specific areas, including not only the nuclear elements of the Second Artillery Corps
(Strategic Missile Forces), but also those conventional naval, air, missile and mobile
elite ("fist") units that are most suited to fighting the types of limited, high-tech wars in
the maritime periphery which are central to current Chinese defence planning. 91 The
modernization of selected maritime and conventionally armed missile capabilities has
come largely at the expense of the ground forces, creating, in effect, a three tier military:

Mark A. Stokes, China's Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States, Strategic Studies
Institute, U.S. Anny War College, Carlisle, PA, September 1999, p. 81.
87 You, The Armed Forces ojChina, pp. 56-61.
88 See, for example, Bates Gill and Michael O'Hanlon, "China's Hollow Military," The National Interest,
No. 56, Summer 1999, pp. 56~57.
89 James Lilleyand Carl Ford, "China's Military: A Second Opinion," The National Interest, No. 57, Fall
1999, pp. 72-73.
90 See, respectively, ''Taiwan Warns of Threat and U.S. Watches Warily after Military Boost," The
Sydney Morning Herald, 8 March 2001, p. 10; and "China's Defense Budget to Rise by 17.6 Percent:
Minister," People's Daily (onIine ed.), 6 March 2002. In part, the large increases may be an attempt to
compensate the PLA for being forced to divest a large part of their business interests since July 1998. See
"A Model People'S Anny." Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 July 2000, pp. 14~16. The PLA retains
control of many smaller businesses and farms directly related to sustaining PLA units and their
dependents. The PLA was also granted a divestiture exemption for its commercial telecommunications
interests, which are deemed important for the development of its command, control, communications,
computers and intelligence capabilities, including transfers of civil sector information technology. See
James Mulvenon, "'Eating Imperial Grain'?: The Ongoing DiVestiture of the Chinese Military-Business
Complex, 1998-2000," in Andrew Scobell, ed., The Costs of Conflict: The Impact on China of a Future
War, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, October 2001.
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1. The sharp end of the PLA, which consists of a modernizing vanguard capability
emphasizing high-technology weapomy for use around the Chinese periphery,
especially along the East Asian littoral;
2. The main body of the still vast, mostly obsolescent PLA, including most ground
forces and the bulk of the air force (which currently is largely limited to defence of
the airspace over continental China and support of the ground forces); and

3. Thirdly, the even less well-equipped forces tasked with internal order and security,
such as the PAP and the militia.

China's independence of military action is largely underwritten by its nuclear
forces. There is a longstanding and ongoing programme of nuclear force modernization
which is, in part, influenced by a doctrinal requirement to develop the forces needed to
operationalize what has been termed China's "limited deterrent" (meaning a limited
nuclear war-fighting capability).92 Although China has only a relatively small nuclear
force compared to the United States or Russia, involving approximately 350-400
warheads deployed on ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)
and bombers, there are important new ballistic missile, SLBM and cruise missile
programmes under way.93 The most notable developments are a new solid propellant,
road mobile 8,000 km range ICBM, the DF-31 (CSS-X-9) and its SLBM derivative, the

JL-2. 94 When deployed, the two new types (plus an extended range DF-31) will give
China a more credible, survivable second strike nuclear deterrent. Initial deployments of
the DF-31 are expected within the next two to three years, whilst China also is believed
See, for example, Godwin, "The PLA Faces the Twenty-first Century"; and You, The Armed Forces of
China, Ch. 2. The forces most relevant to China' s maritime power are assessed in detail in Chapter 6 of
this dissertation.
92 See Alastair lain Johnston, ''Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization: Limited Deterrence
versus Multilateral Anns Control," The China Quarterly, No. 146, June 1996; and You, The Armed
Forces o/China, Ch. 4.
93 There are approximately 20 DF-5 (CSS-4) intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with a range of
13,000 km; twelve JL-1 SLBMs (1,700 km range); ten (Plus) DF-4 (eSS-3) intermediate-range ballistic
missiles (IRBMs) (4,700 km range); 38 DF-3 (CSS-2) and DF-3A IRBMs (with ranges of 2,650 km and
2,800 km. respectively); and 30 DF-21 (CSS-5) and DF-21A medium-range ballistic missiles (with
ranges between 1,700 to 1,800 km). Figures based on a December 2001 (U.S.) National Intelligence
Council estimate, cited in China Security Review Commission, "The National Security Implications of
the Economic Relationship between the United States and China," Report to Congress Pursuant to Public
Law 106-398 (30 October 2000), July 2002, Ch. 10. The National Intelligence Council report predicts that
by 2015 China will have 75-100 nuclear warheads deployed on lCBMs and SLBMs, mostly targeting the
United States. See "Report Upgrades China's Threat as a Nuclear Power," The Washington Times (onIine
ed.), 11 January 2002. In addition, China's rapidly growing arsenal of short-range ballistic missiles
(SRBMs) are nuclear capable. See also Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, Jane's Information Group,
Coulsdon, Surrey, 2001, pp. 42-67.
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to be developing both advanced penetration aids for its nuclear warheads and a multiple
warhead system (probably for the DF-5 ICBMs) in order to be able to defeat missile
defences. 95
In terms of its military-technological prowess, it is evident that China has made

gains in some areas, such as missile production. However, as Richard Bitzinger
comments, with no little irony: "Missile production is not exactly rocket science any
more." Further, the technologies are "mature and increasingly proliferated ... missile
systems may be less a pocket of excellence than an 'island of adequacy' surrounded by
a sea ofmediocrity.,,96 Whether that argument is overstated or not, the fact remains that,
in general, China remains a long way behind its rivals, with a defence industrial sector
that is struggling to catch up to the standards of the more technologically advanced
states. 97 Beijing is also highly dependent upon imported weapons and military
technology, especially from Russia,98 but also from Israel and Western Europe. 99
Moreover, it is not clear whether China will be able to leverage the advances it has
made in civilian sectors such as telecommunications and information technology into
discernible technological gains for its defence industries or the PLA. 1OO It is also
possible that the focus of the 863 programme may be diverted towards (politically
sellable) systems with "direct military significance," which might produce short-term

Ibid., pp. 47 and 66.
"Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China," July 2002. pp. 27-28. The
units that will deploy the DF-31 reportedly have already been fonned. See "China Ready to Deploy Its
First Mobile ICBMs," The Washington Times (onIine ed.), 6 September 2001.
96 Richard A Bitzinger. "Going Places or Running in Place? China's Efforts to Leverage Advanced
Technologies for Military Use," in Susan M. Puska, ed., People's Liberation Army after Next, Strategic
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, P A, August 2000, p. 40.
97 See, for example, Bernard D. Cole and Paul H.B. Godwin, "Advanced Military Technology and the
PLA: Priorities and Capabilities for the 21 st Century," in Larry M. Wortzel, ed., The Chinese Armed
t
Forces in the
Century, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Anny War College, Carlisle, PA, December
1999; Bitzinger, "Going Places or Running in Place?"; and Norman Friedman, "Chinese Military
Capacity: Industrial and Operational Weaknesses," in Eric Arnett, ed., Military Capacity and the Risk of
War: China, India, Pakistan and Iran, SIPRI and Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997.
98 Military cooperation between China and Russia (and the other states of the former Soviet Union) is
detailed in «Annual Report on the Military Power of the People~s Republic of China," July 2002, pp. 3946.
99 "The National Security Implications of the Economic Relationship between the United States and
China," Ch. 10. France and Britain have been the most prominent European states to transfer military
technology to China, although Germany has also supplied diesel engines for the PLA Navy's latest
frigates. The Europeans do remain (tentatively) constrained by post-Tiananmen sanctions, however.
100 Frieman, "'The Understated Revolution in Chinese Science and Technology," pp. 263-264. Frieman
notes, however, that whether or not China will be able to apply such civ:ilian sector advances to the
military, there will plausibly be "something there to apply" (p. 264: original emphasis).
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gains for the PLA, but would probably retard the broad-based modernization strategy to
catch up to the advanced economies in the long run. ID1
One field that China is pursuing relentlessly is space technology, with its
inherently dual-use applications. Space systems are important elements of the 863
programme: 102 China hopes to benefit economically (from commercial space launches
and satellite construction), technologipally (through technology spin-offs), militarily (by
establishing independent space-based capabilities for intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance, navigation and targeting, communications and even space warfare), and
politically (in terms of prestige). Among the "short-tenn development targets" set out in
China's space policy white paper are the establishment of national satellite networks for
ISR, communications, and navigation/positioning and an aspiration to "realize manned
space flights" by 2010. 103 The most strategically relevant Chinese space developments
are dealt with :ip. a later chapter, but the extent of China's space ambitions is worth
noting. In particular, China is aiming to develop its manned space programme for deepspace exploration, establish a space station and space laboratories and exploit the
resources of the moon.104 Although these ambitions may be unrealizable in the intended
timeframes, given the costs and China's current technology levels, Beijing clearly
intends to catch up to, or even leapfrog, the established space powers: there are even
long-range plans for a manned mission to Mars.

105

In addition to its space programme, China is believed to be investigating a range
of other advanced military technologies that could be used to fend off an intervention
by technology-heavy (and technology-dependent) American forces in a Taiwan
contingency, which would seem to be the leading planning scenario for PLA capability

Feigenbaum, "Who's Behind China's High-Technology <Revolution'?" pp. 125-126.
Stokes, China '$ Strategic Modernization, p. 186.
103 Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic ofChlna, "China's Space Activities,"
Beijing, November 2000, Part Ill. Available as "China's Space Industry Flying High," China Daily
(oniine ed.), 23 November 2000. For analysis of China's space programmes see, for example, David J.
Thompson (Col., USAF) and William R. Morris (Lt. Col., USAF), China in Space: Civilian and Military
Developments, Maxwell Paper No. 24, Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, August 2001; and
Stokes, China's StrategiC Modernization, Ch. 3 and Appendix m.
104 See "China Sets to Land on Moon by 2020," People's Daily (onIine ed.), 26 May 2002; and "Fourth
Unmanned Spaceship Set to Roar by Year End," People's Daily (online ed.), 14 August 2002. If the
upcomW.g flight of the Shenzhou IV, the fourth in a series of umnanned spacecraft, is successful, China
hopes to launch a manned mission by 2005. For background on the manned space programme, see Phillip
Clack, "Chinese Designs on the Race for Space," Jane's Intelligence Review, Vo!. 9, No. 4, April 1997;
Phillip S. Clark, "China's Space Dream COWltdown Is in Sight," Jane 's Intelligence Review, Vol. 11, No.
9, September 1999; and "Blasting Off," Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 August 2000, pp. 30-35.
105 See "China Aims High with Mars Mission," The Washington Times (online ed.), 19 August 2002. It
should be noted, however, that Chinese spacecraft are developments of 1960s-era Soviet space capsules.
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development. Some of those technologies involve ISR capabilties, electronic warfare,
information warfare, anti-satellite and electromagnetic pulse weapons for infonnation
system denial, and advanced conventional weapons for physical access denial, including
capabilities intended specifically to target (American) aircraft carriers. 106
It is probably reasonable to be open-mindedly sceptical about the ability of
China to successfully develop all of those aspirational capabilities. 107 Nevertheless, the
fact remains that China seems to be serious in its pursuit of such technologies. The PLA
is selectively modernizing elements of its conventional forces for conflict in the
maritime theatre, with specific goals (and adversaries) in mind. It may be wise,
therefore, not to dismiss China's growing military power lightly. To be sure, it is indeed
quite feasible, as is asserted by two leading Sinologists, that "China's technological
level and military capabilities may fall even further behind those of its great-power

rivalS.,,108 That is certainly the case if one compares the capabilties of China (or any
other country at the present time for that matter) to the United States. Military, let alone
strategic, effectiveness, however, rarely, if ever, depends upon technological superiority
alone:109 China's increasingly tailored military options for dealing with specific, limited
contingencies mean that, in such circumstances and, throughout its immediate maritime
neighbourhood, China's military power is becoming ever more credible, even if that
military power appears woefully inadequate in paper comparisons with global U.S.
military strength.l1O

106 See Stokes, China's Strategic Modernization; and Michael Pillsbury, "China's Military Strategy
toward the U.S.: A View from Open Sources," Contracted Research Paper for the U.S.-China Security
Review Commission, 2 NQvember 2001.
107 For a superior example of a sceptical analysis, see Cole and Godwin, "Advanced Military Technology
and the PLA."
108 Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress; China's Search/or
Security, W.W. Norton, New York, 1997, p. 229. Other studies that are overly dismissive of China's
military capabilities include Solomon M. Karmel, China and the People's Liberation Army: Great Power
or Struggling Developing State? St. Martin's Press, New York, 2000; Gill and O'Hanlon, "China's
Hollow Military"; and Thomas J. Hirschfeld, "Assessing China's Military Potential," East Asia; An
International Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 1, Spring 1999.
109 Technology is but one of 17 dimensions of strategy identified by Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy,
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, Ch. 1. Gray argues that the 17 dimensions of strategy operate
synergistica11y; that advantages in one or two dimensions (such as teclmology) "carries no guarantee of
excellent strategic performance overall," but that "genuine major weakness in anyone of the seventeen
dimensions ... can prove fatal to the whole enterprise of strategy" (pp. 25-26, original emphasis). He has
further clarified the matter by stating that "strategic, even military, effectiveness is rarely dominated by
weapons to the practical exclusion of other factors .... No major war between industrial powers has been
won because one side was technologically superior." Colm S. Gray, Weapons Don't Make War: Policy,
Strategy, and Military Technology, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 1993, p. 176.
llO Similar arguments are made by Thomas J. Christensen, "Posing Problems without Catching Up:
China's Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4, Spring
2001.
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Some PLA strategists have also become avid students of the evolving American
revolution(s) in military affairs (RMA), 111 although much of the Chinese literature is
derivative of open source American (or other foreign) RMA thinking.1l2 The current
U.S.-Ied RMA, first demonstrated during the liberation of Kuwait, later in the air war
against Serbia in 1999 and again in Afghanistan against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in
2001-2002, combines, inter alia, electronic and infonnation warfare dominance,
increasingly networked sensors and precision, long-range air and missile strikes to
create new standards of operational effectiveness - at least against relatively pliant or
backward adversaries. When compared to what the United States has already achieved,

it may seem that the RMA will remain beyond the grasp of the PLA. Yet that perhaps
misunderstands the concept. Several identifiable American RMAs have been occurring
ahnost simultaneously over the past 20 or more years, involving different technologies
(such as stealth, computinglinfonnation, networking and so on). A particular American
strength has been to link those varied capabilties together to achieve dramatic military
effect. However, an R1\1A, like military and strategic effectiveness, is not merely a
function of technology. Revolutions in military affairs thus have been described by two
leading strategic thinkers as

periods of innovation in which armed forces develop novel concepts involving changes
in doctrine, tactics, procedures, and technology. . . . Their driving force is rarely

technology; the technological capabilties of forces that have realized revolutions in
military affairs have o:tren been inferior to those of their opponents. And revolutions in

military affairs take place almost exclusively at the operational [rather than at the
strategic] level of war. 113

III See Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment, NDU Press, Washington,
D.e., 2000, Ch. 6, esp. 278p292. For Chinese commentary on the RMA, see Michael Pillshury, ed.,
Chinese Views ofFuture Warfare, rev. 00., NDU Press, Washington, D.C., 1998. Part 4.
112 lames Mulvenon, ''The PLA and Information Warfare," in James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang,
eds., The People's Liberation Army in the Infonnation Age, CF-145-CAPP/AF, RAND, Santa Monica,
CA, 1999, pp. 181-182. Some PLA RMA literature has been copied directly from foreign sources without
attribution. What is more interesting is PLA thinking on the operational and strategic application of
information warfare in the tradition of the ancient military strategists and Maoist operational experience
of guenilla warfare-and the use of technologically inferior forces to defeat superior ones. Ibid., pp. 183184.
113 Williamson Murray and MacGregor Knox, "The Future behind Us," in MacGregor Knox and
WiJ.J.iamson Murray, eds., The Dynamics ofMilitary Revolution, 1300-2050, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 2001, pp. 179-180. Murray and Knox contrast RMAs with what they tenn ''military
revolutions": "'uncontrollable, unpredictable, and unforeseeable" events that "recast society and the state
as well as military organizations," each with its own attendant RMAs. The five revolutions identified are:
the creation of the modem state and modem military institutions in the seventeenth century; the French
Revolution; the Industrial Revolution; the combining of the first three revolutions in the fonn of the First
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Moreover, a contemporary Chinese RMA need not be a sinicized version of
American RMA developments. In fact, unlike in the United States - where RMA-type
capabilties are being developed in something of a strategic vacuum (that is: in the
absence of either a peer competitor or the likelihood of a large-scale war versus a major
power opponent)114 - Chinese RMA thinking is aimed specifically at a particular goal
and adversary and limited to a particular operational theatre: countering American (and
allied) conventional military superiority in East Asia (especially in a conflict over
Taiwan).115 That single-minded focus fulfils another defining RMA characteristic:
"Successful innovators have always thought in terms of fighting wars against actual
rather than hypothetical opponents, with actual capabilities, in pursuit of actual
strategic and political objectives.,,1l6 To the extent that China's military developments
have become focused upon Taiwan and the possibility of American intervention in a
cross-Strait conflict, one commentator has gone so far as to suggest that those
developments may in fact represent a Chinese "counter-revolution in military
affairs.,,117
Chinese military power, therefore, is probably both stronger and, paradoxically,
also weaker than it might seem in antiseptic paper comparisons of forces. It is weaker
because the great numerical bulk of the PLA is outdated, and fit generally only to
maintain internal order or to defend against the most unlikely scenario of a massed
continental invasion. It is stronger because, despite the overall technological gap
between Chinese and Western armed forces, technology is not the sole (or even
primary) determining factor for military effectiveness; and selective modernization of
naval, air and missile forces, in particular, in addition to other, less conventional
capabilities designed for specific contingencies involving particular opponents, means
that the PLA increasingly is a force that must be treated with respect throughout

World War; and the coming of the nuclear and missile age. Potentially, the next revolution might be led
by infonnation technology - but that is for the unforeseeable future. Williamson Murray and MacGregor
Knox, ''Thinking about Revolutions in Warfare," in ibid., pp. 6-7 and Table 1.1, p. 13.
114 Murrayand Knox, "The Future behind Us," pp. 193-194.
1lS Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment, pp. 289-295; and Pillsbury, "China's
Military Strategy toward the U.S.," esp. pp. 8-9. Of course, it is also in the interests of RMA advocates
within the PlA to posit the most technologically advanced state as their likely adversary in order to
attract funding and political support for their pet projects. That possibility notwithstanding, the United
States is perceived more generally by the wider political and militaty establishments to be a likely
adversary in the longer tenn.
U6 Murray and Knox, "The Future behind Us," p. 192.
117 See Christensen, "Posing Problems without Catching Up," pp. 21-34.
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maritime East Asia, especially in Northeast Asia. Ultimately, however, the effectiveness
of military power can only be truly tested in a contest of anns: that is, in combat.

Translating Material Power into External Behaviour: The Domestic Factors
China's Relative Power in the Eyes ofIts Leaders
There exist a range of opinions amongst China's foreign and security policymaking
elites and analysts on China's relative position in the regional and international systems.
Those opinions differ over the rate of relative U.S. decline, over which other states will
most likely challenge the United States and over the extent of international
multipolarity.118 To gauge China's relative position in what they allege is increasingly a
multipolar era, Chinese analysts subscribe to a concept of "comprehensive national
power/' which is employed to rank states in tenns of their respective national strengths,

in some iterations using mathematically quantifiable values. The current concept was
developed in the early 1980s, but it has been argued by Michael Pillsbury that the
practice of estimating the comparative power of leading states is a tradition which can
be traced back to the classical strategic texts of ancient China, as developed during the
(multipolar) Warring States period (475-221 B.C.).119 Sun Tzu, in fact, wrote that
comparative evaluations of forces "through estimations" could be made to effectively
calculate the results of warfare in advance. 120
The Chinese concept of comprehensive national power has some parallels with
the Soviet conception of the "correlation of forces" and fulfils the same evaluative
purpose as Western (especially Anglo-American) geopolitical theory and net
assessment. 121 Each offers a holistic perspective on the dynamic process of competitive
international politics and the relative strengths and weaknesses of the major players,
with geopolitical theory explicitly placing power analysis within the immutable context
of physical geography.I22 One highly problematic aspect of Chinese power assessments,

The subject ofPilIsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment.
Ibid., pp. xxxvii-xxxviii and 207-210. For the ancient texts, see Ralph D. Sawyer, trans., The Seven
Military Classics ofAncient China, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1993.
120 Sun Tzu, The Art 0/ War, "Initial Estimations," p. 167. For a discussion on Sun Tzu's views on net
assessment, see Michaell. Handel, Masters a/War: Classical Strategic Thought, 2nd rev. ed., Frank Cass,
London, 1996, Ch. 12, esp. pp. 138-142.
121 On geopolitical theory see, for example, Colin S. Gray and Geoffrey S1oan, eds., Geopolitics,
Geography and Strategy, Frank Cass, London, 1999; and Mackubin Thomas Owens, "In Defense of
Classical Geopolitics," Naval War College Review, Vol. LII, No. 4, Autumn 1999.
122 Such holistic approaches, in addition to geographical context, must include both material factors
(including economic strength. natural resources, technology levels and military capabilities) and nonJJ8
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however, is the dubious efforts of some analysts to use quantitative analysis. Another
concerns the way such evaluations (whether qualitative or quantitative) are used, not so
much as a general guide to improve understanding of the geopolitical context for the
practice of statecraft, but as a precise, predictive tool of statecraft. One PLA colonel, for
example, states: "Through the analysis of belligerent countries' Comprehensive
National Power, even before a war has begun, people can frequently know the results in
advance.,,123 As we are reminded by Clausewitz, the institution of war is, by its very
nature, penneated by the forces of chance and uncertainty: ''No other human activity is
so continuously or universally bound up with chance. And through the element of
chance, guesswork and luck come to play a great part in war." Furthermore,

absolute, so-called mathematical, factors never find a firm basis in military calculations.
From the very start there is an intetplay of possibilities, probabilities, good luck and bad
that weaves its way throughout the length and breadth of the tapestry. In the whole
range of human activities, war most closely resembles a game of cards. 124

The differing strategic traditions between China and the West thus need to be kept in
mind in any study or intelligence assessments of contemporary Chinese strategic
behaviom. 125
Michael Pillsbury has identified two distinct schools, one civilian and one
military, for the forecasting of China's future relative comprehensive national power,
each derived intellectually from Deng Xiaoping's 1986 pronouncement on the coming
of a multipolar world. The divergence between the two schools stems not from the
assumption that the United States is in decline and that the world is becoming
increasingly multipolar, but on the strength of those trends. The "orthodox/' military
view, represented by the Academy of Military Science, when projected out to 2020,
predicts that China's comprehensive national power will by that time be equal to that of
material factors (such as social cohesiveness, government effectiveness and legitimacy, and cultural
aEpeal- and other so-called "soft power" attributes).
1 Li Qingshan, quoted in Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment, pp. 213-214. The
similarity of such thinking to that of the ancient Chinese strategists, including Sun Tzu (as noted above),
is obvious.
124 Clausewitz, On War, 1: 1, pp. 85-86.
125 Nevertheless, Michael Handel, in his comparative study of the works of C1ausewitz and Sun Tzu,
concludes that "the basic logic of strategy, like that of political behaviour, is wriversal." See Handel,
Masters of War, p. xiii. Similarly, the commonly held idea that there exist substantial and fundamental
differences between Chinese and Western strategic culture is challenged by Alastair lain Johnston,
Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, NI, 1995. See esp. pp. 253-255.
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the United States, with Gennany and Japan ranked next. The ''reform'' position,
represented by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences index, instead is less optimistic
about Chinese comprehensive national power growth rates and, when projected out to
2020, predicts that China will only rank seventh, with Japan surpassing the United
States by that time. 126
It may be significant that PLA analysts are more bullish about China's

prospects; combined with the PLA's seeming belief in the predictive value of such
power ranking exercises to establish the outcome of future wars, that self-confidence
conceivably might increase the likelihood of China employing or threatening force in
maritime East Asia. Certainly, China's 2000 defence white paper has hailed the
progress being made in the PLA's modernization and technological innovation
efforts. 127 On the other hand, successive American military campaigns showcasing not
only advanced military technologies in action, but improvements in many of those
technologies over a short space of time, from the Gulf War to Kosovo/Serbia to
Afghanistan, have demonstrated just how great the capability gap has become.
Nevertheless, some PLA analysts have taken heart at aspects of what they believe to he
American inadequacies also displayed during the Kosovo campaign and, concomitantly,
China's ability to withstand similar attacks. 128
Typically, Chinese power analyses do not provide longer-term projections or
refer to a future Chinese superpower, in order to avoid aggravating fears of a future
Chinese geopolitical threat. 129 The downplaying of China's growing power has become
commonplace in the Chinese media as· a specific response to what the Chinese term the
''theory of China threat. ,,130 However, in more general terms, China seems willing to
acknowledge its rise up the hierarchy of nations. For example, Foreign Minister Tang
Jiaxuan has acclaimed China's growing international status and activism, stating: "In
the five years since 1997 ... China's diplomacy was unprecedentedly active,
Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment, pp. 205-207 and 257.
"China's National Defense in 2000," pp. x-xi.
128 David Shambaugh, "China's Military Views the World: Ambivalent Security," International Security,
Vol. 24, No. 3, Winter 1999/2000, p. 60. Similarly, in a commentary compiled by unnamed Chinese
"experts," it is argued that one of America's "gains" since the catastrophic terrorist attacks of 11
September 2001 has been its ability to ''put into practice its theory of military revolution, and [it has, as a
result] displayed and consolidated its military superiority." On the other hand, the article argues that the
United States has become "over-confident of its military strength." See "A Year after 'September 11'
Attack," People's Daily (online ed.), 11 September 2002.
129 Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security EnVironment, p. 206.
130 For an example of this practice, see ''Will China and U.S. Follow the Tracks of Soviet-U.S. Cold
War?" People's Daily (online ed.). 28 June 2002.
126
127
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establishing its distinctive global role as a major socialist powert and creating even
more favorable international conditions for development." Tang explicitly attributed
China's increasing international role to improvements in its comprehensive national
power. 131 Similarly, the directors of the Chinese Academy of Social Science's Centre
for Regional Security Studies in Beijing note an increasing self-confidence in China's
international behaviour, fed by its growing relative power:

States conduct diplomacy based on their self-images and images of the outside world. In
the past 20 years, China has undergone a profound transformation in how it views itself
and the world. It no longer views itself as a country on the edge of collapse, but as a
rising power, with limited but increasingly significant capacity in shaping its
environment. 132

By implicitly acknowledging the linkage between China's growing power, its se1fperception of increasing strength and the ability and ambition to use that power to shape
the external environment,133 the analysis also confonns to the central assumption of
neoclassical realist theory: states will attempt to influence and control their external
environment as much as their relative power capabilities reasonably allow.

State Power and Effectiveness
It is through the power and effectiveness of the state apparatus,134 in the neoclassical

realist research design, that the material components of national power are able to be
converted into employable capabilities. As Michael Swaine and Ashley Tellis have
identified, the maintenance of a stable domestic order has historically been a prime

131 "Chinese FM: China's Int'l Status Grown in Last 13 Years," People's Daily (onIine ed.), 9 October
2002.
132 Zhang Yunling and Tang Shiping, "More Self-confident China Will Be a Responsible Power," The
Straits Times (online ed.), 2 October 2002.
133 Peacetime perceptions nevertheless can be most unreliable. Kurt Campbell relates an anecdote from
the mid 1970s regarding America's self-perception, when U.S. policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union became
the achievement of the best possible deal because Henry Kissinger believed that American power was in
serious relative decline. See Campbell. "Hegemonic Prophecy and Modem Asia: Lessons for Dealing
with the Rise of China," in Carolyn W. Pumphrey, ed., The Rise of China in Asia: Security Implications,
Strategic Studies Institute, V.S. Anny War College, Carlisle, PA, January 2002, p. 50. Happily, Kissinger
was wrong. American military power was in decline relative to that of the Soviet Union at the time, but
only because the United States allowed it to be so, due to a combination of bad policy (including an
infatuation with arms control mechanisms) and a Vietnam-induced weariness.
134 On the state structure of contemporary China, see David Shambaugh, '''The Chinese State in the PostMao Era," in David Shambaugh, ed., The Modem Chinese State. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 2000.
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security concern of the Chinese state. 135 However, controlling such a large and fractious
population has never been easy, often requiring strong coercive measures by the
government of the day. In some respects, the power and effectiveness of the Chinese
state are in doubt, with a combination of factors creating widespread pockets of unrest,
especially in rural areas and in the old industrial heartland. That unrest is caused by
growing unemployment, often resulting from the ongoing need to reform inefficient
state-owned enterprises; growing income and social gaps and lack of social security
protection; and corruption and increasing levels of rural lawlessness. 136 A further social
problem, caused by a sex selection preference for males, is that China has a growing
surplus of young, unmarried men. Those young males, mostly low-status, poorly
educated, unemployed rural labourers, constitute a disproportionately large part of
China's transient ("floating") population and are associated with rising levels of
violence and other crime. 137 In 20 years time, China may have as many as 40 million
such men, representing a substantial social powder-keg. 138
China also is a multicultural and multilingual state. The large, restive
populations of Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang and Tibetans in Tibet, and their separatist
agendas, are well documented: less

well~known

are China's other officially recognized

ethnic minorities (there are 55 such groups in total). It has been argued by Dm Gladney
that the Han majority, officially 91 per cent of the population, is in fact an ethnically,
linguistically and culturally diverse group, and that the concept of Han nationality is a
modern, early twentieth-century phenomenon. 139 The official language, Mandarin, is
only one of eight major languages, and Beijing is still fighting a losing battle to impose
it unifonnly across the country.140 Regional-cultural identities seem to be growing
stronger within China and Gladney suggests that, should the Chinese state weaken
135 Michael D. Swaine and Asbley J. Tellis, Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and
Future, MR-I121-AF, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2000, p. 18.
135 See, for example, ''Politics in China: Intimations of Mortality," The Economist, 30 June 2001. pp. 2123; "China's Inner Circle Reveals Big Unrest," The New York Times (onIine ed.), 3 June 2001; "Order
Yielding to Lawlessness in Rural China," The New York Times (onIine ed.), 29 May 2002; "China Races
to Defuse Time Bomb," The Straits Times (online ed.), 28 October 2002; and Chang, The Coming
Collapse of China.
137 See Valerie M. Hudson and Andrea Den Boer, <CA Surplus of Men, A Deficit of Peace: Security and
Sex Ratios in Asia's Largest States," International Security, Vol. 26, No. 4, Spring 2002, pp. 29-34.
Hudson and Den Boer also argue that the induction of some of these men into China's internal security
forces (such as the PAP) has the potential to increase, rather than decrease, internal violence, corruption
and instability (pp. 33-34).
138 Ibid" p. 36.
139 Om C. Gladney, "China's National Insecurity: Old Challenges at the Dawn of the New Millennium,"
in Asian Perspectives on the Challenge of China, NDU Press, Washington, D.C., 200 I, esp. pp. 5-8.
140 See "Chinese Whispers," The Economist, 30 January 1999, pp. 89-91.
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significantly, it is not inconceivable that the coUntry might divide "along cultural and
linguistic lines."

141

Despite opposition to Chinese rule in Tibet and Xinjiang, China seems largely
politically unified for now. However, the geographically uneven growth of the last two
decades has created wide socio-economic divisions between regions. 142 Some of
China's reglOns are also developing their own linkages with the outside world
"independent of China's central government.,,143 Partly, however, that is because it has
been easier for the richer, coastal regions to build external rather than internal economic
relationships due to an underdeveloped national transportation and communications
infrastructure. Beijing is attempting to remedy this situation by significant investments
in roads, railways, energy and telecommunications infrastructure, meaning that the
domestic Chinese economy is becoming truly integrated for the first time, and that
integration is occurring rapidly.l44 China has also been trying to direct investment and
infrastructure projects into the poorer western and central regions since 1999,145 in order
to reduce both regional inequality and political and social unrest in those areas, as well
as to develop the latent potential of the natural resources of the interior. A fundamental
government weakness, however, and one restricting the extent of state investment, is the
miserably low level of government revenue (at around 13.6 per cent of GDP in 2001),
due to an inability to create a viable taxation system. 146 Tax reform to remedy that
situation is under way, however, with taxes currently levied by the provinces to be
collected directly by the central state apparatus, perhaps by the end of 2003 .147
The slippery political grip of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seems, on the
one hand, to be failing to suppress unrest, separatism or other disobedient groups such
as the Falun Gong sect,148 or even to maintain continuous and effective control of the

Gladney, "China's National Insecurity," p. 12.
Ibid., pp. 11-12.
143 Kenichi Ohmae, "China's Rapid Industrialization Will Challenge Global Status Quo," Taipei Times
(online ed,), 9 September 2002.
144 "China's Economic Power: Enter the Dragon," The Economist, 10 March 2001, pp. 21 and 24. There
may be some similarities with nineteenth century United States in that respect.
145 "China since 1990: Facts and Figures Tell of Rising Prosperity," People's Daily (online ed.), 16
September 2002.
146 "Now Comes the Hard Part: A Survey of China," The Economist, 8 Aprll2000, p. 14; and "As China
Changes," The Economist, 30 June 2001, p. 9. Such a low level of taxation may seem like heaven to the
economic libertarians amongst us, but does not make for particularly effective state building. In
developed countries taxation tends to account for between a third to a half ofGDP.
147 ''Beijing to Regain Taxation Power from Provinces," The Straits Times (online ed.), 23 October 2002.
148 On the lack of political reform, see "Politics in China: Intimations of Mortality," The Economist, 30
June 2001, pp. 21-23.
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intemet. 149 Suppressing the fractiousness of China's huge population has always been a
concern for Chinese governments. Shu Guang Zhang identifies the episodic pattern of
unrest and dissent in Chinese history as part of Chinese political culture, which he terms
Chinese "rebellionism.,,150 On the other hand, Chinese governments throughout history
have shared an inglorious and bloody willingness to dispatch large numbers of their
own people for the ends of maintaining social stability and regime security. This
unfortunate, murderous tradition was demonstrated most recently in Tianarunen Square

in 1989, and has been a consistent characteristic of CCP rule since Mao's triwnph in
1949}S1

Maintaining an absolute monopoly on political power remains the foremost
concern of the CCP; as Jiang Zemin stated at the Party's 16th National Congress, China
''must never copy any models of the political system of the West."lS2 To supplant the
bankrupt ideology of communism and restore the sagging legitimacy of Party rule,
especially since the Tiananmen massacre, the Chinese government has promoted
Chinese nationalism as a substitute legitimizing ideology.153 Nationalism may be a
dangerous card for the Party hierarchy to play, however, as once unleashed, nationalist
fervour may be difficult to control, potentially adding to Beijing's instability
conundrum. 154 Even if China were to democratize, however, it has been argued that the
process of democratization actually makes states more, rather than less, war-prone, in

149 See, for example, "China Grapples with Net Dilemma," BBC News (online), 15 September 2002. In
general, direct social and economic control over the Chinese people by the state has weakened
substantially since Deng's reforms. See Shambaugh, ''The CWnese State in the Post-Mao Era."
150 Shu Guang Zhang, "China: Traditional and Revolutionary Heritage," in Booth and Trood, eds.,
Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region, p. 31.
151 On the frequency of large-scale, bloody acts of repression under CCP rule, see Bruce A. Elleman,
Modern Chinese Waifare, 1795-1989, Routledge. London, 2001, p. 303.
152 Jiang Zemin, quoted in "China's Leader Urges Party to Reform Economy, Not Politics," The New
York Times (online ed.), 9 November 2002.
153 See, for example, Maria Hsia Chang, "Chinese Irredentist Nationalism: The Magician's Last Trick,"
Comparative Strategy, Vo1. 17, No. 1, January-March 1998.
154 For example, Beijing moved to constrain nationalist anti-Japanese protests over the Senkaku Islands
dispute in 1996 and, after initially encouraging anti-American protests following the accidental bombing
of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, also sought to dampen a public anger which threatened to
get out of hand. See, respectively, Erica Strecker Downs and Phillip C. Saunders, "Legitimacy and the
Limits of Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Islands," International Security, Vo!. 23, No. 3, Winter
1998/99~ esp. pp. 137-139; and James Miles, "Chinese Nationalism, D.S. Policy and Asian Security,"
Survival, Vol. 42, No. 4, Winter 2000-01. The Chinese responses to the 11 September 2001 terrorist
attacks against the United States were at best ambiguous, with many Chinese expressing a degree of
satisfaction with American suffering. And the Chinese government was caught uncomfortably between
the need not to appear sympathetic to terrorism, and the need not to appear too sympathetic towards
America, lest it undermine its own anti-American rhetoric. See "China Shows a Less-than-Wann
Response to Disaster in America," International Herald Tribune (online ed.), 14 September 2001.
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part due to the role of populist nationalism in new democracies and democratizing
states. 155
Beijing's ongoing attempts to promote and exploit nationalist feeling reflects not
only ideological bankruptcy, but also the waning of government control and
effectiveness, paradoxically coming at a time when most indicators of China's national
power are steadily on the rise. Inasmuch as Beijing may be promoting economic growth
primarily as a means to bolster the power of the state rather than to boost general
economic well-being for its own sake (or even to boost national power).156 it is not
entirely clear that the policy is succeeding, although such a seeming disjuncture
between national power and state power may only be temporary. The situation may be
exacerbated in the medium term by the absence of a commanding leadership personality
- a Mao or a Deng - who might be able to more effectively defend the regime or lead
the country in a crisis, domestic or foreign, due to great personal stature and the
legitimacy that that would bestow. 157 There would not seem to be any obvious
candidates for such a role, especially as the revolutionary generation, who command
considerable personal respect, are now rapidly passing from the political scene.
If there is a sense that Party rule is weakening, one factor that may prolong its
monopoly on power is the growing political power of the PLA, which may in turn have
longer-term implications for China's strategic behaviour. The need for greater internal
coercive power to suppress dissent, particularly in the wake of the Tiananmen massacre,
has been evident in the strengthening of the PAP and militia. Although the PLA has
always played an important political role in Communist China, the evolution to a postDeng leadership has led to a boost to the PLA's political influence. The PLA's rising
political fortunes have been boosted because the new Party leadership, led by Hang
Zemin, lacked the stature (and record of military service) of Mao or Deng. Anny
loyalty, therefore, was not assured for Jiang's leadership of either the party or the
Central Military Commission. Instead, Jiang was forced to build support within the
PLA. That support, as argued by Ellis Joffe, has been conditional, in part, on Jiang's
lSS See Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, ''Democratization and the Danger of War," International
Security, Vol. 20, No. 1, Summer 1995.
156 Thomas Kane argues, for example, that limited market capitalism is pursued "primarily for the benefits
it can bring the state .... [The leaders of the Chinese regime] not only wish to enjoy national prosperity,
they wish to have it at their disposal." Kane, "China's Foundations: Guiding Principles of Chinese
Foreign Policy," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 20, No. 1, January-March 2001, pp. 50-51.
157 The importance of the influence of leading individual statesmen upon history is the subject of Daniel
L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, "Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In,"
International Security, Val. 25, No. 4, Spring 2001.
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own support ofthe PLA's institutional interests. 158 Inevitably, Jiang's need to gain PLA
loyalty has both increased PLA influence over foreign policy and served to promote
other PLA interests, such as larger defence budgets. In Joffe's words, the PLA
"supported Jiang Zemin where it counted, and he gave them a lot. He gave them
autonomy, he gave them budget increases, he gave them a voice in policymaking in
issues that mattered to them like Taiwan and relations with the United States." Joffe
adds that Jiang's successor as Party leader, Hu Jintao, is likely to face the same
difficulty in consolidating PLA support, which will further enhance the PLA's influence
over policy: "It will be very difficult for Hu ... to go against a united front of the
'l'tary.,,159
mll
The increased power of the PLA presents a dilemma for the CCP, however.
Although the PLA is an organ of the Party rather than the Chinese state, its growing
autonomy, influence and professionalism is creating a situation, in the words of David
Shambaugh, in which "the anny and the party are unmistakably separating" and where
the PLA's interests are "diverging from the party'S.,,160 The Party's growing reliance on
the PLA for domestic political control leads to tlte conclusion that the anned forces
increasingly will become the pre-eminent shapers of Chinese foreign and security
policy. The PLA's influence may also extend to domestic policy, which raises the
speculative notion of a future Chinese regime ruled, at least indirectly, by the military.

Culture as Context

A discernible Chinese political and strategic culture is a leading contextual influence
upon China's external behaviour. Part of that context concerns the cultural basis for
what has been described as China's ''infonnal ideology," which is part of "a generic
Chinese nationalism" fonned over the centuries and refined over the last 150 years of
(mostly unhappy) historical experience. China's ideological nationalism involves the
views that the Chinese people and nation are part of a grand civilization that
traditionally has stood at the centre of world affairs, and ought to do so again; that
Chinese foreign policy is virtuous and China ought to be respected by others as a natural
great power; and that China should be compensated (in one way or another) for the
158 ElIis Joffe. "How Much Does the PLA Make Foreign Policy?" in Goodman and Segal, eds., China
Rising, esp. pp. 56-57.
159 Ellis Jofi'e, quoted in "China's Military Retains Strong Role," Newsday (online ed,), 18 November
2002. Jiang, however, remains Chairman of the Central Military COmmission, at least for the moment.
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injustices and disrespect that had befallen it during the periods of European
encroachment and Japanese colonial occupation. I61 That particular, misleading view of
Chinese history - of five millennia of uninterrupted Chinese political and cultural
sovereignty until the century of national humiliations beginning with the Opium War of

1840 - is manipulated and propagated by Beijing to justify current policies and
territorial claims. 162
The promotion of the nationalist cause to redress the perceived wrongs inflicted
upon it in the past thus is somewhat ubiquitous in today's China It has been argued by
Alastair Johnston that state-led nationalism intensified following the Tiananmen
massacre and the increased suspicion of the outside world caused by that event. 163
Chinese nationalism also can be viewed, in part, as a continuation of Maoist liberation
ideology, which remains apparent in the policies of "anti-hegemonism" - the avoidance
of foreign domination and interference in China's "domestic affairs" - and restoring the
nation to its rightful position as a great power at the centre of the international
system. 164 In that way, some of the more "fonnal" elements of Chinese Communist
revolutionary ideology may outlive Chinese Communism itself and become subsumed
within the informal ideology of Chinese nationalism. 165
China's strategic culture is fundamentally a pessimistic, realist one, in which
war is deemed to be an unavoidable feature of world affairs and a primary concern of
the state. 166 One commentator has gone so far as to suggest that China ''may well be the

high church of realpolitik in the post-Cold War world.,,167 Alastair John8ton, by
studying the ancient Chinese strategic texts, has discerned both a Confucian-Mencian
160 David Shambaugh, "China's Post~Deng Military Leadership," in Lilley and Sharubaugh, eds., China's
Military Faces the Future, p. 32.
161 See Steven I. Levine, "Perception and Ideology in Chlnese Foreign Policy," in Thomas W. Robinson
and David Shambaugh, eds., Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1994, pp. 43-44.
162 Thomas Bartlett terms this the "1840 and All That" school of Chinese historiography, in ''The Role of
History in China's View of the World Today," Pacifica Review, Vol 13, No. 1, February 2001, esp. pp.
118-121.
163 AlastaIT lain Johnston, "Realism(s) and Chinese Security Policy in the Post~Cold War Period," in
Kapstein and Mastanduno, eds., Unipolar Politics, pp. 293-294.
164 Zhang, "China," pp. 31~32 and 35.
165 Levine, "Perception and Ideology in Chinese Foreign Policy," p. 46.
166 See Zhang, "China," esp. p. 30; Yong Deng, "The Chinese Conception of National Interests in
International Relations," The China Quarterly, No. 154, June 1998; and Jing-dong Yuan, "Culture
Matters: Chinese Approaches 10 Arms Control and Disannament," Contemporary Security Policy, Vo!.
19, No. I, Apri11998.
161 Thomas J. Cbristensen, "Chinese Realpolitik," Foreign Affairs, Vo!. 75, No. 5, September/October
1996, p. 37. Christensen's claim is probably an overstatement, not because China isn't a practitioner of

51

strategic culture, which stressed "accommodationist" strategies against external threats
and the minimal, defensive use of violence only when absolutely required to maintain or

restore a just and harmonious internal order; and a "hard realpolitik" zero-sum realist
strategic culture favouring the employment of more offensive, coercive strategies,
which were deemed necessary to deal with the types of strategic threats inherent in a
dangerous and violent world. He concludes, however, using an empirical analysis of the
Ming era, that the latter, realist, perspective was the dominant one,168 and asserts that
the realist strategic culture has been a continuous characteristic of successive Chinese
169
regimes since ancient times, clearly identifying the tradition in Mao-era China. That
"hard realpolitik" strategic culture has been evident in China's relatively high

propensity to risk the use of force to settle international disputes since 1949. 170 And the
willingness to use force against stronger enemies, such as the United States in the

Korean War and in border clashes with the Soviet Union in 1969, demonstrate another
feature of China's strategic culture that impacts upon both its international behaviour
and its self-perception of power: the belief that inferior forces can defeat superior
ones pI A final aspect of China's strategic culture of especial relevance to this
dissertation is that it is finnly rooted in a continentalist rather than a maritime

experience and outlook, which has been especially prevalent since the mid-fifteenth
century.

CHINA: THE DEVELOPING STATE AS GREAT POWER

In drawing some conclusions on China's overall power, one is struck by two seeming
paradoxes. Firstly, the Chinese state is growing stronger in some respects at the same

time as it is growing weaker in others. Whilst new physical infrastructure projects and
ideological, culture-bound nationalism serve to unite much of the country more tightly,
the ability of the state to direct those factors to its own ends may be constrained by a
realpolitik. but because. at the base level of foreign policy and behavioural fundamentals, so too are all

major states.
168 Jobnston, Cultural Realism, esp. pp. 249-250. Johnston terms this a "parabellum strategic culture,"
derived from the axiom (originally in Latin) "if you want peace, then prepare for war."
169 Alasts¥' lain Johnston. "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China," in Katzenstein, 00., The
Culture o/National Security.

See Alastair lain Johnston, "China's Militarized Interstate Dispute Behaviour 1949-1992: A First Cut
at the Data," The China Quarterly. No. 153, March 1998; and AlIen S. Whiting, "China's Use afForce,
1950-96, and Taiwan," International Security, Vol. 26, No. 2, Fa112001.
170
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loosening control over the regions, insufficient revenue streams of the type that can not
be disrupted by external events or enemies, and relatively widespread social unrest.
Nevertheless, one should not be too dismissive of the Chinese state's ability to mobilize
its population for limited external adventures, or to control anti-Party dissent through
coercive means. The second paradox is that, although China continues to exhibit many
of the symptoms of a relatively weak state, its national power is consistently, and
impressively, on the rise. This phenomenon is not a contradiction in terms, as it is
perfectly feasible for a state to be both internally weak, yet at the same time, externally
strong. 172 The Soviet Union, after all~ was in many ways a weak state, both
economically and socially, from its very inception to its eventual collapse - attributes
which indeed ultimately helped to trigger that collapse - yet that did not prevent it from
becoming, between those historical bookends, a seriously strong military power that
threatened to overthrow the non-communist world in an ideologically aggressive global
geopolitical expansion. 173
Moreover, it is not entirely clear as to which part of the Chinese "dynastic cycle"
- the historically recurring cyclical pattern of imperial decline, internal disorder,
division and dynastic fall, followed by the rise of a new dynasty to reunify the country we are currently encountering. 174 In other words, is the social instability of today's
China symptomatic of the imminent decline of the CCP dynasty and descent into
domestic division? Or is that instability simply epiphenomenal, with further geopolitical
consolidation and external expansion still to come? (Or perhaps attempts at external
expansion will be the trigger for internal collapse.) Even if China does turn out to be on
the verge of collapse, that will not ensure a safer regional security environment, at least
in the shorter tenn. Indeed, dynastic decline and internal chaos conceivably might spur
the creation of an even more nationalistic and militaristic regime, perhaps led by the
l7l See Zhang, "China," p. 34; and Shen Kuiguan (Senior Col., PLA), ''Dialectics of Defeating the
Superior with the Inferior," in Pillsbury, ed., Chinese Views of Future Waifare.
172 See, for example, Barry Buzan's distinction between weak and strong states (with reference to sociopolitical cohesiveness), and weak. and strong powers (with reference to relative material power
capabilities). Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the PostCold War Era, 2nd ed., Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead. Hertfordshire, 1991, pp. 97-98. Samuel
S. Kim makes a similar point about China today, adding that "as China becomes more insecure and
fragmented at home, it feels more compelled to demonstrate its toughness abroad." See Kiln, China's
Quest for Security in the Post-Cold War World, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,
Carlisle, PA, July 1996, p. 32.
173 The record of Soviet aggression has been detailed by two retired Red Army officers. See Gen. Oleg
Sarin and Col. Lev Dvoretsky, Alien Wars: The Soviet Union's Aggressions against the World, 1919 to
1989, Presidio, Novato, CA, 1996.

53

PLA, to unite the COuntry.175 In such a hypothetical situation, it is not too difficult to
imagine a Chinese Galtieri - leading a PLA military junta - launching an assault on
Taiwan or other territories coveted by China, just as Argentina invaded the Falkland
Islands in 1982; thus consolidating the legitimizing nationalism of the regime and
providing an external distraction from internal difficulties. 176 One scholar argues that
the use of such a hypothetical external adventure to divert the attention of the Chinese
population away from domestic instability, actually has a precedent in modern Chinese
history: China's aggression against Soviet forces on the Ussuri River in 1969.

177

Furthermore, the growing political power of the PLA within China, as noted
earlier, increases the likelihood that China may end up with an authoritarian military
government, even in the absence of widespread internal disorder. It may be premature to
begin speculating on the nasty little "f' word in the Chinese context; yet it also must be
acknowledged that many of the preconditions for the establishment of a fascist political
order already exist in today's China. In addition to the growing influence of the military
and their role in internal order, those factors include a capitalist economy directed by
the state for the state; the promotion of a strong nationalist ideology; extensive
territorial claims and ambitions; a victim mentality and historical grudges against other
states; an authoritarian political culture; a willingness to use force and a growing
militarism to match the PLA' s modernization; a constant threat of internal instability;
and a desire to restore China's leadership over Asia.
However, no matter how the Chinese state evolves in coming years, the
important question remains: just how "great" a power is China? Gerald Segal perhaps
overstated his case when he claimed in 1999 that China didn't matter nearly as much as
most commentators suggested:

At best, China is a second-rank middle power that has mastered the art of diplomatic
theater: it has us willingly suspending our disbelief in its strength. In fact, China is

174

The concept of the dynastic cycle is central to Elleman, Modern Chinese Waifare. 1795-1989. See esp.

fPs' x-xii.

5 On this possibility, see Michael R. Chambers, "Rising China: A Threat to Its Neighbours?" in
Pumphrey, ed., The Rise o/China in Asia, pp. 85-86.
176 On the domestic political rationales driving Argentina's Falklands folly, see Martin Middlebrook,
~eration Corporate: The Falklands War, 1982, Viking, London, 1985, pp. 35-36.
1 Lyle J. Goldstein, ''Return to Zhenbao Island: Who Started Shooting and Why It Matters," The China
Quarterly, No. 168, December 2001, esp. p. 997. Goldstein bases his claim that China initiated the brief
conflict on newly available evidence from both Russia and China.
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better understood as a theoretical power - a country that has promised to deliver for
much of the last 150 years but has consistently disappointed. 178

Nevertheless, Segal did provide a useful corrective to the idea that China already is a
globally important great power. It is not. Rather. China is a major regional power which
continues to grow stronger in material power capabilities, albeit with some internal
weaknesses and external vulnerabilities - especially its growing oil dependency.
Whether or not China supplants Japan as the largest Asian economy within the
next two decades, it is already becoming an economic power to be reckoned with within
the region. Whether or not China can indigenously master a wide range of advanced
military technologies, it is already creating a military sufficient to he taken seriously in
its own neighbourhood, even by the reigning American hegemon. And. although

China's "soft power" is limited, with its ideology of Chinese nationalism hardly an
attraction for other regional states, Japan and India are probably equally unattractive
models for the region. Nor should one overstate the ideological affinity of most Asian
countries with the United States. Thomas Christensen is on the right track when he
suggests that China can pose serious difficulties for American (and thus also regional)
security interests ''without the slightest pretense of catching up" in tenns of material

military power and technology. 179

A Rising China as the Context for Chinese Maritime Expansion
As the primary influence on a state's external behaviour, the dynamics of the
international environment have been exceptionally kind to China since the decline and
fall of the Soviet Union. The benign systemic dynamics have allowed China to develop
rapidly, with visibly tangible modernization gains achieved in many areas of its
economy, national infrastructure and military capabilities. China has grown more
powerful not only on absolute terms, but also relative to its neighbours, thus creating a
new, potentially destabilizing, dynamic to regional affairs that has become increasingly
evident over the 1990s and into the twenty-first century. There seems to be a sound
understanding amongst China's leaders that, if China's time has not necessarily yet
arrived, then it is approaching, with the distribution of relative material power evolving
in tenns ever more favourable to their regional ambitions.
178

Gerald Segal, "Does China Matter?" Foreign Affairs, Vat 78, No. 5, September/October 1999, p. 24.
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Whilst remaining a weak state, possession of the dual armoury of the coercive
means (and willingness) with which to assert the Party's domestic political control, and
a strong nationalist ideology, means that Beijing is still likely to be able to harness, to a
sufficient degree, the elements of national power required to pursue its foreign policy
objectives reasonably effectively. Moreover, China's strategic culture and political
traditions, and its revisionist policy objectives (discussed in the next chapter), also
suggest that it will conform to the neoclassical realist predictions of great power
behaviour, by attempting to assert itself and strengthening its influence as far as it is
reasonably able to do so.

179 Christensen, "Posing Problems without Catching Up," p. 7; and also Richard K. Betts and Thomas J.
Christensen, "China: Getting the Questions Right," The National Interest, No. 62, Winter 2000/01.
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3

Policy, Strategy and the Sea

The previous chapter posited a rising

China~

in both theoretical and empirical tenns.

The current chapter identifies the maritime priorities of China's foreign and national
security policies, and the maritime aspects of China's grand strategy. The chapter then
traces the evolution of China's national military strategy, from its traditional continental
bias to a new emphasis upon the East Asian maritime periphery. Lastly, the chapter
argues that the maritime aspects of China's policy goals and strategies, in particular, are
irreparably altering East Asian geopolitics in ways that undermine the maintenance of a
stable regional order.

CHINA'S FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICIES

China's foreign and security policies are represented by an agglomeration of principles~
guidelines and statements. There exists no overarching foreign policy document,
although these guiding principles have been continually restated and refined in defence
white papers, speeches and in the official media. Despite that fact, however, policy is
often vague and general. The formal basis of China's "independent foreign policy of
peace" remains the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (originally enunciated in
1954): mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression,
non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and
peaceful coexistence. The Five Principles comprise one part of a "new security concept"
first developed in 1996, which sets out to replace what Beijing tenns the "Cold War
mentality" of military blocs and alliances with a "'new international political, economic
and security order responsive to the needs of the times.... Only by developing a new
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security concept and establishing a fair and reasonable new international order can
world peace and security be fundamentally guaranteed."!
The second element of the new security concept is to strengthen ''mutually
beneficial" economic cooperation, ''reduce the development gaps between countries and
seek common prosperity." The third element calls for the promotion of "mutual
understanding and trust through dialogue and cooperation" and the peaceful resolution
of disputes.2 Beijing has further developed the concept, putting some emphasis upon
multilateral security mechanisms and co-opting the 19808 Western European concept of
common

security. 3 There has

been

no

Chinese

conversion

to

ideological

multilateralism, however. 4 Rather, Beijing has learnt how to engage and manipulate
multilateral fora such as the ASEAN Regional Forum for its own political purposes,
much as do other~ more diplomatically seasoned major powers. China's multilateralist,
cooperative security rhetoric ought to be viewed primarily as part of Beijing's ongoing
diplomatic efforts to break up the American regional alliance system. 5
China's guiding motivations in adopting the new security concept as policy
rhetoric thus need to be viewed within the context of Beijing's persistent condemnation
of''hegemonism'' and ''power politics," and promotion of a more multipolar world: that
is, one in which the relative standing of the United States is reduced and China's is
improved. Whilst the tenn ''hegemonism'' was used in the 19608 to refer to the Soviet
threat, and for a time in the late 1970s and 1980s also to describe Vietnam's imperium
over all Indochina, it is now a label for American activities in East Asia and around the

1 Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, "China's National Defense in
2000," Beijing, October 2000, supplement to Beijing Review, 23 October 2000, p. H.
2 Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, "China's National Defense,"
Beijing, July 1998, in Beijing Review, 10-16 August 1998, p. 14.
3 See "China Offers New Security Concept at ASEAN Meetings," People's Daily (onIille ed.), 1 August
2002. On the well meaning but conceptually shallow and practicably feckless idea of common security,
see Barry Buzan, "Common Security, Non-provocative Defence, and the Future of Western Europe,"
Review ofInternational Studies, Vol. 13, No. 4, October 1987. The concept was popular with analysts of
East Asian security in the early 1990s. See, for ex.ample, Geoffrey Wiseman, "Common Security in the
Asia-Pacific Region," The Pacific Review, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1992; and David Dewitt, "Common,
Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security," The Pacific Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1994.
4 China's initial, guarded participation in East Asian multilateral security processes was largely
prudential, to head off possible threats to its interests. See Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser,
''Multilateral Security in the Asia-Pacific Region and Its hnpact on Chinese Interests: Views from
Beijing," Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 16. No. 1, June 1994.
5 Robyn Lirn. makes the point strongly in ''The ASEAN Regional Forum: Building on Sand."
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 20, No. 2, August 1998, esp. pp. 130-131. More cautiously optimistic
is Rosemary Foot, "China in the ASEAN Regional Forum: Organizational Processes and Domestic
Modes of Thought," Asian Survey, Vol.
No. 5, May 1998,

:xxxvm,
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world. 6 When China calls for a "'new international political, economic and security
order," therefore, it is not only rejecting what it deems to be interference in its "internal"
affairs by an overbearing American hegemon (including criticisms of China's human
rights abuses, China's lack of political and religious freedoms and its Taiwan policy).
Rather, China is challenging the entire structural and institutional basis for that global
hegemony. In this way, China's foreign policy represents a fundamental rejection of,
and challenge to, the existing international security order, particularly in East Asia.
China's rejection of American strategic primacy in Asia has intensified in a
relatively short space of time, following the natural death of the Sino-American antiSoviet strategic partnership with the end of the Cold War. During the 1990s, as gains in
China's comprehensive national power expanded Beijing's regional ambitions, the
policy requirement to challenge American leadership and reduce the American military
presence in East Asia thus increased. The need to check American power was
exacerbated by Washington's military and political responses to the Taiwan Strait
missile crisis of March 1996, an event which set the tone for subsequent strategic
developments in littoral Northeast Asia.
In its 1998 defence white paper, for example, China devoted only one, fairly

relaxed paragraph to the issue of ''hegemonism,'' never mentioning the United States by
name.? Two years later, however. in the 2000 defence white paper, the anti-American
rhetoric was notably enhanced:
No fundamental change has been made in the old, unfair and irrational international
political and economic order. Hegemonism and power politics still exist and are
deVeloping further in the international political, economic and security spheres. Certain
big powers are pursuing "neo-interventionism," "neo-gWlboat policy" and neoeconomic colonialism, which are seriously damaging the sovereignty, independence and
developmental interests of many countries, and threatening world peace and security ....
a certain country is still continuing its efforts to develop and introduce the National
Missile Defense (NMD) and Theater Missile Defense (TMD) systems, which have

6 Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for
Security, W.W. Norton, New York, 1997. p. 5. The term "hegemon" was traditionally used in ancient
China to describe the leading state in the Warr.ing States period and, according to Michael Pillsbury, the
texts of that era have heavily influenced contemporary Chinese security analyses. See Michael Pillsbury,
China Debates the Future Security Environment, NDU Press, Washington, D.e., 2000. p. 313.
7 "China's National Defense." p. 13.
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undermined ... efforts to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to
promote disarmament.

8

The white paper continues on to mention the United States by name, specifically railing
against American weapon sales to Taiwan, the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance
(including the new Defense Cooperation Guidelines and their possible link to a Taiwan
Strait conflict) and plans to deploy a theatre ballistic missile defence system in East
Asia. 9 To be fair, the 2002 defence white paper returns to the earlier practice of implicit
criticism of those issues, rather than explicitly naming the United States, although the
fundamental policy dynamics, including the rejection of the U.S.-Ied international
security order in East Asia, remain unchanged. lO The more muted criticism of
Washington can probably be attributed to the limited (perhaps notional) cooperation
between China and the United States in the war on Islamic terrorismY The limits to
Chinese cooperation in the war on terrorism stem from Beijing's underlying rejection of
America's regional and world leadership. Furthermore, the expanded American
strategic presence in Centrru Asia has exacerbated Chinese fears of strategic
encirclement, which is viewed by at least one Chinese analyst as an American plan to
dominate Central Asia, South Asia and the Middle East "as an important part of
Washington's overall strategy of suppressing Russia, containing China and dominating
the entire world.,,12 In response, China has actively been trying to counter American

8

"China's National Defense ID 2000," p. ii.

9 Ibid.
10 Infonnation Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, "China's National Defense
in 2002," Beijing, December 2002, Part n. Available on the World Wide Web at:
http://english.people.comcnlfeatureslndpaper2002/ndf.html.
Ll China's response to the September 11 attacks was somewhat ambivalent. There has undoubtedly been
some cooperation with the United States in the war against terrorism, although the extent and depth of
that cooperation is questionable. Initially, Beijing attempted to "tie its anti-terrorist cooperation to
American concessions over Taiwan and Tibet. There have been no known American concessions in those
areas, although Beijing still may have gained more from anti-terrorist cooperation than Washington:
China has used the putative war on terror to crack down on separatist movements within China, especially
in Xinjiang, and the United States has listed one Uighur separatist group as a terrorist organization. See
"China Offers Help - With Conditions," The Washington Post (online ed.), 18 September 2001; ''Beijing
Marks Out Limits to Support," South China Morning Post (onIine ed.), 20 September 2001; "China, U.S.
Ready to Share Intelligence," The Washington Times (onIine ed.), 22 September 2001; "China Using
Terror War against Separatists," The Washington Times (online ed.), 11 October 2001; "China Vows to
Help in Terror Fight," The Washington Post (online ed.), 19 October 2001; and "In Nod to China, U.S.
Blacklists Muslim Group," International Herald Tribune (online 00.),27 August 2002. For analysis, see
Mohan Malik, Dragon on Terrorism: Assessing China's Tactical Gains and Strategic Losses PostSeptember 11, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, October 2002, esp. pp. 515.
12 Gao Fuqiu, ''The Real Purpose of the American March into Central Asia," Outlook [Liaowang]
Magazine, 10 May 2002, trans. by the U.S.-Cbina Security Review Commission, p. 4.
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influence in those regions, partly by strengthening its relations with anti-American
''rogue states." Jiang Zemin thus voiced China's concerns during a visit to Iran in April
2002 in no uncertain terms: "Beijing's policy is against strategies of force and the V.S.
military presence in Central Asia and the Middle East region"; 13 whilst the director of
the PLA's General Staff Department chastised the United States in equally strident
terms, declaring that "counter-terrorism should not be used to practice hegemony.,,14
China's anti-terrorist cooperation with Washington has altered neither its
ongoing anti-American strategy in East Asia, nor its low-level political wrufare against
Taiwan. 15 China's opposition to American regional leadership is not likely to lead to a
serious clash of arms, however, unless China launches significant military operations
against Taiwan. Inasmuch as China wishes to counter American preponderance in East
Asia and what it believes to be an American policy to contain China, Beijing is quietly
attempting to reduce Washington's global dominance. Beijing is not leading an open
global challenge to the United States, but it is cultivating closer ties with other major
power centres such as Russia and Western Europe as a way to create cleavages between
Washington and those powers,16 in addition to its often close relationships with rogue
terrorist-supporting and/or weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missileproliferating states. Because Beijing believes that its relative power position in East
Asia will strengthen over time~ it is prepared to bide its time and take a long-tenn view,
making incremental gains towards its goal as it is able to do

80.

In that respect, Jiang

Zemin is reported to have stated in early 2002 that China 'must find ... [breakthrough
points] to check American preponderance," but that, "[i]f necessary, we can make
concessions for 20 more years.,,17
Within the overall policy context of Beijing's rejection of the extant
international order, three broad Chinese foreign policy priorities can be discerned:

13 Quoted in "Jiang Ends Five~nation Tour, Deploring Expansion of U.S. War on Terror," Yahoo! News
Singapore (onIine), 22 April 2002. See also "China Opposes U.S. Presence in Central Asia," CNN.com
(onIine), 22 April 2002; "China Counters U.S. Influence," The Washington Times (anline ed.), 11 January
2002; and Malik, Dragon on Terrorism, pp. 26~31.
14 Fu Quanyou, quoted in Ibid" p. 31.
15 In Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan's words, despite Sino-American cooperation over terrorism, when it
comes to Taiwan, China continues to wage "struggles in a reasoned, advantageous and restrained way."
See "Strive to Create New Phase in China's Diplomatic Work in New Century: Interview," People's
Daily (onIine ed.), 18 December 2002.
16 See, for example, "Hang Roles Last Diplomatic Dice," CNNcom (onIine), 24 September 2002; and
"Beijing's Diplomatic Bridge-building," CNN.com (onIine), 1 October 2002.
17 Quoted in "China Plays Waiting Game with U.S.," CNN.com (onJine), 12 February 2002.
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territorial integrity and sovereign rights, economic development and internal stability,18
and primacy in East Asia. There are hints of those priorities in an amendment to the
th

Chinese Communist Party's (CCP's) constitution adopted at its 16 National Congress
in November 2002. The amendment states that China's "three major historical tasks"
are

to propel the modernization drive, to achieve national reunification, and to safeguard
world peace and promote common development, and in bringing about the great
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation on its road to socialism with Chinese
characteristics. 19

In similar tenns, the 2002 defence white paper lists the primary national interests which

drive China's defence policy (in reality, China's foreign or national security policy) as:

safeguarding state sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and security; upholding
economic development as the central task and unremittingly enhancing the overall
national strength; adhering to and improving the socialist system; maintaining and
promoting social stability and harmony; and striving for an international environment of
lasting peace and a favorable climate in China's periphery?O

China's Foreign Policy Priorities
Territoriailntegrity and Sovereign Rights
The defence of its territorial integrity (including Taiwan - in China's perspective) and
the protection of its sovereign rights are fundamental policy goals for China, as noted
above. That policy priority is highly problematic for security in East Asia, however, due
to the highly expansive nature of China's conceptualization of its national territory (and
thus also its national "unity") and sovereign rights, including wide-ranging maritime
rights. When the extent of China's territorial and sovereignty claims are taken into

18 The foreign policy priorities of economic development and territorial integrity and unification have
been followed consistently since first formulated by Deng. See AlIen S. Whiting, "Chinese Foreign
Policy: Retrospect and Prospect," in Samuel S. Kim, ed., China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy
Faces the New Millennium, 4th ed., Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1998, pp. 288-289. Those priorities
broadly align with the three factors David Finkelstein identifies as ~hina's "national security objectives":
sovereignty, modernity and stability. See David M. Finkelstein. "China's National Military Strategy," in
James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang, eds., The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age,
CF-145-CAPP/AF, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 1999, pp. 103-107.
.
19 ''Full Text of Resolution on Amendment to CPC Constitution," People's Daily (onIine ed.), 14
November 2002.
20 "China's National Defense in 2002," Part 11.
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account - from Taiwan to the Senkaku Islands to the widespread territorial features of
the South China Sea, the marine resources of those territories and perhaps further
jurisdiction over claimed waters - 'the pursuit of a "favorable climate in China's
periphery" can be interpreted to mean a high degree of Chinese influence or control
over its neighbourhood. Beijing' s claims to large areas of sovereignty and jurisdiction in
East Asian seas certainly seem to reflect an intention to enlarge China's maritime
territory, space and influence throughout the region. By attempting to enforce its claims
to such wide-ranging sovereign rights in East Asian seas, Beijing is implicitly
challenging America's maritime dominance, and thus also the benign "hegemonyj, of
the United States in maritime East Asia.

n

is important to note that the primary political consideration for the CCP

remains regime security and the maintenance of internal order and stability. Now that
the Party has promoted Chinese nationalism as a legitimizing ideology, it has become
next to impossible for Beijing to compromise any of its extensive territorial claims lest
it undennine its domestic support and internal stability.

Economic Development

Sustained economic growth has been a central requirement to maintain domestic order
and regime security. The maintenance of external conditions favourable to continued
national economic development has thus been an important foreign policy priority for
Beijing ever since the reopening of the Chinese economy. The 1998 defence white
paper notes, however, that competitive international economic relations, including
competition and conflict over natural resources, are on the rise. 21 The document
seemingly reflects China's own growing resource needs and anticipates further conflict
over disputed maritime territory. China's growing dependence on imported oil has
served to heighten those economic and energy security concerns.

22

China's energy

needs also have created interests both in sea lane security and in enhancing its political
influence in energy-producing regions. Apart from those energy concerns, however,
China's economic vulnerability to external shocks is steadily reducing as its domestic
economy increasingly drives growth. 23 The extent to which China will be willing to
forgo stability in its international trading environment to pursue its territorial claims by
"China's National Defense," p. 13.
See, for example, "China's Oil Security Faces Tests of War," People's Daily (oniine ed.), 20 October
2002.
21

22
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force, especially over Taiwan, remains uncertain. But once again~ as its domestic
economic base continues to grow and becomes more self-sustaining, and thus somewhat
insulated from external economic pressure, China may become increasingly disposed
towards military action.
Although there

IS

a constant reiteration of the subordination of defence

modernization to the higher priority of economic development, it is apparent even in
Beijing's own policy pronouncements that defence is being afforded an increasingly
high national priority as the prevailing economic circumstances allow:

Developing the economy and strengthening national defense are two strategic tasks in
China's modernization efforts .... the state strives to ... form a mechanism that enables
national defense and economic development to promote each other and develop in
harmony?'

Jiang Zemin has further spoken of the need to coordinate improvements in military

capabilties with economic growth, which will provide steady ongoing defence budget
increases and which is intended to lead to "leapfrog" developments in Chinese military
modernization - effectively skipping a generation of weapons to catch up with the
West. 25

Chinese Primacy in Asia

A third (and most contentious) element of Chinese foreign and security policy is the
goal of geopolitical primacy throughout its periphery - especially its East Asian
periphery - amounting to a desire to return China to its fonner Middle Kingdom status

as the central, leading power in Asia. 26 At the very least, in the short term China seeks
t9 be the leading Asian power (at the expense of Japan, -India and Russia), although it
seems increasingly likely that Beijing also has designs on geopolitical primacy in Asia
over the longer tenn: that is, replacing the United States as the leading power in the
region. China's desire to expand its diplomatic, strategic and economic influence over
the peripheral environment as its comprehensive national power grows is increasingly

See, for example, "A Limited Impact," South China Morning Post (online ed.), 1 October 2001.
"China's National Defense in 2000," p. Hi.
25 "Military Modernization to Be Propelled by Economic Growth," China Daily (online ed.), 8 November
2002.
26 See Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. TeIlis, Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and
Future, MR.-1121-AF, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2000, Ch. 4 and pp. 231-232.
23
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evident,27 and certainly is consistent with neoclassical realist expectations. Thus, it is
predictable that China will become more assertive as it grows stronger and, in the words
of Michael Swaine and Ashley Tellis, that it will· "likely result in a search for
'hegemony' understood as a quest for universal acceptance of its increased power,
status, and influence as a legitimate right." That search will require the accumulation of
an extended Chinese sphere of influence, territorial expansion, regional military

assertiveness and the replacement of the existing international political order (and its
mechanisms) "With one of China's own making (or at least one more acceptable to
Beij ing) ?8
Beijing's ambitions for regional political leadership, although not stated
explicitly in official documents, also are consistent with unofficial Chinese nationalistic

publications which praise China's rise and expound strategies for the accomplishment
of Chinese geopolitical pre-eminence in Asia. 29 Traditionally, imperial China
maintained a hegemony of cultural and political pre-eminence over its periphery, based
on a suzerain relationship which placed China at the centre of the regional hierarchy.
The control and influence exerted by the imperial centre diminished the fUrther one
moved from the seat of Chinese power. 30
Beijing, for its part, takes any accusation of China's hegemonic intentions and
the "theory of China threat" extremely seriously, as the term ''hegemony'' today is used
to describe its own sorry experience with encroachment by foreign imperialist powers?l
The 2000 defence white paper reiterates the official line that the

development and powerfulness of China will constitute no threat to anyone, but will
mther promote the world peace, stability and development Never to seek hegemony is
the Chinese people's solemn pledge to the world.

32

See, for example, "In Its Own Neighborhood, China Emerges as Leader," The Washington Post (online
ed.), 18 October 2001; "China Races to Replace U.S. as Economic Power in Asia," The New York Times
(online ed.), 28 June 2002; and "China Reshaping Military to Toughen Its Muscle in the Region," The
New York Times (online ed.), 16 October 2002.
28 Swaine and Tellis, Interpreting China's Grand Strategy, pp. 232-233.
29 See, for example, John W. Garver's review of one such work: "China as Number One," The China
Journal, No. 39, January 1998.
30 See Swaine and Tellis, Interpreting China's Grand Strategy, Ch. 3; and David Shambaugh, "Chinese
Hegemony over East Asia by 2015?" The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. IX, No. 1, Summer
27

1997,p.17.
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Ibid., p. 10.
"China's National Defense in 2000," p. ii.
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Leading sinologist, David Shambaugh, argues that China is unlikely to seek hegemony
in Asia in the near term. 33 He has stated that there is nothing "to suggest an aggressive
world view or expansionist ethos in Chinese strategic thinking." Yet he also suggests
that China aspires to ''regional political pre-eminence and veto power so that any issue

in East Asia must take Chinese views into account,,,34 and that "Chinese leaders ... seek
preponderant power in order to rebuff any encroachment on Chinese sovereignty,
independence, and freedom of maneuver, but also to place China near the top of the
hierarchy of powerful nations.,,35 That aspiration itself may be viewed as a fonn of
hegemonic intention,36 as long as one understands that hegemony need not refer to a
policy of imperialistic aggression but merely to a leadership

~tatus

atop the regional

political hierarchy of nations. It is somewhat misleading, however, to suggest that those
Chinese aspirations of regional political primacy are

non~threatening

or do not amount

to expansionism, and that the Taiwan situation and China's claims to territories in the

South China Sea can simply be written off as inconvenient "exceptions" to the rule of
either benign intentions, or of an inability to operationalize hegemonic ambitions. 37

CHINA'S GRAND STRATEGY

China's external policies thus can be characterized as being geared to the sometimes
contradictory goals of ensuring favourable conditions for economic development and
asserting its expansive notions of territorial sovereignty,38 as well as achieving regional
political primacy over the longer term - say, by 2050. Whilst China has no officially
propounded grand strategy, one study identifies what it terms a "calculative" strategy.
The identified grand strategy consists of a pragm.atic maintenance of sound diplomatic
relations with other leading states and "a general restraint in the use of force," thus
providing external conditions suitable for the pursuit of economic grow$ and military

Shambaugh, "Chinese Hegemony over East Asia by 2015?"
34 David Shambaugh, quoted in "China's Military Can't Be Asia's No. 1," The Straits Times (onIine 00.),
29 October 2002.
35 Shambaugh, "Chinese Hegemony over East Asia by 20 15?" p. 18.
36 Shambaugh accepts this point in ibid., p. 22, although he remains deeply sceptical of the ability of
Beijing to fashion such a regional hierarchy with China at the centre (pp. 18-20).
37 For this view see, for example, Shambaugh's comments in "China's Military Can't Be Asia's No. 1,"
The Straits Times (onIine ed.), 29 October 2002; and Michael R. Chambers, "Rising China: A Threat to
Its Neighbors?" in Carolyn W. Pumphrey, ed., The Rise of China in Asia: Security Implications, Strategic
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, January 2002, esp. p. 87.
'!s Whiting, "Chinese Foreign Policy," p. 289, makes this observation on the potentially contradictory
relationship between Beijing's foreign policy goals.
33

66

modernization; and an expanded programme of political engagement (including in
multilateral fora), in order to maximize China's relative political gains. 39 That study is
consistent with neoclassical realist thinking when it states that "China's currently
limited objectives - domestic order, peripheral stability, and geopolitical recognition may gradually evolve in the direction of more expanded interests requiring that it 'exert
more control over its surroundings. '" It asserts further, however, that the calculative
strategy would continue at least Wltil China has completed its improvements in
comprehensive national power. 40 A similar argument is made by Avery Goldstein, who
asserts that China's grand strategy is "designed to engineer the country's rise to the
status of a true great power that shapes, rather than simply responds to, the international
system." He asserts, however, that China will take "several decades" of development to
achieve that objective and is unlikely to jeopardize its modernization efforts by
destabilizing the external environment. 41
Such arguments are potentially flawed in at least two respects. Firstly, as noted
in the previous chapter, there is no peacetime test to gauge national power. Exactly how
one is supposed to know when a certain level of national strength has been
accomplished is not explained, particularly when that strength always must be relative
to that of other states. Secondly, states tend to expand their influence as they are able,
rather than to a pre-planned timetable. If one accepts the contention that China
maintains as a policy goal the achievement of regional primacy, it is more likely that
greater regional influence will be pursued consistently and incrementally. Nor should it
be presumed that China's assertiveness will be constrained until its material national
power indicators reach levels comparable to those of its main rivals.

In order to accomplish the three foreign policy objectives outlined above,
therefore, contemporary Chinese grand strategy seeks to expand China's influence over
its periphery, whilst at the same time reducing American influence in Asia. Thus,
Chinese grand strategy will employ China's growing political and economic power,
increasingly backed by the modernizing elements of the PLA, to undermine the U.S.
alliance system, tie the economies of East Asian states to the Chinese economy, develop
the military capabilities to threaten its rival Asian states and their seaborne economic
lifelines and, ultimately, their American protector in the East Asian theatre. A
39
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Swame and Tellis, Interpreting China's Grand Strategy, pp. 112-114.
Ibid., pp. 153-155.
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fundamental tenet of China's strategy is to develop geopolitical and strategic superiority
over its Asian rivals: both India and, especially, Japan. Beijing's longstanding suspicion
of Tokyo has only intensified in the more fluid political conditions of post-Cold War,
post-Soviet Asia. 42
There can be little doubt that the best way for China to maintain external
conditions favourable to economic development, including secure sea lanes and access
to natural resources, would be to allow the American-led and protected international
security order to continue unchallenged. However, China's pursuit of strategic and
economic independence and regional leadership make that an unlikely prospect. The
two elements of China's grand strategy co-exist uneasily, but as its relative influence
continues to grow, China will increasingly seek to determine the shape of its peripheral
strategic environment. An essential connecting link between the elements of China's
grand strategy and its policy objectives is the centrality of maritime factors, which has
created a requirement for the further development of Chinese maritime power as a grand
strategic enabler.

The Maritime Aspects of China's Grand Strategy
China's grand strategy is influenced by a number of maritime factors, including:
political geography, strategic geography, the creation of a new economic heartland in
the coastal zones, the location of new sources of raw resources, the importance of
seaborne trade and the shipping-dependent nature of China's oil security.

Geography

As noted in the introductory chapter, the geography of East Asia, including the
economic geography of trade, is largely maritime; the sea is the primary factor linking
the large and politically disparate area. China's most politically urgent, contentious and
dangerous territorial disputes are in the maritime, rather than the continental,
geographical environment. China's territorial, jurisdictional and wider political disputes
with its three main rivals in East Asia, Taiwan, Japan and the United States, are all

inherently maritime in nature. Conversely, China's ascendancy in continental Asia, at

Avery Goldstein, "The Diplomatic Face of China's Grand Strategy: A Rising Power's Emerging
Choice," The China Quarterly, No. 168, December 2001, p. 836.
42 See, for example, "Japan Wants Rearmament," People's Daily (online ed.), 6 December 2002.
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the expense of Russian power,43 means that Beijing's land borders are more secure
today than they have been for centuries, although

cross~border

support for Uighur

separatism in Xinjiang remains a concern for Beijing. 44 China nevertheless enjoys
comfortable relations with Russia and the former Soviet Central Asian states,
demonstrated by the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to promote
Chinese influence in that region under the guise of confidence building. That influence
is being used by Beijing to combat "terrorist" (that is, separatist) forces,4s and to secure
alternative sources of oil and gas supplies,46 even though Beijing has been frustrated by
the increased American strategic presence in Central Asia, as noted earlier. 47 Despite
that frustration, Michael Yahuda's description of China's geopolitical situation as
offering a contrast between China's continental "ease" and its maritime "difficulties"
remains largely valid. 48
Secondly, because China holds ambitions to eventually dominate what is largely
a maritime region, it must develop maritime strategic power capable of operations
throughout East Asian seas; and because its principal major rivals are sea powers, it
needs to be able to develop the maritime forces capable of defeating those powers at sea
in Asian waters. The continued presence of a hostile regime on the island of Taiw~
however, remains a fundamental geostrategic barrier to the Qperationalization of
China's regional ambitions, adding a further "Chinese strategic rationale to the already
tense cross-Strait political conflict.
Thirdly. the economic aspects of China's grand strategy have a decided maritime
flavour. The reopening of the Chinese economy was based upon enhanced economic
engagement with the outside world; China's external trade is predominantly carried by
sea. China's economic development in the Deng and post-Deng eras has been centred
upon the coastal regions, which have replaced the old industrial and agricultural interior
as China's new economic heartland, initially based in designated Special Economic

See Ross H. Mumo, "China's Waxing Spheres of Influence," Orbis, Vol. 38, No. 4, Fall 1994.
See Information Office of the State Council, "'East Turkistan' Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with
Impunity," 21 January 2002, reproduced in the People'8 Daily ConIine ed.), 21 January 2002.
45 See, for example, "Shanghai Body Vows Terror Fight on All Fronts," South China Morning Post
~on1ine ed.), 8 January 2002.
6 See "China's Oil Security Faces Tests of War," People's Daily Conline ed.), 20 October 2002.
47 See Malik. Dragon on Terrorism.
48 Michael Yahuda, "China's Foreign Relations: The Long March, Future Uncertain," The China
Quarterly, No. 159, September 1999, p. 655.
43
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Zones. 49 And, although China is relatively resource rich, the need to fuel future
economic growth has enhanced the role of sea-based living and non-living resources in
Chinese thinking on economic security. Many of those resources lie within (or under)
disputed waters, whilst the importance of seaborne oil imports is a strategically vital
maritime factor impacting upon China's grand strategy.

Oil Security
The maintenance of secure energy supplies is a necessary precondition for China's
continued high economic growth rates. With demand for hydrocarbon resources
outstripping domestic supply, China has attempted to diversify the sources of imported
supplies to lessen the dangers of disruption, particularly to those supplies sourced from
the Middle East. 5o The importance attached by Beijing to energy security is shown in its
willingness to pursue energy infrastructure projects which are not viable in purely
financial tenns. Neither the Three Gorges Dam hydroelectric project,5! nor the 4,000 km
gas pipeline now under construction to connect the gas fields ofXinjiang's Tarim Basin
to the booming industries of Shanghai,52 is likely to be economically viable, although

each also plays a role in the economic development of central and western China.
Whilst energy, in general, is important, oil, in particular, is strategically
essential. Oil is the lifeblood of any military machine and much of the transportation
sector of an economy, and a secure supply is a prerequisite to the attainment of true
strategic independence. Although total energy consumption has fallen over the last few
years due to a reduction in the use of coal, oil (and gas) consumption continues to
groW.
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Total oil consumption in 2000 amounted to almost 227 million tonnes, over 88

million tonnes (or almost 39 per cent) of which was imported. Of those imports 43.5 per

49 See, for example, Alexander Chieh-cheng Huans, "Chinese Maritime Modernization and Its Security
Implications: The Deng Xiaoping Era and Beyond," Ph.D. dissertation, George Washington University,
1994, esp. pp. 104-138.
so See Erica Strecker Downs, China's Questfor Energy Security, MR-1244-AF, RAND, Santa Monica,
CA, 2000; and Christoph Bluth, ''Energy Needs Shape China's External Relations," Jane '8 Intelligence
Review, Vol. 14, No. 10, October 2002.
SI See Vaclav Smil. "China's Energy and Resource Uses: Continuity and Change," The China Quarterly,
No. 156, December 1998, pp. 945-946.
52 "A Pipeline to the Future, Clogged by China's Past?" The Washington Post (onHne ed.), 20 August
2002. The entire project may cost upwards of U.S.$18 billion to complete. At present, demand for gas is
being driven by political rather than economic factors, as Beij:ing attempts to push Chinese :industry away
from its dependence on dirty coal to cleaner, more efficient energy sources. For a self-congratulatory
Chinese perspective, see "Gas Pipeline Runs over 4,000 km across China," People's Daily (onIine ed.), 5
July 2002.
S3 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2001, BP, London, 200 I, p. 2.
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cent were sourced from the Middle East~ with Southeast Asia and West Africa the other
significant supply regions. 54
Beijing fears that continued instability in the Persian Gulf area poses a threat to
oil security, whilst the seaborne oil trade route has also become an important national
security concern. To mitigate the threat, China plans to establish a strategic oil reserve

of about eight million tons, rising to 20 million tons (almost 150 million barrels) in ten
years time. The intention is to create a reserve of at least 30 days supply. 55 The strategic
reserve is to be one part of a national oil strategy which will also involve new
investment in domestic oil exploration and infrastructure, increased diversification of oil
imports and investment in foreign oil production projects. 56 Chinese oil companies
already have exploitation projects in Sudan, Venezuela, Kuwait, Iran, Iraq, Algeria and
Indonesia, and may develop further projects with Russia and Kazakhstan. 57 Of those
overseas production projects, only ventures with Russia and Kazakhstan can mitigate a

growing dependence upon (and vulnerability to potential disruptions of) the Asian sea
lines of communication (SLOCs) along which China's imported oil (and gas) supplies
are carried. Whereas a Kazakh pipeline does not seem at all economically viable under
current circumstances,58 a new 2,400 km oil pipeline from Angarsk, Siberia, to Daqing
in northeast China, may supply an estimated seven per cent of China's annual demand
by 2005. 59
Nevertheless, with demand for oil growmg

In

unison with its expanding

economy, China will struggle to significantly reduce it,S current reliance on the Middle
East in the medium term. One Chinese report claims that continued strong economic
growth may require China to import up to 50 per cent of its oil needs by 2020,60 and
54 Ibid., pp. 18 and 38. China still exports small quantities of oil; net imports equated to 71 million tonnes
(or around 31 per cent oftotal consumption) in 2000.
55 "China's Oil Security Faces Tests of War," People's Daily (onIine ed.), 20 October 2002.
56 See "China's 21'1 Century Oil Strategy Outlined," People's Daily (onIine ed.), 14 November 2002.
51 See "China to Step Up Overseas Oil Exploitation," People '8 Daily (ooline ed.), 22 April 2002;
"China's Strategic Pattern of Natural Gas Outlined," People's Daily (online ed.), 1 November 2002;
"Sinopec Wins Oil Contract in Algeria," CNN (online), 3 October 2002; and Bluth, "Energy Needs Shape
China's External Relations," p. 41. See also Downs, China's Quest/or Energy Secun·ty. Table 3.1, pp.
21-23, for a more detailed list of China's international oil partnerships.
58 Ibid., pp. 24-29; and Bluth. "Energy Needs Shape China's External Relations," pp. 42-43. There may,
however, be long-tenn political and strategic advantages for China in Central Asia were Beijing to pursue
such a project some time in the future, perhaps in a period of sustained high world oj[ prices. See also
Gaye Cbristoffersen, "China's Intentions for Russian and Central Asian Oil and Gas," NBR Analysis, Vol.
9, No. 2, 1998.
59 "Russia-China Oil Line Clogged By Politics," The Straits Times (online ed.), 24 December 2002; and
''Russia to Build Two Oil Pipelines in the East," The Straits Times (online 00.), 12 February 2003. The
China pipeline will be able to carry 400,000 barrels of oil per day.
60 "China's Oil Security Faces Tests of War," People's Daily (online ed.), 20 October 2002.
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another that China's oil imports may almost quintuple by 2030, in the process making
China the world's biggest oil importer (from being the third biggest today).61 Because
much of the world's easily extracted oil is located in the Persian Gulf, that region will
continue to be a major supplier to an increasingly oil hungry China, even if some
diversification of supply is successfu1. 62 That continued reliance may lead to increased
competition for influence in the oil producing states of the Middle East between major
importers, adding another potential irritant to the increasingly competitive relations
between China and India, and China and a heavily import-dependent Japan.
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Central

Asia and Southeast Asia are also prime targets for major power competition over access
to oil. The oil problem is less one of resource scarcity than one of the rising energy
security concerns of the states of Northeast Asia and South Asia, whereby the otherwise
reliable pricing mechanisms of the market are insufficient to allay strategic uncertainties
and strategic competition, increasingly involving China and its projected future oil
demand. 64
Natural gas is also becoming an important energy source for China's booming
central and southern coastal provinces. 65 Imported supplies inevitably will play an
important role, consisting of liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports (by sea) and imported
pipeline gas. 66 Despite long-tenn plans to build natural gas pipelines from Russia andlor
Central Asia,67 there are huge infrastructure costs and engineering challenges involved
in such schemes. LNG is not only an easier and economically more feasible supply
See "China's 21 at Century Oil Strategy Outlined," People's Daily (online ed.), 14 November 2002.
On the continuing strategic importance of Persian Gulf oil, see Geoffrey Kemp, "The Persian Gulf
Remains the Strategic Prize," Survival, Vol. 40, No. 4, Winter 1998-99; and Amy Myers Jaff"e and Robert
A Manning, "The Myth of the Caspian 'Great Game': The Real Geopolitics of Energy," Survival, Vol.
40, No. 4, Winter 1998-99.
63 See Kemp, "The Persian Gulf Remains the Strategic Prize"; Kent E. Calder, Asia's Deadly Triangle:
How Arms, Energy and Growth Threaten to Destabilize Asia-Pacific, Nicholas Brealey, London, 1997
(first pub. 1996), Ch. 3; and Ji Guoxing, "Energy Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific," The Korean
Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. VIII, No. 2, Winter 1996, p. 290. In fact, China has. already forged
close links with "rogue state" terrorist-sponsoring oil producers such as Iran, Iraq and Sudan. See U.S.China Security Review Commission, "The National Security Implications of the Economic Relationship
between the United States and China," Report to Congress Pursuant to Public Law 106-398 (30 October),
July 2002. Ch. 7; and "China Struggles to Cut Reliance on Mideast Oil," The New York Times (online
ed.), 3 September 2002.
64 On the issues and competing market economic versus competitive strategic options for Asia's future
energy security see, fOT example, Robert A. Manning, "The Asian Energy Predicament," Survival, Vol.
42. No. 3.., Spring 2000; and Daniel Yergin, Dennis Eldof and Jefferson Edwards. "Fueling Asia's
Recovery," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 2. MarchlApril 1998.
65 By 2020 total energy demand in the coastal provinces is expected to more than triple from 1995 levels.
Dean Girdis, Stratos Tavoulareas and Ray Tomkins, Liquefied Natural Gas in China: Options for
Markets, Institutions, and Finance, World Bank Discussion Paper No. 414, International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, World Bank, Washington, D.e., May 2000, p. 6.
66 Ibid., Ch. 4.
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option than piped supplies for imported gas, it also has the advantage of being less
complicated and risky politically because it is not required to transit other countries:
whereas LNG contracts involve only bilateral arrangements, piped gas from the fonner
Soviet Union often would require agreement between several states. 68
With a steadily rising demand for imported oil and gas, China relies increasingly
on the sea lanes connecting the energy supplies of the Persian Gulf, Africa and
Southeast Asia to Northeast Asia. Oil tankers serving Northeast Asia must pass through
the Indian Ocean, the Andaman Sea, the Malacca Strait and the contested waters of the
South China Sea. Those waters are, in effect, collectively protected by the navies of the
United States, India and Japan; and each of these states has a growing competitive
relationship with China. One Chinese report states that such a "single route will bring
certain strategic risks. Once China and Southeast Asian countries or the United States
fall foul of each other, oil transportation will be impeded. ,,69 In addition to instability in
the Middle East, therefore, the vulnerability of sea lanes (i.e., shipping) to disruption is
another determinant of China's diversification efforts.
A second maritime element in China's diversification plan is further
development of oil exploration and exploitation activities in the South China Sea,
including cooperative offshore oil and gas field development with Southeast Asian
nations. 70 Even if cooperative schemes are successful, however, China's grand strategy
to assert its regional leadership is unlikely to change, and such schemes may bind
Southeast Asian states closer to China.

Maritime Power and Geopolitical ExpanSion

The growing economic importance to China of marine resources and the detennination
to "defend" its expansive conception of its own "territorial sovereignty and maritime
rights and interests,'m have combined to create the strongly nationalistic concept of

See Christoffersen, "China's Intentions for Russian and Central Asian Oil and Gas."
Girdis et al., Liquefied Natural Gas in China, p. 30.
69 "China's Oil Security Faces Tests of War," People's Daily (online ed.), 20 October 2002. Energy
cooperation with Japan and South Korea is one part of China's proposed solution, using piped Russian
and Central Asian oil and gas to supply Northeast Asia It would be strategically inept for Tokyo to create
any reliance on pipelines that passed through either China or the Korean peninsula. however. For an
i11ustration of proposed Tram-Asian pipelines, see Mark J. Valencia. "Energy and Insecurity in Asia,"
Survival, Vol. 39, No. 3, Autumn 1997, p. 88.
70 "China's Oil Security Faces Tests of War," People's Daily (online 00.), 20 October 2002. See also
Chapter 7 of this dissertation for more detail.
71 "China's National Defense in 2000," p. vii. This is typical of the phraseology used in official Chinese
documents and speeches.
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"sea as national territory" - the geographical environment within which the greatest
n
contemporary 1;hreats to China's sovereignty and ''reunification'' are perceived to lie.
The economic motivation to harness regional marine resources, especially those of the
South China Sea, has influenced opinion in Beijing that maritime expansion might
provide "survival space" or "living space" (Lebensraum) - a somewhat unfortunate
term to use given its historical connotations - to ease the land-based enviromnental
constraints on China's economic development. 73 An internal, albeit unofficial, Chinese
policy document, revealed in 1992, stated:

In tenns of resources, the South China Sea holds reserves worth U.S.$l trillion. Once
Xinjiang has been developed this will be the sole area for replacement of resources, and

it is a main fallback position for lebensraum for the Chinese people in the coming
century .... development southward is perhaps a strategic orientation that we will have to
choose.'4

China's ambitions to control the oil and gas resources of the South China Sea is
part of a regional trend towards what one Chinese, analyst has termed East Asia's
''resource nationalism." 75 Although the South China Sea has been the primary focus for
Chinese Lebensraum, the East China Sea, the Indian Ocean and (outer) space have all
been targeted as part of this expansionist geopolitical doctrine. 76 The seemingly
innocuous goal of national economic development and modernization thus becomes
rather more worrisome for China's neighbours when the links between development and
Beijing's territorial and hegemonic ambitions are fully considered.
It can be sunnised, therefore, that China's grand strategy includes the

development of comprehensive maritime power - involving both economic/commercial
and military-strategic elements77

-

as one grand strategic instrument with which to

achieve the three (interlinked) foreign policy goals described earlier: economic
72 Samuel S. Kiln, China '8 Quest for Secun'ty in the Post-Cold War World, Strategic Studies Institute,
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, FA, July 1996, p. 12.
73 Ibid., pp. 12-13; John W. Garver, "China's Push Through the South China Sea: The Interaction of
Bureaucratic and National Interests," The China Quarterly, No. 132, December 1992, pp. 1018-1020 and
1027; and Nan Li, ''The FLA's Evolving Warfighting Doctrine, Strategy and Tactics, 1985-95: A Chinese
Perspective," The China Quarterly, No. 146, June 1996, p. 450.
74 Quoted in ''Treacherous Shoals/' Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 August 1992, p. 16.
73 Ji, "Energy Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific," p. 288.
76 Kim, China's Quest/or Security in the Post-Cold War World, p. 12. Goldstein, "The Diplomatic Face
of China's Grand Strategy," pp. 862-863, however, argues (unpersuasively) that China's maritime claims,
including Taiwan, "do not reflect a revisionist, expansionist agenda."
71 See Chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation, respectively, for detailed analyses.
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development, defence of territorial integrity and sovereign rights, and regional
geopolitical primacy. Bemard Cole seems to be alluding to the same point when he
states that Chinese strategy is aiming for "longer-term regional maritime dominance
through both combatant and merchant fleets.,,78 In a similar vein, Andrew Wilson
argues that China has a broad '"seapower strategy" to expand its shipping and other
areas of the marine economy to support the twin objectives of "continuing economic
development while decreasing dependency, and at the same time enhancing and
legitimising China's status as a regional power and a world player.,,79 There can be little
doubt that China fully understands the importance of maritime power to the pursuit of
its regional ambitions. Two Chinese strategists, for example, have explicitly linked the
development of maritime power with China's wider ambitions to reclaim its status as a
leading international power:

If we are to be a world great power, we must not merely cast our eyes at the continental
land, but must also look toward the oceans, and we must have a strong 'ocean
consciousness.' If we don't have a strong and powerful ocean force, it is very difficult
to enter the ranks of the world's powerful states. so

China can thus be expected to try to dominate regional seaborne trade as part of
its efforts to tie the economies of the East Asian states to its own by creating a
dependence upon both the Chinese market and Chinese shipping. In the military realm,
maritime power will be required to protect China's maritime territory and maritime
economic interests - both actual and claimed - and demonstrate Chinese power to its
neighbours by increasing its naval presence throughout the region. To "defend" its
many maritime interests, China is expanding the PLA's maritime capabilities. As
explained in later chapters, China is only at the beginning of that process, and is hardly
preordained to succeed. Nevertheless, although China remains primarily a continental
state in cultural tradition and outlook, the focus of its external policies increasingly falls

Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China's Navy Enters the Twenty-First Century, Naval
Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2001, p. 177. Unfortunately, Cole does not develop the idea further.
79 Andrew R. Wilson, "Chinese Seapower in the Twenty-first Century: Aspirations and Limitations," in
Geoffrey Till, ed., Seapower at the Millennium, Sutton Publishing, Phoenix Mill, Gloucestershire, 2001,
145 .
.
o Zhang Zhaozhong and Guo Xiangxing, quoted in Alastair lain Johnston, ''Realism(s) and Chinese
Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Period," in Ethan B. Kapstem and Michael Mastanduno, OOs.,
Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War, Columbia University Press, New
York, 1999, p. 284.
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on the maritime periphery, thus enhancing the role both of maritime strategy and
maritime forces within China's overall national military strategy.

CHINA'S MILITARY STRATEGY

Chinese military strategy has had to adapt to changed threat perceptions resulting from
the rise, decline and disappearance of the Soviet threat, and has mirrored to a large
extent Deng Xiaoping's economic refonns. These changes created a need for the PLA to
refocus its strategy to take account of China's new outward-looking and rapidly
modernizing national ethic. 8I Although, internally, the PLA lacks complete Wlanimity in
its views on potential threats and the character of future war,82 there has been a general
change in Chinese military strategy and doctrine from a focus upon continental interests
and threats to threats and interests in the Chinese littoral and adjacent seas. It is in those
maritime regions where the heart of the modem Chinese economy, the Taiwan issue and
other pressing territorial and jurisdictional disputes lie. And, for China to successfully
ascend the hierarchy of nations in East Asia, it must take to the sea and develop its
maritime power.
The PLA's patterns of behaviour, such as military procurement and exercises, all
point to a new strategic focus on China's maritime periphery.83 The following sections
demonstrate how Chinese military strategy has evolved from a continental
preoccupation to an emphasis upon the maritime periphery as threat perceptions and the
scope of Beijing's geopolitical ambitions have shifted over time. 84 One potential
difficulty encountered in both Chinese documents and the secondary literature is an
See Finkelstein, "China's National Military Strategy," pp. l07~108.
See, for example, PiIlsbury, China Debates the Future Security EnVironment, esp. Ch. 6; David
Shambaugh, "China's Military Views the World: Ambivalent Security," International Security, Vo!. 24,
No. 3, Winter 1999/2000; Finkelstein, "China's National Military Strategy," pp. 123~128; and Allen S.
Whiting, "The PLA and China's Threat Perceptions," The China Quarterly, No. 146, June 1996.
83 The maritime emphasis of the PLA's force structure development is dealt with in Chapters 5 and 6. On
the emphasis of recent PLA exercises on the Chinese periphery, especially the maritime periphery, see
SUSM M. Puska, «Rough but Ready Force Projection: An Assessment of Recent PLA Training," in
Andrew Scobell and l..arry M. Wortzel, eds., China's Growing Military Power: Perspectives on Security,
Ballistic Missiles, and Conventional Capabilities, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,
Carlisle, P A, September 2002.
84 On
change, see, for example, Paul H.B. Godwin, ''The PLA Faces the Twenty~first Century:
RetIections on Technology, Doctrine, Strategy, and Opemtions," in James R. Lilley and David
Shambaugh, eds., China's Military Faces the Future, AB! and M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, N.Y., 1999; Paul
H.B. Godwin, "From Continent to Periphery: PLA Doctrine, Strategy and Capabilities towards 2000,"
The China Quarterly, No. 146, June 1996; Li, ''The PLA's Evolving Warfighting Doctrine, Strategy and
Tactics, 1985-1995"; and E1Jis Joffe, The Chinese Army after Mao, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London,
1987, Ch. 4.
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inconsistent and sometimes confusing use of terminology. In particular, there is a
tendency to use the tenn "doctrine" in the Chinese (and Soviet) sense to describe "a
view about the nature of the most important type of future war in which the nation is
likely to be involved." Yet, in Western parlance, as explained by Mark BurIes and
Abram ShuIsky, such a view guides the formulation of national military strategy, whilst
that strategy in turn guides weapon procurement, the development of doctrine and other
"decisions concerning the nation's preparations for war."S5 The following analysis
employs the Western tenninology. Thus, national military strategy can be defined as
"the art of employing all of the anned forces '" for the political purposes expressed as

high policy, H whilst doctrine "should specify how the different anns can fight
effectively together.,,86

The Evolution of China's National Military Strategy: From Continental to Maritime
Priorities
Strategy in the Mao Era

China's military strategy and doctrine evolved only slowly until Mao's death in 1976.
Maoist military strategy was represented by the slogan "people's war." People's war
was a strategic concept to overcome Chinese military inferiority and teclmological
backwardness, and defeat any invasion of the Chinese homeland. People's war relied on
the use of geographical advantage and such "human factors" as morale, ideological
indoctrination and the mass mobilization of the Chinese army, militias and general
population. Mobility and the doctrinal principle of "active defence" were stressed,
informing a military strategy that planned for an attritional war against invading forces,
whereby China would use its defensive depth to make strategic withdrawals, vacating
cities in the path of the enemy in order to lure him into the interior and lengthen his
lines of communication before launching, firstly, counterattacks to attrite those enemy
85 Mark BurIes and Abram N. Shulsky, Patterns in China's Use of Force: Evidence from History and
Doctrinal Writings, MR-1160 AF, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2000, pp. 21-22. David Finkelstein puts
the inconsistency in the use of the term "doctrine," when comparing PLA to common Westem usage,
down to "the opaque nature of [the Chinese] system ... complicated by the language barrier and ... a lack
of parallelism in terminology." See David M. Finkelstein, "Conunentary on Doctrine," in James C.
MuIvenon and AndrewN.D. Yang, eds., Seeking Truthfrom Facts: A Retrospective on Chinese Military
Studies in the Post-Mao Era, CF-160-CAPP, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2001, pp. 126-127. These
semantic confusions aside, the general gist of different secondary source analyses is the same and result in
similar conclusions. For other treatments of the topic, see Paul RE. Godwin, "Compensating for
Deficiencies: Doctrinal Evolution in the Cmnese People's Liberation Army: 1978-1999"; and Alexander
Chieh-cheng Huang, "Transformation and Refinement of Chinese Military Doctrine: Reflection and
Critique on the PLA's View," both in ibid.
w
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forces (by a variety of means including guerrilla warfare) and, eventually, large-scale
counteroffensives. 87
The concept of people's war lived on into the (Chinese) nuclear era: by the late

1960s at the height of Sino-Soviet tensions Mao antiCipated "an early war, an

all~out

war, and a nuclear war." Even if China's main cities and its coastal regions were to be
devastated by a Soviet nuclear attack, Mao believed that people's war could continue to
be prosecuted from 'Within the vast Chinese interior. s8

The Transformation ofStrategy in the Deng Xiaoping Era
It was not until the death of Mao that the obsolescence of China's defence posture, in

tenns of both strategy and forces, was able to be modified. Even then, it was not
possible to reject the Maoist legacy out of hand. The new strategy developed during the
late 1970s and early 19808 was termed "people's war under modern conditions," which
represented a significant departure from people's war by rejecting the trade-off of space
for time, and instead sought to defend China's borders at the outset of any Soviet attack.
Cities were now to be defended in a forward-defensive strategy of positional warfare, a
concession to the fact that manoeuvre warfare would be extremely difficult against
highly mobile Soviet mechanized divisions. Once any assault had been halted, Chinese
forces would then be able to take the counteroffensive, thus maintaining the Maoist
principle of active defence. A final change from the people's war strategy was that
China could now employ its own small nuclear arsenal as a retaliatory force to deter

Soviet nuclear first use. Guided by the precept of people's war under modem
conditions, Chinese strategy no longer assumed that any major war would automatically
involve nuclear attacks at the outset of hostilities: the PLA's nuclear weapons thus were
intended to provide a modicum of intra-war nuclear deterrence. 89 The role of Chinese
maritime forces did not change, however, perhaps due to limited naval capabilities:
coastal defence thus remained the primary naval mission. 90

86 Colm S. Gray, War, Peace, and Victory: Strategy and Statecraft for the Next Century, Touchstone,
New York, 1990, pp. 32 and 41 (emphasis added).
87 JoiIe. The Chinese Army after Mao, pp. 71-77.
88 John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China's Strategic Seapower: The Politics ofForce Modernization in
the Nuclear Age, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1994, p. 212.
89 See loffe, The Chinese Army after Mao, pp. 77-93; Godwin, "The PLA Faces the Twenty-first
Century," pp. 43-48; and Li, ''The PLA's Evolving Warfighting Doctrine, Strategy and Tactics, 1985-

1995," p. 443.
Lewis andXue, China's Strategic Seapower, p. 224.
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China's military strategy undelWent a rather more profound transformation
during the height of the Deng Xiaoping period. Initially identified in 1985, the Deng-era
transformation continued to evolve as the Soviet threat.first declined, and then died with
the collapse of the Soviet Union and continued strategic decline of the new Russian
state. The Soviet collapse effectively left China without a serious external threat,
transforming Beijing's strategic outlook and its perceptions of the types of wars that the
PLA might in future be required to fight. In this major revision, the longstanding
assumption that the most likely war facing China was a total war against a probable
Soviet invasion was forsaken in favour of a new military strategy which stressed
China's interests in its maritime periphery. This seismic shift in strategic emphasis
transformed Chinese strategic thinking from its traditional landward predisposition of
continental defence, to defence of all of China's peripheral regions, including, in
particular, its coastal areas and maritime territorial and economic interests. The new
strategy was no longer based around the requirement to fight total, probably nuclear and
possibly global, war, but "local, limited, war" along China's periphery, particularly the
maritime periphery, with an emphasis upon the territorial and resource disputes in the
South China Sea. 91
A major new concept was delineated by Chinese strategic thinkers to describe
(and justify) the expansion of strategic aims beyond purely territorial defence of
continental China. Whereas continental China had been protected hitherto by the
defence of its "territorial frontier," the new concept called for defence of China's
"strategic frontier," which emphasizes the maritime periphery both as the most likely
geographical source of competition and conflict, and as an area of newfound territorial,
economic and strategic interests for China. The concept of the "strategic frontier" has
been described in the PLA's Liberation Army Daily in the more elastic tenus of
"security space," "survival space" and "living space" of the state, the form and extent of
which may change as the comprehensive national strength of the state itself evolves.

92

As noted in an earlier section, the South China Sea was to become the primary, if not
the sole object of Chinese Lebensraum. It is important to remember that China had
spent the 1980s making deliberate and uncompromising preparations for an advance
91 Godwin, "The PLA Faces the Twenty-first Century," pp. 48-50; Godwin, "From Continent to
Periphery," pp. 468-469; and Li. "The PLA's Evolving Warfighting Doctrine, Strategy and Tactics, 19851995."
92 Ibid., p. 450. The PLA commentary reportedly characterizes the (outer) space environment, in addition
to the maritime one, as the most likely source of competition in the new international strategic landscape.
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into the Spratly Islands, where Vietnam was the leading, hut not the only adversary,
culminating in the establishment of Chinese military outposts in the archipelago in
1988.93 A seni~r PLA Navy officer thus outlined in the- late 19808 the newfound
maritime focus of Chinese military strategy:

the major political and economic conflicts between om country and other countries will
focus on the sea. The threats to our development and security also come from the sea.
To be more exact, they lie in the areas within the first island chain in the South China
Sea.94

The strategic importance of China's maritime environment was also stressed by
two Chinese strategists in 1987:

The strategic position of om coastal areas is extremely vital '" Numerous key cities,

industrial bases, foreign trade ports. and naval and air force bases ... are scattered along
our coastal areas [which play] an extremely important role in our effol18 to check the
hegemomsts' ... expansion in Southeast and Northeast Asia. In view of this, surprise
attacks launched by the enemy against our coa8tal areas might achieve greater results
than those against our landlocked borders. 95

At that point in time, the foremost "hegemonist" in Beijing's view was Vietnam (in
Indochina and the South China Sea) and, to a lesser extent, its Soviet backers
throughout East Asia, although perceptions of a Soviet threat were waning. As argued

by Tai Ming Cheung, improvements in Sino-American relations and growing ties across
the Taiwan Strait lessened the priority given to Taiwan as a strategic issue during the
19808. However, in the same period China began to grow increasingly suspicious of
Japanese military (especially naval) modernization and the extension of Japanese
responsibilities within the U.S.-Japan alliance for sea lane defence out

to a distance of

1,000 nautical miles from the Japanese home islands. India's naval ambitions also were

See, for example, Garver, "China's Push Through the South China Sea," pp. 1008-1010.
Rear Admiral Lin Zhiye, quoted in You Ji, "A Test Case for China's Defence and Foreign Policies,"
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 16. No. 4, March 1995, p. 380. See Chapter 6 for explanation of the
"two island chain" concept.
9S Zhang Huairui and Zhu Hengxing (in an article entitled "Resist the Enemy's Surprise Attacks on Our
Country's Coastal Areas by Employing the Integrated Combat Capabilities of the Anny, the Navy, and
the Air Force"), quoted in Lewis and Xue, China's Strategic Seapower, p. 225.
93
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beginning to be regarded as a potential threat to Beijing's interests. 96 The Indian Ocean
and its resources, after all, comprised part of China's envisaged future "survival space."
The new strategy represented a major discontinuity for Chinese militMy
planning, doctrine and force structure development. The role and meaning of "active
defence" was transformed into a doctrinal requirement to take the initiative (both
strategic - meaning to strike first - and tactical) and, increasingly, to perform offensive
operations at the outset of hostilities, rather than following the more traditional, reactive

course of defending against initial enemy attacks before launching counterattacks. In
another reversal of previous thinking, the PLA intended in future to concentrate its
forces in a local conflict, in order to achieve victory as quickly as possible through
superiority in forces and weaponry. (In any conflict against the Soviet Union, the PLA
had planned to win

'~ctory

over superiority through inferiority.") The acceptance of

the concept of "strategic deterrence," including the use of force build·ups and
demonstrations in localized areas for deterrence purposes (presumably including naval
''presence'' and coercive diplomacy missions), represents another change from Beijing's
Cold War perspective, which associated the concept of deterrence with aggression and
imperialism. A final difference to Chinese strategic thinking and planning was a new
emphasis upon elite forces, rather than on the mass mobilization of the anny and
militias, and a recognition that new organizational structures and command and control
procedures would have to be developed in order to be able to operate in the maritime
environment. 97
The focus on the maritime periphery and the growing importance of China's
maritime interests created a need to develop the ability to conduct joint operations. 98 As
a result of those requirements, the roles of both the air force and navy have been
elevated within Chinese defence priorities at the relative expense of the land forces that
traditionally have constituted the primary means for China's continental defence
strategy. 99 The implications of this transfonnation are far-reaching, requiring

96 Tai Ming Cheung, Growth of Chinese Naval Power: Priorities, Goals, Missions, and Regional
Implications, Pacific Strategic Paper 1, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1990, pp. 10-15.
97 Li, ''The PLA's Evolving Warfighting Doctrine, Strategy and Tactics, 1985-1995," pp. 450-453.
9S Current practice defines "joint operations" as integrated operations involving two or more of the
military services, while "combined operations" refers to those operations involving the forces of more
than one polity. "Combined anns" operations refers not to the combined forces of two or more countries,
but to the employment of environmentally-specific forces of one military service, in combination (such as
the surface, sub-surface, airborne and amphibious units of a navy).
99 This view is not universally shared by Western analysts, however. See Thomas J. Hirschfeld,
"Assessing China's Military Potential," East Asia: An International Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 1. Spring
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substantial, focused modernization of the elements of the PLA most likely to be used in
limited conflicts along the Chinese littoral and throughout the adjacent semi~enclosed
seas (especially, at that stage, the South China Sea). Those elements include air, missile,
naval and elite rapid response (or so-called "fist") forces, and require new levels of
professionalism, technical proficiency, lOgistics and readiness enhancement, and new
command, control and conununications arrangements to enable integrated military
formations to effectively prosecute joint operations in the East Asian littoral. For the
first time, the maritime component of Chinats defence strategy required more than just
the traditional coastal defence adjunct to a continental defence strategy. The
transformation to an "offshore defence" focus represents, therefore, a major challenge
for the PLA, which has had to reformulate its maritime strategy. wo .

Strategic Evolution in the Post-Deng Era
China reordered its threat assessments in the early 1990s in an acknowledgement that its
borders were perhaps as secure as they had ever been. Once the Cold War had ended
and containment of an imploding Soviet Union became UlUlecessary, however. the
United States no longer required a strategic partnership with China. That allowed
Washington to apply greater pressure upon Beijing over human rights, particularly after
the Tianarnnen massacre, Tibet and Taiwan, including major arms sales to the island in
1992. The global preponderance of American power in the post-Cold War period, amply
demonstrated in the Gulf War and in opposition to the Chinese policy of
''multipolarization,'' combined with diverging political interests to set Beijing and
Washington on a more competitive path in East Asia. As argued by AlIen Whiting, the
United States increasingly was viewed by Beijing as the leading political, if not
necessarily military threat to China. IOt
China's perceptions of military threat by this time had become almost
exclusively centred upon its maritime interests and the ambition to secure Lebensraum
in the maritime periphery, thus further expanding the scope of the PLA's
responsibilities and national military strategy ·'well beyond defence against attack."
1999, pp. 99~lOO, who argues that there is a "maritime over~emphasis" in most Western assessments; and
Alfred D. Wilhelm, China and Security in the Asian Pacific Region through 2010, CRM 95~226, Center
for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, VA, March 1996, pp. 42-44. These dissenting voices are unpersuasive,
however, and seem to discount the available (growing) evidence too easily.
100 Godwin. ''The PLA Faces the Twenty~first Century," pp. 50~51. (The development of Chinese
maritime strategy is the subject of Chapter 6 of this dissertation.)
101 Whiting. ''The PLA and China's Threat Perceptions," pp. 607~609.
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Whiting classified the PLA' s threat perceptions in the early 19908 period thus: an
immediate threat from Vietnam and other Southeast Asian claimant nations in the
Spratlys; a short-tenn (political) threat from Taiwanese democratization, independencemindedness and growing American support for the island (potentially including military
support); a

longer~tenn

threat from a more strategically independent and re-militarized

Japan; continuing suspicions of India; with threats to land borders now given the lowest
priority.102 A restricted distribution book on China's views of future threats and wars,
mistakenly sold to a foreign diplomat in Beijing, seemed to support that
characterization. 103
The ability of the PLA to achieve all of the necessary modernization (tenned
"anny-building" in PLA parlance) in order to be able to implement the new strategy and
doctrine was, however, already questionable at the time of the U.S.-led liberation of
Kuwait in 1991. 1he effectiveness of high technology weaponry during Operation
Desert Storm was deeply disturbing to the PLA, demonstrating just how backward its
forces and their supporting infrastructure were compared to those of the United States
and, to a lesser extent, other leading Western states. In the words of Paul Godwin, PLA
concern was heightened due to the fact that, "in the abstract, the Gulf War was precisely
the kind of war the PLA had been training to fight."l04 The gap between the PLA's
ambitions and the reality of its capabilities was thus rudely illuminated by the American
military perfonnance against Iraq: the PLA's wealmesses in range and mobility are
aptly summed up by the phrase "short arms and slow legs." Nevertheless, as shown by
Godwi~

Desert Stonn had actually vindicated in large part the PLA's conception of

warfare in the post-Cold War period; 105 it was a short, intensive regional conflict
featuring offensive joint operations, and a

high.ly~trained

professional force employing

high technology weapons and C 4rSR systems. 106
The impact of the Gulf War on PLA thinking led to the further integration of
modern weaponry and systems into PLA strategy: local, limited war thus evolved into
"local, limited war under high-tech conditions." This evolution re-emphasized the need
for taking the initiative, quickly and decisively (by surprise attacks if necessary) in
102 Ibid.

(quote from p. 600).
lO~ Ross H. Munro, "Eavesdropping on the Chinese Military: Where It Expects War - Where It Doesn't,"
Orbis, Vol. 38, No. 3, Summer 1994. The book, entitled Can China's Armed Forces Win the Next War?,
is believed to have been written either by PLA Navy officers or civilians promoting naval interests.
104 Godwin, "The PLA Faces the Twenty-first Century," p. 55.
105 Ibid.
4
106 C ISR: command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.
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offensive, joint operations, using well-trained elite forces equipped with high
technology weaponry. Acknowledging the PLA's shortfalls in most of these areas, as
4

well as in integrated logistics, support and sustainment and C ISR capabilities, there
seems to have been an at least implicit return to the idea of defeating superior forces
with inferior forces (depending upon the specific enemy in question)j by emphasizing
surprise (in addition to taking the initiative) and asymmetric capabilities and tactics, and

by leveraging the "non-linearity of the contemporary battlefield. "to1
The strategic planning that envisages high technology conflict in the maritime
periphery does not lie entirely unchallenged within the PLA. Another school, according

to some analysts, also influenced by the Gulf War (and the application of American and
NATO air power in Operation Allied Force against Serbia in 1999), has taken a longerrange view that believes that China must develop its own ''revolution in military affairs"
(RMA) .to be able to compete with the United States or other major powers in the

future.108 As noted in the previous chapter, China's capacity to develop American-style
RMA capabilities is limited at present, 109 although many of those capabilities are not
only compatible with the high-tech local war scenario (such as integrated C4ISR, the use
of space, infonnation warfare and long-range, precision strikes), but may well be
necessary for success in any localized war over Taiwan, especially if the United States
was to be involved. In fact, the very potential for conflict with the United States or any

other major power in the East Asian theatre (such as Japan) creates a confluence of
interests and strategic emphasis between the local war and RMA advocates. In any case,

107 Godwin, "The PLA Faces the Twenty-first Century," pp. 54-59. The tenninology of "local, limited
war under high-tech conditions" was adopted officially by Jiang Zemin in his capacity of Central Military
Commission chainnan in 1993. See Finkelstein, "China's National Military Strategy:' p. 126. For a
Chinese perspective on fighting superior military powers, see Shoo Kuiguan (Senior Col., PLAAF),
"Dialectics of Defeating the· Superior with the Inferior:' in Micbael Pillsbury, ed., Chinese Views of
Future Waifare, rev. ed., NDUPress, Washington, D.e., 1998.
.
108 Finkelstein, "China's National Military Strategy," pp. 125-126. Michael Pillsbury identifies three
separate, largely mutually exclusive, schools of thought: people's war; local war (power projection); and
RMA. Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment, Ch. 6. The three schools, particularly
the latter two, may not be as incompatible as Pillsbury sets out, and all are bound somewhat by the shared
concern about the Taiwan issue and the possibility ofU.S. intervention in the event of a Taiwan conflict.
For PLA perspectives on the RMA, see Pi11sbury, ed., Chinese Views of Future Waifare, Part 4. With
regard to Operation Allied Force, Arthur Waldron states that, despite the arguable effectiveness of the
U.S.-led air campaign, "what the Chinese saw operationally was wtdonbtedly troubling." See Arthur
Waldron, "The Kosovo War: Implications for Taiwan," in Susan M. Puska, ed., People's Liberation Amy
Next, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, August 2000, p. 265.
1 See, for example, Godwin, "Compensating for Deficiencies," pp. 108-109.
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as discussed earlier in Chapter 2, China may be developing its own RMA, "with
Chinese characteristics,,,110 or counter-RMA doctrine and tactics.
That potential for conflict with the United ,States over Taiwan heightened
markedly following American naval intervention during the Taiwan missile crisis in
1996. Political evolution in Taiwan had by mid decade elevated the island to being
China's number one "threat,',111 and America's naval diplomacy during the missile
crisis had transfonned the V.S. political threat into a military one for Beijing. The
daunting prospect that the V.S. Navy might again intervene in any future Taiwan
conflict has led, in the words of Douglas Porch, to the acceleration of "PLA efforts to
develop counters to D.S. naval superiority, with a goal of neutralizing American sea
power in the region.,,1l2 Chinese military strategy has become focused, therefore, on
potential combat over Taiwan involving the United States and, potentially, also Japan.
The subsequent revitalization of the V.S.-Japan alliance only made China more
suspicious of both the United States and Japan, and enhanced Beijing's perceptions of
an American-led anti-China containment policy.113 That perception may have been

exacerbated by America's expanding security cooperation not only with Japan but also
with states in Southeast Asia, Central Asia, South Asia and the Middle East. It4
India's 1998 nuclear weapons tests and identification of China as its main
adversary also increased Chinese awareness of a potential South Asian threat in the

future, whilst the South China Sea has dropped in priority as a potential area of threat as
China's strategic presence and influence have grown in Southeast Asia. us
The need to counter the United States has led to the development of specific
strategies and tactics for fighting superior adversaries. In an influential book published
in 1999, Warfare beyond Rules, two PLA authors rejected the idea that any war versus a
stronger opponent should remain limited. The book instead argues that Chinese strategy
should not be bound by rules set by Western powers and nonns. The authors, both PLA
110 For more positive views on the RMA opportunities being developed by the PIA. see, for example,
You Ji, The Armed Forces 0/ China, AlIen and Unwin, 8t Leonards, NSW, 1999, Ch. 1; and John
Arquilla and Solomon M. Kannel, "Welcome to the Revolution ... in Chinese Military Affairs," Defen.se
Analysis, Va!. 13, No. 3, December 1997.
111 Because Taiwan has become inextricably linked to the CCP's nationalist legitimizing ideology and the
PtA's nationalist world view, Taiwan's democratization and the increasing nativization of Taiwanese
politics pose an inherent threat to both party and Army.
112 Douglas Porch, "The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996: Strategic Implications for the United States Navy,"
Naval War College Review, Val. LIl. No. 3. Summer 1999, p. 23.
113 See; for example, Shambaugh, "China's Military Views the World."
114 See Malik, Dragon on Terrorism, esp. pp. 28-31.
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Air Force senior colonels, promote the employment of "unrestricted war," using
unconventional (asymmetric) means, including terrorism and cyber warfarey6 One
potential element of such unconventional means may be the use of nuclear weapons in a
high-tech local'war for tactical, war-fighting purposesy7
Maritime interests, ambitions and potential threats have thus dominated the
transfonnation of Chinese military strategy. The geopolitical implications of China's
seaward strategic focus is the subject of the next section.

CHINA'S MARITIME EXPANSION AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF EAST ASIA

The Geopolitics of East Asia
In geopolitical tenus, East Asia (and Asia more broadly) is probably entering its most
WlStable period since the era of Japanese imperial expansion, characterized by an
intensifying competition for influence between the major powers: the rise of China is a
central feature of that competition, both geographically and strategically.II8 As has
already been noted, China's continental borders today are free from any external, stateorganized threat. China's growing power and the strategic decline of Russia, moreover,
have arguably left China as the dominant continental Asian power. That is certainly the
case within eastern continental Asia, with Russia and India still both strong continental
powers in their own core regions. 1l9 However, the East Asian region CatUlot be
dominated by land power alone due to its maritime nature. Continental East Asia is
flanked by the sea on its eastern and southwestern edges, and by a long arc of
archipelagic and peninsular territory from Korea to Sumatra and peninsula Malaysia. Of

11S On China's assessments of threats posed by Japan and Indi~ see Pillsbury, China Debates the Future
Security Environment, Ch. 3.
116 See Ehsan Ahrari, "Unrestricted War: The Leveller," Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 12, No. 2,
February 2000; and Ming Zhang, 'War without Rules," The Bulletin a/the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 55, No.
6, NovemberlDecember 1999.
117 See Godwin, "Compensating for Deficiencies," p. 108; and You, The Armed Forces v/China, pp. 9495.
118 See, for example, JOM R. Landry, ''The Military Dimensions of Great-Power Rivalry in the AsiaPacific Region," in Paul D. Taylor, ed., Asia and the Pacific: U.S. Strategic Traditions and Regional
Realities, Naval War College Press, Newport, RI, 2001.
119 Micb8.el McDevitt may be overstepping the mark when he refers to China as continental Asia's
"dominant militaIy power." Continental Asia encompasses a huge area: it is currently beyond the
capabilties of anyone state to "dominate" the entire land mass of Asia militarily, and Russian (and
Indian) military power should not be written off lightly. It is more accurate, therefore, to describe China
as the dominant land power of East Asia, rather than of the entire continent of Asia. See Michael
McDevitt, "Geographic Rwninations," in Larry M. Wortzel, 00., The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21 31
Century, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, December 1999, p. 2.
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those territories, only the Korean Pertinsula is directly vulnerable to Chinese land
power. Within the maritime realm there exists a dominant sea power, the United States;
a major sea power, Japan; and the smaller, but strategically significant sea powers,
South Korea and Taiwan. Finally, the three major Asian continental powers are each
significant sea powers, but it is the growing maritime power of continentalist China and
its current maritime strategic focus that threatens to destabilize the geopolitics of Asia.
It is important to acknowledge that, in strategic terms, states usually are neither

exclusively land powers (except for landlocked states) or maritime powers: most coastal
states, even continental ones, maintain at least some level of maritime power - both
commercial and military. Polities do tend to emphasize, however, either a landward or
maritime strategic disposition, depending on their geographical circumstances. 120 Thus,
geostrategically, East Asia is dominated on land by China, and at sea by a loose system
of American bilateral alliances centred upon U.S. maritime power. 121 eoHn Gray makes
the point that, in war, "great land powers can be beaten only on land and great sea
powers can be beaten only at sea."I22 In East Asia, therefore, for China to achieve its
long-term goal of geopolitical primacy and sovereignty over Taiwan and large areas of
East Asia's seas, it must develop the means to, at least, be able to contest the sea control
enjoyed by the dominant sea powers of the region and, at best~ to be able to decisively
defeat those powers at sea, if necessary.

Maritime Strategy for a Continental Power
In a widely cited article, Robert Ross misrepresents the current geopolitical situation in

East Asia. He contends that the region is geopolitically stable due to a combination of
regional bipolarity between China and the United States, and the inability of either
power to threaten the other in its dominant strategic realm. 123 The United States~ quite
clearly, poses little threat to the dominance of Chinese land power in continental East
Asia. However, while Ross admits that the future stability of East Asia is dependent

120 Colin S. Gray, "Seapower and Landpower," in Colin S. Gray and Roger W. Bamett, eds., Seapower
and Strategy, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1989, pp. 3-4. See also Colm S. Gray, The Leverage
o/Sea Power: The Strategic Advantage o/Navies in War, The Free Press, New York, 1992; and Norman
Friedman, Seapawer as Strategy: Navies and National Interests, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis. MD,
2001, esp. Ch. 6.
121 See, for example, James E. Auer and Robyn Lim, "The Maritime Basis of American Security in East
Asia," Naval War College Review, VaL LIV, No. 1, Winter 2001.
122 Gray, "Seapower and Landpower," p. 4.
123 Robert S. Ross, "The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-fIrst Century," International
Security, Vat 23, No. 4, Spring 1999.

87

upon whether China develops sufficient maritime power to challenge the regional order,
he is overly dismissive of the extent to which Chinese grand strategy is already focused
on a long-tenn reordering of the geopolitical hierarchy of major powers. 124 He misstates
the problem by suggesting that China will be unable to develop a quality of naval power
sufficient to "challenge U.S. supremacy," noting the similarities between China's
current situation and the naval dilemmas and limitations of previous continental great
powers, imperial and Soviet Russia and Wilhelmine Gennany.125
China, however, does not need to be able to generate naval power comparable to
that of the United States to challenge American preponderance in East Asia: favourable
geography means that the PLA needs only to be able to deter or defeat the United States
in the East Asian littoral using the sum total of its land and sea-based maritime forces.
As noted by James Auer and Robyn Lim, the development of Chinese maritime power
is not aimed at becoming a global peer competitor to the reigning maritime superpower,
but to deter its maritime adversaries (by being able to inflict politically unsustainable
losses in any conflict) as it slowly edges toward its goal of regional primacy.126 It is
important to remember, using Gray's words once again, that previous "great continental
powers ... notwithstanding the traditional primacy of land power in their dominant
theories of war, have been obliged to find a maritime strategy.,,127 China, too, is obliged
to develop a maritime strategy and commensurate maritime power to secure its
overriding regional foreign and security policy objectives.
The bipolar, neorealist geopolitical perspective proffered by Ross also distorts
the complex and fluid reality of regional power relationships. He is seemingly unaware
of the extent that China's maritime expansion threatens Japanese security, or the central
role that Japan plays in a continued American presence in the region. 128 Contra Ross,
therefore, it is the contention of this dissertation that China is actively seeking, as part of
its long-term grand strategy, to undermine American maritime dominance in East Asia
and to develop sufficient maritime strength to eventually become both the leading Asian
124

Ross unconvincingly argues that China's primary security concern lies with its border with Russia.

Ibid., p. 104.
125 Ibid., pp. 106-107.

Auer and Lirn, "The Maritime Basis of American Security in East Asia," p. 45.
Colin S. Gray, "Sea Power in Modem Strategy," in David Stevens and John Reeve, eds., Southern
Trident: Strategy. History and the Rise ofAustralian Naval Power, AlIen and Unwin, Crows Nest, NSW,
2001, p. 34 (emphasis added). On the maritime strategies and options taken by previous continental
powers, see Gray, The Leverage ofSea Power, esp. Ch. 3; and Friedman, Seapower as Strategy, esp. ehs.
7 (on World War!) and 10.
126

127
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state and the leading power in East Asia. It is precisely this strategic venture into the sea
power business that is so threatening to the region's littoral states. A China whose
strategic modernization was instead focused on land forces and continental priorities, on
the other hand, would pose much less of a challenge to maritime East Asia (although
such a China would be more threatening to Russia, Central Asia and, perhaps, India).

China and the Competition for Influence in Southeast Asia
If China's immediate neighbourhood, Northeast Asia (the location of the Taiwan
problem and the dual American-Japanese threats), is Beijing's foremost geopolitical
concern, a rapidly unfolding facet of the geopolitics of East Asia is the growing rivalry
between China, Japan and India (and also, to a lesser extent, the United States), over
influence in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia, once more, is becoming a geopolitical
"shatterbelt." Shatterbelts have been defined by political geographer Sau! Cohen as
"strategically-oriented regions which are politically fragmented areas of competition
between the Maritime and Continental Realms." At the end of the Cold War, Cohen
argued that Southeast Asia had lost its shatterbelt status, with "insular and southern
peninsular" Southeast Asia joining the maritime world, in both economic and political
terms. 129 That was a plausible case to argue at the time, although the argument has been
undermined. by the subsequent expansion of ASEAN to encompass all Southeast Asian
states, including continentally-focused Indochina and Bunna. However, only one
decade later, influence in the region has again become a strategic prize in the
geopolitical competition between four of the five major powers in Asia (with the fifth,
Russia, having completed its withdrawal from the area).
Due to the region's physical geography} peninsular and archipelagic Southeast
Asia is relatively immune from direct strategic, landward pressure from the two Asian
continental giants, China and India. Only by maritime means can China (and India)
exert strategic pressure upon maritime Southeast Asia and underwrite their political and
economic influence in the region. That is not to imply that geopolitical competition
between China and other major powers for position in Southeast Asia is likely to lead to
open conflict in the medium tenn, but it does suggest that Southeast Asia will become
politically more fragmented, as individual ASEAN members increasingly favour
128

For related arguments, see Auer and Lim, ''The Maritime Basis of American Security in East Asia," p.

45.

89

different major power sponsors. As will be shown in Chapter 7, maritime power in its
wider sense is playing a central role in this new competition: from trade to marine
resource development to naval diplomacy to security cooperation and military basing

arrangements.
Policy~

Strategy and the Sea

The current chapter has demonstrated how the adoption of foreign and national security
policy priorities with a maritime emphasis has required Chinese grand strategy to
include the development of significant military and commercial maritime power.
Shadowing the growth of China's maritime interests has been a transfonnation of
China's military strategy, from one focused on continental Asia to one focused on the
maritime periphery: the location both of China's leading external interests and
ambitions, and the source of the leading foreign threats to those ambitions. Finally,
China's external interests and ambitions have destabilizing implications for the
geopolitical status quo in the East Asian maritime realm. The next three chapters assess
the non-military and military dimensions of China's maritime power, and the
development of Chinese maritime strategy.
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Saul B. Conen. "Global Geopolitical Change in the Post-Cold War Era," Annals of the Association of

American Geographers, Vol. 81, No. 4, December 1991, p. 567.
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4

China as a Rising Maritime Power: The Non-military
Dimensions

Just as it can be difficult to assess the relative strength of a great power in the
international system, so too is it difficult to accurately appraise a state's specifically
maritime strength (other than in the broadest sense). An initial obstacle to analysis is the
meaning of the tenn "maritime power." Does maritime power simply eqoote to naval
strength: that is, is it primarily a ''military concept"?' Does it merely reflect the

objective nature of a state's physical geography? Or can it be viewed in largely
commercial terms?' This chapter ass.. s.. the non-military dimensions of China's
maritime power by first discussing and defining the concept of maritime power and
identifying its constitoent ccmponents, and then applying that conoept to the case of

China.
EXPLAIN1NG "MARITIME POWER"

A widely-quoted, largely military, appraisal of sea power, is that of Admiral Sir Herbert

Richmond:
Sea power is that fonn of national strength which enables its possessor to send his
amries and commerce across those

stretchl::;s

of sea and ocean which lie between his

country or the countries of his allies, and those territories to which he needs access 111
war, and to prevent his enemy from doing the same. 3

1 The preferred

approach afEtic Grove, The Future a/Sea Power, Naval Institute Press, AlmapoHs, MD,
1990,p.3.
:l See, for example, hwin Millard Heine, China's Rise to C01tII1UrcialMarltIme Power, Oreenwood Press,
W ••tport, cr, 1989.
3 HcrbertRichm.ond. Statesmen and Sea Power, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1946, p. ix.
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J.R. Hill has defined IlllIritime power simply as ''the ability to use the sea'" Geoffi"ey

Till h.. noted that sea power has been variously described as one of the
enviro_aUy-specific forms of military power; as a label far those states posse.sing
referring to the ''material instruments" with which to
Uattain maritime objectives"; and as a strategic enabler. s Till's own definition is that sea
"great maritime strength";

88

power "consists of influence exerted by a mixture of military (mainly naval but with
associated ok and land) and non-military furoes:" The Soviet Union's foremost
proponent of the development oflllllritime power, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, defined it

thus: "The essence of the sea power of the state, in our view, is how far it is possible to
make the most effective use of the Warld Ocean ..• in the intereats of the state as a
whole.'" And, in an extensive stndy of the coocept, Harold Kesnlley notes usefully that
use of the sea fur the exercise of power (the ability to influence others) involves the
employment of the IlllIritime sphere both as "a condnit of power" and as an economic
"gmcrator of that power.',a

Maritime power, or at least politicaUy meaningful levels of maritime power,
itself consists of several constituent components. Even those studies that fullow a
primarily military (or naval) definition of sea power nevertheless tend to acknowledge
that the demand for naval power is to a large extent closely related to, or derived from,

a wide range of s.a-based activities and interests.' The leading inteUectual guide to the
essential components of IlllIritime power remains Alfred Thayer Mahan and his
"elements of sea power," first enunciated in 1890.'0 Although Mahan's analysis has
been critiqued and moilified by I.ter theorists, it is no exaggeration to suggest that
subsequent analyses mostly are derivative of the original Mahanian template: as Paul
Kenoedy states, "Mahan is, and will always remain, the point of reference and departure
for any wode upon 'sea power."''' The fuUowing section iliscusses Mahan's "principal
4 J.R.1Iill, Maritime Strategy for Medium Pawers, Nova! Institure 1're88, Annapollil, MD, 1986, p. 48.
, Geolli"eyTill, Maritime Slrutegy and the Nuclear Age, 2'" ed., MacmiUan, London. 1984, pp. 12-13.
6 Ibid.. p. 14.
1 g. G. Gonhkov, The Sea Power a/the State. PetgaI1l.on Press, Oxford, 1979 (first pub. [in Russian]
1976), p. I.
BHarold J, Kearsley, Maritime Power and th(l.1We~fint Century, Dartnwuth. Aldershot, 1992. p. xii
9 See, forexamp1e. Grove, 17JeFuture ofSe4Power,p. 3 andCbs. 34.
10 AT. ~ The Influence of SeD Puwer upon HiBtory, 1660-1783, ,. 00.., Dover PublkatiOll.9, New
Yodc, 1987 (S od. fir" pub. 1894), Ch. 1, ''Discussion of the ~ ofSeaPoWlOf."
11 Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall qf Britioh Naval MoMery, Penguin, Londoo, 2001 (fuot pub.
1976), p. 9. In fact, . . . 1011<ijmg expert Mahan has noted, the chapter OD the
of sea power was
not C6pCCial1y original. Yet: it was Maban who explicated and popularized the concept in a "coherent
presentation of certain large. issues" to a receptiw public. See Jon Tetsuro Somi.da. Inventing Grand
SJra"'gy and Teaching Command: The CJ=ic Wo,", qfAlfred Thayer Malum Recon.ridered, Woodrow

on
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e_,

oonditions affecting the sea power of nations" and its derivative versions befure
applying them to as.ess the non-military aspects of Chins's contemporary maritime

power. 12
The Elements ofSea Power
Mahan'. six principal oonditions affecting national maritime power comprise: (i)
geogrspbical position; (ii) physical eonformation; (iii) extent of territory; (iv) number of
population; (v) national eharacter; and (vi) character of the government
The first principal oondition, geographical position, notes that insular states
have • maritime advantage over those continental powers that are required to
concentrate substantial strategic effort on defending their land frontiers. A position close
to major sea transport routes and the ability to ooncentrate ono'. naval forces without
suffering disadvantage in another vital theatre also were deemed important geographical
components of sea power." By physical c",!formation Mahan referred to the seaboard
and the number of natural harbours: a long seaboard and numerous harbours provide
easier and greater access to the sea. CQuntri.. poor in land-based natural resources also
were more likely to be drawn to overseas trade and exploitation of the oceans, whilst
those states whose territory i. divided by the sea must be able to control the dividing
body of water or

me.

potentially adverse strategic consequences.t' Mahan's 1llird

physical condition, extent

0/ territory,

refers to the number, or proportion, of the

population that live along .the coost: a sparsely populated coastline being both
vulnerable to encroachment from the sea and less able to translate the benefits of along
coast and good harbours into useable sea power. 15
Mahan's fourth principal condition, number o/populatioll, involves not the total
size of a state's population, bnt the number ofits people engaged in merine industries,
servicing marine industries, or so skilled as to be able to serve at sea. 16 The fifth
condition, national character, involves the extent to which a nation is inclined to
commerce, enterprise and trade and, in the context of Mahan's times, the matmer in
Wi!Bon Ceutcr Press, Washington, D.e., and John, Hopkins Univemity P"",,, Baltimore. MD, 1997, p.
28.
12 For an earlier study, see Alexander Chieh--cbeni Huang, "'Chinese Maritime Modemiration and Its
Seourity bnplicati"",,: The Dens JGaoping ilIa and Beyond," Ph.D. dissertation, Georg. Washington
University, 1994, pp. 24~27.
13 Maban. ne ltifluence ofSeo Power upon HisJory~ pp. 29-35.
14 lbid.• pp. 35-42.
~ Ibid., pp. 4244.
uiIbid.• pp.44-49.
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which a state treat. its colonies to further promote trade benefits." Finally, charaaer of

the government refers to the role that governments can play to promote both commerce
and ..a-based enterprise (especially commercial shipping), and the naval strength that
can grow out of that commerce, given the appropriate ttirection from a strong centtal
authority. Such a naval capability constructed during peacetime, iucluding the
estsblishment of appropriately-located naval bases, in his view is best able to secure and
enhance a country'. trade-based prosperity, and defend those interests in times of war. "
Mahan inevitably was a man of hi. times and some of hi. generalizations about

the supposed national characteristics of certain people., and also the role of colonies in
promoting trade and providing csptive llliIIl<ets may seem anachronistic today: political,
economic and technological circwnstaoces hsve changed signilicantly. Mahsn also

ignored the importance in his own era of raw economic power for the aeation of a first
class quality of sea power: rather than deriving from an inclination towaro., or
dependence upon, economic uses of the .ea, first rate IIIlIritime power was instesd
dependent upon the type of economic strength that, during the industrial age, was
iucreasingly fuelled by the natural resource base of continental-sized states.I '
Nevertheless, his analysis remsios relevant to the identificstion and assessment of the
components of maritime power todsy.20 A brief summary of modem restatements of
Mahan'. elements of .08 power follows, culminsting in the explicstion of a ncoMabanian template against which the non-military dimensions of China's contemporary
maritime power can be judged.
In one modem version, Geoffrey Till distingnishes interdependent "sources" and

"elements" of sea power. The sources of sea power involve: a maritime community;
resources (economic streng1h); style of government; and geography and geopolitics.
Till's ''immediate elements" of ses power comprise: shipping; bases; and the fighting
instroment21 Eric Grove has developed his owo version of the principal conditions

affecting national sea power, proposing three "first order" and three "second order"
conditions. His first order conditions comprise: economic strength; technological
prowess; and socio-political culture. The second order conditions include: geographical
position; sea dependence (involving degree of reliance upon seaborne trade, the
11 Ibid., pp.

SO-58.

Ibid.. pp. 58..88.
19o Grove, '17re Future ofSea Puwer. p. 225.
21) For this point aDd a critique of the ahortcominga ofMahan's elements of sea power. sec Kcnnedy. The
Rise and Fall ofBritish Naval Mastery, pp. 6-9; and Grovc, The Future a/Sea Puwet', pp. 221-232.
11
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men:bant llUlrine, shipbuilding, fish catch and offshore zone); and government policy
22

and perception.

The notion of sea dependence (or "maritime-ness") was developed by

Rear Admiral Hill, whose conception of the "components of maritime power" involves:

trade and access (to routes and marlcets); shipbuilding; exploitation of natural resources;
and militruy power at sea. Hill also stressed fue influence of international law upon
maritime power." The most important legal factor inflnencing maritime power today is
fue extent of a nation's offshore zones of jurisdiction allowed under fue United Nations
Convention on the Law of fue Sea": fue larger fu. offshore estate fue greater fue
potential economic benefit, although large zones inherently are more difficult to police,
fuus necessitating more impressive maritime security forces.
In the most lengthy reinterpretation, Harold Kearsley breaks the components of
maritime power into "objective" and "subjective" categories. The tangible, objective (or
quantifishle) components oomprise: physical factors - geogrspbic location, size of the
national maritime domain, the ''landIsea area ratio" and sea wea\fu (resources); and
economic factors - size of GDP relative to size of the national offshore estate,
percentage of GDP tied up in indostry, GDP per capita, size of fue merchant marine
fleet, shipbuilding capacity, seaport usage and population. The subjective components
comprise intangible factors - maritime tradition, type of government, power bloc
aligmnent and fue exrernal threat environment25
The frameworl<: employed here for fue analysis of fue components of China's

maritime power is consistent with the above approaches and largely resembles a
simplified vemon of Kearsley's approach, distinguishing geogrspbicaI, economic and
political elements.

:n Till. Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age, Ch. 3,
Grove, The Future ofSeo Power, pp. 229-232.

2'l

Hill, Maritime Strategy for Medium Puwers. pp. 30-44.
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. which came into effect in November
1994, sets out the following regime for ooastal state jurisdiction over adjacent ocean areas: internal waters
(waters on the landward side of baselines used to measure the breadth of the territorial sea); a 12 nautical
mile (mn) territorial. sea; a contiguous zone out to 24 om. from the territorial sea baselines; a 200 run
exclusive economic zone (EEZ); a continental shelf ofup to 350 :wn; and the high seas (all parts of the
IICa which are not part of iUly state's EEZ, territorialscB. or internal watm. or Qfthe arcbipclagic ftters, of
an arcbipelagic state). See United Nations, 11Ie Law o/the Sea, Division for 0cean.A:ffair8 and the Law of
the Sea. Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations. NewYodc, 1997.
" KearsIey, Maritbne Power ""d tile Twenty..jIm C..""", Chs. 6-9. eop. pp. Il 5-118.
23

24

95

I Geographical Factor.:

size and location of territory
tetTes1rial resource base
size and location of population

harbours and sea access
sea-based resource.

n Economic Factors:

size and strength of the national economy
technological capabilities
size of, and reliance upon, 1110 marioe economy
colllD:llltCial shipping and port iofrastructure
shipbuilding
fishing
ofliIDore oil and gas

III Political Factors:

role of government
ocean consciousness
sea laws

The following section applies the framework in some deIail to the case of China.
THE ELEMENTS OF CHINA'S MARITIME POWER: A NEO-MAHANJAN
ANALYSIS

I Ge6gr<lJJhica/ Factors
Size and Locatio" o/Territory

China is • large continental country with an ex\eosive inner-Asian frontier and long
Pacific coastline. Although the south-western province of Yunnan is also tenuously
connected to the lodian Ocean via river systems running through Bwma, China is not a
two-ocean continental state in the manner of the United States. In tenns of location
China is favourably positioned to take advantage of a g1oba1izing economy, enjoying in
much of its territory a temperal",zon. climate and, from the productive coastal zones,
easy ""cess to mazkets via the sea. 26

" A leoctiDg international devclopment economist points out lbat there Oldat two inherent SeogIlIphical
_
ID ec:onomk development: ttopjcol c _ (duo to _ ) IIJld physicol bani"", ID mark... (an
especial probl"" fur landlocked .tales). See Jem.y D. Sschs, ''The Geography of Economic
Development,' Naval War College Reod.w, Voc LIIL No. 4, Autmnn2000, pp. 102-105.
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Terrestrial &source Base
AB has already been noted in earlier chapters, China's resource hase is relatively large
yet insufficient to meet the future demand of a strongly growing economy. A recent
report suggests that China will need to import ever greater quantities of oil and gas, as
well as an extra three billion tonnes of iron, 500 mi1Iioo toones of copper and lOO
million tonnes of aluminium over the next 20 years and, eventually, also zinc and
tungsten. 27

Size and Location ofPopulation
Of China'. total population of around 1.3 billion, fully two-thirds reside in the richer
and more productive eastero fifth of the country.28 The coastal provinces, "autonomous
regioos" and municipalities (excluding Hong Kong and Macau) that make up 15 per
cent of Cblna's territory hold 40 per cent of the nation's population (that is, well over
half a billion people). It is projected that, by mid-century, 50-60 per cent of China'.
population will live in coastal areas - numbering up to one billion people.29 Whatever

the wider population concerns, such a concentration of people in the richest (coastal)
parts of the country poteotially also i. a source of economic atreogth and of natiooal
maritime power.

Harbours and Sea Access
Geographically, China enjoys free and easy access to the sea, possessing a mainland
coastline over 18,000 kilometres long. And, as noted above, riverine "",,"ss to the
Indian Ocean is possible from Yuonan province through Burma. China's own major
river systems also facilitate access to the sea frum 1he interior. The ''physical
confonnation" of the Chinese seaboard, to use Maban'. term, is highly favoursble to 1he
developmeot of sea power, with over 160 bays and hundreds of kilometres of deepwater coastline, providing many natural harbours and arople opportunities for shipping
and port developmeot.30 Many of China's offshore islands, most of which are located

17 "China Runs Low on Mineral Resources, Of

TClWei TImes (onlioe 00.), 13 January 2003.
Comes the Hard Part: A Survey of China,.. 'flu; Economist, 8 Aprl12000, P. 4.
~ State Oceanic Administration, China Ocean.Agenda 21, China Ocean Press, Beijing. 1996, pp. 23-24.
30 Information Office of the State COWlcil of the People's Republic of China, "The Development of
China's Marine Programs," Beijing, May 1998, reprocb.wed in Beijing Review, 15·21 June 1998, pp. 1314.
211 "Now
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close to the coast within the twelve nautical mile territorial ,ea zone, also provide
excellent deep-water harbours that could be used for future port development."
Sea-based ResOW'CB8

The final geographical factor, sea-based resources, i, dependent upon the size of the
offshore estate, itselness a physical factor than a political-legal one (see section ill on
political factors below). However, it is worth pointing out that within its territorial sea,
200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone and continents! shell; China possesses
jurisdiction over substantial (and valusble) marine living and non-living resources.
Within those offshore zones the main exploitable resources are fish, salt and other seawater chemicals, oil and gas, and other seabed ntinerals.

n

Economic Factors

Size and Strength oflhe National Economy

Whereas Mahan emphasized his economic trinity of production, shipping and colonies
as the source of national sea power, today it is sheer economic strength backed by a
large resource base which creates the necessary preconditions for the establishment of
first class sea power: "Large countries with numerous populations and powerful

economies can devote resources to military sea power, as sheer expressioos of that

strength, even. if they have little other interest in using the sea. ,,32 As discussed in
Chapter 2, China's economy continues to grow .t an impressive rate: the extent to

which economic resources are diverted to build maritime power or for other strategic
purposes will depend upon the economic (and domestic political) opportunity costs the
Chinese leadership is willing to shoulder.
Techtwloglml Capabilitie.o

Tbe second economic factor is one stressed by Eric Grove, "technological prowess" and
technical knowledge, including the ability to adapt to technological change: even great
powers with considerable mw economic strength may be unable (or unwilling) to
China has Dver 6,500 is1anda with 8. tmdarea ofover 500 m2, over 400 (IfwhiGh are occu:pjcd. Of these.
over 5,000 are situated within "Cli:oa'& tenitorial waters" (although a very small number of these are
probably ialBnda in the East and South China Seas subject to sovm:ignty cq,ute8 - official Chinese
statistics do not distinguish between actual and olaimed territory), with combined COllStlines totalling over
14,000 km. See China 0"""" Agenda 21, p. 29; a!ld 'Tho DevelopmOJlt of Cbina'. Marino Programs:'
IT. 13-14.
Grove, The FUIUrtl ofS." Puwer, p. 229 (originaIomphasi.).
31
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pursue high technology sea power. 33 Although referring primarily to the application of
high technology to national naval power, the development and adoption of technology
(more gen...uy) into the civilian economy is an important element of national
economic strength in the modem world. To recap from the previous chapter, China has
made significant efforts to narrow the technology gap with developed nations in a range
of civilian teclJnologies, yet there remain significant borriers to overcome befure it can
be considered a truly modem, technology-driven economy with a comprehensive
indigenously-developed techoology base. 34
Having recognized the relative teclJnological backwardneas of its marine
industries, China has explicitly promoted improvements in marine science and
techoology as a mesns to bolster further economic development of its marine resources
and industries, enhaoce conservation and the sustainability of marine resource
exploitation and raise the overall teclJnological standards of the marine _ecmr to
developed world standards. Tbe production and dissemination of oceanographic data
has been promoted, and national plans and policies for oceanography and marine
science and technology have been formulated."

Size of, and Reliance upon. the Marine Economy
Serious development of China's marine economy began in the late 1970_ once a
measure of political stability had been restored in the post-Mao era. By late in that
decode China's merchant shipping fleet had expanded rapidly to become a major
international player in world shipping, whilst shipbuilding, ofl'sbore oil exploitation and
other forms of maritime economic development were encouraged. 36 A. China opened
up its economy under Deng, both the merchant marine (to facilitate its burgeoning

international trode and to compete against fureign fleets) and omho", oil productioo (to

satisfy future energy demand from a newly naleashed economy) were being conscioualy
Ibid., p. 230.
for example, Roger Cliff. The MiJiUuy Potel1tial of ChiM'S Commercial Technology, MR-1292AF, RAND, S_ Monica, CA, 2001; and Wendy Frieman, "!'he Unde....oo.t Revolution in Cbineoe
Science and Technology: Implications for the PLA in the Twenty-First Century,'" in James R Lilley and
David Shambaugh, eds.• China's MilittJry Faceg Ms Future, AEI and M.E. Shatpc, Armonk, New York,

33

34 S~

1999.

See ''The Development of China's Marine Programs," pp. 19~20; and China Ocean Agenda 21, Chs. 2
and 6. It should be noted that Chinese oceanography bad to be rebuilt from. scratch from the late 19708 on
following a virtual cessation of oceanographic research activities during the Cultural Revolution (1966~
1976). See David G. Muller, China as a Maritime. P(}wer. Westvicw Press, Bou1cier CO, 1983, pp. 19835

199.
36 Ibid., Ch. 13; and Heine. China's Rise to Commercial Maritime Power, ells. 2-3.
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supported and developed by the Chinese government as vital components of national
economic growth. 37
Starting from a low ba,e China', marine economy has grown at a rate faster than
the already impressively high overall growth rate of GDP. Notwithstanding the
inevitable reliability problems with official Chioese economic data, the marine economy
may have expanded in the twenty years between 1980 and 2000 by as much as 50 times,
from eight billion ynan in 1980 to approximately 400 billion ynan (or U.S.$48.3 billion)
in 2000 (see Table 3.1)." That factor of increase i. ten times greater than the fivefold
increase in the size of the overall economy over the same 20 year period." Using
another point of comparison, whilst the average annual rate of GDP growth since Deng
reopened the Chinese economy stands at 9.5 per cent,40 the marine economy grew at an
average annual rate of 17 per cent dW'ing the 1980s, and at an average rate of 20 per
cent annnally during the 199Os.41

Although one should not overstate the importance of the size of the marine
economy - U.S.$48.3 billion is still a relatively modest amount in the context of a
national economy now worth over U.S.SI trillion annually - the trend is obvious; the
marine economy will likely play an increasingly importaol role in China's economic

perfurmance in the futnre. In the decade between 1990 and 2000, for example, the size
of the "blue economy" grew as a proportion of total GDP from 2.45 per cent 104.3 per
cent (see Table 4.1 below).·'

37 Muller.

China as a Maritime Power, p. 225.
38 Another estimate given by a Chinese news report suggCtits 1bat the marine economy grew by a factor of
32 during that period. Sce "Blueprint Released for Rising Blue Economy," China Daily Business Weekly
(0II!ine cd.), 21 AlJsust 2001. Po,,,'bly, the di=epsncy _
the two figur.. (both derived from
official IIOUICes) m.igb:t be explained if the Busineas Weekly version is based tlpon inf1ation~adjustcd,
00DStan1 currency value •• Either way, the picture painted of the blue eocnomy .. undoubtedly one of wry
higb growth ......

.EntcrtlmDragon."11Ie&onomist, 10 March 2001, p. 21.
"CID""" GDP 10 Top U.S.$1.08 Trillion This Y..,," Clrina Daily (online od.l, 27 November 2001. A
more CODJervative Western estimate is an IIllnU8l average growth rate of 8 per cent since 1979. ''Now
eo.... the Hud. Part: A Survey of China," TIre EcOMmisl, 8 April 2000, p. 20.
41 "Marioc Economy: New Economic Growth point," BeIj/ng Review, 30 NoveJllbe1'.6 December 1998, p.
12. Between 1980 and 1993 the avcra,ge annual increase in the value of1he marine ecooomy amounted to
28percont. Ch... 0ceanAg.mda 21, p. 8.
42 To restate the difIicultics with Chinese statistics: whilst the data used should not be assumed 10 be
correct in an absolute sense, they ere probably corMCt enough to be indicative of the general state of the
marine economy and. its upward trend. Figures for 2000 arc estimates.
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Table 4.1 Growing-up Qulcldy: Tb. Expanoion of CbiDa" Marine Economy

Marine .......my (Yon bllll.n)'

Marine economy as a penentage of GDP

8

43.3
2.45

140

327

3

4

400
4.3

Sources:
Defence InteUigmce Organisation. IJifence Economic; Trend" in the ~Pacfftc 2000. Department of Defence,

~

Canberra, 2001, p. 29.

State Oceanic Administration,. China OceaIllAgtmda 21, Orina Ocean Press, Btijing. 1996, P. 14 (for 1980, 1990
and 1994); State Oceanic Adminiatrstion, China Marine Statistical YetJrbook 1999. China Ck;ean Press, Bei.jing.
1999, p. 48 (fur 1998): and "Dl"""",, Rel......! fur Risjng Blue Economy," Chi.., Daily B_... WeeJdy (mill..

b

ed.), 21 August 2001 (for2OOO),

The size of the marine ecooomy relative to 1llIli0nal GDP i, only part of the

story, however. For the vital coastal cities and province, - the engines of growth of the
Chinese economy - the blue economy, logically enough, is even more important. The
marine economy contributes a far higher proportion to the GDP of coastal areas tIum for

the country as a whole; the average con1ribution of the marine sector to the GDP of
China', eleven coastal regions is approximate1y seven per cent.·' The largest regional
marine economies are those of Guangdong and Shandong provinces, which in 1998
were worth 79 billion and 68 billion yuan, respectively. The coastal regions most
dependent upon marine indus1ries are the island province of Hainan (where the blue
economy acoounts fur around twelve per cent of local GDP - albeit as a propertion of a
very small economic base) and the much larger regional economies of Guangdong,
Shandong, Shaogbai and Fujian (acoounting for between 9.5-10 per cent oflocal GDP),
whilst the least dependent coastal regions are Hebei and Jiangsu, where the con1ribntion
of marine indus1ries to local GDP is well below the national average."
Over fuur million people are employed in marine indus1ries in the coastal
regions, although the proportion of the overall population so employed remains quite
small. Taking into consideration China'. large population, however, it would probably
be misleading to dwell upon that fact; in strictly Mahanian ''number of population"
terms, a marine sector workforce of over four million is still impressive. By fur the
largest marine industry sector in terms of both employment and value i. Chin.'s marine

43

Calculations based OD 1998 data in State Ocesnin Adminil!ltration. ChIna Marine Statistical Yearbook

1999, China Ocean Press, Beijing. 1999, pp. 6-7 and 49.
44 Ibid.
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fisheries, with • labour force of over 2.8 million people and an economic output value
of 177 billion yuan in 1998 (see Table 4.2 below).
Table 4.1 ChbI.'. MarIne Economy In 1998 - Output Value and Employment by Industry
Sector

Industry Sector
Marine Fisheries

Maritime Transportation
Coosta1lntcmstional Tourism'
Coastal Shipbuilding
0ffiIh0re Oil and Natural Gas

Sea Salt

Beach Placer"
Marine Enviromneotal Protection

Marine Science Research Service

-

TOTAL

GroS8 Value (YUBD biDiont
177

53
47

24
18.5
7.5
0.06

•

•
327

Labour Foraab

2,855,000
372,000
423,000
126,500
33,000
179,000
3,500

45,500
17,500
4,055,000

State Oceanic.Admini8llalion. Chbta Marine SlalJatical Yearbook J999. China Ocean PrcSII" Beijing. 1999. pp. 48 and
51-53 .

.. Figures haw: been roandod to the neII1'eS1: 500 miUion yuan (CIccpt for beach placer).
b Figures have been rounded 10 the nearest 500 people.
C Data excludes domestic tourists from mainland ChiDa (but doetiI include those from Hong Kong and Macau.) .
.. Beach placer comprises metallic and non-metallic ctq,osits exploited ftom sandy beaches and the i:n9hore seabod.
"Data unavailable.

SEA DEPENDENCE

Tbe analysis above demonstrates that, al1hough China's IIllIritime economic interests are
growing quite rapidly, they still constitute a relatively small proportion of the economy.
Simi1arly, although it is difficult to qoantify the degree of China's "sea dependeoce,"
the situation is most likely similar to that of the marine economy: relatively small, yet
growing.
One potential area of ... dependence derives from the level of China's seaborne

trade. China's trade has burgeoned over the last twenty years, growing at a fuster rate
than GDP, with exports ""Paoding by 15 per cent and imports by 13 per cent per year
over that period." By 1999 China geoerated 3.1 per cmt of world trade by value,
although when put into perspective that figure only managed to equal the value of Hong
Kong's trade." Another way in which to view those figures, however, is that China's

.., "Now eom.o the Hard Pan: A Survey ofChina," The Economist, BApril 2000, p. 20 .
.. United Nati.... Confurence on Trade and Devolopmont (UNCTAD), Review of Maritime TraosP011
2000, UnitedNatio.., New yotk and Geneva, 2000, Table 30, p. 47. Mainland China'. figure takonalone
i. I"""r !ban the tntalB tor _-sized economies such as Italy, Canada and the NeIIierlaOOs. To
provide _ _ Olive, • survey by The Economist not.. that ooIy by 1993 did China regain the
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trade effectively doubled with the return of Hong Kong in 1997 - and around 80 per
cent of the total value of the territory'. exports were re-exports from ChilUl. Hong
Kong's return also made China a more "maritime" nation, increasing die importanoe of
maritime factors, especially shipping and trade, in Beijing'. world view.'7 In 1999
mainland China's trade was worth around U.S.S361 billion (U.S.$195 billion fur
exports and U.S.SI66 billion fur imports.)" Viewed from another angle, in 2000 the
value of exports os a percentage of GDP stood at 24.5 per cent, and imports 22.5 per

cent." Of that trade, a large proportion is shipped across the sea; according to one
Chinese report 84 per cent of China's exports are carried by maritime shipping.50 And
the December 2001 accession of China into die World Trade Orgsnization (WTO) is
likely to provide a further boost to China's seaborne trade.
However, as an indicaf.or of sea dependence there is cause for some caution in
this case also. Despite its large (and growing) level of exports, and die fact that it
already is the world's ninlh-iargest exporter, a good deal of China's exports (and
imports) - perhaps around balfthe total- consist ofproduets manufactured by foreignowned companies poorly integrated widi the domestic Chinese economy; commonly,
such firms import components for assembly using China's almost bottomless pool of
cheap labour in order to re-export finished or semi-finished goods, olien vi. Hong
Kong. In this sense the main body of the Chinese economy (and its dnmestic
companies) remains yet to be genuinely integrated with the global economy." Rather

than an ''international trading economy," one analysis suggests that China's economyi.
a "vast 'continental' one" driven primarily by domestic demand. To back up this point
the analysis quotes a Hong Kong-based economist who estimates that, somewhat
counter-intuitively, if Chin.'s net exports were to decline by 25 per cent in oue year ".
mere half-percentage point would be knocked off the country's growt!t.,,52 The upshot
of this point for any estimation of China's sea dependence is that, if the Chinese
share ofworld trade it had held in 1928 - the year when China's share previously had peaked. See "Now
Comes the Hard Part: A Survey of Chlna," The Economist, 8 April 2000, p. 20.
See Tai Ming Clleung. "Hong Kong's Strategic Importance under ChincBe Sovereignty," in Jona than D.
Pollack and RichardH. Yang. eels., In China's Shadow: Regioool Perspectives on Chinese Foreign Policy
and Military DeveIopnumt. CF-137-CAPP, RAND, Santa Monioa, CA. 1998, pp. 171-174 .
.. Department of Foreign Affairs ouID Trade (DFAn, The APEC Reg/<>n Trade and Invealment 2000,
Merlret Information andAnaIysis Unit, DFAT, Canberra, November 2000, Table 2.14, pp. 44-45.
" World Bank, ''China Data Profile," July 2001, available at hUp:/Idevdata. _Idbank.org.
""Chlna', Shlpping Market, Where to Go after Chlna Entty into WT07" People', Daily (o;oIino od), 23
47

April 2001.
;Si

Sec "China's Economic Power: Enter the Dragon," ne Economtst, 10 March 2001, p. 22.
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eoooomy is mostly domestically-driven and not especially trade-dependent, then it
follows that China also is not overly dependent upon specifically seaborne trade, other

than potentislly for its energy and food security.

COmm£rclaJ Shipping and Pori /1Ifrastructure
SHiPPING

Despite the above assessment that China is neither a highly trade-dependent nation nor

finnIy integrated into the global economy, the absolute numbers regarding the growth in
its trade volumes remain impressive. A fundsmental factor undeIpinning that trade
growth has been the simultaneons expansion of China's merchant fleet; in the words of
on. oarly-1980s stody, the fleet bad been at that time ''the primary vehicle for China's
integration into the world economy."" The fust international voyage by a People's
Repnblic of China-flagged merchant ship took place only in 1961. Since that time
concerted government policy to construct a national merchant fleet, thus avoiding
dependence upon foreign carriers, bad led by 1982 to China's fleet ascending the
international pecking oIder to rank seventh largest." By the end of 1999 China

po.....ed the fourth largest fleet in tenus of numbers of ships, and fifth largest in terms
of deadweight tonnage. If merchant ships owned by Hong Kong-based interests were to

be added to the stato-owned Chinese fleet, China's rankings would be third in each

category."
China has over four decades not only developed a large merchant fleet but also
the mariners to crew those ships, with an emphasis since the l.to-l970s on producing
quality sailors from China'. maritime colleges." Chin... crews, moreover, are not only
in demand from China'. own shippers but increasingly also from other Asian shipping
companies, as they tend to be highly competitive in terms of both price and quality. The
shipping indnstty expects that, over time, European shippers also will employ Chinese

crews; it already has become accepted as fact that China ''will become a leading source
" !bid., p. 24; and see also "Domestic DemaDd Dri"", Cbineoe Eccnomy Forward," Chllla Daily (onlino
ed.), 8 December 2001.
~l Muller, CIJiIuJ as a Mtuitime Puwer, p. 233.
" 1bid.,pp.186-188.
~5 As of 1 January 2000 China po.sae8ged 2,172 vellsel8 of 1,000 gross reg:istcr.'at tons or larger, amounting
to arouDd 39.5 million deadweigbt tons (or 5.39 per cent of the world total) in "'tal. Were Chin. '"
..._fully uourp TItiwan, and Taiwaneoe-<>wnod shipa lidded '" the ccmbined China·HoDS Kong
merchant fleets, China would rank a close scoond mterms of numbCI'8 of vessels (behind Greece) and a
cw.. _
(bobind lopan in second pI... on the list) in term8 of deadweigbt tonnage. S.. UNcrAD,
Re1Iiew ofMarltime Trcmsport 2000, Table 16, p. 28.
:56 Huang, ""Chincsc Maritime Modemimtion and Ita Security Implications," pp. 151-152.
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of seafilrers for the international IIUIli<et."" The leading source of new seafarers from
within China is expected to be the interior regions, .. poorer Chinese seek employment
prospects in the richer coastal provinces." This win further expand the part of the
population involved in the marine economy and ill£1'eaae the pool of trained and
experienced mariners: in Mahanian tenns, further strengthening China's overall

maritime power. AB Andrew Wilsoo has argued, the
mannirJg market offers ChiDa a seapower force multiplier that plays to China's
manpower surplus. MBnning dramatically increases China's inftuence in the maritime

economy without requiring immense capital investment in ships.59

By far the largest and most important of China's shipping companies is the

China Ocean Shipping Company (caSCO), which waa established in 1961 under the
Ministry of Connnunications,60 with other compaoieB more recently established. 'I AB
China's premier shipping company, casco has evolved from insignificant beginnings
to become a major player in world merchant shipping. In 1961 China's merchant marine
comprised a meagre 150 ships (totalling just 760,000 dwt), only twenty of which were
engaged in international trade.'" Of that total COSCO owned initially just fOnr ships
totalling 22,600 dwt. 63 Rapid growth ensued, however, with COSCO adding 302 ships
(totalling 5.4 million dwt) dnriog the 1970s alone. By 1986 casco owned a diver.e
neet of 614 ships totalling 13 million dwt, 64 and by the mid-1990s its neet comprised a
''Th.eMain Provider,"lloyd's ship Manager, October 2001. p, 53.
Ibid., p. 54.
59 Andrew R. Wilson, "cmnese Seapower in the Twenty-first Century: Aspirations and Limitations." in
Geoffi'ey T!l~ cd., Seapower at,,", Millennium, SutroD Publishing, Phoenn Mil~ GloucesteBbire, 2001,
S1

58

p.147.
Heioc. China I a Rise to Crnnmerctal Martttme Power, pp. 11-19.
" Tho China National Foreign Trade Transpor1aOOn Group (Sinotraos), another tJ:aDapor! company
involved in sea-going shipping but with a much smaller shipping fleet eompared to COSCO, was 8et up
under the Ministry of Foreign Trnde and Economic Cooperation (MOFl'EC) in 1950. In 1993 tbo two
entities reorganized themselves into the COSCO Group and the Sin0tran8 Group, respectively. The
Siootnms Group is • diversifiod 1l'aIllIpor! oompany and the largest freight fo.-wanler in China. Tb. Group
is dominated by the SinotraDs Corporation but alao consists of other subsidiary mns including, inter alia.
the China National Chartering Corporation, the China Muine Shipping Agency and the China Business
Marine Corporation. By the mid-[990, the Group operated a fleet totalling 2.5 million doadwei&Jlt I<>D8
(dwt -the cargo wei&Jlt a ship can carry), .. wdI ...Ieven port tenninaIs. Wodd Bank, China Contalnel'
Transport Serl'ices and Trade: Framework for an EjJlcient Container Transport Syatem, Report No.
15303-CHA, East Asia and Padfic Regional Office, [0 Octob.. 1996, Annex 1 C'DescriptiDn of COSCO
and Sinotnms Groups'), pp. 47-50. China', other main shipping line is the China Shipping Group (CSG).
62 Heine, China's Rise to Commercial Maritime Power, p. 19.
""COSCO Develops Reroarl<ahly 0"" PIIIlt Four Dec8dos: COO," People's Daily (onIine od.), 30 May
2001.
64 Heme, Chtna's Rise to Commercial Maritime Pawer, p. 19.
60
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similar number of ships (600) but now totalling 15 million dwt, and serving over 1,000
ports around the world," Although the total number of ships operated by coseo has

fallen, the average size has increased. According to a Chinese media report, in 2001 the
eoseo fleet consisted of "more thIIIl 500" ships totalling 22 million dwt, serving 1,200
ports worldwide": these figores represeat an impressive tonnage increase of almost 50
per cent injust half a decade,

The eoseo Group consists of easca itself, includiog its maoy suhsidisry
shipping compaoies, and three ether major arms, including the China OCOllIl Shippiog
Agency (penavico), Following the 1993 reorganizatioo the company's two maio

businesses, contaiooc and bulk shippiog, were split and consolidated into specialized
companies; eoseo'. contaioer shipping department was spun off into a new subsidisry
company, easeo Contaioer Lines (COSeON), now based io Shanghai, and its bulk
"shipping interests into COSCO Bulk Carriers (eOSBULK), based io Tianjio,,7 The
general cargo fleet, specializing in heavy-lift shippiog capabilities, also has been
organized into a General Cargo Vessels Fleet based in Guangzhou'" eosco can be

viewed as baving played a leading role in implementing the "opeu door" policy; in the
1990s COSCO carried over 30 per cent of China's iotemational trade,"
A significant proportion of Chios's merchant fleet is operated under flags of
convenience; as of the beginning of 2000 43.5 per ceat sailed under fureign flags. 7o It
may seem strange that • state-owned, nationalistic enterprise continues to employ flags
of convenience, One analysis suggests a purcly economic rationale fur the practice: Ial<
concessions and fureign exchange earnings through China's Hong Kong front
companies.

71

In terms of gro.. registered tons, around 40 per cent of Chios's nationallyflagged merchant fleet consists of bulk carriers; almost 30 per cent of general cargo
os World Bamk, China ContIJiner Transport Senices and 7rade. p. 49. COSCO operates a wide mnge of
ship types. including container ships. oil tankers, bulk carriers, roll-onlroll-offs (ro/ros), general cargo
vessels. forest products carriers, refiigerated ships and paB8enger vessels.
.. "COSCO Develops Rem,rlrably over Past Foor Decades: CED," Peuple's Daily (miline ed), 30 May
2001.
6'1 World B8Dk, China Container Transport Services and lrade, pp. 48-50; and see also "COSCO
Container Linea" and "Modem Enterprise System - History," on the COSCO web site.
h~:/Iwww.cosco.com.cn .
.. "COSCO Dovolop. Remadalbly over Past Four Decades: CEO," People'. Daily (oolioe ed), 30 May
2001; and '''Modem Enterprise System - History," http://www.co&CO.com.cn.
59 4'Modetn Etttetpriae System _ History," http://www.cosoo.com.cn. COSCO also functiOD1l ail 'the
Chinese military's merchant marine.
"UNCTAD,Review ofMm/tlnr< Thmaport 2001), Table 16, p. 28.
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ships; almost 13 per cent of oil tankers; and over eight per cent of oonWner ships.72
Although China's overall share of world, or

ev<Il

regional, seaborne bulk trades i. still

relatively small, the high economic growth rate experienced in the central and southern

Chinese ooastal areas ''has been respoosible for much of the new growth in [those]
world bulk trade•.""
SHlPPING-DRTBULK~

Of the dry bulk trades the most significant is iron ore." Despite being the world's
largest iron ore producer, China's own deposits tend to be of poor quality material with
a low iron oontent; a growing demand for stee1 has thus led to a growing dependence

upon imported ore." Around balf of China'. imported iron ore is sourced from
Australia, much of which passes throogh the South China Sea via the Lombok and
either Makassar or Omboi Straits, creating a potential vulnerability of supply should the

7'

Indonesian straits ever be closed.

Grain is another dry bulk-1raded commodity that may have increasing
significance for China's national security. Althongh China'. future ability to feed itself
is a matter of fierce debate, it i. likely that, over time,

0

combination of a growing

population, the loss of productive arable land to mbanization and other causes, water
shortages and a rising demand for meat due to increasing affluence will require higher
levels of grain imports for food andJor animal feed, and possibly more imported meat
and other food prodocts.77 China'. food security also may become dependent, therefore,

11 Peter 1. R.immer, "Shipping Pattefllfl in the Western Pacific: The China Factor," Maritime Studiss, No.
94, May-June 1997. W. 13-14.
12 UNCfAD, RevIew ofMaritime 7ran.sporl 2000, Annox IV (a), p. 126. In teIms of deadweight tonnage,
in 1999 43.5 per cent of China's merchant fleet sailed under foreign flags. Ibid., Table 16, p. 28.
73 Rimmer, "Shipping Patterns in the Westem Pacific," pp. 19~2.0.
74 Metal ores in total comprised the largest "foreign" traded cargo (by weight) handled by CIrin.ese ports
in 1998 at around 56 million "illS, aMad of oil, gas and related products at just under 55 million ' - und
coal and related products at 44 million tons. See China Marine Statislical Yearbook 1999, p. 120.
75.Rimmer, "Shipping Patterns in the: WestemPacific," p. 22.
16 Ibid.; and Peter J. R:immer, "Commercial Shipping Patterns in the Asian-Pacific, 1990-2000: The Rise
and Rise of China," paper lRPared for the conference on The Stnltegic Importance of Seaborne Trade
and Shipping: A Common _
of Asia P.dfic (13· SWC eonn.reu.:e), Canbctra, 3-4 April 2001, pp.
:5-6, Despite China's attempts to diversify its iron ore supply by increasing imports from South America,
Australian exports. of iron ore to ChiJla neverthelefl8 increatlcd in value over the period between 1994-95
10 199~0 by 12.1 per cent (copper ore exports 10 China al., increased by 10 per cent). DFAT, The
APEC Regimt Trade and Investment 2000, Table 11.13, p. 187.
" Juclifu Banistor and Pet« Johnaon, Human DinreIf8101lll of Asian Secwity, CRM 95-230, Centor for
Naval Ana1y...., AIoxandria, V A, March 1996, pp. 81-85; and Tho.... M. Kane and Lawrence w.
Serewicz, ''China's Hunger: The Consequenoes ota Ris.ing Demand for Food and Energy," Parameters,
VoL 31, No. 3, Autumn2001,pp. 68-69.
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upon seaborne import., presumably from leading grain producers such as Australia,
Canada and the United States.
SH/PPING-LIQUIDBULK TlWJE.'J (OILANlJ GAS)

Sttategically, the most important sector of China's seaborne trade is a growing

depeodence upon oil imports, whlch dominate its liquid bulk trades. The amount of oil
imported by China has progressively increased sin"" it first became a net importer of oil
in 1993, as mentioned in the previous chapter. Whilst estimates of China'. future oil
demand vary widely, the 100 million tonne import figure fur crude oil may be exceeded
as early as the ODd of2003 according to • Chine.e report, perhaps tripling to 300 million
tonnes by 2010, half of whlch would be transported by sos. 78 According to some

western estimates, by 2020 China', net oil imports could be anywhere between 250400 million tonnes annually, accounting fur over ba1f of the country', oil consumption.
China's dependence upen Middle East oil producers, and the Persian Gulf states in
particular, will continue to grow; by 2020 the Middle East is likely to account for over
half of China's oil imports, all of wbich must be canied by sea through the sttategic
choke point. of the Indnnesian ,trait,." To carry the ever-increasing volumes of oil
from the Middle East China will most likely bave to increase its fleet of very large

crude caniers (VLCCs) and develop terminal. to facilitate tho.e ship•.'"

Chin. has ouIy begun to develop its market for imported gas, with construction
of the first liquefied natural gas (LNG) receiving terminal approved in lanuary 2000.
The terminal, in Shenzhen, Guangdong province, is dne to ,tart supplying LNG to

Shenzhen and three other cities by approximately 2005, and to five other cities by 2010,

whilst a second terminal i. planned fur the Shanghai area.81 Guangdong province also
plans to build six gas-fired pewer plants and to convert existing oil-fired plants to

""Experts Call for n""r _
for on Spills," People's Daily (ocline ed.), 10 July 200!.
19 See "Taken Hostaa;e." The Economist, 14 July 2001. p. 28; and also ''Growth Exposea China '00 Oil
Supply Shocks,» i.tematlonai Herald Tribune (oolino .d.), 31 October 2oo!.
81J VLCCs, O1herwise kno'Wll88 8Upertankers, are oil t8Dkers over 160,000 dwt. Most of China's tanker
fleet consists ofPanumax-sized shipa (between 50-75,000 dwt). COSCO-owned VLCCs operated by ifs
Hong Kong-based subsidiary, Ocean Tramping, have not been widely used for Chinu's own oil import
requiRments, purtly due to the lack of terminal :facilities to accommodate such large vessels. See Rimmer,
"Sh:lppingPatl:erns in tbe WestemPacific," p. 23.
" Erica S1rockor Downs, Chbul's Quat for &ugy Security, MR-I244-AF, RAND, SlIIlta Mooica, CA,
2000, p. 35; and also "EnteIprioo Culture - Downstream Projects - LNG Proj..~" on 1110 CNOOC web
site, hltp11www.CIIOOC.com......~
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LNG. B2 Construction of the Guangdong receiving tenninal was slated to begin in 2002,
and when completed will have an annual capacity of three million tonnes. In 2002
Chin. struck deals with Australia and Indonesia to supply LNG to Guangdong and
Fujian, respectively, which will further increase Beijing's inrerests in safeguarding its
shipping interests in the South China Sea."

SHJpPING- LmER SERVICES (CONTAINER DUDE)

The third major furm of shipping involves globalized container networks, increasingly
organized into a ''hub and spoke" system, with large hub ports dominating container
traffic as distribution point. to smaller ports (and being fed by those smaller ports).
China's rapid trade growth and its central geographical location within the Asian
rogionallllllIket has led to it taking "a pivotal position" in the global hub and spoke
system." China's total container traffic in 1998 amounted to 24.7 million TEUs (out of
• world total of 165 million - equating to 15 per cent of W<lrld container traffic), a
substantial increase of24 per cent on the previous year."
The primary vehicle for China's involvement in the global container networks is
COSCO Container Lines (COSCON); as of Jannary 2000 COSCON was the world's
sixth-largest container line, operating 114 ships with a total capacity of over 200,000
TEUs." COSCON's capacity in 2001 was approximately 210,000 TEUs, with 118 shipa
serving over 100 ports on 20 main shipping roulea. 87 Yet in 1997, while COSCON
carried over 3.3 million TEUs, this amonnt still equsted to less than 17 per cent of
China's total container traffic in that year, meaning that, in addition to other Chinese
container lines, non-Cbinese-owned intra-regional feeder services remain important fur

China's container trade. IS
" U.S. E""'lY iIlformatiOll AdminislratioD, "China Country Analysis Brior,"' April 2001,
http://www.eia.goviemeulcabslchina.html.
n See "Australia Wins 25-year Deal to Sell Gu to China." The New York Times (onIine 00.), 9 August
2002; and "Chm., Incloru:,ia 8ign U.8.$8.5 Billion LNO Cootract," Poople's Daily (online ed.), 27
Sep_ 2002. Boo also Cbapter 7 for furtbor details.
S4 Rimmer. ''Commercial Shipping Patterns in the Asian-Pacif1c, 1990·2000," pp. 7-& .
., UNCfAD, Review oJMaritime Transport 2000, Table 42, p. 70. (TEUs: twenty-foot equivalent units,
the standard unit of measurement for containers.) COSCO's contajnM capacity bad trebled between 1989
and 1994. Rimmer, "Shipping Patterns in the Western Pacific." p. 13,
o. UNCTAD, l/ev/ew o/Maritime 1hm3port 2000, Table 31,p. 50.
B7 "COSCO Container Lines," http://www.coBCO.com.cn.
H8 ''Modem. Enterprise Syskml- History," hnp:llwww.cosco.com.cn; and Rimmer. "Shipping Patterns in
the Western Pacific," pp. 14-15, who suggests that COSCON carries only around tcnper cent ofCbioa.'s
container trade. Foreign shippers are belic:vt:d to IlOC01m.t for 70 per cent of ocean-going container liners
involved in t1ul China. trade and 47 per cent of China's coastal container liners. See "China's Open
Shipping Market First Rato," People's Dally (ooline ed.), 13 April 2001.
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At the time of COSCON's fonnation in 1993, most of its ships wore relatively

small, with carrying capacities under 1,500 TEUs.89 Dming the 1990., however,
COSCON added 13 modem 3,800-TEU cellular container ships and six large, advanced
post-Panamax cellular contain.. ships each with a 5,446-TEU capacity.'" This
impressive expansion to become a leading player in the global containec network was
consolidated in 1998 when COSCON joined K-Line of Japsn IIIld Yangming Line of
TaiWllll in a global alliance, representing a more commercial approach and IIIl "intention
to shrng off its image as a state-controlled outsider.""

PO=

As already noted, Cbioa's geographical position aod trade expansion gives it a central

role in the global container distribution system. A major programme of port
improvement, both for expansion and modernization (including containerization) was
initiated in 1979, although at first it stroggled to overcome the inadequacies of China's
undenleveloped inftastroctw:..'2 From being insignificant players, however, mainland
China's major ports have developed over the past two decades to become important
contaioer terminals - see Table 4.3 and Map 4.1 below. (Hong Kong, it should also be
noted, is the world's leading container port: the return of the territory increased China's
port capacity by 20 per ceo!.")
Although smaller than their largest regional rivals, China's leading ports are

catching op quickly, especially Shanghai, China's foremost port facility. Between 1980

and 1990 Shanghai's container ttaffic grew by over 31 per cent," yet despite its
advances, by 1994 Shanghai was still ranked only twenty-fifth in the world in terms of
container ttaffic, the first time it had made the "top 25."" By 1998, however, Shanghai

had risen to tenth on the list, during which year its container throughput grew by over
20 per cent and, in 1999, it become the seventh-busiest container terminal in the world,
moving over 4.2 million TEUs, representing a phenomenal 37 per cent growth in

89 R:immer, "Shipping Patterns in the Western Pacific," p. 13 .
and "Modem EnlOlpri8e S~ - Himmy," hUp:llwww.CO!IOO.com.on.
" _ , ''Commeroiol Shipping PatkmS in tbe Asian-Padfic, 199()'2000," p. 9. COSCO gajned

., "cosco Container LlneI,"

independence from the Ministry of CommunicatiOtl8 in 1999, COSCON is not the only Chinese vehicle
fer compoting in th. inlcrnatiolUl! . _ trade: Chi... Shipping Group and SinotniDs have also
cmperieoced tapId i"'wth.
n Muller, Cldna aaaMaritimePuwer, pp. 188a190.
"Cboong, "Hoq KDq'. Strategic Importance \DIder Chine.. Sovereignty," p. 174 .
.. _ , ''Shipping _
in the W........ Pacilio," Table 9, p. 17.
'9Slbid., Table 3. p. 7.
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throughput that year." In 2000 Shanghai handled over 200 million tons of cargo (of all
type.), making it the world'. third large.t port, and also ascended to .ixth place amongst
world oontlliner ports, handling over 5.6 million TEUs, or close to on.,.quarter of
Chin.'s total container movements." In 2002, Shanghai became the world's fuurthbusiest container port, handling 8.61 million TEUs, an increase of over on.,.third
compared to the previous year." Shanghai was set to become the world'. second-largest
port in 2002, with a predicted freight volume exceeding 250 million tons, and its port

IIIlthority has predicted. container throughput often million TEUs in 2003."

Table 4.3 Cblna'. Largest Ports -1998
Port

Coastal Region

Shanghai

Shanghai

Cargo Volume
(million tons)'

Foreign Trade
(million tons)'

164
87

49

35

79

23

78
75

22
26

70
68
34

30
35

Berths
(forsblps
10,000 toOl and
above}

Ningbo

Zh«iiaog

Ouangzhou
Qinbuangdao
Dalian

Guallgdong
HeIl.i

Qingdao

Slmndoug
Tianjin

Tianjin
Shenzhen

-

Liaoning

Guangdo!!l!

18

67
20
27
26
37
27

48
28

State Qceqcic Administration" Clrina. Manne Statistical Yearbook 1999, 0Una. Ocean Press, Beijing. 1999, pp. 118119 and 126-127.
" Figures have been rounded iD 1he nearest million too.

Shanghai'. meteoric rise as • leading international port city is set to continue
with the adoption of. huge 20-year project to construct a new deepwaler port on the
y angshan islands below the mouth of the Yangzi River in Sh""gsi, Zbejiang province,

which will become one of the world's largest container ports. The project seeks to
overcome Shanghai port's existing problems of silting and shallow river waters,
providing a g""nine deepwaler facility, as well as much-needed extra capacity; it will be

~ UNCfAD, Review afMan"tune

Transport 2000, Table 43, p. 7l.
n "Shanghai to Launch Deep-water Port Project," People's Daily (onIine cd.), 13 February 2001;
''Shanghai Port Sees Shipping Volume Rcoord High." People's Daily (online ed.), 21 December 2000;
and "ContaioerB Handling Surpll88 Five Million at Sbangbai Port," People's Daily (online oo,), 28
November 2000.
.. "Shanghai eo_Port Rankod Number Four in 1he World," People's Datly(oolino 0<1.),11 January
2003.
99 "Shanghai Set to Become World's Second l..arge8t Port." People's Daily (online ed.), 4 Septc:m.ber
2002.
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the core component of what collectively ill termed the "Shanghai International Shipping
Centre," the single largest development project in the Shanghai municipality's current
fivo-year plan. The first phase is due to he completed by 2010 and is expected to cost
U.S.$12 billion. By the time the 20-year project is completed, Shanghai ought to have

added 52 new berths and increased its IUIllIl8.I container capacity by 15 million TEUs.
Combined with other planned projects Shanghai should achieve a total annual container
throughpnt capacity of over 25 million TEUs by thst time. 100

Whilst Shanghai might be the largest and best-known of China's ports
(excluding Hong Kong), other ports also have undergone rapid growth and expansion, a
process that seems set to continue well into the new century. As the figures quoted fur
both Shanghai (above) and the following ports indicate, when compared to the 1998
data of Table 3.3, it ill immediately apparent that high growth rates in cargo volumes

recorded by China's ports over the past decade show no sign of abating.
In 2001, Shenzhen (involving the ports ofYantian, Sheknu and Chiwan), on the
Pearl River delta north of Hong Kong, moved over five tnillion TEUs, placing the
apecial economic zone amongst the world's top ten container port complexes aod
rellecting an annual average freight handling growth rate of almost 45 per cent over the
previous five years, with extra capacity of \.6 millioo TEUs planned fur the next fonr
YOllI1l.

101

It has been suggested thst within 15 to 20 years Shenzhen might even threaten

Hong Kong's statos as the leading port in the southern Cbioa area, whilst the vast
economic developments in the lower-Yaogzi area also may see the greatest levels of
investment and growth in China shift from Guaogdong, the source of 85 per cent of
Hong Koog'. trade, to Shangbai.l02 N"mgbo, Zbejiang province, which is Cbio.'s
second largest port by cargo volume, handled over 100 millioo toos in 2000, including
900,000 TEUs, an incre..., in container throughput of 50 per cent

00

the previous

100 ''Oa_y to the Future," South Chi"" Morning Post (online ed.), I October 2001; "ShaDgbai to
LallDDh D....-waIm Poll Project," People's Daily (online ed.), 13 February 2001; and "Chinese Por1s
Outline the Cballenges and Opportunitiee Ahead," Asia Paclflc Shipping, Deeember 2000, pp. 31·32. To
placo the project into pet'flpootive, in 1999 the world's two biggest container ports. Hong Kong and
Smeapore, each had a througbput of around 16 million TEUs. Nevertheless, it seems certain that
Slumglyd will be:fixe Ioug join those two ports 10 become one of the world's "big three" container

1emrlnals"
IDI

''Shcnzhea Becomes 0IIe oeWorld', Top 10 Con!ainerPorts," People's DailY (oo1ine ed.), 141B11l1111}'

2002.

102 Hong K.oDg is lilrely to come under :incnwJing competition from m.ainl.and ports. Also. if the direct
ttade ban betwoen Taiwan and China was to be Iiftod, Hong Kong could 1... up to six per con! of i1s
c:<IIItalner lhroushPnt ''Wvahy with China Ends Smooth Soiling fur Hong Kong Por1s," The Waahington
PO&t ( _ ed.), 7 Anguot2001.
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year,l03 whilst Tianjin, near Beijing, was set to achieve a cargo volume of over 100
million tons and a container throughput of two million 1EU. in 2001. 104 The ports of

Qingdao, Xiamen and Dalian also are reputed to have each handled more than one
million 1EUs in 2000. 105

Map 4.1 China'. Leading Porto

nzh

ong

LJ

K~g

in purely economic terms the standards of Chins's container operations stilllag
behind those of developed countries. China lacks an integrated logistics infrastructure
and is hindered by slow tmnsport funes. 106 Nevertheless, in strategic terms China clearly

has become a major play<>" in the world shipping market, including the global container
network, and will likely continue its rise to challenge Japan as the foremost Asian
shipping nation. To accomplish this objective Beijing has reportedly made logistic. a
priority in its latest five-year plan, with large-scale investment to be made in
transportation networks nationwide based around large logistics hubs. The most

'" The Ningbo Boill1ll_ container port will become pan of the sbangbai International Sbiwina
CettIre. acting as a ·'tnajor transit eenter to the south of the Yangtze River delta." "Li Ka-ahing Invesis in
Mainland Container Port," PeopI4'sDa{/y(onlinecd.),11 June2001.
104 ''Tianjin Port Opens Six New Container Shipping Routes," People's Daily (onIine cd.), 20 April 2001.
105 Rimmer. "Commercial Shipping PatJ:erns in the Asian-Pacific. 199()..2000." p. 7.
'" World BIIJIk, China CanJaiIIer TraMpart Services and Trade, pp. 19-21.
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important hub is Shanghai, which Beijing has targeted to become the world's biggeot
conllriner port by 201 0. 107

Shipbuilding
For most of the People" Republic of China's first three decades, development of the
most iInportant industries and technologies was secretly controlled and organized by the
People's liberation Army (PLA), including most sbipbuilding. For much of that period
the fucus of China's shipbuilding industry was to indigenously design and build
warships for the PLA Navy (PLAN), a factor that increased in salience from the early
19608 onward once China had parted ways with the Soviet Union: Moscow had been
the source of Beijing'. military and naval technology and designs, and an important
provider of technical assistance.

1'"

The Sixth Ministry of Machine Bnilding was

established in 1963 to take responsibility fur the entire shipbuilding industry,
encompassing both naval and civilian sbip constructinn: sbipbuilding in China thus
remained essentially a defence industria1 concern. '09
Although there were limited effurts to build merchant ships from the mid 1950s
onward, most of the expansion of China's merchant fleet through to the late 1970s
depended upon the importation of second-hand ships. no Attempts to promote domestic

sbipbuilding during the early to mid 1970s had foundered on the rocks of the ongoing
political crisis within China, so that, by the end of that decade almost all new sbips
entering service with the Chine..,.flagged international merchant fleet were built
overseas, despite small numbers of ships being built in Chinese ysrds for export'"
A major rationalization of the shipbuilding industry occurred in 1982 with the
dissolution of the Sixth Ministry and creation of the China State Shipbuilding
Corpomtion (CSSC) as a state corporation with virtual ''ministry status." CSSC
incorporated most ocean-going shipbuilding and sbip repair activities in China. Its brief
included building and servicing ships for COSCO and other Chinese fleets, building
ships frn the PLA Navy, competing effectively in the world shipbuilding market,

'07 ''The 21" Century Be10nss .. ChimI," Ni<> Pacific Shipping, April 2002, pp. 16-17.
101 John Wilson Lewis and Xne Litai, China's Strategic Seopower: The Politica of Force ModernfzatiJm

In the Nud..,. Age, Stanrord Uni.....ity _ , Stanfurd, CA, 1994, pp. 74 and 81·83.

Evan S. Mede:i:ros, "Revisiting Chinese Defenae Conversion: Some Evidence from the PRC's
34, No. 5, May 1998, p. 84.
110 Ibid., p. 8S. Prior to 1949 most shipyards in China were involved in ship repairs rather than ocean·
~oina 111el'clwlt ship COllIItruction. Heinc, China's Rise to Commercial Maritime Power, p. 36.
11 Muller. China as (J Marilime Power. pp. 178-184.
101

~buildingJndustry," Issues aJld Studies, Vol.
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increasing China's self-reliance in ship construction and introducing advanced
tecbnology into fue industry.!l2 According to one study, CSSC represents one of 1he few
genuine success SfDries of fue Chinese defence conversioo progrmnme which had begun
in fue late 1970s, partly due to a similarity of product between naval and civilian ships
(and 1he fact 1hat naval and civilian shipbuilding projects are co-located, and the major

shipyards cootinue to produce both naval and civilian vessels), and partly due to the fuct
1hat CSSC already had some experience with building (and exporting) merchant ships.
Other factors were the early adoption of advanced design and productioo tecbnologies
and a decentralized structure and location of many major facilities

00

the coast (as

opposed to those defence industries located deep in the interior).ll3 It has been estimated
that the civilian output of China's shipbuilding industry exceeded the military output as
early as 1981, wben civilian output reputedly accounted for 60 per cent of fue total,
rising to 80 per cent by 1992, over half of which (in terms of tonnage) was exported in

that year. 1l4
Mirroring growth in fue national merchant fiee4 China's shipbuilding capacity
and output have consistently been on the increase since the early 1980., bofu to fulfil

China's own merchant ship requircments and to gain vital fureign exchange earnings. In
1981 China's total annual shipbuilding capacity was 800,000 tons (including bofu those
shipysrds in fue interior buiWing mostly riverine craft and smaller coastal shipbuilders),
150,000 tons of which were exported (with around 300,000 tons exported in 1982).115 In
that period CSSC's shipping outpnt was around 400,000 tons per year, and limited to

building individual ships of 60,000 tons and under, yet by 1993 production had more
fuan doubled to reach the millioo tons per year mark. That total had further grown to
1.75 million tons per year by 1995, the year in which China also became the world's
third largest shipbuilder, albeit still a long way behind Japan and South Korea.

ll

'

By

1hat time CSSC also was capable of building ships .. large .. 150,000 dwt. CSSC's
annual output (by tounage) quadrupled betweeo 1981 and 1994 and doubled between

Heine, China's RUe to Commercial Maritime Puwe.r. pp. 37-38.
m Medeiros. "Revisiting Chinese Defense Conversion," pp. 95-98.
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114 Ibid., p.

90.
Il~ Muller, ChiM as a.Maritime Puwer,p. 184.

116 By mid 2000 Chinese shipyards held seven per cent of world orders for new commercial ships,
compared to South Korea's 43 per cent and Japan's 26 per cent. U.S. Department ofCommetee, NatWnai
Security Anegsment of the U.S. Shipbuilding aNl Repair Industry, Bureau of Export .Adnrlnistmtion,
Office of Strategic Industries and Economic Security, Strategic Ana1ysls Division, U.S. Department of
Commerce. May 2001, Chart 7.1, p. 89.
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1990 and 1996 alone, with over 50 per cent of ship tonnage by that time built for

export.ll7
Shanghai is also the leading location for China's shipbuilding industry. A major
expansion took place in Shanghai in the early 1990s, and w" completed by the end of
1995 to increase the lllJOuaI capacity to one million dwt. Yet this improvement only
preasged further expansion plans for new shipyards and facilities to incre..e total
capacity, build larger ships with modem high-technology characteristics and complete
the largest ship repair facility in China, equipped with 100,000 tonne-class floating
docks, on Cbongming lBland in the month of the Yangzi. '" esSC'. Shanghai shipyards
inclnde the Jiongnan, Shanghai, Hudong, Qiuxin and Zbongbu. facilities. Other leading
yards in China involved with the construction or repair of sea-going vessels include the
Dalian (and Dalian New), Shanbaiguan (Qinbuangdao), Xingang (lIanjin), Xinbe

(1ianjin) and Beibai (Qingdao) shipyards in northern China; the Nantong and Chengxi
(Jiangyin) on the central (eastern) Chine,e coast (in addition to the Shanghai complex);
and the GlI.ngzbou shipbuilding complex in sonthem China, comprising the
Guangzhou, Wenchong and Huangpu shipyards. m CSSC by the late 1990s comprised
''25 large and medium sized shipyards, 57 marine equipment manufacturers and 36
research and development instituteS,,,I2<l including the Marine Design and Research
Institute of China (MARIC) in Shanghai, the China Ninth Design and Research Institote
of the Shipbuilding Industry and the CSSC System Engineering Research Institute. 121
A second major reorganization of the shipbuilding industry occurred in July
1999, wben much of CSSC's ..sets were hived off into a new state-owned entetprlse
also under the direet supervision of the central government, the China Shipbuilding
Industry Corporstion (CSIC). CSIC claims to be the "largest group in China in the field
of design, manufacture, and trade of military and civil ships, marine engineering and
marine equipment," involving 48 industrial entetprises and 28 research institotes,
mostly based in northern China. These include, inter alia, the Daliau, Dalian New,

U1 Medeiros, "R.evisitiog Chinese Defense Conversion,." pp. 90-93. The same souroe quotes figures that
claim that CSSe's ""!'OrIS in 1996 wore 95 per cent higboo' than in !be previous year (p. 92).
'" Yong S. Pari<, _ •., "Sbaogbai Yards Plan to
Annual Output to 1.5 Million DWT by 2000,"
U.S. Office of Naval R..oaroh Asian Office
database). 30 August 1997. from lID artic.Ie originally
~li8hed (in Chinese) inAst. . Shipping, Febnuuy 1997.

Boo.,
<_

19

Hcinc, ChIna's Rise to CommercJaJ Maritime Power, pp. 39-43; and Huang, ''Chinese Maritime

ModcmizotionandIls Security implicatiom,"pp. 157·160.
'" essc China Shipbuilding Tradmg Co., Lld. broclmre (no dare).
121 CSSC brochmc (no date). MARIC is Chi..·.1eadiDg ship coostruction ",search institute and is ODe of

around 80 sbip-related research institutes. Herne. China's Rise to Commercial MarltlJ1w Power, p. 45.
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Bohai and Sha:nhaiguan shipyards, the China Ship Research and Development
Academy, the China Shipbuilding Trading Company (CSSC's form... foreign trading
ann), the China National Shipbuilding Equipment and Material Colporation and the
China Offshore Industrial CorporatiOn.'ll CSIC's sal.. in 2000 amounted to U.S.S1.4
billi'on. 123
For CSSC the restructuring of the industry has meant consolidation and
expansion within its Shanghai and southern China shipbuilding bases. According to a
writer for the Chinese Communist Party's mouthpiece, the People's Daily, the
restructuring was necessary ''to make Chin. a great power in shipbuilding.,,124

essc

now comprises three major groups: the Jiangnan Group (formed by merging the
Jiangnan and Qiuxin yards); the Hudong Zhonghua Group (a merger of the two yards at the time of merger in April 2001 representing the largest shipbuilding base in China);
and the Guangzhou GroUp.'25 CSSC is .lso the largest shareholder in the new
Waigaoqiao shipyard in Shanghai, a 3.2 billion yuan project which begao operations in
November 2001 and will, when completed in 2003 become China'. largest shipbuilding
base with an annual production capacity of over one million dwt, including two 300,000
dwt-capacity dry docks. 'U This single yard, therefore, will poss... an annual capacity
substantially greater than the capacity of China's entire shipbuilding industry just
twenty years ago. CSSC's sales in 2000 amounted to U.S.S1.5 billion.l27 Another large
shipbuilding sod ship repair facility is under construction in Qingdao, with so annual
capacity of two million dwt.

12
•

See "Survey" on the CSIC web sire, http://www.csic.com.cnlCsiC/eo/survey.htm. The COlDpElIl}'
statement continues: ''CSIC PO:!l8CSL9CS the largest shipbuilding and ship repair bases, capable of
undertaking research, design, mannfiu::ture and :repair of various civil vessels up to the capacity of
300,000 dwt, marine engineering, surface and submerSIble combat vessels, naval supplemf:ntary boats,
under water weapons and other related equ::ipmeot"
123 U.S. Department of Commerce. Natimtal Security Asseasme.nt of the U.S. Shipbuilding and RRpair
Industry, Appcrulix C.
124 ''Cbina', Largost Slripbuilding Induslry Based in Shangba;," People', Dally (on1ine 0<1.), 10 April
200!.
125 Ibid.; and "China's Shipbuilding Giant Receives 136 New Orders in 2000." People's Daily (online
ed.), 12 January 2001.
12I.'i "Shanghai Builds Mainland' 8 Largest Ocean Carrier," Peqple '8 Daily (oDline 00.), 10 November 2001;
and "China's Largest Sbipy81'd Operational in Shongbai," People's Daily (online 00.), 8 November 2001.
Waigaoqiao is to be managed by the Jiangnan Group and may eventually exceed a capacity of 1.8 :million
dwt 8IlIlIIOIIy. See Pod<, Iralls., ''Sbangbai YaId, Plan to Booo' Annual Output to 1.5 Million DWT by
2000."
121 U.S. Department of Commerce. NationtJl Security Assessment of the U.S. Shipbuilding and Repair
Industry, Appcrulix C.
'" ''Cbina', Largos' Shipyard under Construction in Qingdao," People's Dally (online od.), 3 Sop_her
2002.
122
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Chinese shipyards produced arouud 4.5 million tons of shipping in 2001, over
60 per cent of which was expected to be exported. In 2000 China exported U.S.$ 1.43
billion worth of ships, representing five and six per cent of the world market by value
and tonnage, respectively, and earned U.S.S7.9 billion in the five year period between
1996 and 2000 through ship exports. CSSC alone received orders for 136 new ships in
2000, with a total order book at the beginning of 2001 amounting to 188 ships. Chinese
yards also are now capable of producing large and sophisticated vessels for the Chinese
and world morket, including 230,000 dwt bulk carriers, 300,000 dwt VLCCs, 5,600
TEU container ships, floating, production, storage and offioading (FPSO) vessels for
the offiiliore oil and gas industry and modero LPG and LNG tankers.!2' The remarkable
rise of the Chinese shipbuilding industry shows no signs of absting, with a prediction
that the sector will grow to a capacity of 10 million dwt annually by 2010, possibly

doubling its world market share to 15 per ceDtyo Other industry insiders bave even
suggested that, due to a continued price advantage (China builds ships fur
approximately ten per centles. than the international morl<et value) which is leading
both Korean and Japaoese shipbuilders to reduce capacity and enter into joint ventures
with Chioese yards, China may even swpass South Kores's global market sbare by
2010.131 For example, China's first 300,000 dwt VLCC, launched in 2002, was a joint
venture involving Daliao New shipyard and aoother, Sino-J.paoese, joint venture
shipbuilding compaoy.132
In addition to its shipbui1ding activities, China i. a dominaot player in the world

shipbreaking industry,133 aod "will soon become," in the words of one writer, "the
world'slesding shiprepair centre"; foreign-owned ships account fur arouud 9S per cent

". "Chioa's Lmx..t ShipbuildiDg Bose Completed." People', DfJlly (0IIline od), 31 October 2002;
"Clrina Remains World's Third Largest Shipbuilder:' People's Daily (onIine 00.), 10 December 2001;
"Cbina Stays World Third Shipping &porter," People'. Daily (online od), 29 June 200[; and "China's
Shipbuilding Giant _ _ [36 Now Ordo.. in 2000," People's Daily (online od), 12 JIUIll8l)' 2001.
China's sbare of '''worldwide export orders for new ships" equated to almost 20 per cent in 1999 and
2000. The gtatest concentrations of shipbuilding capacity continue to be developed in Shanghai, Dalian
and Guan£zhou, each of which will possess the capability to build 300,000 dwt VLCCs. Wayne Hugar,
"Is Chioa Taking. Great Leap Forward in Shipboi1ding?" U.S. Naval Institute ProCe£dings, July 2001,
l'.l:' 32-83.
Ibid., p. 82.
'" U.s. Department of C o _ . NsJimuzIIkcW'/tJ Aasesamen. of "'" U.S. Shipbuilding ami Repair
brdU8Jry, p. 93.
'" "China Had Superlwgo Oil Tanker Lsnnched," People's Daily {online 00.),3 September 2002. The
Slno-Jopan... cntorpriBe Is N_ng COSCO KIll EngiDcering Co., ajoin'_ between COSCO and
Ko_Pi Hosry IDdustrios.
'" Even by tbo JIlid,.[980. oDly TaiWllll held a larger share of tbo world shipbreaking IlUUket. Heine.
China's Rise /Q Commercial Maritime Power, p. 46.
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of the vessels repaired in Chinese yards, and those yards aIao are now aggressively
targeting the world ship and offshore conversion market. l34 China also is the world's

largest producer of containers, using iIB low cost sttucturcs to dominate the marJret; in
1999 China acoounted for 66 per cent of world dry ftcight container production. 135
The fuet that civilian and military shipbuilding are co-located may be prodocing
benefits fur the modemization of the PLA Navy. In the words of Evan Medeiros, "the
Chinese policy of [defenoe] conversion has been more a strategy of diversification and
civil-military integration than a complete shift from military to civilian production." He

further points out that the Chinese leadership has viewed conversion "as a two-way
process in which military industries would help civilian ones, followed by
technologically upgraded and financially refurbished civiliao industries supporting
improved military production."I36 Although unproven, it may be the case that some
shipbuilding profits are being funnelled as a tacit subsidy into the naval shipbuilding
programme, a not uncommon practice in China where commercial and military
industries are co-located. 137 According to one Chinese report, "military enterprises" in
2000 accounted for half of China', shipbuilding output and 70 per cent of its ship

exports by value. 138
The developmeot of China's sbipbwlding industry thus may have positive spinoffs for improvements in warship design, especially in the areas of speed/propulsion
systems, hull forms and sea worthiness, design aod production techniques, and new
materials aod technologies. The vast expansion of shipbuilding capacity, including the
construction of new facilities that cao now build the largest types of ships and build
batches of shniiar ships simultaoeously, also is relevaot. However, it is important to
remember that while maoy civiliao technologies cao be exploited to improve China's
new warship designs as far as the basic sea-going platfurms are concerned, these do not

include military specification modular design features, for example, or the all-importaot
weapun systems, sensors or systems integration tecimologies needed to equip modern

See the special feature sootion ott China in Shiprepair am:l Co"version Technology, 4th QIl8rter 2001,
5-18 .
fE·UNCfAD,
Review o/Maritime Transport 20lI0, p. 82.
IM Medeiros, ''Revisiting Chinese Defense Convmlron." pp. 80 and 87, respectively,
137 Ibid.. p. 100.
138 It is not clear in the report whether those "military enterprDes" refer to esse, CSIC, or both.
Shipbuilding is deemed to be one of China's ''five major military iDdustrica," which also ilwlude the
nuclear, space. aviation and weaporuy sectors. See ''Remarkable Progress Made in Military Products for
Civilian U,.... People', Daily (online cd), 19 Decembor2000.
]34
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oombatantsY' AB a fina\ caveat, it also is likely that not all the technologicallyadvanced features installed in ships connnercially constrocted in Chinese yards will
result in technology transfers able to be exploited by Chinese industry - wlwther
civilian or militsry. Rather, as with much of China's export manufacturing sector,
advanced componeots may be imported into China to take advantage of it. low
manufacturing/assembly costs, only for the finished products to be n>-exported to
overseas clients. 140

Marine Fishing

Marine fisheries remains the largest sector of China's marine economy by far, both in
tenDs of value and the number of people employed (see Tabl. 4.2). According to

official sources China possesses (or at least claims) 2.81 million square kilomea:e. of
ocean fishing grounds, home to over 20 commercial fish species, although those sources
do acknowledge that some of those species are spread over areas of overlapping
national jurisdictions. [.[ In 1998 China'. total prodoction of marine aquatic products

amounted to 23.5 million tons valued at 177 billion yuan. Of that tonnage, about 15
million tons oomprised marine (offihore) catches of naturally-ocCW"ring species, whihrt
over 8.5 million Ions derived from mariculture (salt water aquaculture in shallow seas,
bays and tidal flats). The largest sea areas for marine catches in that year were the East
China Sea (over 5.5 million tons), and the South China and Yellow Seas (each
accounting for around 3.4 million tons), whilst the coastal regions landing the largest
marine catches were Shaodong, Zhejiaog and Fujian provinces. [42 Chin. poss...es a
huge fishing fleet of over 280,000 motorized boats, up from 49,000 in 1980.[4)
Most of China's marine fish catch is landed from coastal waters; ooly seveo per
cent comes from pelagic (or open ocean) fisheries and less than 1,300 boats of the large
Chinese fishing fleet are ocean-going. [44 Moreover, China has only around 20 large
139 Medeiros,

"Revisiting Chinese Defense Conversion," pp. 98-101; and Hugar, <ors China Taking a Great

Leap Forward mSbipbuild;"g?" pp. 83-84.

t46 For example, the Shanbaiguan yard haa won a contract from. 8 British company to build a cutting-edge
specialized ship fur the installation of off8hore wind turbines. with sevm.l more likely to fonow. A
spokesman for tire British company has stated that China W8S chosen to build the ship for J:e88OD8 of "(lost
and speed." yet twc-third8 of the oontract value will c:onsist of navigation and electronic equipment
.......eeI ftom Europe. S•• "U.K.. Shipyan!s Loo. Out ID China," BBC New. (ontine), 3 December 2001.
141 Chi1lD Ocean Agenda 21, p.40.
142 China Marine Statistical Yearbook 1999, pp. 57-62. China is the worW'slargeat maricu1tu.re producer.
Job Ibid.. p. 76; and see also ''Beijibg Denies Hiding- Drop in Seafood Stocks,.. South China Morning Post
(oaline ed.), 19 Decembcr2001.
144 China Ocean Agenda 21, p. 39; and China Mmine Statistical Yearbook 1999, p. 76.
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deep-water fishing vessels, all of which are old, imported boats. However, due to

dec1ining stocks in some traditional fisheries, di_water fishing for highly urigralory
species such as tuna i. becouring more important for China's fishing strategy.145 China

has had a major fishing presence in Micronesian waters fur some time but is now
attempting to exploit fish stocks further afield. Large numbers of Chinese boats were

reported to have moved into Fijian waters in 2001, where they now acconnt fur twothirds of the fleet fishing the Fijian exclusive economic zone: five years ago there were
no Chinese fishing boats in Fiji. Likened to "locusts," the nnsnstainable fishing
practices of the Beijing.supported Chinese fleet have prompted fears that a ''hundred·
strong" Chinese fleet may over-exploit the resource, oontrary to the oonservation
principles of the

western and Centrsi Pacific Tuna Convention, of which China is

a

party but which has yet to come into force. 14'

China, like most East Asian oonntries, has placed a new importance upon fish to
satisfy an increased demand for animaJ protein and as part ofits drive fur fuod security,
stimulating a particular interest in the rich supply of fish in the South China Sea l47
However, overfishing has led to the enfurcement of temporary fishing bans by China in
parts of that sea, where there is fierce competition between littoral _

for fish stocks,

maI<ing the prospects for significant increases in offshore catches somewhat slim. I "
A further barrier to increasing offshore fish harvests is the need to take into

account the claims of other states whose exclusive economic zones overlap those of
China China's Fisheries Bureau (part of the Ministry of Agriculture) chlms that,
collectively, Beijing's bilateral fishing agreements with Japan, South Korea and
Vietnam (see Chapters 7 and 8) oould reduce China's annual catch by over one million

loU Interview at Shanghai Fisheries University, Slwlghai. My 2000. China is actually using roflagged
uIDltiliud Taiwanese voasels to overcome its shortfall in appropriate boats and deep-water fishing
technology (faiwan has more fishing boats than fishing quota), BeijiDg also boosts its own political ego
by ilyjng Chinese flags on Taiwanese vessels. Interview with Taiwanese marine policy -specialist, Taipei,

August 2000.

"Flurry over Fiji Fleet," The New Zealand Herald (online 00.), 25 September 2001.
See, for example, John W. Garver, "China's Push Through the South China Sea: The Interaction of
Buxeaucratic andNlllionalhltereots," The China Quarterly, No. 132, 00_1992, p. 1019.
141 See "Plenty More Fish in South China Sea," China Daily (onIine 00.), 2 August 2000. A Canadian
survey has made a claim, denied by Beij:ing, tbal China over·reported fislring catc.... during Iho 1990s,
thus ''masking a decline in global :fish stocks." "Beijing Denies Hiding Drop in Seafuod Stocks," South
China Morning Post (onIine ed.), 19 December 2001. In a further attempt to limit fishing in offiiliore
areas mrere fish stocks are depleted, Beijjng has clamped down on illegal fishing by unregi,teted or
1lIIliconsed boat8 (almost baIf Iho tola! ChiDe.. fishing fleet). "Gavernmont Moves to Roel in megal
Fiobing," People's Daily (onlino eel.), 28 February 2001. One plan being imp_d to reduoo
Dverfisbing in oft'8hote zones is to use government support to SCIap excess fishing boats. See "Fishing
Deals Cut Number ofMariDoIs," China Daily (oolitJe eel), 9 December 2000.
1<4(;
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tons and that "at least 300,000" fishennen might have to leave the fisheries """tor.'" It

is likely, therefure, that any significant incrosse in fish production will have to come
from mariculture andIor aquaculture, although Beijiog appears certain to aggressively

seek further deep-water fishiog opporllmities. By doillg

'0 China is set to become a

m1\ior regional fishiog power not only io East Asia, but also throughout the Central and
South Pacific.
Offikore Oil and Gas

A potentially more important resource consideration than fish fur China io the South
Chioa Sea and elsewhere, however, is oil. The exploitation of offshore oil and gss hss
become a significant element of China's plans to reduce its I!fOwing imported energy
dependency, although onshore production still accounts for almost 90 per cent of
domestic oil output. 150 Initial exploration occurred throughout the 1970s, but it was only
io 1979 that China engaged foreign companies, who possessed the tecbnical and
financial wherewithal, to begio serious exploratory drilling along China'. coast and
down ioto the South China Sea. lSl The China National Offshore Oil Corporation
(CNOOC) was estsblished io 1982 as the primary stata iostrnment for exploiting
offshore oil and gss reserves. Following oil iodus(ry restructuring in 1993, CNOOC wss
placed under the Stale Economic and Trade Commission with ministry-level status,
reporting directly to the State Council. 1S2
In 1998 China'. offshore oil and gss fields produced close to 19 million tons of

oil (or almost twelve per cent) of a national oil p"'!luction total of 160 million tonnes,
and just under 4.2 billion cubic metres (BCM) ofnatura\ gss (or almost 19 per cent) ofa
national tota\ of just over 22 BCM.''' According to one Chinese source, close to 1.5

billion tons of oil and 320 BCM of gss have already been discovered ''in China'.
territorial seas," with the total quantity of economically recoverable reserves esthrtated

.., "Fishlng Deals Cut Number ofMatinon," China Daily (ooIine ed.), 9 December 2000. It should be
SIllTOUIlding \he disputed Senkaka Wands.
InterviewlI at Sl!angbai Fisboms University, S~ and Stare Ooeanic Administration, Beijing, July
2000.
'" U.S.· Energy Infonnotion Mmini.tratiDD, ''CbiDa Country AnaIysio Brief," April 2001,
htlp'J/www.oia.gov/emoulcebolchlna.html.
IS1 Muller, Chiml DS 0 Marlttme Power, pp. 192-195.
'" a.,. CIuistotIeroen, "China's Intentinns for RWIOiJm and Cenn.l Asian Oil and Gas," NBR Ana/ysi3,
Vo19,No.2,l998,p.l1.
I~' For total production figures, see BP SlIlIiatical Review (JfWorld Energy 2001, pp. 6 and 23; and for
offlhore totaJ., see China Marine S'arutlcal Yearbook 1999, p. 82.
noted fllat !be .....,.,.". wilh Japan do.. oot incltld. _
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to amount to seven billion tons of oil and 4.5 trillion cubic metres (rCM) of gas.1S4
There were almost 800 offilhore wells in production in 1998, mostly in the BohBi Gulf

near Tianjin, as well as in the northern part of the South China Sea. '" For both
exploration and exploitation of those offilbore reserves CNOOC remains dependent
upon foreign investmeot and oil industiy expertise; by early 2000 it had (since its
inception) signed 143 exploration contracts with 70 foreign oil companies.

I'. CNOOC

pllllls to use this investment to roughly double its 1999 annual output of oil and gas to
40 million tons in 2005, although this tsrget may require investment of as much as
U.S.$15 billion to achieve. I "
China's major offilhore oil production sreas lie in the Bohai Gu1f; whieh may
hold over 200 million tonnes of reserves, and the northern continental shelf of the South
China Sea, psrticu1arly near Hong Kong in the Pearl River-mouth basin and the
Wenehllllg oilfields east ofHaillllll. oth... production areas include the Yellow Sea, the
East China Sea and the Tonkin Gulf. The most sigoificant offilbore gas production areas
are located in the Yinggehai basin to the south-west and south of Hainan: the Dongfung
I-I (DF 1-1) field - China's largest gas field currently W1der development - IIIld the
Yacheog 13-1 (yC 13-1) field, whieh has an annual production capacity of 3.4 BCM
(moally ID supply Hong Kong), respectively. In the East China Sea CNOOC also
operates the Pinghu gas field (supplying Shanghai) and another Chinese oil company,
China National Star Petroleum, i. developing the Chunxiao field, whieh may hold
reserves of more than 45 BCM.t" A World Back study estimates that East China Sea
gas fields eventually should be able to supply between 3.7 to 5.5 BCM annually to

J:r4 ''Oil Industry Enjoys Great Potcmtial for Development," Beijing Review, 22-28 J\IllC 1998, pp. 15·16.
Chinese estimates of total reserves II\(lst likely will turn. out to be bighly over-optimistic. however; a
leading Western source quote& figures that China's total (including both onshore and o:ffiilion::) proven
reserves at t:lw end Qf2000 stood at 33 billion tonnes afoH and 1.37 TCM of natural gas. BP su,tislical
Review of World Energy 2001, pp. 4 and 20.
lSS China Marine Statistical Yearbook 1999, p. 84.
'" "Explonltion Contract Sigruod," China Daily (onJine od), 27 Apri12000.
'" Ibid.; and ''Growili &jl""" China to Oil Supply Shookll," In'ernntional Herald Trlbu1U! (online od.),
31 October 2001. A rough calculation would suggest that, in 1998, total offilhorc production of oil and
gas (in terms of million tonnes of oil equivalent) equated to approximately 11 per cent of national
cowrumption. Doubling offshore production by 2005 would undoubtedly see that percentage rise.
tU See U.8. Energy Infonnation Administration. ''China Country Analysis Brief," April 2001,
http://www.ei.a.gov/emculcabsfcltinabtm1; ''Enterprise Culture - Upstreol - Offshore Hydrocatbon
Exploration" on 1he CNOOC web site. bttp:llwww.cnooc.com.cnlenglishlbusiness/index.html; and Cben
Dogong,. ''Offshore Exploration and Exploitation for Oil and Gas in China," in Dall.,boong Kiln. Jiao
Y_lre, Jin-Hyun Pait and Cbea Degoog, e<is., Ocean Affair> in N"""'"" AsW and Prosp_ for
Korea-China Maritime Coop£ratwn., East and West Studies Series 32, Seoul Press for the Institute of
East aucl West Studies, Yonsei University, Seoul, 1994.
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eastern China, although that supply alooe will not be able to satisfy projected

demand

1
"

Despite Beijing's high hopes for the futore, oftShore oil production results in
coastal waters have to date been relatively disappointing, leading to an ""Pansion of
exploration activities furth... south into the South China Sea around the disputed Spratiy
Islands,16O and also to CNOOC itself investing in overseas projects to secure greater
security of supply. CNOOC's fim overseas project in 1994 was a one-third stake in an
Indonesian oilfield in the Malacca Strait; in 1996 CNOOC Overseas Oil and Gas Co.
Ltd. was set up to develop CNOOC'. ov.....,.. supply interests, with a target for those

interests to produce (for China) two million tons of oil annually by 2000. CNOOC's
ov.....,.. fucus is on Irsn and Kazakbstsn's sector of the Caspian Sea. 161 Nevertheless,
there can be little doubt that China is making some progress in the development of its
own offshore hydrocarbon reso= as it accumulates experience, technology and
capital.

m

PolitlcoJ Facto,..

Role ofGovernnumt
The role of govermnent is perhaps the most important of all relevant factors when
considering China'. maritime power within the regional strategic context. A high level
of government direction across a range of maritime sectoral interests indicates that
Beijing is indeed intent to develop China's national maritime power as an instrument of

its grand strategy. The Chinese government has explicitly acknowledged the leading
role that maritime filctors will play within China's broader national security interests,
and has targeted growth in the marine sector as vital for China's futore economic wellbeing. To achieve its maritime economic goals Beijing began work on a 25 year (19952020) marine development plan in 1991.162 The plan i. being coordinated by China's

ID Dean OirdJs, Stratos Tavou1areas and Ray Tomkins. Liquefied Natural Gas in China: Options for
MtJ1'Irzts, lnatUuiio1lll, ll1Id Finance, World Baok: Discussion Paper No. 414, International Bank for
Reconstruction aud Devclopment, World Bank, Washing"''' D.C., May 2000, p. 31.
A fuller 1re_ of _
h»drocarbon is.... in aud IUVlIIld the disputed par!8 of the South Chine
Sea i, provided in Chapter 7.
161 ChriBtoffersen, ·'China's llItentioos for RUSBian and CcntralAsian Oil and Gas," pp. 17-18.
162 Zhou Zheng, ''The National PrograDlDlO fur Marine Deve1~ent to Strengthen the Comprehensive
Management ofthe Ocean," in Kim et al., eds., Ocean Affairs in Norlheaat Asia ami Prospect8 for KoreaChJnaMarittme Cooperation, pp. 122-125.
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leading agency for marine affitiIs, the State Oceanic Administration, I" wbich has
produced an integrated policy and strategies for China's marine development. l ..

The 1998 marine policy white paper states thst Chin.'s marine industries ''have
become forces actively promoting the development of China's economy as a whole."
And, with no equivocation: "Chin.... must take exploitation and protection of the
ocean as a long-term strategic task before it can achieve the sustainable development of
its national economy."I" The father of the modern Chinese navy and the most senior
and influential military officer in China from the late 1980. through much of the 1990s,
Liu Huaqing, ba, <tired similar thoughts:
Exploitation of dIe ocean has turned into an important condition for coastal countties in
devek>piDg lhoir economy and ovenill
of national power. It is certaln !bat !be

._gth

ocean will be more and more sigoifwam to the long-tmm dewlopmc:nt of a country. We

must UIlIierstand the ocean from a strategic level and its importance to the whole
nation. 16(;

The.. admonitions represoot rather more than mere rbetoric; over the past two decades
the Chinese government has consciously targeted and promoted those marine economic
sectors moot important both to the overall economy and its dynamic coastal regions
under the open door policy, and to its wider natiooal secority interests (particularly
shipping and shipbuilding).
All a taogible expression of its ackoowledgernent of the increased salience of
China's marine industries to natiooal well-being, Beijing included the development of
the marine economy as one of ita top priorities in ita Ninth Five-Year Plan (19962000).167 China reportedly plans to continue ita inve.troent in marine industry
development in the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005), which includes as "major
objectives" the further development of the marine economy, protection of China's
I
maritime rights and interests, and protection of the marine environment. .' Ambitious
growth targets for the blue economy have been set hy the Chinese government:

163 On the State Oceanic: Administration &CC Jiao Yoo:gkc, "Bilateral Cooperation in Marine and Fishery
Science and Technology between China and Other Colllltries," in ibid., pp. 162-165.
164 See China Ocean Agenda 21; and ''The Development of China' s Marine Proi11UD8."
16S Ibid., pp. 15 and 13, respectively.
166 General Liu Huaqing. ''Defense Modemization :in Historical Perspective," in Micbael Pillsbury, ed.,
ClJinese news ofFutkre. Wadare, rev. eeL, NDUPress, Washington, D.e., 1998,p. 118.
167 "China to Exploit Its Marine Resources," China Daily (online ed,). 18 September 2000.
168 Ibid.; and uA New Order ofOcoan Law," China Daily Hong Koltg Eelitton (0llIi00 00.), 12 July 200l.
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according to the China Ocean Agenda 21 policy document, the overall marine economy
should aim for an annual growth rate of "not less than 15 per cenf' by 2000 and tbat,
"after 2000," the marine economy sho1l!d grow to account fur between five to ten per
cent of total GDP, and between 20 to 30 per cent of the GDP of coastal srea•. l69 One
report suggests that the marine economy will be expected to accolUlt fur ten per cent of

national GDP by 2010,170 an extremely ambitious target which wo1l!d require the blue
economy to continue to grow at a much faster rate than overall GDP in order to more
than double its value as a proportion of GDP over the span ofjust one decade. 171
In addition to promoting the overall growth of the marine economy, the

objectives of China Ocean Agenda 21 place special emphasis on the shipping, ocean
fisheries, offilhore oil and gas and coastal tourism sectoIs. The general goals of China's
marine industry strategy include: the development of a modero maritime transport
infrastructure; changing the focus of the fisheries sector away from depleted coastal
fishing grounds to offShore and pelagic fisheries as well as further promoting

mariculture, so that the sea will eventually provide coastal areas with ten per cent of
their food requirements; introduction of new technologies for offilhore oil and gas
exploration and exploitation; aod increasing the use of sea water and improving

desaJination technologies to counter water shortages on land.1"I2 More specific targets,
noted in previous sections above, have been set within the various industry sectoIs, aod
concerted effurts have been made to promote research and development and the
introduction of new technologies throughout the related fields of marine science aod the

marine economy.
AB also has been noted in two earlier sections, Beljing, through the Slate

Council, has closely directed the development of the shipping and shipbuilding sectors,
each of which is important both economicatly and strategically. One analyst has
SUWSted tbat, with the exception of the (fonner) Soviet Union, no other oountry has
exercised such "comprehensive control" over national maritime policy (that is, maritime
transportation, including shipbuilding).173 One of the aims of China's maritime policy
has been to maximize the proportion of its foreign trade carried by Chinese-flagged

,..

.

China Oc.rmAgem/a 21, p. 5.

_0.

'" "fargeto Set fur Blue industty," Beifing Review, 2J Febrwuy-l Maroh 1998, p. 5.
171 A new national blueprint to facilitate that further boost to the marine economy over the next five to ten
yeen; repcrtodly was being drafted In Jate 2001 by 1he State Oceanic
''Blueprint ID Boost
'Bluolloonmny,'" Chin. Daily (onlinc od), 17 August 200 1.
112 See China OceImAge1fda 21, Chs. 2-3.
173 Heine, China '3 Rise to Commercial Martttme Power. pp. 1.2.
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ships, or at least Chinese-owned ships. It remains to be seen whether the increased
corpomtization and commercialization of China's shipping industry will result in
redoced state control. Given the general transition of the Chinese economy from one
that is state-directed to one of statc>-led capitalism, it might be expected that those
maritime industries will continue both to be influenced by the priorities of the
government's national development policies, and to be used by Beijing to further
contnbute to the expansion of Chinese maritime power, thus also boosting China's
overall national power. It is certsinly unlikely that those strategically importaot (and
profitable) industries will be privatized in the state-capitalist political-economic system
that has evolved in China.
In fact, the profitability of the maritime transportation industries probably meaos

that the government role, and posstbly also the attention of the PLA as both financial
aod strategic stakeholder in those industries, will strengthen rather than diminish, even
if the linkages may become less direct or outwardly obvious. In one particular example,
the Chinese government has moved to limit the influence of the Hong Kong-based
Hntchison Whampoa gmup's port interests on the mainlaod; the company holds stakes
in eight mainlaod ports which are maoagod by the gmup and which accounted for 26
per cent of China's container thmugbput in 1999. In part, the move may have been
aimed at providing investment opportunities to foreigo companies previoosly shut out of

China's port seclor. However, it also is likely that China wools greater control over its
own ports due 10 their increasing profitability."4 This (unofficial) policy has occurred
despite the repotedly close ties of Li Ka-shiag, the Hong Kong shiPPing magnate who
controls the Hutchison Whampoa group (which controls some 15 per cent of the world'.
shipping), with members of the Beijing government, senior officers of the PLA and
COSCO.17S

174 See ''Deep Water," Far Eastern Economic Review,

2 Novemhe:r 2000, p. 26.
U'S ties to the PLA have concerned members of America's conservative elite ever since Hut:cllison
Whampoa won management contracts for ports at either end of the Panama Canal and e3tabliBhed a new
major hub port on Grand Babama Island.in 1997, prompting felU81hat Chinn might be taking control of
the canal and extending its maritimo-political influence into Cbe Western Hemisphere, See ibid,; and
"China's Whampoa Ltd. Opens Port in Bahamas," The Washington 7Ymea (online 00.), 20 NovembeI'
2001. Nevertheless, Beijing's alleged rcafrictions evidently have not stopped Hntchison Whampoa
acquiring a 49 per cent stake m the Beilungang coo.tainer port in Ningbo, which is to be part of the
emerging Shanghai International Shipping Centre, and investing over U.8.$660 million in capacity
expanaion at Shenzhen's Yantian port See, respectively. "Li Ka-shing Inves1JJ in Mainland Container
Pori," P'op"'·' Dolfy (online .d.l, 11 June 2001; and ··SheDZl!on Iieoomes Onc of World·, Top 10
Container PortJ," People's Daily (online ed.), 14 IBJlII8:I'Y 2002.
17S

127

One leading contemporary example of government involvement that stands out
in China, cutting across the shipping, ports and shipbuilding sectors, is the development
of the Shanghai International Shipping Centre, that agglomeration of maritime
transportation fucilities in the Shanghai and Zhejiang regions which collectively will
become one of the world's greatest concentrations of ports, shipyards and other
shipping-related infrastrnctnre. After lobbying Beijing, Shanghai managed to win the
sopport of both the SIste COImcil and the State Development Planning Commission to
proceed with the huge project. 11• The

MinistrY of Communication'. strategic tatgets fur

waterway Innsportation also feature as a core objective the development of Shanghai as
a leading international shippiog centre. In addition, the Ministry wants China's top five
coutainer ports to b. nmked in the world's top 20 in

.erIllB ofthroughpul by 2010. In

A group of Shanghai National People's Congress (NPC) depoties also have
lobbied for a new law to further enhance the pace of development of China',
shipbuilding industry ''for both deme and commercial putpOses." The law would
promute a high degree of self-reliance in shipbuilding and related technological
improvements to China's fleets, and quickly gained the sopport of the influential
Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTlND).178
High-level political support for the development of Shanghai's maritime industries
represents jost part of the general promotion of Shanghai as China's leading city:
Premier Zhu

Rongj~

fur example, has promuted Shanghai as the future Chinese

equivalent of New York. \19
Ocean Consciousness
A concerted effort is being made by the Chinese govermnent to estshlish a sense of
"ocean consciousness" amongst its generally landward-focosed peeple, as a way to
promote both the 1llllrinl: economy and enviromnentally sustsinable sea-use practices.
Beijing's effurts also seek to create a wider knowledge of China's maritime territorial
claims and the importanoe of the .ea to China's national interests and regional

lho FuIure," SoWlh China M>miIIg Post (0D!ine ed.), [ 0 _ 200 1.
ITI!'MinistrYofCnrmm.nications Blueprints China's Traffic Construction," People'a lJtJiJy (on1ine 00.),8

11. "Gateway to

June 2001.
11. "LaWDlllkeni Propooe Law to Spur Shipbuilding Industry," People's Daily (onIine cd.), 15 Much
2000.
'" "Rivalry with Cbiua EDds SIllOO1h Sailing fuT Hong Kong Porlli; 71Ie W...hillgton Post (onlino cd.), 7
ADSUS' 2001. S"""",, mombero ofth. cum:nt Chinoio leadership beve their poliIic.al roots in Shanghai Jiang Zemin is a fOl'.Dlel" mayorofShaogiJai, for example.
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ambitions. Beijing's promotion of the ocean thus should be viewed as being directly
related to predominsting nationalist sentiment within China, particularly when it comes

to China's claims to Taiwan and other maritime territories in the East and South China
Seas. In a similar vein, Liu Huaqing has pleaded that the very fate of the nation depends
on whether China can establish sufficient ''maritime sense" and concomitantly
appropriate maritime strategic capabilities. ISO
The plao to promote awareness and appreciation of the .ea and its growing
salieoce for China'. future national well-being takes the form of school education
programmes and testbooks; poblication of books and prodoction of televiaion
programmes and videos

00

marioe science and national maritime territories and

interests; production and disseminatioo of a marine "propaganda handbook"; and
marine-focused workpl..., training for those living in coastal regions."1

Sea Laws
China's intention to protect its claimed maritime rights and interests has been
demonstrated by the promulgation of a series of national ocean Jaws enacted since 1992.
These laws also reflect the entry into force in 1994 of the Law of the Sea Convention.
which was ratified by Beijing in May 1996. The most important piece of ocean law
promulgated by Beijing is its Territorial Sea Law. adopted in February 1992. followed
by it. EEZ'Continental Shelf Law. adopted in June 1998. A new law. the Law on the
Use of Maritime Space. was passed in 2001 to assert state ownership over maritime
areas and marioe resources. and to regulate exploitation of those areas in order to

maximize the national benefits of China's marine-economic development. l82
China'. Territorial Sea Law claims sovereignty over not only Taiwan "and all
islands appertaining thereto including the Diaoyo [Senkaku] Island.... but also the
Pescadores and Pratas Islands (both of which are occupied by Taiwan). the Par...,l and
Spratly Islands. Macclesfield Bank and "all the other islands belonging to the People's
Republic of China. ,,183 In addition to its expansive territorial claims. the Law also is
180 LiD, "Defense Modernization in Historical Pempcctive," p. 118.
,.. CIrin. Ocean A,g.nda 21, Appendix 12,pp.190-191.
182 "Law on Marine Use Hailed," China Daily Print Edition (onIine 00.), 2 November 2001.
1113 "Law of the People's Rqlublic of China on the Territorial Sea and tbe Contiguous 'hJne," 2S February
1992, Article 2, in Office of Policy, Law and Regulation. State Oceanic Administratioo, Collection o/the
Sea Laws and ReguJatio1lS of the. People's Republic of China, State Oceanic AdministratioD, Beijing,
1998, p. 186. Forpolitical-1egal analysis of China's maritime territorial claims. see Grog Austin, China's
Ocean Frontier: Imernatio1tlJl Law, Mili.llUy Force and National Development, Alleo & Unwin. St
Leonards, NSW, 1998, esp. Ch. 2; and for a Chinese interpretation, Ji Guoxing. ''M.aritim.e Jurisdiction in
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controversial internationally because it claim. straight baselines for tbe mellSUl"elllent of
its twelve nautical mile territorial

se.,

restricts the innocent passage of warships tbrough

China'. territorial .... and claims extra enforcement power. for ''security'' pwposes in

its contiguous zone.'" The Territorial Sea Law tbus attempts to maximize Cbina'.
maritime power by claiming exceosive territorial sea boundaries, l15Serting ownership
over disputed maritime teuitories and the marine living and non-living resources found
within the maritime zones of those territories and claiming expansive powers within

China's own maritime zon.., including exceasive security provision. desigoed to
restrict tbe freedom of navigstion of trsditinnal sos powers. In tbe strategic environment

of tbe early twenty-first century thst means, primarily, the United States. The ract that
Cbina itself is now a significant maritime power might suggest thsl, on face value, it too

now has an interest in defeDding navigational rights and freedoms against the tide of
~creeping jurisdietion" and restrietions increasingly imposed by coastal stat.s.'"

However, there is no sigo of any easing of restrictions. Boijing may w.ll try in tbe
future to have it both ways by maintaioing its own restrietions whilst using its rising

infIIUODCe to chalJenge tbe maritime restrictions and claims of otber regional stotes.

the Three China Seas: Options for Equitable Settlement," in Dalchooog Kim et aL, eds., UN Convention
on the Law ofthe Sea and East Asia, East: and West Studies Series 40, Seou1 Press fur the Institute of East
aDd West Studio" Yomm UDi""';ty, Seoul, 1996.
184 See Max Herr:iman, "China's Te:tritorial Sea Law and International Law ofthc See," Maritime Studies,
No. 92. hnuary-February 1997. The territorial sea baseline is the set of coordinates from which the 12 DDl
territorial sea is measured; rmher than follow the CODtours of its coastline, China has drawn. straight
baselines aJong its entire COBBt aDd around the Pancel I"hmda, thus extending its cJaimed maritime zones
10 seaward and eacl.o8ing: larger areas as internal wate:r8. Foreign warships are requinxI to seck prior
approval before cOllduotins an imwcent passage 1hrough China's tmritorlal sea, contrary to the provisions
of the Law of the Sea Convention. China also is in dispute with itH neighbours over principles of
c.::ontinental shelf demarcation and EEZ delimitation and over the ~tent to which many of the small
terrlIorial f'oa1lJre. of 1bo South China Sea c1aimed by Cbino aDd other . - .... entitled to their own
maritime zones for the pmpose of clBi:mfng sovereignty over nearby marine resources.
115 A point made in personal eonversations with 1he author by Sam Bateman. A similar SUggestion was
nwIe iD 1990, albeit iD "",ay ditrerent otrategic conditWns, at a timo when 1bo United States had • .......!
to be El ''naval tbreat" to China: Beijing's growing economic and strategic interests in tfu: sea and its
requirement to be able to transit vital straits and atclripelagic waters in the region at that time were
creating; "a ditli.cult political and. ideological dilemma for China regarding the question of whether or not
to maintain its leadership in the Third Wodd at the cost of pursuing its own ma.riti:mo inter08I8." Y&nOw
Imei Song, ''China IUld the Military Uses of the OeelUl," Ocean Development and Intematioool Law, VoL
21, No. 2, April-I.... 1990, p. 230.
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THE NON-MILITARY ASPECTS OF CIIINA'S MARITIME POWER: AN OVERALL
ASSESSMENT

In Mahanian tenns, China already poss...es significant maritime power, even though its
primary geostrategic disposition remain, continental. It enjoys a sound geographical
position for the development of sea power, albeit with a long laod frontier: in the current
strategic environment, however, the historical disadvaotages posed by long land
frontiers for the development of Chinese sea power are diminished, although China cao
never be free from the possibility of ti.ttllre continenta1 threats. China enjoys a long
coastline with numemus harbour.!, a large and growing number of the population reside
near the coast and a significant number are employed in marine industries. Moreover,
there are surging levels of commercial dyoamism within China combined with rapidly
increasing foreign trade, aod there is a high degree of gnvernmeot intervention to
promote the marine economy aod China's maritime interests.
Greater numbers of the Chinese popul8tion are likely to migrate to coastal areas,
inexorably pushing the economic and strategic focus of the country ftntber towards the
sea. China's marine economy is set to become an increasingly important element ofthe
overall economy, although significant new capital investment will be required,
particularly in port iofrastrocture, offshore oil aod gas and onshore LNG infrastrocture.
China has become a leading player in international shipping aod a major shipbuilder,
bcth of which have important strategic implications for the region. 10 the words of one

commentator, China "is now set to exert the largest single influence on the world's
shipping industry over the next decade."'" It is this faotor that bcth underpins China'.
seaborne trade (especially when Hong Kong-based assets are included) and sets it on a
medium-tenn path to challeoge Japao as Asia's pre-eminent commercial maritime
power. locreasing volume. of Asia-based trade will be carried by Chinese shipping
compaoies, potentially in ships designed and constrocted in Chinese yards.
Despite the fact that China's trade dependence remains at a moderate level, the
sheer size of the Chinese economy aod its trading vohnnes will grow to dwarf the
collective seaborne trade of its East Asian neighbours other than Japan. Even so, it is
likely thst as the domestic market expands and diversifies, the overall level of China's

186

Rimmer, ''Commeroial Shipping Patterns in the Asian-Pacifi(:, 1990-2000," p. 1.
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trade dependenee will actually fall, other than fur certain strategic resources,
particularly oil.
Pedlaps the most important dimensioo of China's sea power is the seemiogly
well-coordinated role of the eeotrol government io promotiog the expansion of natioool
maritime power as a leading iostrument of gnmd strategy fur the pllfSUit of its politicol,
economic and strategic policy gool•. Although Chioa'. dependeoce on the sea remains
relatively modest, in the Deng Xiaopiog and post-Deng eras Beijiog has consciously
pursued a maritime-focused nationol development strategy. In the words of one study,
Beijiog has iodeed followed a strategy of ''maritim...oriented nationol development" as
a primary means to Chioa's overall modernization. l87 The politicol rhetoric exhorting
China's exploitation of the sea has been consistent sioce 1979, and the policy practice
has been largely consistent with the rhetoric. The historicaIly modest role of the sea io
Chioa's nationol interests, in other words, is heiog transformed by a politico1leadership
who, io the words of You Ii, now view ''tbeprospect of ocean exploitation [as] a lasting
attraction.,,188
A consequence of Chioa', maritim...focused development strategy and its other
maritime-related fureign policy gaols has been the rise to prominence of the .ea io
Beijiog's wider national security ioterests, thus creating a demand for expanded
maritime security capabilties. The next chapter anolyses those strategic cap_bilties to
complete the overall assessment of Chioa', comprehensive nationol maritime power.

'87 H""""
18& YDU Ji,
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"Cbi"".. Maritime Modernization and I.. Security Implications," Cb. 6, esp. pp. 333-334.
ne Armed Forces ofChi"." Allen & Unwin, St Leonurds. NSW. 1999. p. 162.

5

The Military Instruments of China's Maritime Power

Chapter 2 included a general introduction to the material elements of China's military
power. The current chapter details the military instroments of China's maritime power.
However, the difficulty of evaluating the military power of any state in peacetime is
exacerbated when the state in question has a highly secretive political and military
establishment and, in the Chinese case, has not actua1Iy fought a war of significance for
almost a quarter-century (the limited invasion of Vietnam in 1979). Assessments of
military capabilities can also tend towards mere besn counts of weapon platforms,' with
little regard for the other factors that make up capabilities and contnbnte to military

effectiveness. Those factors often are difficult to assess and include, inter alia:
tecbnological proficiency and military-industrial capacity and self-reliance; systems
integration; logistics; quality of personnel and professionalism levels; proficiency in
strategy, doctrine and tactics development, joint operations and training; and morale.
Using a holistic approach that incorporates many of the above factors, this
chapter firstly evaluates current Poople's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy force stroctore
and capabilties. China's maritim<>-strategic power involves far more than strictly naval

forces, however. The second section assesses the PLA's

non~naval,

maritime--relevant

forces, whilst the :final section provides a brief conclusion, summarizing China's overall
maritime-strategic power.
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CHINA'S NAVAL POWER

Organization
The Chinese navy has been a net beneficiary of the shift in resources and force structure
emphasis within the PLA since the strategic transfonnation of 1985.' This change has
largely come at the expense of the ground forces, as the PLA's strategic focus has
zoomed in upon China's maritime periphery. Although the PLA Navy (PLAN) has
slimmed down both in personnel and force structure, in keeping with the general
downsizing of the PLA since 1985, the relative importance of the navy within the PLA
is likely to increase, and its disproportionately large share of the defence budget in
relation to its size as a service is likely to remain unchanged.' In 2001 the PLA Navy
consisted of 268,000 personnel, a number which includes 25,000 PLA Navy Air Force
(PLANAF), up to 10,000 Marines and a coastal defence force of around 28,000.'

Command Strocture

The national command structure for China's naval forces begins with the centralized
Party control of the Central Militsry Commission aud runs through the PLA Geoeral
Staff Department to the Navy Headquarters based in Beijing, the PLAN's Headquarters
Department aud on to the three fleets (see Figure 5.1 below).' There are also three other
departmeots in addition to the Headquarters Department: the Political, Logistics aud
Equipment Departments, with the PLA Navy Air Force counting, in effect, as a fifth
department. It is argued by Bernard Cole that the Headquarters Department is the most
important of the five, as it is through that department that the chain of command
connects to the fleets.'

I

2

You li, The Anned Forces o/China, Alien and Unwin, St Leonards, NSW, 1999, pp. 30-31.
Bernard D. Cote, ''The Organization of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)," paper prepared

fur the CAPS-RAND Conference on the PLA, Warrenton. VA, 4-6 August 2000, pp. 19-21 (permission
to cite received),
3 Jane's Fighting Ships 2001-2002, lane's Information Group, Coulsdon. Surrey, 2001, p. 112. The
coastal defence forces are taslred with protection o~ inter alia, naval bases and "offshore" islands, and are
equipped with artillery and anti-ship cruise missiles. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS),
The MUUary Balance 1998199, Oxford University Press for the llSS, London, 1998, p. 180.
4 For ~ detail on the PLA Navy (and PLA) command structure, see Bemard D. Cote, The Great Wall
at Sea: China's Navy Enters the Twenty-first Century, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis,:MD, 2001, pp.
73-79; Cole, ''The Organization of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)," pp. 28-30 and 52; You,.
The Armed Forces o/China, pp. 35 (Figure 2.1) and 172-175; and Information Office of the State Council
of the People's Republic of China, "China's National Defense in 2000," Beijing, October 2000,
supplement to Beijing Review. 23 October 2000, p. iv.
S Cole,
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The Great Wall at Sea, pp. 73-79.

Figure 5.1 SimpHlied PLA-PLA Navy Command Structure
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The Fleets and Bases
The Chinese navy is divided into three fleets: the North Sos, East Sea and South Sea
Fleets. The North Sea Fleet comprises six major naval bases, with headqnarters at
Qingdao, plus ten minor naval bases and twelve air bases. The East Sea Fleet comprises

five major bases, with its headquarters at Ningbo, twelve minor bases and six air bases.
The South Sea Fleet also has five major bases, including Hong Kong, with the
headquarters located at Zhanjiang, 17 minor naval bases and seven sir bases. Each fleet

Iias two submarine squadrons, three squadrons of major surface combatants and a single
squadron of mine warfare vessels, as well as large numbers of small patrol craft. The
North Sea Fleet possesses one amphibious sqo!ldrqn whilst the East Sea and South Sea
Fleets possess two apiece, although the majority of the best amphibious crafl are
concentrated in the South Sea Fleet, with which the PLA Navy's two brigades of
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Marines also are located. The aircraft of the PLA Navy Air Force comprise eight
divisions divided between the three fleets. 6
Although the balance between the strengths of the three fleets remains relatively
constant, the East Sea and South Sea Fleets are believed to be receiving most of the
latest ships and aircraft inducted into the navy. In part, this may be due to the
assignment of specific classes or types of vessels to a particular fleet in order to simplify
operational and logistical considerations. 7 The strategic emphasis upon Taiwan and the
South China Sea over the past few years is likely, however, to have been another
influence over the deployment pattema of the newest weapon systems. In the recent
past, when the Soviet Union was the primary threat, the North Sea Fleet was the preeminent fleet, illustrated by the fact that China's largest naval base, Qingdao, reputedly
the largest in the Far East, was completed only in 1988.' However, if Chinese sources
are to be believed, there is interest in establishing an even larger facility, possibly at one
of the major East Sea Fleet bases such as Ningbo or Zhoushan, which would be closer
to the most likely operational thestres of conflict: the Taiwan Strait and the South China
Sea.9

In relation to the geographical location of the three fleets, each has its own

general area of operational responsibility which corresponds roughly to the boundaries
of China's coastal military regions (MRs - see Map 5.1).10 The North Sea Fleet is
primarily responsible for operations in the Bohai Gulf and most of the Yellow Sea (and,
presumably, the Sea of Japan), an area which corresponds approximately to seas
adjacent to the northern coastal provinces down to the border between Shandong and
Jiangsn provinces (or the Shenyang, Beijing and Jinan MRs). The East Sea Fleet's
operational area inclndes the northern part of the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea
(inclnding the Taiwan Strait), corresponding to the sea area adjacent to Jiangsu,
Zhejiang and Fujian provinces (or the Nanjing MR). And the South Sea Fleet is

6 Jane's Fighting Ships
7

2001-2002, p. 112; and Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, pp. 82-83.

Ibid., p. 90.

& Tai Ming Cheung, Growth of Chinese Naval Power: Priorities, Goals, Missions. and Regumal
Implications, Pacific Strategic Paper 1, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1990, pp. 32-34.
9 You, TheAnnedForcesofChina, pp. 179-180.
10 In order-to meet the challenges of China's new strategic circumstances, operationalize the new doctrine
of 1985. and prepare the armed forces for combined arms and joint operations, the PLA's geographical
organization was reformed during 1989-90 into seven enlarged military regions (MRs): the inland MR.s of
Lanzbou and Cbengdu and, from IWrth to south, the coastal MRB of Shenyang, Beijing, Jirum, Nanjing
and Gwmgzhou. See David Shambaugh, "China's Military in Transition: Politics, Professionalism.
Procurement and Power Projection," The China Quarterly, No. 146, June 1996, p. 283; and You, The
A.rmed Forces o/China, pp. 42-49, esp. Figure 2.2.
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responsible for operations in the entire South China Sea and the Tonkin Gulf, involving
not only the sea adjacent to Guangdong province and Guangxi Autonomous Region (the
Guangzhou MR), but also the waters beyond the island province of Rainan, inc1nding
the Sea's disputed territorial featores. 1I Ideally, with no physical barriers separating the
three fleets, they ought to be able to operate together in a relatively seamless and
synergistic fashion, although doubts bave been proffered over their actual level of
interoperability.12 Interoperability questions also cloud the relationship between the
PLANAF and the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) aod their ability to conduct joint matitime

and coastal air defence operations. 13
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China maintains military outposts on some of the dispoted territories in the
South China Sea, including an airstrip on Woody Island in the Paracel group able to be
used as a forward operating base for PLA combat aircraft.

I' Apart from some very

See Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, pp. 82-85; and also the two maps in Cheung, Growth of Chinese
Naval Power, pp. 33 and 39.
12 Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, p. 89.
l3lbid., pp. 85-86.
14 See, for example, Cben Humg-yu, ''The PRC's South China Sea Policy and Strategies of Occupation in
the Paracel and Spratly Islands," Issues and Studies, Vol. 36, No. 4, July/August 2000, pp. 126-128.
11

Fur1:her detail on China's South China Sea outposts and other PLA military facilities south of the Chinese
border is provided in Chapter 7.
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limited pier facilities scattered amongst those South China Sea islands and reefs,
however, the PLA Navy currently has no overseas bases - although it may have secured
naval access agreements with Bunna, Cambodia, Iran and Pakistan (see Chapter 7).
Foreign basing and logistics and maintenance facilities remain important even for
modern navies operating far from home, particularly for operators of diesel-electric
submarines." Given the limited range and endurance of the PLA Navy's submarine
fleet and the limited underway replenishment capabilties available for its surface
combatants (discussed in later sections), the lack of forward operating bases will
continue to restrict the geographical extent of Chinese naval operations, although China
has supported submarine deployments to the Bay of Bengal by using Bunnese bases. 16

PM Navy Force Structure
Background

The PLA Navy began life as a force inherited from the fleeing Nationalists in 1949.17

During the early 1950s China depended upon the Soviet Union to supply new ships and
to provide the technical assistance that was required to estsblish a Chinese naval
shipbuilding industry, which was to be centred on Shanghai. By the roid-1950s Moscow
had provided 50 motor torpedo boats, four submarines, four destroyers, six submarine
chasers and two minesweepers. Soviet assistance also enabled China's fledging naval
shipbuilding industry to build large numbers of patrol craft and to plan construction of
larger, more sophisticated warships, such as destroyers, submarines and other types,
based on Soviet designs.

l'

Following the breakdown in Sino-Soviet relations in 1960, China was forced to
follow a more independent path to naval expansion - continuing to produce ships and
submarines of Soviet design but, inCfl'llSingiy, using indigenous technical and
techoological inputs. 1. China's isolation throughout the 1960s and 1970s meant that,
qualitatively, the PLA Navy fell yet further behind the navies of both the West and the
Soviet Union, a period during which the Cold War was driving new technological

" See Norman Friedman, Seapower as Strategy: Navies and National Interests, Naval Institute Press,
Annapolis;MD, 2001, pp. 62-67.
16 See Chapter 7 for details on the Bwma link.
17 See Bruce Swanson, Eighth Voyage of the Dragon: A History of China '8 Quest for Seapower, Naval
Institute Pre.., Annapolis, MD, 1982, pp. 179-182.
18 Ibid.,

Ch. 15, esp. p. 196.

See ibid., Ch, 18; and Ellis Joffe, The Chinese Army after Mao, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London,
1987,p.97.

19
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developments for all types of warfare at an increasing rate. 20 The one exception to
China's military-technological stagnation was the independent development of a
national nuclear capability, including a naval element; China successfully embarked
upon an ambitious programme to develop, produce and deploy a nuclear capability at
sea, which ultimately led to the fielding of a small fleet of nuclear-powered attack
submarines (SSNs) and a single nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN).21
Quantitatively, however, the period 1965-71 represented a high-point of naval
construction, with the PLA Navy receiving approximately one quarter of the defence
budget.22 The bulk of that constroction continned to focus upon platforms necessary for
coastal defence: varions types of small attack craft and conventional submarines. Larger
combatants were being developed and built, however, with Chines..-designed Jiangnanclass fiigates and the first Luga-class guided missile destroyer (DOG) entering service
in that period. The PLA Navy had by 1971 also expanded its air force and established a
shor<>-based coastal radar network for maritime surveillance."
Following internal political ructions culminating in 'the death in 1971 of the
Defence Minister Lin Biao (and the downfall of his supporters), defence spending and
naval shipbuilding plummeted in China,24 However, following the identification of the
new Soviet maritime threat, Mao, in May 1975, called for rapid naval modernization
and the development of an ocean-going navy." Mao's plans were blocked by his

domestic rivals, however, and even under the enthusiastic direction of Deng Xiaoping
China's naval modernization remained hampered into the 19808 by the country's severe
economic constraints.26 Nevertheless, from the beginning of the 1970s to the mid 1980s
China greatly expanded the size of the PLA Navy, even though the new weapons were
already obsolete, and in the 1980s attempts were made to purchase Western
technologies and systeros to improve the capabilities of the f1eet.27

2(1

Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, p. 23.

The subject of John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China's Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force
Modernization in the Nuclear Age, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1994. On the submarines
themselves, see the discussion in the following sections below.
22 Joffe, The Chinese Anny after Mao, p. 97.
23 David G. Muller, China as aMariti:me Puwer, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1983, pp. 107-109.
24 Ibid.• p. 151. Linhad, since 1965, presided over large increases in defence spending, including the new
naval construction.
2S Ibid., pp. 154-155.
26lbid., p. 160.
27 During that period the number of conventional submarines tripled, missile craft increased tenfold and
over 35 major surface combatants entered service. See Joffe. The Chinese Army after Mao, pp. 109-111.
21

139

By the time of China's strategic transformatioo in 1985, the PLA Navy had
become a very large furce, but ooe which retained China's longstaniling coastal defence
focus and which was armed with obsolete equipment, with minimal ocean-going
capabilities. The emphasis to that point primarily had been to increase the number of
hulls in the water, with no real priority given to comprehensive capability improvements
to weapon systems." Fiscal constraints, and the fact that the PLA ranked last in priority

amongst Deng's "four modernizations," ensured that naval capabilities advanced ooly
incrementally throughout the 1980. and 1990s. Since 1980, China's naval
modernization, as identified by Bernard Cole, has involved three simultaneous
development paths: local design and construction; imported technology (initially,
throughout the 1980s, involving purchases of mostly Western components such as
engines, sensors and weapons, but more latterly including purchases of entire Russian
weapon systems such as ships, submarines, aircraft and their respective weapoury); and
reverse engineering. 29 However, as another study has argned, China lacks the
technologies and skills to build a truly modern, regionally-capable and effective navy in
the near futore; it cannot afford to purchase an entire modern navy overseas; and reverse
engineering of imported platforms and technologies also entails perhaps insurmountable

costs and technical obstacles. 30
Over the past decade the PLA Navy has downsized both in personnel and force

atructore, but with a long-tenn goal of substantially improving capabilities across the
board. New technologies and weapon systems have slowly entered service, often
imported from Russia, whilst from the late 1980s onward, modernization reputedly has
been focused on four areas: electronics, automation, guided missiles and nuclear
propulsion. 31 In general, the numbers of surface combatants has slowly increased, whilst
substantial numbers of small attsck craft and obsolete submarines and fighter aircraft
have been scrapped; overall, although the PLAN's force structure has declined in purely
numerical term., its capabilities steadily continue to improve, as do its professionalism
and training standardS.32

28 Cheung, Growth o/Chinese Naval Power. p. 22.
"Cole, I1.e Great Wall at Sea, p. 27.
30 See Cbristophet D. Yung, People's War at Sea: Chinese Naval Puwer in the Twenty-first Century,
CRM 95-214, Center for Naval Analyse., Alexaudria, v A, M""h 1996.
31 Kenneth w. Allen. "PLA Navy Building at the Start of a New Century," Report of the Second
Conference 00 the PLA Navy, Alexaudria, VA, 28-29 June 2001, The CNA Corporation, AlexlUldria,
VA, luly2001,p. 8.
32 Ibid., pp. 9-14; and You, The Armed Forces ojChina, pp. 185-186.
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Nuclear Forces

China currently possesses just one Xla-class SSBN based with the North Sea Fleet at
Huludao. Commissioned in 1987 after a long naval nuclear development programme
dating back to the late 1950s, it is anned with 12 JL-I (CSS-N-3) intennediat<>-range,

submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)." The JL-I is thought to have a
maximum range of approximately 2,150 km and a single 250 kT nuclear warltead,
although the X", may have been fitted with improved JL-lA missiles with a 2,500 km
range and 90 kT warltead.34 The Xla is believed to be a relatively unsuccessful desigu

awl rarely puts to sea,3S making it an unreliable nuclear secoud strike retaliatory
capability, although a refit over the period 1995-98 suggests that it most likely will
remain in service for up to another decade. 36 This represents a significant drawback to
the PLA's strategic flexibility; such a capability has been a longstanding development
goal of the PLA Navy and will continue to be a leading Chinese strategic requirement
into the future. China probably requires four to five reliable SSBNs - allowing at least
one boat to remain on patrol at all times - to achieve that secure second strike

capability.
A replacement class of SSBN - the 094 class - is being developed, probably
with Russian tecImological assistance, and may enter service towards the end of the
decade. The 094 boats are each likely to carry 16 of the new generation JL-2
intercontinental-range SLBM." The JL-2 (CSS-NX-5) is derived from the new landbased DF-31 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), and is believed to have a
maximum range of up to 8,000 km, which will put parts of the continental United States
within range of 094 SSBNs based in operating bastions in waters adjacent to the

Jane's Fighting ShipS 2001-2002, p. 113.
Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems,lssue 34, Jane's Information Group, Coulsdon. Surrey, 2001, pp. 5960. The JL-1A maybe the ''medium-range SLBM" that the U.S. Deparbnent of Defense expects to be
deployed aboard the Xw by the end of 2002. See Departmeot ofDefense, "Annual Report on the Military
Power of the People's Republic of China," Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense
Authorization Act, July 2002, p. 27.
3S See, for example, Mark. Farrer, "Submarine Force in Change - the People's Republic of China," AsiaPacific Defence Reporter, Vol. XXIV, No. 6, October-November 1998. p. 14.
""Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China," July 2002, p. 22.
37 Farrer, "Submarine Force in Change," p. 14; Richard Scott, "China's Submarine Force Plans Its Great
Leap Forward," Jane's Navy International, Vol. 102, No. 3, April 1997, p. 17; and "Annual Report on the
Military Power of the People's Republic of China," July 2002, p. 27.
33

34
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Chinese coast. The 1L-2 has the potential to carry multiple, independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) warheads. 38
China also maintains one elderly Soviet design Golf-class conventionallypowered ballistic missile submatine (SSB) for use as a missile trials boat.

39

It is this

boat that has been used for recent missile ejection tests in October 2001 and early 2002
on the new JL-2 SLBM.

40

Submarines

The North Sea Fleet operates the PLA Navy's five Han-class nuclear-powered attsck
submarines, which were commissioned between 1974 and 1990. Although the Hans,
like the related Xia-class, have experienced reliability problems with their nuclear

reactora, four of the five are now believed to be operational.41 The Hans nevertheless are
an old design and relatively noisy, and thus also relatively easily detected by more
modern adversaries. The newest three Han-elass reportedly are equipped with Y1-1 antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs), but the boats must surface before launching.42 A new
SSN - the 093 class - is being developed in conjunction with the 094 SSBN. The 093 is
reputedly derived from the Russian Victor llI-class SSN and may, for the first time,
offer the PLA Navy a land-attack cruise missile capability. The first 093 boat is not
expected to enter service until 2005 at the earliest.43 The 093 is likely to be able to use
Russian heayweight wake-homing toIpedoes designed to destroy aircraft carriers.

44

Despite the retirement oflarge numbers of obsolete diesel-electric boats over the
past decade, the PLA Navy's conventional submarine fleet remains bloated with
obsolete types. The active inventory includes up to 32 old Romeo-class boats (a 19508era Soviet design) and 20 Ming class, an improved Romeo design, the first of which
was completed in 1971 and which remains in low-rate production (an indication of the

Jane 's Strategic Weapon Systems, p. 66.
113.
40 See ''Inside the Ring," The Washington Times (on1in<: od.), 1 February 2002.
41 Jane's FightingShips 2001-2002, p. 114.
42 Jane's Naval Weapon Systems, Issue 34, Jane's Information Group, Coulsdon, Surrey, 2001, pp. 27738

39 Jane'sFightingShips2001-2002,p.

278.
43 Jane's'Fighting Ships 2001-2002, p. 114; ''Russia Helps China Take New SSNs into Silent Era," Jane's
Defence Weekly, 13 August 1997, p. 14; and Malcolm R. Oavis, ''Back on Course," Jane's Defence
Weekly, 24 Jamuuy 2001, p. 23.
44 Lyle Goldstein and Bill Murray (Lcdr, USN), "China's Subs Lead the Way," U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, Mareh 2003, p. 59.
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difficulties being encountered with later designs). The Ming-class boats are divided
between the North Sea and South Sea Fleets."
The future of the conventional sobmarine neet is likely to be focused on a mix
of Russian-built boats and the new indigenous Song class. China received four Kiloclass boats from Russia between 1995 and 1999, the first two of the Project 877EKM
export model and the latter two of the more advanced, much quieter, Russian Navy
specification Project 636 design. The Kilos are all deployed with the East Sea Fleet.
Initial maintenance and training problems have thus far hindered Kilo-class operations
(including trouble with 'the batteries), however, and the boats evidently have at times
had to return to Russia for maintenance." China has subsequently ordered eight more
Kilos equipped with the long-range Kiub-S ASCM in a deal worth V.S.$\.6 billioo,
with delivery due by (approximately) the end of2007.47
The Song class has only slowly been inducted into service since 1999: the fourth
was due to commission in 2002 and the fifth during 2003." The Songs represent a
considerable advance for domestically designed and constructed submarines, and are the
first PLAN diesel-electric submarines to be anned with an ASCM capability (.
submarine-launched version of the YJ-J missile - the YJ-82):· The design of the Song,

according to one source, suggests that the class is intended for use in ''near offshore
waters,',so which seems to reflect China's need to be able to conduct offensive
operations in and around the Taiwan Strait. Nevertheless, the slow, delayed rate of
production, extra purchases of Kilos and continued production of the Ming class, as
noted .bove, indicate problems with the new class. Those difficulties are believed to
involve broad technology (both indigenous and foreign) integration and project
manageroent issues, noise problems and YJ-82 oper.tion, requiring substantial
modifications to the second boat of the class. SI Among other improvements, China may
be developing an air independent propulsion (AlP) system for future Songs, which

4S Jane's

46

Fighting Ships 2001-2002, p. 116.

Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, p. 97.

See "Chen Warns that China's Military Build-up a Growing Threat to Security," Taipei Times (online
ed.), 11 June 2002; and "China to Buy 8 More Russian Submarines," The Washington Post (online ed),
25 June 2002. Current Chinese Kilos are armed with torpedoes (or mines) only.
48 A.D. Baker, ''World Navies in Review," V.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March 2003, p. 46.
49 Jane's Fighting Ships 2001-2002, p. 116.
5{) Farrer, "Submarine Force in Change," p. 13.
St See "China Looks to Second Song Class for Solution," Jane's Navy International, Val. 104, No. 8,
October 1999. p. 9.
47
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would allow for much longer uuderwater endurance. 52 China also is buildiug midget
submarines,53 presumably for use in the Strait and other coastal waters.

Major Surface Combatants
The most prominent PLA Navy surface combatants are the two Project 956E

Sovremenny-class DDGs built in Russia (both were uncompleted hulls originally laid
down for the Soviet Navy in the late 1980s) and commissioned in Decerober 1999 and
January 2001, respectively." These large (7,940 ton) warships represent a major
advance for the PLA Navy, offering for the first time a relatively modern 'surface
combatant with a wide range of combat capabilities. However, despite being a marked
advance over the PLAN's indigenous warships, the anti-air and anti-submarine warfare
capabilities of the class remain limited, making the two ships, Hangzhou and Fuzhou,
highly attractive targets in a war. The Sovremenny-class was designed by the Soviet
Union fur surface warfare as part of an integrated task group, targeting U.s. aircraft
carriers and other high-value members of carrier task forces such as Aegis air warfare
cruisers. China, on the other hand, lacks the defensive components to be able to furm
such an integrated task group."
The most impressive featore of the class are each ship's eight SS-N-22 Sunburn
(Moskit) ASCMs. Although there exist more modern ACSMs on the world arms
market, the Moskit remains (at least until the inuninent arrival of the successor
generation of Russian ASCMs), in the words of one naval analyst, "the most feared
missile in the Russian ASCM inventory."" Both ships are based with the East Sea
Fleet. In January 2002 Moscow and Beijing agreed a new contract, worth a reported
U.S.$1.4 billion, for the construction of two new, improved Sovremenny DOGs
(designated Pmject 956EM) to be delivered by 2006, with an option fur two more.'7
suggesting that the introduction of the first two ships has been accomplished to the
satisfuction of the PLA Navy. According to one report, the new ships will be armed

52 Goldsteinand Murray. "China's Subs Lead the Way," p. 58.
53 Jane's Fighting Ships 2001-2002. p. 115.
'4 Ibid., p. 119.
ss See Ben1ard D. Cole and Paul H.B. Godwin. "Advanced Military Technology and the PLA: Priorities
and Capabilities for the 21 st Century," in Larry M. Wortzel. ed., The Chinese Anned Forces in the 2111t
Century, Strategic Studi.. institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, December 1999, pp. 190-191.
56 Richard Scott, ''Global Developments in the ASCM Threat," Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 12, No.

6, June 2000, p. 55.
57 See ''Rival Shipyard Wins Sovremenny Contract," Jane's Navy International, Vol. 107, No. 3, April
2002,p. 39; and ''China Buys Two More SovremennyDDGs," The Navy, April-June 2002, pp. 16-17.
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with the SS-N-26 Yakhont ASCM, a more modern, longer-range missile than the
Moskit, while the ships' air defence capability will be enhanced by the SA-N-17 missile
system, an upgraded version of the SA-N-7 system used on Hangzhou and Fuzhou." It
has been claimed that China has aiso expressed interest in an even more powerful
Russian platfurm - a partly completed 11,000 tonne Slava-class cruiser still under

construction. 59
China's newest indigenous surface warship is the sole 6,000 ton Lubai-class
DDG, Shenzhen, which was commissioned in January 1999 as a follow-on from the
earlier Lnbu-class and is based with the South Sea Fleet. The Lnbai class is the first
Chines<HIesigned warship to have a significantly rednced radar cross-section, although
it would be an overstatement to call Shenzhen a stealth ship. It also possesses
considerable range (14,000 nautical miles) compared to other PLAN warships. This
class of destroyer utilizes a range of imported and "eopied" components and
tecbnologies, from Ukrainian gas torbines to French point air defence missiles and
combat data system, and Italian torpedo tubes. Shenzhen's weapons fit is dominated by
16 YJ-2 ASCMs, with only rudimentary point air defences and virtually no ASW
capability.60 Four new DDGs of an upgraded Lubai design are currently under
construction at Shanghai's Jiangnan shipyard. The new ships seem to offer a
considerable advance in capabilties: they have been reported as being equipped with a
three-dimensional air-search and targeting radar married to a medium-range surface-toair missile launched, for the first time for a Chinese ship, froro a 48-cell vertical launch
system (VLS).'1 These Project 52B DDGs will thus likely provide the PLA Navy with
its first area air defence capability.
The two 4,600 ton Luhu-class DDGs were commissioned in 1994 and 1996,
respectively, one based in the North Sea Fleet and the other in the East Sea Fleet. As
with the Lubai-class, the Luhus are equipped with a French combat data system and an
HQ-7 SAM system, as well as eight YJ-2 or YJ- I ASCMs, ASW mortars, torpedos and
two 100 mm gnus. Perhaps the most significant featore of the first ship is the use of

''Missile Deal to Boost Beijing's Nawl Prowess," Taipei Times (online 00.), 18 June 2002.
The Navy, January~March 2003, back cover caption.
60 Jane's Fighting Sh;pa 2001-2002. p. 118; and Josh Corless, ''Indigenous Destroyer Extends China's
Reach - But It Needs ASW Help," Jane's Navy International, VoL 105, No. 2, March 2000, pp. 7-9. The
KA-28 ASW helicopter would alleviate somewhat the ASW weakness if deployed with this class,
however. The HQ-7 surface to air (SAM) launcher is a copy of the French Crota1.e, for example. See also
Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, p. 101, for a critique of the "stealth" characteristics of the Luhai class.
61 Baker, ''World Navies in Review," p. 48.
S8
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American LM 2500 gas turbines, a standard ship engine for world navies. The second
ship uses imported Ukrainian gas turbines," however, due to Washington's imposition

of post-Tiananmen sanctions.63
The Luda-class DOG haa been the mainstay of the destroyer fleet fur three
decades. The first was completed in 1971 with construction ending only in 1991, when
the final Luda II ship and sole Lnda III were commissioned. The Luda is a relatively
small destroyer (3,670 tons full load - smaller than many modern Western frigates) and
the weapons fit is extremely outdated, although some ships might be upgraded with the
HQ-7 SAM system and YJ-2 ASCMs. Only two of the class are fitted with .. combat
data system. The Ludas are distributed between the three fleets and, despite their
limitations, are still capable of out-of-area deployment. 64
The PLA Navy maintains a large frigate force of 41 ships, although by modern
standarda they are small ships - more akin to corvettes. The latest is the Jiangwei IIclass guided missile frigate (FFG), which displaces 2,250 tons. Six ships of the class
were commissioned between 1998 and 2000 with another three soon to enter service.
The weapons fit is similar to late-model PLAN DOGs, with six to eight YJ-I or YJ-2
ASCMs, HQ-7 SAMs, two 100 mm gons and two Zr9A helicopters'" This class was a
follow-on from the four Jiangwei I-class completed between 1991 and 1994, all of
which serve with the East Sea Fleet. The Jiangwei I differs from the later class mainly
due to its less-capable SAM system. 66 The Jiangwei frigates use German diesel

engines. 67
The 27 small (1,702 ton) Jianghu I FFGs (the FFG designation is somewhat of
an exaggeration) are very basic, obsolete warships built between the mid-1970s and
1996. Their main armament comprises fourC-201 ASCMs and two 100 mm gons. Two
modified Jianghu III and one Jianghu N were completed in the late-1980s, which were
slightly larger ships (1,924 tons) fitted with the more modern YJ-I or YJ-2 ASCMs.
They also were the first fully-enclosed, air conditioned warships to be built in China. A
single Jianghu II ship was commissioned in 1986 and is the only one of the Jianghu
aeries to be fitted with a helicopter deck. None of China's Jianghus haa a SAM

Fighting Ships 2001-2002, p. 120.
Co1e, The Great Wall at Sea, p. 100.
64 Jane's FlghUng Ships 2001-2002, p. 122.
6S Ibid., p. 127.
6l Jane's

63

66

Ibid., p. 123.

67

Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, p. 101.
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capability. Apart from four ships based with the North Sea Fleet, the Jianghus are
evenly distributed between the East Sea and South Sea Fleets. 68

Other Warships: Mine Warfare. Amphibious. Fast Attack and Patrol Craft
The PLA Navy's nrine warfare fleet includes 27 old ocean nrinesweepers in the active
fleet, only one dedicated nrinelayer, and eight coastal nrinesweepers of the Wosao-class,
which entered service in 1988 and continues to be built. All Wosao-class vessels are
based with the East Sea Fleet, 69 indicating a concern with a potential Tlriwanese mine
threat.
China's amphibious fleet is mostly quite dated and relatively small. The 4,800
ton (full load) Ynring-class landing ship - tank (LSn is the latest (and largest) of
China's amphibious ships, and cao accommodate 250 troops, plus ten mlrin battle tanks
and four landing craft. Eight entered service between 1992 and 2000, with at least two,
probably more, extra ships to follow. 70 The PLA Navy also has seven Yukan-class LSTs
built between 1980 and 1995. Both classes of LST are split between the East Sea and
South Sea Fleets, wbilst the Chinese navy also possesses 37 medium landing sbips and
large numbers of landing craft, mostly based with the South Sea Fleet. Around ten
hovercraft complete the amphibious fleet, although according to Jane's Fighting Ships,
these may be replaced by wing-in-ground effect (WIG) craft derived from a Russian
design if trials of a prototype are successful. 71
The PLA Navy force structore includes approlrimately 320 fust attack craft,
around 87 of which are ASCM-armed. The latest classes, such as the 26 boats of the

Houxin class and six or more boats of the Houjian class are armed with either YJ-l or

Jane's Fighting Ships 2001-2002, pp. 124 and 127-128. Norman Friedman recounts how ships of the
Jianghu class (ill and IV) exported to Thailand and a later type built for Thailand (to be equipped with

68

Western weapons - the Naresuan class) suffered from both design and build defects. The Jianghuslacked
not only a combat direction system but also a combat infonnation centre (both of which were first
installed in American warships in the Second World War), and the ''watertight'' doors were not
watertight Both classes featured compartments with no access and ladders and doors that led nowhere,
whilst the Naresuan class also used wood as a structural element of the superstructure, and the hull
warped _
the gun had been fired. S", Friedman, "Chinese Military Capacity: Industrial and
Operational Weaknesses," in Eric Arnett, ell, Military Capacity and the Risk of War: China, India,
Pakistan and Iran, SIPRI and Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997, pp. 69 70 and 72.
69 Jane's Fighting Ships 200]R2002, p. 132.
7ll Ibid., p. 133; and "China Revives Yuting--class Ship Programme," Jane's Defence Weekly, 14 June
R

2000, p. 37.
71 Jane's Fighting Ships 200]R2002, pp. 133R134.

147

YJ-2 ASCMs. The Houxin-class is based both in the East Sea and South Sea Fleets, and
Houjian-class in the South Sea Fleet at Hong Kong. 72
In addition to the fast attack craft, the PLA Navy nperates 15 other patrol boats,

whilst large numbers of patrol craft of various types and sizes are operated by four
paramilitary agencies. Jane's Fighting Ships lists the four agencies as: the Customs
Service; the Maritime Police (the maritime section of the Public Security Bureau); the
maritime command of the Border Security Force, which is part of the PLA's militia
force - the People's Armed Police (PAP); and the Border Defence. 73 It has been
reported that PLAlPLAN personnel (wearing Customs Service unifollIlll) are being used

to man up to 24 new lOO m Qui-M-class patrol boats sporting Customs Service liveries,
each armed with two 30 mm guns, for deployment in the South China Sea.74
Auxiliaries, Survey and Research Ships

The PLA Navy possesses just three underway replenishment ships, the most impressive
of which is the single 37,000 ton (full losd) Nanyun-class ship, Nancang, built in
Ukraine and commissioned in 1996. The two Fuqing-class ships (21,750 tons fulllosd),
operational since late 1979, were the first underway replenishment ships built in China
Other auxiliaries include 29 or more supply ships, six troop transports and nine
submarine soppor! ships.75 Significantly, as pointed out by Bernard Cole, the fact that
the Chinese navy has not given any priority to developing a more credible underway
replenishment capability suggests that out-of-area, oceanic (blue water) operations are
not a near-term consideration for PLA operational planners, (Two further Fuqings were
in fact built but later sold.)"
The PLA Navy also operates a number of survey and research (and spy) ships, at
least some of which belong to civilian govermnent agencies. These include several
space monitoring vessels used for both satellite aud missile tracking and the monitoring
of satellite commonications. Other civilian govermnent agencies also own aud operate
marine survey and research vessels.77

"Ibid., pp. 129-13\.
73

Ibid.• pp. 142-144. See also Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, pp. 86-87.

74 ''South China SoaP,trols Boosted," Jane's Dlifence

Weekly, 26 September 2001, p. 11.
" Jane', FightingShip, 200/-2002, pp. 135-139.
76 Cote, The Great Wall at Sea, p. 104.
77 Jane's Fighting Ships 2001-2002, pp. 139-141. See also Desmond Ball, "Signals Intelligence in
China." Jane's Intelligence Review, VoL 7, No. 8, August 1995, pp. 368~370.
148

PLA NtIVJI Air Force Aircraft
Of China's surface combatants, ships of the Sovremenny, Luhai, Luhu, Luda 11, and
Jiangwei I and II classes are helicopter-capable. The· naval air furce CIl1Te11tly has six
Russian KA-28 Helix ASW helicopters for use with its Sovremenny and Luhai DOGs,
and just ten Z-9 (locally-built French Dauphin 2) for the remainder of the combatant
fleet Further Z-9 helicopters may be built, and are equipped with dipping sonar,
torpedoes and ASCMs. In addition, the PLANAF maintsins four further Helix
optimized for search and rescue and six large French SA-32IG/Z-8 Super Frelon ASW
helicopters, which are sometimes flown io the role of escorts for the PLA Navy's sole
SSBN."
The PLANAF flies perhaps as many as 400, mostly obsolete, fighter aircraft of
the F-6 (J-6), F-7 (J-7) and F-8 (1-8) types, predominantly io the air defence role
(although they do have limited anti-shippiog capabilities); 40 of the A-5 (Q-5) type io
the strike role, some of which carry YJ-I ASCMs; and around 45 obsolete torpedoarmed B-5 (H-5) light bombers. The PLANAF's main strike aircraft io the anti,shippiog
role are 14 B-6D (H-6) bombers capable of carrying C-601 and YJ-l ASCMs.19 The
more capable, YJ-I-armed FB-7 (JH-7) fighter-bomber is the PLANAF's new medium-

range, dedicated maritime strike platfurm, 80 which has the potential to greatly improve
the PLANAF's anti-surface warfare contribution to the PLA Navy's sea deoial strategy,
if built io sufficient numbers. Only a few have been built thus far (about 20 aircraft),"
although a new version, believed to possess an improved radar, night attsck capability
and weapons, reportedly is under development." China will also equip the PLANAF
with versions of the advanced Russiao multi-role Su-30 fighter; it is not clear what the
implieations will be for FB-7 programme. At least 28 Su-30MK2 aireraft optimized for
78 Jane's Fighting Ships 2001~2002, p. 128. Other sources suggest that there are greater numbers of
Super Frelons; the Inoomational Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) quotes 21 of these types, for example.
The Military Balance 1999-2000, Oxford University Press for the nss, London. 1999, p. 188.
79 Jane's Fighting Ships 2001-2002, p. 129. The latest version of the F-8 interceptor (the F-Sll) is a more
modem aircraft. Thirty B~6Ds (a version of the H-6 bomber modified specifically to carry the C-601
ASCM) were produced, although it is believed that some of these are no longer operational. Jane's
Strategic Weapon Systems, p. 67.
80 Jane's Fighting Ships 2001-2002, p. 129. The FB-7 was originally designed around imported 1960s-era
Rolls Royce Spey engines, only 50 of which were received before post~Tj8nanrnen sanctions were
imposed. See Michael McDevitt (Radm., USN, ret.), "The PLA Navy: past, Present. and Future
Prospects," Report of the Conference on the PLA Navy, Washington, D.C., 6-7 April 2000, The CNA
Corporation, Alexandria, VA, May 2000, p. 11. It was reported in July 2002 that Rolls Royce had
''recently'' sold China 90 jet engines - presumably Speys. See "China's Army Charm Offensive," BBC
News (online), 11 July 2002. (The FB-7/JH-7 is sometim.. designated .. the FBC-I.)
81 See "Long March to Modernisation," Jane's Defence Weekly, 11 July2001, p. 27.
82 "Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China," 1uly 2002, p. 16.
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maritime operations, perhaps followed by another 40 Su-30MK3s, will be purchased
together with a range of Russian ASCMs and other precision munitions, and the aircraft
may be armed with China's new YJ-83 ASCM." One Chinese report also claims that
the new J-IO will becomes the main PLANAF fighter in the twenty-first century.84
Whlchever combat aircraft types are added le the force, there is little doubt that

the PLANAF is, as claimed by a Chinese report, enhancing its capabilities - especially
for long-range strikes. The same report demonstrates an understanding of the vital
importance of air power le both modern maritime operations and China's own maritime
ambitions: ''Without air control there would be no naval supremacy. If China wants le
build a powerful modern navy ... it mnst have a contingent of adaptive Naval Air

Force.,,85
The PlANAF's force strncture also includes just six Y-8MPA unarmed
maritime patrol aircraft and seven SH-5 (PS-5) amphibians (with more le follow),
which possess some basic ASW capability,86 as well as China's first airborne early
waroing (AEW) aircraft, the Y-8AEW, which entered service in 1999 using imported
British SkyMaster AEW Systems.87

Marine Corps

The Chinese Marine Corps consists of two brigades, totalling approxinlately 10,000plus specialist troops attached le the South Sea Fleet, each with three infantry regiments
and one artillery regiment The marines are lightly armed aod in any conflict would
most likely be used le estsblish beachheads, in conjunction with airborne assault troops,
for the main body of landinw'invasion furces. The modern PLAN Marine Corps dates
back only to 1980, and is the one arm of the PLA Navy that continues le expand in

personnel. 88

See "Sukhoi Sales," Air Forces Monthly, January 2003, p. 24.
''China's Air Force Equipped with J-I0 Fighter-bomber," People's Daily (online ed), 13 December
2002.
85 ''President TUlIlg Concerned with the Modernization of Naval Air Force," People's Daily (online ed.),
18 September 2002.
86 Jane'sF'ightingShips2001-2002,p.129.
87 "Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China," July 2002, p. 17; and
Kenneth W. Allen, ''PLA Air Force Operations and Modemization," in Susan M. Puska, ed., People's
Liberation Army qfier Next. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, August
2000, pp. 222-223. Up to eight SkyMaster systems were sold to China.
BII Jane's Fighting Ships 2001-2002, p. 112; McDevitt, ''The PLA Navy," pp. 11-13; and Cote, The Great
Wall at Sea, pp. 114-115.
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PLA Navy Munitions
The PLA Navy maintains a large and diverse arsenal of weaponry to equip its various
platfonns, and places considerable importance upon ASCMs (see Table 5.1). The
Russian SS-N-22 Moskit installed on the Sovremenny DDGs thus far is the most lethal
and impressive ASCM currently in the PLAN arsenal. The Moskit is a sea-skimming
missile with a tenninal phase evasive trajectory which, in combination with supersonic
speed, make it a very difficult weapon to defend against, even for the U.s. Navy." The
new SS-N-26 Yakhont missile reported to be on order to equip the third and fourth

Sovremenny DDGs has a maximum speed of Mach 2.5, but with twice the range of the
Moskit.90

Table 5.1 China's Antl-ship Cruise Missiles

Type

Range (km)

SS-N-26
SS-N-27IK.lub Sb
SS-N-27/3M54Elb
SS-N-22
YJ-83 (C-S03)
YJ-2 (C-S02)
YJ-INJ-S2 (C-SOI)
C-701
YJ-6 (C-601)
YJ-62 (C-611)
YJ-16 (C-IOI)
HY-4 (C-201)'
HY-3 (C-301)
HY-2
HY-I

300
220
300
120c
250
120
42
IS
110
200
45
135
130
95
S5

Warhead
(kg)

•

200
400
300

•

165
165

•

513
513
300
513
513
513
400

Pla1form(.)

Supersonic

ship
sub
sub
ship
air
ship/air/ground
ship/sublair/ground
air
air
air
ship/ground
ship/ground
ground
ship/ground
ship/ground

3
3
3
3

3
3

Sources:

Compiled from the sources noted in the current section.
B Not available.
bIt is not yet known which version of the SS-N-27 will equip China's new Kilo-class submarines.
C Later versions of the SS-N-22 Moskit may have a longer. 160 km range.
d The C-201 designation is also sometimes applied to the HY-2.

The SS-N-27, reported to be on order to arm the eight new Kilo-class
submarines beiog built by Russia, is another of the latest generation of Russian ASCMs.
See Steven J. Zaloga, "Russia's Moskit Anti-Ship Missile," Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 8, No. 4,
April 1996. According to one source, the PLA Navy may have signed a technology transfer deal with
Russia to produce the Moskit domestically. See Mark Farrer, "China's Navy Comes of Age," Asia-Pacific
Defence Reporter, VoL XXVI. No. 3, AprillMay 2000, p. 31. No other sources seem to support this
claim, however.
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It is not clear exactly which version China has ordered: Klub-S is the submarinelaunched version of the standard SS-N-27, whilst the 3M54EI is a long-range subsonic
version fired through standard submarine torpedo tubes!'
The standard Chinese ASCMs in the PLAN inventory are the capable YI-1 and
YJ-2 medium-range series of missiles, with around 90 launcher systems and 1,000
missiles produced so far. The YI-1 design is influenced by (although probably not based
upon) the French Exocet missile, used most famously by Argentina during the 1982
Falklands conflict. The YI-1 entered service roughly in 1985 and the YJ-2 in 1993. An
upgraded version has been reported as having been fitted with a Global Positioning
System (GPS) satellite navigation receiver. A third version, the CY-I, is believed to
have entered service in the early 1990s as an ASW wespon.92 A new longer-range,
supersonic derivative, the YJ-83, was test-fired from an FB-7 strike fighter in late 2002.
Significantly, it is the firsi indigenous Chinese ASCM to be capable of over-the-horizon
attacks and is believed to be cspable of receiving targeting dats whilst in flight."
Older snrface combatants (of the Luda I and II and Jianghu I and II types) and
fast attack craft and coastal batteries still use the obsolescent RY-l and RY-2 series of
missile - and their derivatives" - based on the 1950s-era Soviet SS-N-2 Stys. The C.
701 is a new helicopter-launched missile which also may be developed as a ship-

launched version. 9s
Other naval weapons relevaot to China's sea denial strategy include modern
torpedoes and mines. The PLA Navy's Kilo-class submarine packsge includes modero
Russian wire-gnided Test-71MB heavyweight and 53-65KE wake-homing torpedoes,
whilst 40 Russian 200 kt rocket-propelled Shkval torpedoes have been ordered. 96
According to one estimate, the PLA Navy may possess as many as 100,000 sea mines,
although mostly of old or obsolete types.97 China has, however, reportedly developed
90 Scott, "Global Developments in tire ASCM Threat," p. 55.
91lbid., pp. 54-55,
92 Jane 's Naval Weapon Systems, pp. 277-278.
93 "Chinese Missile Has Twice the Range U.s. Anticipated," The Washington Times (online ed.), 20
November 2002.
94 The HY-3. HY-4, YJ-16. YJ-6 and YJ-62 are all HY-IIHY-Z derivatives. Some of these types, such as
the HY-4, YJ-6 and YJ-62, may have been withdrawn from frontline service and placed in storage. See
Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, pp. 49-58 and 67.
95 Jane 's Naval Weapon Systems, p. 273.
9(j Jane's Fighting Ships 2001-2002, pp. 115-116; "Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's
RePublic of China," July 2002, p. 22; and on the ShkvaI, John Downing, "China Equips Itself for Power
Projection," Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 12, No. 2, February 2000, p. 43. The Shkval and wakehoming toIpedoes are very difficult to defend against.
9'/ Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, p. 103.
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new types of modem mines, including the EM-12 ground mine, which can be armed
with either acoustic, magnetic or water pressure fuses for use in shallow seas (five to
200 m depth) against submarines and surface vessels. A second new mine type is the
EM-52 rocket-propelled mine, whicb can be laid in depths of up to 100 metres. 98
The PLA's fascination with cruise missiles is not limited to the anti-ship types; a
land-attack cruise missile (LACM) programme has been underway since 1977, leading
to the HN-I series of missiles, with development continuing on a range of naval
variants. Flight testing began in 1995 on the HN-2C, a submarine-launched LACM with
a range of 1,400 km, which uses inertial guidance assisted by an electro-optical
TERCOM (Terrain Contonr Matching) system (and possibly also GPS), and is armed
with either a 90 kT nuclear or 400 kg conventional warhead. Initially designed to be
launched from torpedo tubes, an HN-2C vertical-launch systero is believed to be under
development for either the Song-class boats or the new 094 SSNs. The PLA is believed
to have reverse engineered cruise missile technology from crashed, bnt intact, American
Tomahawk LACMs used in conflict zones such as Iraq and the former Yugoslavia, and
obtained snrreptitiously by China Russian technological assistance has probably been
an ongoing factor in China's LACM programme. In addition to the HN-2C, an
extended-range ship and submarine-launched version, the 3,000 km HN-3B, is under
development, and there are reports of a 4,000 km supersonic version, the HN-20oo."
An air-launched version of the HN series of laod-attack cruise missile would be

a logical addition to the range, and may be matched with the PLANAF FB-7 strike
aircraft. 100 In aoother possible sea-launched option, it has been claimed that the 3M54EI
ASCM, mentioned above, may also be pre-confignred with a secondary land-attack
function lOl Whichever systems do eventually enter service, it is abundantly clear that
land-attack cruise missiles are intended to be at the forefront of future PLA power
projection capabilities, and sea-launched versions will likely offer the most flexible,

xx.

See Wilfried A. Herrroan, "Latest Chinese Maritime Developments," Naval Forces, Vol
No. V,
1999, pp. 14-15.
99 Jane's Naval Weapon Systems, p. 279; and ''More Details on Chinese Cruise Missile Programme,"
Jane's Defence Weekly, 6 September 2000, p. 19. The TERCOM system works by the missile matching
images ofth.e terrain below with images held in its onboard computer (although the Chinese version uses
a TV camera, aB opposed to the terrain-mapping radars used by American and other advanced missiles),
allowing a pre-programmed flight path to be followed at very low, radar-evading heights, whilst GPS
improves precision. See Steven J. Zaloga, ''The Cruise Missile Threat: Exaggerated or Premature?"
Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 12, No. 4. April 2000.
100 See "China's New Cruise Missile Programme 'Racing Ahead, '" Jane's Defence Weekly, 12 January
2000, p. 12.
101 Zaloga, "'The Cruise Missile Threat," p. 50.
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extended-range delivery options available to the Chinese political aod military
leadership.

PLA Navy Capability Deficiencies
Despite an increased pace ofmodemization in recent yeaIS, the PLA Navy nevertheless
still suffers glaring deficiencies across the full range of naval capabilties, especially for
sea control aod power projection operations beyond the Chinese littoral.

Fleet Defences
Two importaot capability shottcomings involve the PLA Navy's limited anti-air warfine
(AAW) aod ASW defences, hoth within its sea-going fleet and its land-based air power.
In other words, the PLA Navy's own naval platforms are highly vnlnerable to attack,
especially from the air and from under the sea. Its current ship-based AAW capability

depends on shoo-range systems only - mainly the French Crotale-derived HQ-7, plus
the Russian SA-N-7 on the Sovremermy DDGs (older ships have no SAM systems at
all). Chinese warships currently possess no medium-rsnge air defenceS or even modern

air defence radars, let alone an area air defence capability with long-range defences
necessary to protect task groups and amphibious operations fsr from the Chinese
coast. 102 Nor do PLAN warships possess defences against anti-ship cruise missiles,
preferring instead to outguo (or rather, "outmissile") potential opposing forces by
relying on improvements to its own ASCM capabilities. 103 Those deficiencies are being
addressed, however, with the latest class of (Project 52B) destroyers currently under
construction expected to introduce at least a rudimentary area air defence capability, as
well as two close-in-weapon-systems for ASCM defence. 104
Although the PLANAF has a basic airborne esrly warning capability, the system
has a limited command and control capacity to direct combat aircraft, thus limiting in
tom the effectiveness of its land-based interceptors. The PLA Navy's ability to conduct

Department ofDefense speculates, however. that a ship-based version of the long-range HQbe in development. "Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of
Cbina," July 2002, p. 20. Conceivably, this may be the system being installed on the new Project 52B
DOGs.
103 See Eric McVadon, "PRC Exercises, Doctrine and Tactics toward Taiwan: The Naval Dimension." in
lames R. Lilley and Chuck Downs, eds., Crisis In the Taiwan Strait, NDU Press, Washington, D,e.,
1997, pp. 259-260; nnd Cole, 17re Great Wall at Sea, p. 109.
104 Baker, "World Navies in Review," p. 48.
102 The u.s.

9 SAM may

154

integrated, combined arms air defence (that is, by both ships and aircraft), therefore, let
alone in joint operations with the PLA Air Force, remains limited.
Chinese warships have only a rudimentary 'ASW capability, using mostly
obsolescent hull-mounted active sonars. 105 The PLA Navy's Russian KA-28 helicopters
and Kilo-class submsrines may be the most capable ASW systems in the Chinese
inventory, but are still limited in number. There is only a handful of land-based ASW
aircraft, perhaps reflecting the low priority given to ASW operations and long-range
maritime patrol in the past. China's mine countermeasures (MCM) capabilities also are

suspect, with seemingly little emphasis being given to improve those capabilities.
Endurance and Logistics
As a sea-going force, the PLA Navy lacks both reach and endurance, limiting not only
the ability to push China's defensive frontier farther seaward but also, with only three
underway replenishment ships available, its ability to sustain both deployments and
operations much beyond China's coastal areas for very 10ng. 106 The majority of the
sobmarine fleet, for example, which remains a force structure priority, numerically still
consists largely of obsolete types that rarely conduct operations far from the submarine
bases of the three Chinese fleets.

I07

Nevertheless, this will change as newer types are

introduced into service: there is already evidence of increased submarine deployments

IOS Cote, The Great Wall at Sea, pp. 110-111. For a critique from the perspective of the PLAN's inability
to integrate various platfonns into an effective ASW system, see Eric A McVadon (Radm.• USN, ret.),
"Systems Integration in China's People's Liberation Army," in lames C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang,

eds., The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age, CF-145-CAPP/AF, RAND, Santa Monica.
CA, 1999, pp. 225-226.
106 In an interview with a PLA Navy officer (Commander) in Shanghai, luly 2000, it was claimed that the
PIA Navy did, indeed, possess the replenishment capabilities to undertake blue water operations. This is
an exaggeration, given the small numbers ofreplcnishment ships available. What the PLA Navy can do is
to send ships on long distance voyages in peacetime on such diplomatic missions as port visits, for
example. These voyages are, however, far removed from the types of exigencies inherent in wartime
operations far from home bases. At best, China may be able to sustain a small task force in the South
China Sea against very limited (or non-existent) Southeast Asian resistance. As an example of what the
PLA Navy can accomplish, in September 2002 it completed its first ever globe-circling voyage of
goodwill port visits. The voyaging "fleet" consisted of the Luhu-class DOG Qjngdao and the Fuqingclass replenishment ship Taicang. See ''Chinese Naval Ship Formation's First Global Navigation,"
People's Daily (onIine eel.), 28 September 2002. This voyage is the latest and most ambitious of a series
of international port visits in recent times,' and is representative of the expansion of Chinese naval
diplomacy.
10 According to an official American publication. most Chinese submarine operations take place "within
20 nautical miles of the coast." (U.S.) Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), Worldwide Submarine
ChaJleng.., ON!, February 1997, p. 19.
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beyond Chinese coastal waters, including several boats discovered operating east of
Taiwan during 2002. 108
Similarly, PLANAF combat aircraft are limited in raoge by China's modest
aerial refuelling capability. This shortfall is not as importaot fur Taiwan contingencies
as it is for operations in the South China Sea and for (non-Taiwan) power projection
operations (which may be defined as the conduct of operations against land-based
targets from the sea). However, even in a cross-Strait conflict China would want to
interdict hostile naval forces as far away from its own coastline as possible. The
PLANAF does not possess its own tanker aircraft, although PLANAF F-B combat

aircraft conducted their initial aerial refuelling training flights using PLAAF tankers
over the South China Sea in March 2000. 109

•

In addition, the PLA's logistics and maintenaoce would probably find it difficult

to sustain significaot operations in the maritime environment for very long. Much of the
logistics system remains geared towards supporting the contioentally-focused defenaive
positional warfare planned for in an earlier era, rather than the type of operations in the
maritime periphery now envisaged. The PLA's key logistics deficiencies include:
strategic and tactical mobility (including sea and air lift); frontline logistics and repair
and support forces; a centralized supply system; unified theatre logistics systems to

enable joint operations in peripheral regions; and the stockpiling of vital materiel,
including advanced munitionsYo
The PLA recognizes those deficiencies and reforms have been under way for a
decade, including the construction of extra amphibious ships and landing craft. There is
pressute from the highest political level to improve the PLA's ability to conduct joint
operations and, at least superficially, the PLA has begun to tske steps to modifY the
logistics organizational slruclute; the fits! unified theatre logistics command system, fur
example, was set up in the Nanjing MR in 1995. 111 Navy commander, Shi Yunsheng,
has been active in the modernization of the PLA Navy's logistics responsibilities under

''WorldNavies in Review," p. 46.
''Chinese-Expand Aerial Refuelling Capability to Navy," Jane's Defence Weekly, 21 Ju.ne 2000, p. 14.
lIO See "Country Briefing: Chi:na." Jane's Defence Weekly, 10 December 1997, pp. 29-30.
III Ibid., p. 29; Tai Ming Cheung, ''Reforming the Dragon's Tail: Chinese Military Logistics in the Era of
High-Technology Warfare and Market Economics," in lames R. Lilley and David Shambaugh. eds.,
China's Mililmy Faces the Future, AEI and M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, NY. pp. 235-236; Lonnie Henley,
''PLA Logistics and Doctrine Reform. 1999-2000," in Puska, ed., People's Liberation Army qfler Next;
and "Jiang Urge. Military Logistics to Aim High," Poop/e'. Daily (onIine od), 20 August 2000.
108 Baker,
109
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the developing joint logistics system, which include supply, repair and maintenance of
ships and naval bases, and naval technical systems SUpport.1I2

Power Projection
The Chinese navy's power projection capabilities also remain limited, especially for
long-range operations. Even in any Taiwan contingency, much of China's available
offensive capability will continue to be land-based, including PLAN air assets. As noted
above, the PLA Navy's infantry component is amaII and any serious amphibious
operation against Taiwan would require large numbers of ground force troops to be
employed. However, despite recent additions, China's fleet of amphibious landing ships
lacks the capacity to carry a force much larger than a single division at anyone time
(about 10-15,000 troops), with few ships able to embarl< heavy equipment. Instead, the
PLA plans to use civilian merchant ships and fishing vessels to transport op to 400,000
tronps across the Taiwan Strait if Beijing ever decided to invade Taiwan, once specialist
amphibious (Marine Corps) and airbome forces had established initial beachheads.1l3

China has carried out many exercises in recent years involving amphibious operations,
and some of these have included the mobilization of civilian ships for just such a
scenario. Some exercises bave involved merchant ships mounted with artillery being
used for shore bombardment practice. lI •

The use of merchant ships, therefore, seems to be a genuine planning
consideration for the PLA. The commander of the Nanjing Military Region, which lies
opposite Taiwan, somewbat in keeping with the people's war tradition, boasted in 1999
that his Military Region could mobilize over 100,000 civilian vessels for such an
operation. 115 The utility of employing merchant ships and fishing boats is questionable,
however, if not entirely unimaginable. Such vessels would be extremely vulnerable to
attack and the often adverse sailing conditions in the Strait, and would be difficult to
coordinate (given their necessarily large numbers) and unload. 116

112 Cote,

The Groot Wall at Sea, pp. 71-72.
See "Country Briefing: China," Jane's Dtifence Weekly, 10 December 1997, pp. 31-32.
114 Ibid; ''Warships, Civilian Vessels Join Forces in Drills," People's Daily (online ed.), 31 July 2000; and
''Inside the Ring,"1he Washington Times, (onlino od.), 3 August 2001.
liS See ''PLA's Landing Exercises Successful," Beijing Review, 27 September 1999, p. 5.
116 McVadon. ''PRC Exercises, Doctrine and Tactics toward Taiwan," pp. 254-256, offers a highly
sceptical critique.
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Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (lSR)
The PLA Navy seemingly is giving some preference to the development and
introduction of land-attack cruise missiles, iocluding ship, submarine and lrir-Iaunched
LACMs (from FB-7 strike moral\, using PLAAF tankers to exteod their raoge), which
may be the focus of short-term naval power pmjection efforts, particularly io the
continuiog abseooo of any sea-based organic lrir power pmjection capability: that is,

mcraft carriers (see discussion below). However, Norman Friedman makes the
important generic point that the benefits of employiog longer-range weapons (such as
LACMs and long-raoge ASCMs) will

hi. limited,

unless the forces employiog those

weapons also possess comparably long-range (over-the-horizon) surveillance systeros to
target the weapons over such distances.lI7 Those long-range sensing and targetiog
capabilities, such as networks of dedicated military surveillance satellites, are
capabilities that China presently lacks (although developments are under way - see the

section on adjWlct capabilities below).118 One unnamed "senior V.S. defense official"
has thus confidently stated: "China still cannot find ships at sea. Over-the-horizon
targetiog escapes them. The United States built an open ocean surveillance capability in
the 1960s. China has all the tools to build its own but it has not.,,'19
China will remlrin hampered io its efforts at long-range surveillance and
targeting, however, not only for power pmjection, but also for the extension of its sea
denial strategy and sea control ambitions beyond coastal waters, at least until the PLA
can deploy an iotegrated sea surveillance system, perhaps using a combination of
surveillance satellites, over-the-horizon radar and AWACS (lrirbome warning and
control system) or other Irircraft fitted out with appmpriate sensor technology. These are
capabilities that China is developiog, but only slowly (see discussion io a later section
below). Nevertheless, io addition to produciog GPS and GLONASS (Global Navigation
Satellite System - the Russian equivalent to GPS) receivers, China has endeavoured to

1I7

Friedman. Seapower as Strategy, pp. 78-81; and see also Friedman, New Technology and Medium

Navies, Royal Australian Navy Maritime Studies Program Working Paper No. 1, RAN, HMAS
CRESWELL, lervi, Bay, NSW, August 1999, pp. 29-36.
118 See,
example, Cole and Godwin, "Advanced Military Technology and the PLA," pp. 176-181.
1I9 Quoted in "China to Buy 8 More Russian Submarines," The Washington Post (online eel.), 25 June

fur

2002. Eric McVadon provides an illustration of China's problem. 1n the March 1996 Taiwan missile
crisis, when the United States deployed two aircraft carrier battle groups to the general area, Chlna had to
rely upon American statements and media reports for any information on the deployment 1n McVadon's
view, China probably still does not know the exact timing, positioning and movements of the second
battle group. See McVadon. "Systems Integration in China's People's Liberation Army," pp. 223-224.
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buy satellite imagery from commercial operators to create the digital TERCOM images
it needs for cruise missile guidance and targeting. 120

Systems Integration and Military Industrial Capacity
The PLA Navy suffers considerable systems integration shortcomings which are
exacerbated, as pointed out by Bemard Cole, by the requirement to integrate
domestically-built Chioese systems with a variety of foreign-sourced Systems,I21 such as
the French-designed TAVITAC combat direction system used in the PLA Navy's later
classes of indigenous Warships.I22 The integration dilemma is a legacy of Chioa's two
decades of intenoational isolation and continuing dependence upon foreign technologies.
In general, Chioa's indigenous technology base for the production, operation
and maintenance of modern naval platforms and their systems is low, with deficiencies
in a wide range of technologies from submarine nuclear power plants and quieting to
sensors to manufucturing and fabrication techniques to digital technology and
computing vital for modeno warship combat/fire.control systems. Despite maintaining
aspirations to develop its own naval systems, China still relies upon foreign
technologies. In addition to buying entire platforms and weapon systems from abroad,
Chioa also continues to rely upon the procurement of major components for its own

warship construction programmes, such as marine gas turbines. I23
120 (U.S.) Department of Defense, "Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of
China," Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, June 2000. For
an extensive overview of the types of con:un.eroial satellite imagery now available on the world market,
see John C. Baker, Kevin M. O'Connell and Ray A. Williamson, eds., Commercial Observation
Satellites: At the Leading Edge of Transparency, RAND and ASPRS, Santa Moniea, CA, and Bethesda.
MD, 2001.
121 Cole. The Great Wall at Sea, p. 111. A detailed study is McVadon, "Systems Integration in China's
People's Liberation Army," who outlines five levels of systems integration which continue to adversely
affect the PLA: integration at the regional (or theatre) level (such as integrated ISR); between platforms in
a specific capability area (such as ASW); between components constituting a combat platform (such as an
indigenous warship): between components from different (national) origins constituting a weapon system;
and between high and low-technology equipment.
122 Ibid., pp. 220-221. The combat direction system fuses data from onboard and off-board sensors to
create a "tactical picture" used for tracking and targeting, For further explanation see Friedman, Seapower
as Strategy, pp. 238-242. It is likely that China remains some way from being able to net information
from various external ISR sensors for use by naval platforms, or to net the sensors of several platforms
together to improve (and fuse) the tactical data picture; that is, a ''network-centric warfare" capability will
evade the PLA Navy for some time to come.
123 See Cole and Godwin, "Advanced Military Technology and the PLA," esp. pp. 185-191; Friedman,
"Chinese Military Capacity," pp. 64-72; Evan S. Medeiros, "Revisiting Chinese Defense Conversion:
Some Evidence from the PRC's Shipbuilding Industry," Issues and Studies, Vol. 34, No. 5, May 1998, p.
101: Richard A. Bitzinger, "Going Places or Running in Place? China's Efforts to Leverage Advanced
Military Technologies for Military Use," in Puska. ed., People's Liberation Army after Next; and Larry
M. Wortzel, China's Military Potential, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, P~
October 1998, pp. 18-20.
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Personnel and Training

A further deficiency relates to the quality, professionalism and training standards of
PLA Navy perSonnel. Navies, like air forces, by their very nature, demand high levels
of technical proficiency and specialist training for effectiveness, and the naval
professioo is one that is inherently driven by the challenging requirements both of naval
tecbnnlogy and an sdvanced level of sesrnanship. The growing economic importsnce of
the sea and marine industries to China (especially shipping) should over time improve
the pool of maritime-skilled personnel available to the PIA Navy although, as in the
West, the PIA may find it difficult to compete for those people against private sector
labour demand. Ye! recruiting and training people for the high-technology environment
of a modern navy is a tall order for an organization that, in most respects, is 20 to 30
years behind today's military-technological standards. It is not clear whether Chioese
sailors are receiving sdequate training. including sufficient time at sea, although the
frequency of exercises, inclnding combined-arms exercises, seems to be steadily on the
rise. Finally, although professionalism necessarily is improving withiri the PIA Navy,

Bernard Cole notes that the degree to which ideological training and confurmity
continues to hamper service professionalism is uncertain. I24
China's Phantom Menace: The PLA Navy's Aircraft Carrier Quest
Speculation has been rife since the late 1980s that China intends to construct an aircraft
carrier capability (with an initial in-service date once guesstimated to be as close as the
early years of the twenty-first century),!" which would afford the PLA Navy a gennine
mobile power projection asset. Speculation was fuelled throughout the 1980. and 1990s
as Chioa purchased ''fur scrap" a number of old or uofinished carriers from abroad,
which has allowed a transfer of aircraft carrier design elements at little cost,
The first of these purchases occurred in 1985 with the acquisition of the
Australian light carrier, HMAS Melbourne, in relatively complete form. The Chinese
were able to garner knowledge of catapults, arrester wires, aircraft elevators and flight

See Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, Ch. 6, for further elaboration of these training and personnel issues.
For ettrly examples of that speculation, see Cheung, Growth of Chinese Naval Power, pp. 27-28; and
You XU and You Ji, In Search ofBlw Water Power: The PLA Navy '8 Maritime Strategy in the 19908 and
Beyond, SDSC Working Paper No. 222, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National
University, Canberra, December 1990, pp. 11-13.
124
125
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deck design from Melbourne."6 The ex-Australian carrier's flight deck design in fact
was copied for the layout of an airstrip used to train PLANAF pilots in carrier flight
operations. 127 China has also purchased three ex-Soviet Kiev-class carriers, Kiev, Minsk
and Novorossiysk (the latter two ships via a South Korean scrap merchant), using front
companies, once more ostensibly for scrapping. l28 The ships can not be returned to

operational service, having had their powerplants, weapons and communication systems
removed before sale to China, in addition to the general deterioration suffered by the
hulls since being decommissioned. 129 Minsk has been dressed up with replica weapon

systems and serves as the centre of a theme park to popularize military and naval
themes in Shenzhen, Guangdong province. \30 Kiev now serves the same pnrpose as the
centrepiece of the world's "biggest military-theme park" being built in Tianjin, which
will become "China's biggest educational base for national defense as well as the

biggest maritime scientific base in north China.,,131
China also purchased the more significant large carrier, Varyag, from the ship's
Ukrainian shipyard in 1998 using a Macau-regi_ed PLA front company. The Varyag
was to have been the sister ship of the Russian Navy's sole smviving aircraft carrier,

Kuznetsov, and was 70 per cent complete beforewoIk halted on the ship in 1992, before
being stripped of engines, weapons and other systems. The Chinese company involved
allegedly paid around three times the scrap value of the Varyag to secure the 33,600
tonne hulk (if completed Varyag would have displaced around 67,000 tonnes),
supposedly with the unlikely intention of converting it into a floating hotel in Macau. A
condition of the sale was that the carrier was not to be used for military purposes,
although lack of maintenance and deterioration caused by the exposure of internal
sections of the incomplete ship to harsh weather conditions probably ensured that

126 Donald J. Evans, ''Beijing Commits to Carrier Aviation," Defence & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy,
VoL 29, No. 9, September 2001, Table I, p. I!.
121 Ibid., p. 12. AJJ noted in an earlier chapter, PLAN commander Shi was in charge of those training
~tions in a previous posting.
1 "Kiev and Varyag Towed to China," Jane's Navy International, Vol. 105, No. 7, September 2000, p. 7,
According to another source, only the Minsk was on-sold to China by the Koreans. See !an Storey and

You Ji, "Chinese Aspimtions to Acquire Aircraft-carrier Capability Stall," Jane's Intelligence Review,
Vol. 14, No. 4, Aprl12002, p. 38.
129 Ibid., p. 39.
130 Ibid., p. 38; and "Kiev and Varyag Towed to China," Jane's Navy International, Vo!. 105, No. 7,
September 2000, p. 7.
131 "Tianjin to Input RMB Sbn Yuan on Building World Biggest Military-Theme Park," People's Daily
(online ed.), 5 June 2002.
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construction of the Varyag could never have been succeasfully completed anyhow. m
The badly decayed vessel eventually arrived at the Chinese port of Dalian in March
2002. 133
Chinese naval architects undoubtedly are studying the hulk closely for design
insights in preparation for potential local construction efforts. Other reports have linked

the PLA Navy's carrier ambitions to the retired French aircraft carrier, Clemenceau, and
to Spanish and Italian shipyards with experience in building sma1l (up to 25,000 ton)
carriers designed for short tskl>-offlverticallanding (STOVL) aircraft, but seemingly for
no result.'" "Conceptoa1 designs" for a Chinese aircraft carrier capability reportedly
were provided under contract by a Russian design bureau, supposedly heavily
influenced by the Kuznetsov, a typically Russian style of aircraft carrier - a heavy
aircraft-capable through-deck ruissile cruiser. Such a design is believed to be the basis
of the PLA Navy's Plan 9985, which evidently is centred on a medium-sized carrier of
around 48,000 tons, powered by Russian steam turbines and equipped with a heavy
loadout of LACMs and ASCMs and up to 24 advanced combat aircraft. A construction
programme of up to three carriers was at one stage predicted to begin at Shanghai's
Jiangnan shipyard in 2001. 13S
For all the rumours and informed speculation, however, China's carrier
programme remsins somethiog of a phantom menace; there is no hard evidence that
carrier construction is actnally under way. Moreover, the cost of develuping carriers,
bureaucratic politics, changed strategic priorities and rapidly evolving PLA capabilities
may preclude carrier develupment in the near term, even if many analysts seem to agree

that a carrier capability has ouly been delayed, perhaps to 2020, rather than abandoned
altogether. An intriguing piece in the People's Daily Hats technical, technological and
cost reasons as contributing to the decision not to build a carrier in the short term, but
political reasons are pinpointed as the decisive factor. The report quotes an unnamed
"navy expert" who claims the decision to be correct "at the current stage" - implying
132 See "Scrap Value," Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 April 1998, pp. 26-27; and Roger Thornhill, "A
Slow VARYAG to ~" The Navy, April-June 2002, pp. 7-9.
133 See Davis, '"Back on Course," p. 23; Evans, ''Beijing Commits to Carrier Aviation," p. 10; ''Navy
Koep, on El'" on Chinese Aircraft Carrier," Taipei Time, (online ed.), 29 October 2001; IIlld Storey ond
You. "ChUiese Aspirations to Acquire Aircraft-carrier Capability Stall," p. 28.
134 Ibid., p. 37; and Davis. "Back. OD Co'W'Se," p. 23. French and British defence contractors also have
reputedly approached Beijing to offer camer--related electronics and other systems. See "Flying Start,"
Far Eastern Economic Review. 11 March 1999,p. 24.
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that aircraft carriers remain on China's longer-tenn agenda. 136 The high cost of a carrier
programme has long been an impediment to receiving a political green light, 137 and
although China could probably afford such a progranune in absolute fiscal tenus, the
opportunity costs, both political and economic, and within the PLA itself, would seem
to mitigate against a near-term realization of China's carrier ambitions.
Furthennore, the political momentom behind acquiring a carrier capability
probably iliminished with the retirement of Liu Huaqing. '38 Even within the Chinese
navy itself, there are conflieting bureaucratic interests affeeting the outcome of the
internal debate. It is believed, for example, that current PLAN commander and lead
advocate for a carrier power projection capability, Shi Yunsheng, was outmanoeuvred
by a rival faction headed by his predecessor, Zbang Lianzhong, who advocated instead
that modernization of the submarine fleet should remain the top naval furce structure
priority.'" Three PLA Navy researchers at Chioa's Navy Research Institute also have
placed a heavy emphasis on the importsnce of submarines fur future naval warfare:

Countries will choose to develop vessels according to situations in neigbboring
countries and national conditions. . .. However, each country will give attention to

developing submarine forces .... We can conclude that during the First World War, the

dominant vessel was the battleship, and in World War IT, it was the aircraft carrier. In
future global wars, the most powerful weapon will be the submarine. 140

China's evolving strategic priorities during the 1990s, away from the South
Chioa Sea and towards operations against Taiwan, also lessened the impetus for
acquiring an aircraft carrier capability. Aircraft carriers are less relevant to a Taiwan
contingency, where the ilistances involved are relatively small and land-based furces
m See Evans, ''Beijing Commits to Canier Aviation," pp. 10 and 12; and "Mystery Sumnmds Chinese
Carrier 'Deal,'" Jane's Navy International, VaL 105, No. 5, June 2000. p. 9. The 2001 start date is based
~n 1999 "U.S. intelligence," cited in Downing, "China Equips Itselffor Power Projection," p. 43.
I 6 See "Why China Chooses Not to Build Aircraft Carrier?" People's Daily (online ed.), 6 December
2002.
131 See, for example, You Xu and You Ji, In Search o/Blue Water Power, p. 13.
138 See the next chapter on the importance of tiu Huaqing for Chinese naval development
139 AlIen, ''PLA Navy Building at the Start of a New Century," p. 8. Admiral Zhang had been quoted, for
example, as stating that "[t]he development of nuclear powered submarines is the chief objective of this
[20~ century." Quoted in ONI, Worldwide Submarine Challenges, p. 18. See also Goldstein and Murray,
"China's Subs Lead the Way."
140 Sben Zhongchang (Capt, PLAN), Zhang Haiying (Lcdr., PLAN) and Zhou Xinsheng (Leut., PLAN),
''The Military Revolution in Naval Warl'are," in Micha.el Pi1Isbwy, 00., Chinese Views o/Future Waifare,
rev. ed., NDU Press, Washington, D.C., 1998, p. 283. The same authors also predict, however, that future
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would play a large role. Moreover, in any war against Taiwan, possibly involving the
United States, Chinese aircraft carriers would be extremely vuloerable to pre-emptive or
counter attack, a problem that would be exacerbated by the PLA Navy's complete lack
of those fleet area air defences (and its limited ASW capabilities) so vital to the
defensibility and, thus, fightiog power, of carriers. 141 The acquisition of the types of
defensive assets needed to create an effective carrier battle group also would add greatly

to the cost of any carrier programme.
Even. if China were able to fund and successfully construct its own aircraft
carrier sometime in the next 20 years, it is another matter entirely to be able to

effectively operate such a large and complex weapon system, particularly in the absence
of a blue water, let alone carrier, naval tradition. Such considerations involve not only
technical and technological issues such as systems integrstion, but also training and the
proficiency of personnel, and the develupment of both tactical and operational doctrine
for the employment of carriers in battle, all of which took establiabed (and former)
carrier operators' many years to master, and tends to be an ongoing, never ending
process. 142
Prestige is likely to loom larger over time as a driver of the carrier
programme,143 however, especially if other East Asian powers develop their own carrier
capability. China will be particularly wary of Jspan's naval developments, but most
likely will want to trump other countries' carrier progranunes as well, and remains wary
of India's carrier capability in the Indian Ocean. 144 The prestige factor alone might

submarine operations in shallow waters and over the continental shelf will be constrained by advances in
anti-submarine warfare. Sec Shen, Zhang and Zhou, "21 at Century Naval War.fare," in ibid., p. 263.
141 Chinese analysts well understand the problem. One has suggested that carrier acquisition will be
delayed until the PLA Navy can build up the requisite fleet defensive capabilities (2020 is suggested as a
possible target date). See Ji Guoxing, ''Missions and Contributions of the PLA Navy in the Post-Cold War
and the EEZ Era." in Choon Kun Lee, ed., The Middle Power Navies: Roles and Missions in the PostCold War and the EEZ Era, The Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy, Seoul, 1999, p. 93.
142 For an historical perspective on the difficulties of aircraft carrier development, see Geoffrey Till,
"Adopting the Aircraft Carrier: The British, American. and Japanese Case Studies," in Williamson
Murray and A11an R. Millett, eds., Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1996. Also instructive is Ken E. Gause, ''Considerations for 2111 Century Carrier
Navies," in Thomas 1. HirschfeW and Peter Hare, eds., Maritime Aviation: Light and Medium Aircrqft
Carriers into the Twenty First Century, University of Hull Press, Hull, 1999; and Gene L Rochlin, Todd
R. La Porte, and Kerlone H. Roborts, "The Self-Designing, High-Reliability Organization; Aircraft
Carrier Flight Operations at Sea," Naval War College Review, Autumn 1987, repr. Summer 1998.
143 McDevitt, "The PLA Navy," p. 14.
144 The only Asian nation to maintain a carrier capability remains India. The oft-mentioned Thai "aircraft
carrier," Chakri Naruebet. in reality is a small flat deck helicopter canier/amphibious ship cumm.t1y with
no power projection capability (the Harrier STOVL aircmft purchased with the ship are non-operational,
and the ship itself rarely puts to sea due to Thailand's economic difficulties). Nevertheless, Chakri
Naruebet represents a capability that China does not yet possess. Japan's Osumi-class of muill (8,900 ton)
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conceivably lead to a larger rather than a smaller ship, similar to Russia's sole carrier,

Kuznetsov. However, if China were to pursue sea-based air power for operational
PUIpOses, the PLA Navy would require at least two in order for one to be available at
short notice at all times, making it more likely that smaller (say, under 40,000 ton) ships
might be a more practicable option. I4'

The PLA 's Naval Puwer: A Summation
In 1990 Eric Grove categorized the PLA Navy as a "medium regional force projection

navy," a category ranked fourth in a list of nine descending from the ''major global furce
projection navy - complete" to the '10ken navy. ,,146 To be ranked in the fourth category,
a navy must be able to project force into adjacent ocean areas. This was a fair
assessment in 1990 and remains true for today's PLA Navy, even if Grove did include
non-naval maritime capabilities in his assessment In no way bas the PLA Navy been
able to ascend into Grove's third category over the intervening period: that of a
'medium global force projection navy," a distinction held only by the British and
French navies. The ability of China's navy to sustain the application of naval power
over longer distances remains limited. Closer to home, however, the PLA Navy
certainly is becoming a formidable instrument for sea denial and "regional force
projection," relying heavily on its submarine force and its aggregate anti-ship cruise

missile power.
In tenns of platforms and technologies, the majority of the PLA Navy's assets

remain firmly embedded in the 1960s and 1970s, with some ships (such as the Ludaclass DDGs) able to trace their lineage directly back to Soviet desigos of the 1940s. The
purchase of more modem (1980s) Russian platforms, now armed with some of the latest
naval weapons, bas sigoificantly improved the PLA Navy's combat potential, although
flat deck amphibious ships at present provide a platform suitable only for limited helicopter operations,
whilst the South Koreans may have some aircraft carrier ambitions and are already building an indigenous
class of helicopter earner. See, respectively. Mark Farrer, ''Th.e Royal Thai Navy: Progress or
Stagnation?" Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, August/September 1999, p. 12; John Downing, "Japanese
Navy in All but Name," Jane's Navy International, Vol 104, No. 3, April 1999, p. 35; and, on South
Korea, Richard Cobbold (Radm., RN) and Damon Bristow, "East Asia - The Regional Effects of
Carriers," in Hirschfeld and Hare, eds., Maritime Aviation, p. 144,
145 This point is made with regard to the Russian Navy by Norman Polmar, ''The Measurement of Naval
Strength in the Twenty-first Century," in Andrew Donnan, Mike Lawrence Smith and Matthew R.H.
Uttley, eds., The Changing Face o/Maritime Power, Macmillan. London, 1999, pp, 132-133.
146 Grove, The Future a/Sea Power, pp. 236-241. Grove's is a useful typology, although the categories
are still quite broad. China is grouped with India and Japan (amongst others 88 varied as Spain, Canada
and Australia), yet Chinese navalltechnologica1 prowess and competence lags behind such countries, even
ifits total maritime force projection capabilities are considerable.
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it is not clear whether new Chinese destroyer and submarine designs will be successful.
bnported platfonns and weapons, however, can not overcome non-hardware

shortcomings in personnel, training, doctrine and organization, as well as in systems
integration. And, if China genuinely inteods to become a major naval power, it can not

remain so depeodent upon foreigo techoology and expertise, particularly from a single
main so=. Yet, if the history of Sino-Russiao relations is aoy indicator of the future,
the current relationship may only be traository.147
Prominent naval analyst, Norman Palmar, has argoed that to measure naval
strength in the post-Cold War, information age, we must focus less on the traditional
value of firepower alone (which the PLA Navy is constantly improving), aod rather
more upon three new "core factors": space, inc1udiog the use of satellites for
''navigation, oceao surveillaoce, targeting [aod] communications"; computer-based
systems for integrated command, control, communications aod the collection and
processing of intelligence; and highly-trained personnel.'" China's navy undoubtedly is
cummtly lacking in all three factors, although their importance for future naval
operations is recognized by the PLA Navy aod improvemeots are being made.'"
However, such critical judgements must be teropered by the likelihood that
China's medium-term naval goals centre less on becoming a global naval power than on
exerting ever-increaaing regional influence throughout maritime East Asia. There is also
some danger in atteropting to mirror image,150 or compare directly (symmetrically),
developments within the Chinese navy with those of Western navies. The PLA Navy
seems increaaingly to be specificaJly designed (in similar, although hardly identica1,
fashion to the Cold War Soviet Navy), for sea denial operations against Amcrican (and
allied) forces, with the ultimate aim offorcing the surrender of Taiwan.
However, the total maritime-strategic power that a continental state such as

China can exert upon its own littoral far exceeds its naval power alone. On the future of
147 A point made by Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, pp. 181-182. Cole may be overstating the case,
however, when he draws a parallel between the PLA Navy's dependence on foreign support today and the
Chinese navy', dependence upon foreigners during the 1a~ DynaBty. China today, unIik< then, is •
country on the rise, not decline, and is largely united with a strong sense of its national objectives.
148 Polmar, "The Measurement of Naval Strength in the Twenty-first Century," pp. 128-129. On the
rapidly expanding importance of space for modem navies, see, for example, Norman Friedman, "Wide
Open Space: Navies Exploit Satellite Revolution," Jane's Navy International, Vol. 105, No. 3, April
2000.
149 See SheD, Zhang and Zhou, ''The Military Revolution in Naval Warfare"; and Shen, Zbang and Zhou,
''21" Century Naval WarfiIre," esp. pp. 263-265 and 271-272.
ISO Mirror-imaging may be viewed as a form of ethnocentrism in strategic analysis. On that sin, see Ken
Booth. Strategy and Ethnocentrism. Croom Helm, Loedcn, 1979.
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(similarly continental) Russia's navy, Norman Polmar suggests that '1and-based forces
may be able to support effectively naval operations to a far greater degree than at

present,,151 And, on modern littoral warfare, in general, a leading naval thinker makes
the obvious yet important point that: "For littoral operations, it is no longer possible to
define a fleet merely as a set of warships, because land-based systems play a prominent
part."IS2 The PLA Navy's own strategic thinkers, not surprisingly, follow a similar line

of reasoning: "As land-based arms will be sharply improved in reaction capacity, strike
precision, aud range, they will be able to powerfully strike fonnations at sea, and even

individual warships and cruise missiles.,,153 The following section, therefore, provides a
brief analysis of those elements of the PLA's non-naval force structure that contribute to
China's overall maritime power.

CHINA'S NON-NAVAL MARITIME POWER ASSETS

The elements of China's maritime power which are not constituent parts of the PLA
Navy eau be classed into four main categories: PLAAF air power; the ballistic missiles
of the Second Artillery; ground truops; and other advauced, adjunct capabilties such as
space and other ISR asSets.

I54

One additional aspect that must also be examined is the

PLA's ability to conduct joint operations in the maritime environment.

PLA Air Force Assets
The PLA Air Force is the world's largest air force with over 3,500 combat aircraft, most
of which are obsolete types and more or less irrelevant to operations in the maritime
environment. I5S Iu general, however, China's air force is becoming more accustomed to
flying missions over water, aod PLAAF fighters are employed for coastal air defence in
geographical sectors not covered by the PLANAF. I56 The potential for PLAAF
involvement in maritime operations incressed throughout the 1990s as the new strstegic
Palmar, "The Measurement of Naval Strength in the Twenty-first Century,';;. 133.
Wayne P. Hughes (Capt, USN, rot), Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, 2 00., Naval Institute Press,
Annapolis, hID, 2000, p. 168.
m Shell, Zhang andZhou, "21st Century Naval Warfare," p. 262.
154 In addition, certain other capabilities also are relevant, such as those non-naval, sea-going paramilitary forces already mentioned in a previous section above.
1" The PLAAF is constantly downsizjog, however, retiring obsolete types at a fairly rapid rate. The U,S.
Department of Defense has predicted that the total number of aircraft comprising the combined
PLAAFIPLANAF combat fleets may fall from as many as 5,300 in 2000 to 2,200 by 2020. See "Annual
Report on the MilitaTyPower of the People's Republic ofChina," lWle 2000.
151

lS2
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guidance of local, limited war under high-tech conditions began to influence air force
procurement. In particular, the traditional PLA Air Force focus upon short-range
fighters (currently mostly F-7 and F-8 variants) for the air defence of continental China
was transformed into a greater emphasis upon the ability to conduct offensive
operstions. That evolution has led to an increase in the proportion of strike/attack and
multi-role aircraft in the overall PLAAF fleet, as well as to the development of new
capabilities in vital support aircrafl types such as tankers, transport, intelligencecollecting aud AWACS aircrafl. 1S7
A rhetorical demonstration of the PLA Air Force's expanded role was provided
in February 2000, when the China Daily newspaper cited the PLAAF commander,
Lieutensnt General Liu Shunyan, expressing the air force's new offensive role and its
resolution ''to defend the country's territorial sovereignty in regard to laud, airspace and

sea as well

Q3

its maritime rights and to maintain the country's unity and Secwity."IS8

According to You Ji, the PLAAF's new roles include joint maritime operations with the
PLA Navy out to a distance of 1,000 km from home bases. IS. Aud, in keeping with its
current Taiwan emphasis, China evidently has, in recent times, constructed ''more than

14" new air bases ''within 350 km" of the island. 160
The PLAAF's foremost new weapon systems are Russian imports. China's first
significant Russian order was placed in 1992 for 26 Su-27 Flsnker-B fighter aircraft,
followed by forther orders throughout the 1990s, including a 1996 agreement to coproduce around 200 aircrafl in China. The exact number delivered so far is uncertain but
may amount to 100 aircrafl. Based in Anhui and Guangdong provinces, most are of the
Russian-built Su-27S type, with up to ten Chinese-assembled Su-27SK (J-11) models
expected to roll off the assembly line each year.I.1 The Su-27S has some ground attack
capability but is primarily an air superiority fighter.

I.' All the advanced components of

the Su-27SKs, such as the engine and important avionics subsystems, are built in Russia

Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, p. 85.
157 See John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, ''China's Search for a Modem Air Force," International
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Security, VoL 24, No. I, Summer 1999, pp. 82·83; and You, The Armed Forces o/China, Ch. 5, esp. pp.
127-138.

"" "AD: Forte Able ID Derend Territory," China Daily (online ed.). 23 February 2000 (_hasis added).
159 You, The Armed Forces o/China, p. 131.
160 See "Lu Warns of Chinese Air Bases," Taipei Times (online ed.), 9 August 2001.
161 "Long March to Modemisat:ion," Jane's Defence Weekly, 11 July 2001, p. 27; and Lewis and Xue,
"China's Search for a Modern Air Force," p. 85.
162 For the technical specifications of China's Su-27s, see JaM'S All the World's Aircrqft 2001-2002,
lane', Infonnation Group, Coulsdon, Swrey. 2001, p. 433.
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and only assembled in China. like China's Kilo-class submarines, the aircraft must at

present be returned to Russia for maintenance on many of those systems. 163
An even more significant U.S.$1.8 billion order was placed in 1999 fur 40 Su30MKK Flanker-C variants, followed by another U.S.$2 billion order in 2001 for 38
more, expected to be delivered by the end of 2003. 164 The Su-30MKK is a far more
capable

two-sea~

long-range, multi-role version of the Flanker with an emphasis on

interdiction/strike roles,165 thus providing the PLA Air Force with its first dedicated
shike figbter fully specified to carry precision gnided munitions (pGMs) and advanced
missile weapons. In June 2002 two Chinese Su-30MKKs test-fired fur the first time
Russian AA-12 medium-range air-to-air missiles, msking it the PLAAF's first "fireand-forget" beyond-visual-range missile capability, similar in performance to the new
generarion American medium-range missile, the AJM-120 AMRAAM. China has also
purchased 2,000 AS-14 precision guided air-to-surfuce missiles and

is believed to be

modifYing the aircraft to carry YJ-I ASCMs. I66 if so, this may be the first time that the
PLAAF has bad sn anti-shipping role, which traditionally has been the sole preserve of
the PLANAF; until recently, the PLAAF had considered low altitode over-the-water
operstions too difficult and dsngerous, bot is now integrsting tactics fur maritime
operstions into the PLAAF training regimen. 167 It is also believed that Chinese Flanker
production will switch from the Su-2?SK to the Su-30MKK "after 80 aircraft."l6'
In addition to the Flanker variants and the PLANAF's FB-? maritime strike

aircraft, the other new combat aircraft type slated to make up China's future fleet of air
l63 See, for example, "China Signs $2 Billion Deal to Buy Russian Fighter Jets," Washington Post (online
od.), 20 Iuly 2001; Kenneth W. Alien and Eric A McVadon, China's Foreign Military ReiatioPl8, Report
No. 32, The Heory L. Stimsoo Center, Waslrington, D.e., October 1999, p. 62; and Alleo, ''PLA Air
Force Logistics and Maintenance: What Has Changed?" in Mulvenon and Yang, eds., The Poople's

Liberation Army in the Information Age.
164 "China Signs $2 Billion Deal to Buy Russian Fighter Jets," Washington Post (online 00.), 20 July
2001. About half of the initial order had been delivered by mid-2001, with the remainder set to follow
soon thereafter. See "Long March to Modernisation," Jane's Defence Weekly, 11 July 2001, p. 27.
Another, unconfirmed Su-30MKK deal was reported in July 2002, with one source quoting a U.S.$1.8
billion contract for 40 more aircraft, and another a deal for 28 aircraft. See, respectively, "China Buys
Weapons as Taiwan Cautions," CNN (online), 30 July 2002; and "China to Buy 28 Russian Sukhoi Jets,"
Hindustan Times (online ed.), 31 July 2002. If correct, China will be able to field a total of between 110
to 120 of the type within four to five years.
16.'5 Jane'sAll the World's Aircraft 2001-2002, p. 438.
166 The same report claims that China is developing its own version of the AA-12, the Project 129 air-toair missile, and that Beijing intends to buy other Russian types of PGM for the Su-30MICKs, including
"laser- and television-guided bombs, long-range television-guided missiles and possibly anti-ship missiles
with ranges of 180 miles." See "China Test-fires New Missile," The Washington Times (on1ine ed.), 1
July 2002.
167 See Allen, ''PLA Air Force Operations and Modernization," p. 211.
168 Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2001-2002, p. 438.
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combat assets is the ''indigenous'' multi-role F-IO (HO), which is in fact based on the
stillborn Israeli Lavi fighter, matched with Russian engines.

I., The F-IO has had a

prolonged gestation (over IS years), partly caused by the continuing difficulty with
integratiog the Russian engine with the airframe; pr.,.production aircraft currently are
flight testiog. 170 Nevertheless, China has ordered 300 AL-3IF jet engines from Russia
to be delivered over ten years to equip the F_IO.l7l The firstten operational F-IO aircraft
entered service in the Nanjing MR in December 2002, and will be equipped with the YI
series of ASCM. In
The PLAAF soon will bave its first AWACS capability after siguing a deal with
Russia for either the sale or lease of four A-50/A-50MIU AWACS aircraft, which bave
a radar range of 4S0 km.I" In addition to the B-6 bombers that bave been converted to
the tanker role, China also is buying fonr 11-78 tanker aircraft from Russia. l74 Other
PLAAF force multipliers include Tu-I S4 ELlNT (electronic intelligenc.,.gatbering)
aircraft based in the Nanjing MR and electronic warfare aircraft based upon Y-8 and B6 platforms, whilst the PLAAF is looking again to Russia to bolster its meagre airlift
asSets.
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China has also purchased several SA-IO (S-300PMU-I) high-altitude and SA-I S
(Tor M-I) medium-altitude SAM systems frmn Russia and may either produce its own
versions or a similar missile of Chinese design,l76 although it has been estimated by the

V.S. Department of Defense that China will not be able to deploy a working integrated
air defence system until approximately 2020. 177 More recently, China has also

169 Mark Farrer, "China's Air Force - Kosovo Spurs a Race to Change," ASia-Pacific Defence Reporter,
VaL XXV. No. 6, OctoberlNovember 1999, p. 21. The Lavi was financed using American money and
incorporated U.S. technology, extema1ly resembling the American F-16 figbter.
170 "Long March to Modetnisa.tion," Jane's Defence Weekly, 111uly 2001, p. 27.
171 ''Russian Fighter Jet Sale Awaits Final Seal," South China Morning Post (onIine ed.), 20 September
2001. TheAL-31F also powers the Su-27.
l7'J "China's Air Force Equipped with I-to Fighter-bomber," People's Daily (online od), 13 December
2002. The report claims that the aircraft is superior to the F-16 and Mirage 2000 fighters flown by Taiwan
and to China's own Su-27s.
l73 See ''Russian PM Clinches $2.3 Billion Arms-for--debt Deal," The Sydney Morning Herald, 6
November 2000, p. 10; and ''China-Russia 'Mainstay' Deal Is Revitalised," Jane's Defence Weekly, 10
October 2001, p. 27. The Chinese originally had signed a contract with Israel for the Phalcon AWACS
s)'Btem integrated with Russian _ s , but intense American pressure caused Israel to suspeod the deal
in July 2000.
m !bid.
175 "Long March to Modemisatioo," June's Defence Weekly, 11 July 2001, p. 27.
176 Ibid. Chinese SAMs under development include the HQ-9 (purportedly based on SA-1O and covertlyacquired American Patriot SAM technologies), the HQ-1O (aliCOIlJle-built SA-IO) IIJld the Ff-2000. Se.
Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, p. 235.
171 "Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China," June 2000.
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contracted for the very advanced S-300PMU-2 SAM, which has some ballistic missile
defence capability. 178
One further aspect of PLAAF capabilities relevant to PLA maritime operations,
especially against Taiwan, is the IS"' Airborne Anny, a (relatively) elite force of three
divisions, each of around 10,000 air-mobile troops. Although that mobility is hampered
by a lack of airlift capacity, the addition ofRussiao IL-76 heavy transport aircraft to the

fleet nevertheless has improved the deployment capacity of aitborne forces. The 15th
Airborne Anny began to form into rapid-reaction forces in 1992,179 and cao be
augmented by special operations battalions, including paratroopers. "0

Ballistic Missiles
In addition to operating Beijing's laod-based nuclear deterrent, the PLA's strategic

rocket force, the Second Artillery Corps, also is rapidly deploying conventional
warhead, theatre (short and mediwn-raoge) ballistic missiles, spurred on by the events
of the Gulf War and Taiwan's role as China's immediate strategic focus since the mid
1990s: l8I all corrent short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) batteries are based in the
Nanjing MRl

'2

In March 2001 there were believed to be between 200-300 SRBMs

deployed opposite Taiwan, 183 whilst by August of that year the number deployed in
China's five separate SRBM bases reportediy had increased to 350, leading one

unnamed "senior Pentagon official" to suggest that "[t]hey are on track with adding 50
new missiles a year," in the belief that China would deploy up to 600 missiles by
2005. 184
The Second Artillery fields two basic types of road-mobile SRBM: the DF-ll
(CSS-71M-ll) and the DF-1S (CSS-61M-9). The DF-ll bas a range of 280 km, and a
600 m CEP. I " A modified missile, the DF-IIA (CSS-7 Mod 2), has a smaIlerpayload,
178 ''Russia's Rosy Export Figures Raise Afghan Aid Questions," Jane's Defence Weekly, 16 January
2002,p.21.
179 Allen, ''PLA Air Force Operations and Modernization." pp. 198-199; and You, The Armed Forces of
China, pp. 143-146.
180 ''Reaching Out," Jane's Defence Weekly, 15 April 1998, p. 32.
181 Marlc A. Stokes, "China's Military Space and Conventional Theater Missile Development:
Implications for Security in the Taiwan Strait," in Puska, ed., People's Liberation Army tifter Next, pp.
107-112.
182 "Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China," July 2002, p. 50.
183 ''China Places Second Missile Base Near Taiwan," The Washington Times (on the Taiwan Security
Research web site), 15 March 2001. China evidently had fewer than 50 SRBMs targeting Taiwan in 1996.
See ''Missiles Bolstered Opposite Taiwan," The Washington Times (onllne 00.), 29 April 2002.
184 See ''China. Increases Missile Threat," The Washington Times (online ed.), 28 August 2001.
18S CEP: circular error probable - the radius within which 50 per cent of warheads are predicted to fall.
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increased range (300-400 km) and improved accuracy (200 m CEP)}" The DF-15 has a
600 km range and a 300 m CEP. I87 In addition to the SRBMs, China also deploys the
road and rail-mobile DF-21 (CSS-5) medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), which is
designed to carry a nuclear warhead to a range of 2,000 km, with a CEP of 700 m. An
improved version, the DF-21A, has been undergoing recent testing.'" However, China

is believed to be working on a more accurate, conventional warhead version (the DF21 C) that uses lermioal guidance (possibly with a CEP of less than 50 m), and perhaps
carries a warhead as large as 1,500 kg.

I" DF-21 tests in July and December 2002

revealed that China has developed penetration aids designed to counter enemy missile
defences in the form of multiple and dummy warheads, 190 a further indication of
China's intent to employ ballistic missiles as its vangnard offensive capability.
The PLA's missile fetish thus involves the PLA Navy's anti-ship cruise missiles
and prospective land-attack cruise missiles noted earlier, plus the Second Artillery's
ballistic missiles and ground and (non-PLANAF) air-launched versions of the RN series
LACMS. I • I In a Taiwan conflict, it is believed that the PLA plans to use its ballistic and
cruise missiles against U.S. regional military bases and even aircraft carriers, sbould the
United Slates intervene. l92 The fast, manoeuvring, terminally-guided warhead of the
DF-2IC might, for example, be capable of anti-carrier strikes.

I.'

Ground Forces
PLA ground forces would provide the bulk of the troops used in aoyamphibious assault
on Taiwan, as the PLA Navy's marines represent only a small force. Many ground force
186 Jane 's

Strategic Weapon Systems. pp. 44-45.
Ibid., pp. 42-43. An improved version, the CSS-6 Mod 2, is believed to have been deployed in April
2002. See ''Missiles Bolstered Opposite Taiwan," The Washington Times (onIine 00.), 29 April 2002.
188 ''China Modifying Its Medium-range Ballistic Missiles," Taipei Times (online ed.), 15 July 2002.
189 Michael Pillsbury, "China's Military Strategy toward the U.S.: A View from Open Sources,"
Contracted Research Paper for the U.S.-Clrina Security Review Commission, 2 November 2001, pp. 2324; Stokes, "China's Military Space and Conventional Theater Missile Development." pp. 120-122; and
Richard D. Fisher, '<Foreign Arms Acquisition and PLA Modernization," in Lilley and Sbambaugh, eds.,
China's Military Faces the Future, p. 90. Terminal guidance options include Radar Digital Area
Guidance (RADAG) and GPS-assisted sysrems.
190 See, respectively, "China Tests Missile," The Washington Times (onIine ed.), 23 July 2002; and
<"China Successfully Tests Multi-warhead Missiles," The Daily Yomiuri (onIine 00.), 9 February 2003.
191 On the non·naval LACMs of the HN series, see Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, pp. 64-65. These
are believed to have ranges ofbetween 600 to 4,000 km and CEPs of20 to just five metres. Mark Stokes
suggests that a land-attack version of the YJ-2 ASCM with a 300 km range and TERCOM and GPSassisted guidance, and an air-launched ltIlti-radiation (that is: anti-radar) missile, the YI-9, also may be
under development. Stokes. "China's Military Space and Conventional Theater Missile Development,"
fJl. 129-130.
Ibid., p. 146.
187
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units based in coastal regions now train for amphibious operations; the 31" Group Army
in Fujian province, for example, has three amphibious-capable infantry divisions, and
the establishment of more rapid-reaction forces may improve further China's ability to
undertake amphibious operations, subject to the sea lift limitations mentioned earlier. I94
The PLA has also given some priority to the development of special operations forces
(SOp),I95 and in 2001 ground forces training and exercises "reportedly emphasized

maritime and amphibious training, and integration of conventional ground units with
Marines, Airborne [Forces], and SOF."l9· In any invasion of Taiwan the ground force's
helicopter fleet (numbering some 150 aircraft) also is likely to be used to transport

assault troops. 197

Advanced Atijunct Capabilities
PLA development since the adoption of the local war strategy in 1985 has sought not
only to modernize selected conventional capabilties (and the Chinese nuclear deterrent),
but also has attempted to ''play to its own strengths" by focusing on "certain enabling
technologies" such as "ballistic missiles, ground-based radars, and information
denial."l9' An important aspect of this development is what Pentagon expert Mark
Stokes terms "China's quest for information dominance.,,199 The capabilties being

pursued by China that add to its maritime power include space, air, land and sea-based

intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, as well as future

RMA~type

weapons.

The ability to provide a clear intelligence pictme of regional military
deployments in China's adjacent seas is vital to the PLA's warfighting capacity in the
maritime environment The PLA currently can monitor an area roughly out to 200
o
nautical miles flum its borders using a variety of ground, sea and air-based sensors.zo

These include signals intelligence (SIGINT) facilities based on the Chinese mainland,
193

Pillsbury, "China's Military Strategy toward the U.S .... p. 25.

'" "Reaching Ou~" June's Defence Weekly, 15 April 1998, pp. 30-32. See also Andrew N. D. Yang and
Milton Wen-Chung Liao, ''PLA Rapid Reaction Forces: Concept, Training, and Preliminary Assessment,"
in Mulvenon and Yang, eds., The People '$ Liberation Army in the Information Age.
19~ "Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic ofChlna," July 2002, p. 24.
,% Ibid., p. 26 (_basis added).
191 Yu Chuanxin, "A Few Issues Concerning Logistic Support for the Cross-strait Amphibious Landing
Operation," Journal of Military Economics Studies, 15 January 2001, trans. by the U.S.-China Secmity
Review Commission.
198 Mark A Stokes, China's Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States, Strategic
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, September 1999, p. 2.
199 The title of Ch. 3 of ibid.
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Hainan, Rocky Island (in the Paracel group) and cooperative SIGINT facilities with
Bunna to monitor the eastern lodian Oceao and the Malacca Strait; the PLA Navy's
specialist intelligeooo-gathering and space-monitoring ships, as well as the SIGINT
equipment based on some surface warships and submarines; and the PLAAF's ELINT
(and prospective AWACS) aircraft.'·l China is also increasing its use of unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAYs) fur reconnaissance, surveillance, ELINT collection and
electronic warfare,'02 as well as deploying the Israeli Harpy armed, anti-radar UAY,
which has recently been used in exercises in Fujian province.'·'
China now has up to three sky-wave over-the-horizon radar systema which can
track airborne targets out to 1,000 km and, possibly, one surfaoo-wave systeIl3. The PLA

hopes to be able to use these systema to track and target eneIl3Y platforms such as
aircraft carriers.20' It is also believed that China has deployed "at least one" underwater
acoustic range using passive acoustic sensors to detect and track both submarines and

surface targets, and is expected to deploy further sensors in the futore, perhaps "as far
offshore as the edge of the continental shelf."'·' However, as argued by Mark Stokes,

and recalling the first of Norman Pohnar's three core factors of twenty-first century
navies, the PLA must further enhance its exploitation of space. Space exploitation has
become an important filctor for the PLA, not only allowing China to monitor activities

on its adjacent seas and ocean ares, but also providing the potential (and essential)

means with which to conduct vital ''mission planning functions" such as navigation and
weapon guidance.'"
Currently, China is dependent to a large degree on purchasing high-resolution
satellite images from Western or Russian commercial imagery providers.207 China is
Stokes, "China'. Military Space and Conventional Theater Misoile Developmen~" p. 112.
See Ball, ''Signals Intelligence in China."
lQ2: "Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China," July 2002, p. 18; and
Stokes, China's Strategic Modernization, p. 42.
203 ''China Deploys Drones from Israel," The Washington Times (on1ine oo.), 2 July 2002.
204 "Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China," July 2002, p. 29; and
200

20'

Stokes, China's Strategic Modernization, p. 41.
"Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China," July 2002, p. 29. The
effectiveness of passive arrays may be limited by the high ambient noise in East Asian waters (as pointed
out by Sam Bateman in a personal exchange).
206 Stokes, ''Cbina's Military Space and Conventional Theater Missile Development," p. 112.
m China i.'believed to use image>y from Russian, U.S. (LANDSA1), Frecch (SPOT), Canadian
(RADARSAT) and, possibly, Israeli (EROS~A) satellites, as well as :from its own joint venture with
Brazil, the China~Brazi1 Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS). See Stokes, China's Strategic
Modernization, pp. 36~37. China more recently has covertly (via a South Korean company), been buying
imagery of Taiwan taken by the Ikonos satellite (with a powerful resolution of around one metre)
belonging to U.S. remote sensing company, Space Imaging, See "China Buys U.S. Satellite Data to
Target Taiwan," The Washington Times (onIine ed.), 7 February 2002. For a more general discussion of
:uJ5
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thus actively pursuing its own real-time satellite surveillance systems which, as
described in the Chinese space white paper's short-term development targets, seek to
establiab "a coordinated and complete national satellite remote-sensing application
system" and "an earth observation system for long-term use to condnct stereoscopic
observation and the dynamic monitoring of the country's and even the whole world's
land, atmosphere, and oceanic environments.'''08 The D.S. Department of Defense has
suggested that those satellites, "when fully deployed, are expected to provide regional
and potentially a hemispheric, continuous surveillance cspability.',209 The PLA Navy's

own researchers write that
future sea warfare will adopt the remote attack as the major combat concept Satellites
and other information platfOl'Dl8 will provide large-scale monitoring, warning, and target
information processing and transmission services. 1bis will supply future vessels and
aircraft with targeting information for launching long-range, precision-guided

platforms. 210

To achieve such a capability, China plans to lannch a small constellation of four
electro-optical and two synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellites (SAR satellites can
"see" at night and in all weather). The fonner will build upon the ZY-I satellite joint
venture with Brazil, and the latter from the HY-I, China's first SAR satellite.211 The
ZY-2 (Jianbing-3) launched in 2001 is believed to be China's first high-resolution
electro-optical military surveillance satellite. The ZY-2 is thought to have (at least) a
five-metre resolution, which is sufficient for weapons targeting.2I2 The first HY-I
satellite was launched with some fanfare in May 2002, ostensibly for "surveying ocean
resources'~ and for marine environmental monitoring and maritime law enforcement.2 13

Although under the nominal control of the National Marine Satellite Application

the security implications of the rapidly unfolding commercial remote sensing phenomenon, see John C.
Baker and Dam J. Johnson, ''Security Implications of Commercial Satellite Imagery," in Baker,
O'Connell and WiIliamson, eds., Commercial Ohservation Satellites.
109 Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic ofCbina, ''China's Space Activities,"
Beijing, November 2000, Part III. Available as "China's Space Industry Flying High," China Daily
~online ed.), 23 November 2000.
9 "Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic ofChina," July 2002, p. 28.
210 Shen, Zhang and Zhou, 'The Military Revolution in Naval Warfare," p. 277. It should be noted that
the United States already possesses such capabilties.
m Stokes, "China's Military Space and Conventional Theater Missile Development," pp. 113·116.
212 "Chinese 'Civilian' Satellite a Spy Tool," The Washington Times (ooline ed.), 1 August 2001.
213 ''China's First Independently-developed Marine Satellite," People's Daily (online ed), 15 May 2002.

175

Center,214 and despite the inherent civilian-military dual-use nature of such satellites and
their imagery, it would seem likely that the PLA will have some priority in the use of
the HY-l. The director of the State Oceanic Administration, Wang Shuguang, has
confirmed China's intention to have its own constellation of oceanic surveillance

satellites in operation by 2010, suggesting that to do so

'~s

a strategic task for China [in

order] to monitor its waters.'''1S The first images from the HY-\ were received in late

May, and its orbit will provide coverage of the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea, the
South China Sea, the Yellow Se. and the Sea of Japan.'16 China and Russia are also
believed to be co-developing remote-sensing satellites.2I7
A new series of ELINT satellite also is under development, as are new

recoverable film-based intelligence-gathering satellites.2I ' One further Chinese space
development goal is to "establish an indapendent satellite navigation and positioning
System.'.2l9 If China could do so, it would at least lessen its dependence npon the GPS
and GLONASS systems for navigation and weapon tenninal guidance. China launched
its two-satellite geosyncbronous-orbit system, the Twinstar Rapid Positioning System
(or Beidou Navigation System - BNS) in late 2000, which provides rudimentary
regional navigation coverage. However, an improved four-satellite system to replace
BNS is planned, which again will focus on regional (presumably western Pacific)
coverage."o Finally, China's space-based military communications remains limited,
thus restricting the PLA's command, control and communications system. A new direct
broadcast satellite, the DFH-4, is planned, and could provide "on demand" data
transmission to relatively amalI PLA units on the ground and at sea, thus increasing
battlespace awareness.221 That system may be some way off, however, as its

214 Ibid. The space white paper uses the term. Satellite Oceanic Application Centre. See "China's Space
Activities," Part n.
21S See "Oceanic Satellites to Form a Network: to Monitor Sea," People '8 Daily (online 00.), 7 June 2002.
216 ''Maritime Satellite Haiyang-l Maps Images," People's Daily {online oo.}, 30 May 2002.
217 "Annual Report on the Militaty Power of the People's Republic ofChina." July 2002, p. 45.
21S Stokes, ''China's Military Space and Conventional Theater Missile Development," pp. 113-115.
China's newest model offihn-based recoverable satellite will be the FSW-3, the latest ofa series ofmore
than twelve launched since 1975. The SAR and ELINT capabilties are expected to form the basis for a
gpace-based Chinese ocean surveillance capability.
219 ''China'1I Space Activities," Part m.
220 See WiUiam R. Morris (Lt. CoL, USAF), ''The Role of China's Space Program in Its National
Development Strategy," in David J. Thompson (CoL, USAF) and Morris, China in Space: Civilian and
Military Developments, Maxwell Paper No. 24, Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, August
2001. p. 11; and Stokes, China's Strategic Modernization, pp. 181-182. It is not believed that either
system will be precise enough for missile guidance purposes, although development of a furtherimproved system. perhaps with global coverage, is under way.
221 Ibid., p. 47.
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predecessor, the DFH-3, failed following its launch io 1997, causiog China to lease

commercial satellite receivers for military communications.m
In addition to space-baaed iotelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, the
PLA recognizes the importsnce of being able to dominate the electromagnetic spectrum
io futnre naval warfare and the role of new weapons to counter the enemy's space
assets.223 China is believed to be investigating several options for anti-satellite (ASA1)
weapons, inc\udiog missiles, high-energy lasers, high-powered microwave (HPM)
weapons, jammers and very small "killer" satellites.224 Advanced technologies assnmed
to be under actua\ development ioclude, inter alia: conventional (non-nuclear)

electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons usiog HPM warheads to destroy the radiating
electronics of enemy systems, which may be particularly useful agaiost technologydependent forces;2" and different fonns of ioformation warfilre, such aa computer
hacking, which may be used in conjunction with other unconventional warfare means to

target specific enemy vulnerabilities.226
One of the difficulties io assessiog China's capabilities in advanced military
technologies is the secretive nature of the PLA and the less obvious natnre of the
capabilties themselves which, unlike major platfonns such as ships or even aircraft, can
be more easily concealed. As Michael Pillsbury haa noted, outside observers should not
assume that any great iosights ioto those capacities can mesningfu1ly be gleaned from
Chinese open source material. 227 To the extent that such advanced technologies are

often mentioned by PLA writers io the context of specific circnmstances and agaiost
specific adversacies in' the East Asian maritime theatre, it seems prudeot that those
technologies and capabilities ought not be writteo-off altogether as possible future
contributors to Chinese maritime-strategic power.
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m See Stokes, China's Strategic Modernization, pp. 117-123; and "Annual Report on the Military Power
of the People's Republic ofChlna," July 2002, pp. 32-33.
225 Stokes, "China's Military Space and Conventional Theater Missile Development." p. 123; and
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226 See, for example, "Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China," July
2002, pp. 31-32; Wang Pufeng (Maj. Gen., PLA), ''The Challenge of Information Warfare," in Pill,bury,
ed., Chinese Views of Future Warfare; Shen. Zhang and Zhou, '"The Military Revolution in Naval
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22B For a more sceptical view, however, see Cole and Godwin, "Advanced Military Technology and the
PLA"; and also Bitzinger, "Going Places or Running in Place?"
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Joint Operational Capability
AB mentioned in Chapter 3, the PLA's strategic transfurmation since 1985 has stressed
the need to develop and use elite elements of the anned forces in offensive joint
opetations. Integrated joint operations have been a feature of PLA exercises held along
China's maritime periphery in recent years, with a particular focus on Taiwan
operations.22' A large multi-service exercise held in June 2001 at Dongshan Island,
named "Liberation I," reportedly involved invasion and anti-aircraft carrier scenarios,
and etoployed furces from all arms of the PLA, including: amphibious troops and over

ISO landing craft; the ISth Airborne Army; missile brigades; reconnaissance satellites;
Su-27 fighters and "electronic reconnaissance" aircraft of the PLAAF; and the

Sovremenny-class DDGs and other warships, submarines and intelligence-gathering
ships of the PLA Navy.230 What is not clear, however, is the extent to which those
separate ccmponents were able to exercise jointly, in an integrated fashion, as opposed
to taking part in a series of coordinated, yet separate, single-service manoeuvres. Tbe
intent to be able to operate jointly has become increasingly obvious in recent years,
however, and has been clearly expressed by the PLA's most senior officer, General
Zhang Wannian; Zhang, who has overseen all exercises and deployments in the Taiwan
Strait since 1995, has urged his forces to "pay special attention to and raise
comprehensively the capability ofjoint-force operations.'''3l

CHINA'S MARlTIME-STRATEGIC POWER: ARMING FOR OFFENSIVE
LITTORAL WARFARE

It may seem at first impression thst the backwardness thst pervaded twentieth-century
China's military capabilities will continue to timit its maritime-strategic power long into
the twenty-first century. Tbe types of capabilities and expertise reqnired to
229 See, for example" Susan M. Puska, ''Rough but Ready Force Projection: An Assessment of Recent
PLA Training," in Andrew Scobell and Larry M. wortzel. eds., China's Growing Military Power:
Perspectives on Security, Ballistic Mwiles, and Conventional Capabilties, Strategic Studies Institute,
U.S. Anny War College, CarJi5le, PA, September 2002.
230 See "China Plans 'Liberation' Exercise as Patience with Chen Runs Out," The Sydney MOrning
Herald, 1 June 2001, p. 11; and "PLA 'Liberation I' Exercise ]s to Ensure Sea Supremacy to Counter
U.S. Aircraft Carriers lntervention in the Taiwan Strait Confrontation," World Journal [IJong Kong), 6
June 2001, available at the U.S. National Defense University's China Center web site:
http://www.ndu.eduliDssIChina_CenterlMilitaryNewsClips.htm.AccorWng ... theChinaCenter.1hiBwas
the first time that the term ''liberation'' had been used since the 1950s and 1960s.
:m Quoted in "Generals Beef Up Southern Defence," South China Morning Post (online eel), 2 November
2001.
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operationalize China's strategic doctrine for high-technology local war have yet to be
realized in anything close to complete fonn, although pockets of competeoce (if not
necessarily excellence) are growing: that is, the "doctrine-capability gap" identified by
Paul Godwin atil! exists.232 Nevertheless, those many weakoesses discussed in the
current chapter perhaps need to be kept in perspective, as suggested by David
Finkelstein: ''The [doctrine-capability] gap is atil! there, but Ihe PLA of [today] is a far
cry from Ihe PLA of 1985 at Ihe inception oflhe shift to Local Wars doctrine.'''''

Undoubtedly, Ihe larger part of Ihe PLA is obsolete and has little relevance to
China's maritime strategy or the focus upon Ihe maritime periphery. It is an
exaggeration and oversimplification, h?wever, to suggest that the PLA is ''not very
good, and not getting better very fast.'''34 A more measured approach to assessing the
PLA's maritime strength is required, although analysis is hampered by the opacity of
the subject matter. Even amongst the better assessments, that opacity exacerbates

dissent between those who are, in the main, sceptical of China's strategic
modernization,2J5 and those who have identified specific PLA capability improvements
which increasingly make China • threat to certain neighbouring states.236 And, whilst
the technological deficiencies described throughout this chapter are real, it is important
to remember that technology and raw military power combined are but only one of the
interdependent factors that contribute to strategic effect.'" When considering the
potential strategic effectiveness of China's maritime-strategic power, therefore, we mnst
not lose sight of the wider political and strategic contexts described in earlier chapters,
including China's distinct geographical advantages in East Asia.
What conclusions can be drawn, then, on the overall strategic potential of the
military instnnnents of China's maritime power? There can be little doubt that China
Paul H.B. Godwin, "Compensating for Deficiencies: Doctrinal Evolution in the People's Liberation
Army: 1978-1999," in James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang, eds., Seeking Truth from Facts: A
Retrospective on Chinese Military Studies in the Post-Mao Era, CF-160-CAPP, RAND, Santa Monica,
CA, 2001, pp. 113-118.
233 David M. Finkelstein, "Commentary on Doctrine," in ibid., pp. 125 126.
234 Bates Gill and Micbael O'Hanlon. "China's Hollow Military," The Nationallnterest, No. 56, Summer
1999 (quote from p. 55), is a representative example of the literature highly sceptical of China's military
capabilities. For a rebuttal, see James Lilleyand Carl Ford, "China's Military: A Second Opinion," The
National Interest, No. 57, Fa111999 (but see also Gill and O'Hanlon's reply, "China's Military, Take 3,"
in the same issue).
23S See, for example, Cole and Godwin, "Advanced Military Technology and the PLA"; and Godwin.
"Compensating for Deficiencies."
236 See, for example, Stokes, China's Strategic Modernization; and Pillsbury, ''China's Military Strategy
toward the U.8."
237 See Colin S. Gray, Weapons Don't Make War: Policy, Strategy, and Military Technology, University
Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 1993, Ch. I, esp. p. 23.
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remains, both in tradition and culture, a continental power: there is no convincing

evidence that Beijing is building in the medium term a truly blue water (ocesnic) navy.
Yet it is important not to ignore China's naval ambitions and genuine advances, or to
underestimste the doctrinal and force structure emphasis being given to preparation for
maritime operations in the Chinese littoml, with a particular focus on Taiwan. 238

The primacy of a Taiwan contingency in China's defence planning since the
1995-1996 missile crises has led to a highly focused PLA emphasis upon developing
formidsble sea and area/access denial capabilties, inclnding land-based air and missile
strike capsbilties, which target Taiwan, enemy forces in the East China Sea and Japan.
Snbmarines, mines, air and missile power (of the ASCM, LACM and ballistic types) are
the primary means for the conduct of the operationally and strategically offensive local,
high-technology warfare being planned for in the Chinese littoral: including invasion,
punitive strikes for coercion or deterrence, and blockade. Snch capabilties as command,
control and communications, ISR assets for surveillance and targeting, personnel
quality and training effectiveness, all of which are so difficult to assess, nevertheless are
also being modernized with those types of scenarios in mind. Notably, China's
maritime-strategic developments seem purposeful rather than haphazard, indicating real
strategic intent.
It sbould also be remembered that the expanded reach being pursued by China's
air forces, the development of both air and sea-launched LACMs and the emphasis

being given to air and sea-mobile elite rapid reaction troops, together combine to
improve China's capacity to project power into the South China Sea, despite the delay
to the carrier programme. The modernization of the PLA Navy's surface and submarine

fleets also will inevitably seem more fonnidsble to the smaller states of Southeast Asia
than to larger, more capsble maritime powers.
To reiterate, the apparently focused improvements to China's maritime-strategic
capabilities indicate that the military instruments of China's maritime power must
increasingly be taken seriously throughout the serni-enclosed seas of Northeast Asia and

238 That enor is made by Alfred D. WiIhelm, China and Security in the Asian Pacific Region through
2010, CRM 95-226, Cente<- for Naval AmIlyses, Alexandria, V A. March 1996, pp. 4243; aad Thomas J.
HirschfeJ.d, "Assessing China's Military Potential," East Asia: An International Quarterly, VoL 17, No. 1,
Spring 1999, pp. 99-100. To be fair, Wilhelm was writing before the Taiwan missile crisis and subsequent
PLA emphasis upon Taiwan contingencies. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, although providing a balanced
analysis, comes close to making a similar overstatement: see esp. pp. 178 and 187-189. Cole, whilst
acknowledging that China is not pursuing blue water naval power, perhaps underestimates the impact of
even a regionally capable and expansionist PLA maritime--strategic capacity.
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the northern reaches of the South China Sea, eveu by the U.S. Navy. Those c"l'abilities
over time are also likely to further expaod the PLA's preseuce into maritime Southeast
Asia. China is no longer merely a continental power with a minor coastal adjunct: the
frontline elements of the PLA are developing into a significant force for littoral warfare
throughout Chin.', adjaceut seas.
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6

The Evolution of China's Maritime Strategy

Chapter 3 set out the maritime aspects of China's grand strategy and the role of
maritime power in that strategy, whilst Chapters 4 and 5 assessed the constituent
elements of Chinese maritime power. This chapter explains how Chinese maritime
strategy - the way in which the People's Liberation Army's (PLA's) maritime power is
used to support political aod military objectives - has evolved from the founding of the
People's Repoblic to the twenty-first century. In particular, the first part of the chapter
focuses on the impact of China's 1985 strategic-doc1rinal transformation upon Chinese
maritime strategy aod the central role of General Liu Huaqing in that process. The
second part demonstrates how chaoging strategic priorities, from the Sonth China Sea to
Taiwan, subsequently altered the focus of China's maritime strategy and how

tha~

in

turn, has impacted upon naval roles and development.

THE EVOLUTION OF CHINA'S MARTI1ME STRATEGY

PLA MIl1'itinu Strategy: Frolll Coastal Defence to "Offshore" Defence
Until the mid-1980s transformation of strategic focus from continental threats to
warfare in the maritime periphery, the PLA Navy (PLAN) had functioned simply as a
coastal force adjunct to the PLA's continental defence strategy. That transformation has
required the PLA to reformulate Chinese maritime strategy essentially within a vacuum:
there exists no recent Chinese maritime strategic tradition and only limited extant force

structure and operational capabilities relevant to operating in the contemporary oceanic
envimnment. As Chinese maritime strategy has evolved, Soviet influences have
continued to be importan~ albeit with Chinese characteristics. Chin.'s maritime strategy
has also developed from being a primarily naval strategy to one tha~ at least in theory,
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is joint, involving not only the PLA Navy but also the frontline furces of the other three
services.

During the early period of the People's Republic, when the primary external
threat was perceived to be Taiwan-based Chinese Nationalist forces, PLA Navy strategy
and force structure are generally held to have been modelled on the Soviet "Young
School" of naval strategy. The Young (or New) School rejected the traditional idea that
navies ought to consist primarily of ocean-going capital ships, deeming such forces to
be expensive tools of imperialism. Instead, the Young School promoted naval forces
with a coastal focus, acting essentially as an arm of the ground forces to defend coastal
waters against invasion. The strategy called for small coastal craft, torpedo boats,
coastal submarines and shore-based aircraft, and promoted the kind of irregular tactics
and surprise attacks developed by the Red Anny during the Russian Revolution and
civil war. Not sorprisingly, this strategy suited not only the Chinese Communist
continentalist strategic outlook and the predominant influence of its land forces, but also
the PLA's own preferences for guerrilla tactics against materially superior enemies and
Beijing's limited financial and technological wherewithal.!
Naval strategy maintained its attachment to Young School strategy throughout
the Cultural Revolution; labelled, appropriately, "people's war at Sea."2 It was only with
the identification of a looming Soviet naval threat in the early to mid 1970, that Chinese
maritime strategic t1tinking began to break free of its dual Yonng School and ideological
limitalions. The spectre of overwhelming Soviet sea power, which had heightened
China's perception of vulnerability to attack from the sea, was exemplified in April
-

1975 during the Soviet Navy's "Okean 75" exercise, a global undertaking which
included a regional component in the western Pacific. 3 Ironically, the Soviet sea-based
threat had developed only after the Soviet Navy's Young School strategy had been
replaced under the leadership of Admiral Sergei Gorabkov. Gorshkov had instead
emphasized the Soviet Union's maritime interests, the role of an ocean-going navy in

1 See David G. Muller, China as a Maritime Power, Westview Press, Boulder. CO, 1983, pp. 47-51;
Bernard D. Cote, "China's Maritime Strategy," in Susan M. Puska, ed., People's Liberation Army after
Next, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, August 2000, pp. 286-287; and
also Bemard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China's Navy Enters the Twen.ty-jirst Century, Naval
Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2001, pp. 161~162. Note, however, that John Wilson Lewis and Xue
Litai, China's Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age, Stanford
Universily Press, Stanforo, CA, 1994, pp. 220 and 320, n. 66, maintain that China developed itB COll8ta1
defence doctrine independently, rejecting any direct Soviet influence.
2 Muller, China as a Maritime Power, pp. 115-116.
3 Ibid.,p. 171.
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protecting those interests, the navy's peacetime utility as an instrument of national
policy and its potential contribution to any overall Soviet war effort against U.S.-Ied
NATO furces, as well as its contribution to the Soviet nuclear deterrent. To achieve all
of these missiona, the Soviet Navy under Gorshkov began to develop a "balaoced fleet"
of ocean-going submarines, surface ships and support vessels aod shore-based aircraft,
thus expanding Soviet capabilities and operational doctrine beyond the limitations of
purely coastal defence. 4
In light of the expooding Soviet tbreat Mao himself called fur Chinese naval

power to be enhanced, a cause readily promoted by Deng Xiaoping. Deng's policies
were increasingly attacked by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) radical faction,
however, whose strict (and ideologically-based) continentalist worldview restricted not
only PLA Navy development but even open discussion of naval strategy. It was not
until the death of Mao and the imptisonment of the "Gaog of Four" that Deng was
freely able to assert his will aod begin plaoning for a modern oceoo-going navy, both to
aupport the maritime elements of China's economic reopening aod modernization and to
contribute more fully to the defence of the Chinese state and its wider national interests
at sea. s
The PLA Navy thus was enabled by Deng's reforms to conceptnally abandon
the Young School strategy of coastal defence and people's war at sea,' ood develop a
sea-based component to China's national military strategy within the rubric of people's
war under modern conditions. Deng explicitly proposed in 1979 that China's navy
"should be able to fight in offshore areas.'" Naval strategy remained informed by the
strategic concept of active defence, resulting in the characterization of naval strategy as
"offshore active defence." The refurmulation of naval strategic thinking to reflect the
new national military strategy, aod the wider acceptance of the requirement to build an
ocean-going navy, were nevertheless not operationalized until after the more sigoificaot
strategic revision of 1985. Up until that time, despite the political determination to
transform the navy and its strategy during the early Deng era, the PLA Navy remained,
See S.G. Gorshkov, The Sea Power o/the State, Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1979 (first pub~in Russian]
1976). pp. 274-277; and also Bryan Ran:ft and Geoffrey Till, The Sea in Soviet Strategy, 2 ed., Naval
Institute Press, A:nnapolis, MD, 1989, pp. 78-88.
S Bruce SWlUlSOll, Eighth Voyage of the Dragon: A History of China's Quest for Seapower, Naval
Institute P"",., Annapolis, MD, 1982, pp. 270·273; and Muller, China as a Maritime Power, pp. 168-172.
(iIbid.,pp.172-175.
7 Quoted in Ji Guoxing, ''Missions and Contributions afthe PLA Navy in the Post~Cold War and the EEZ
Era," in Choon Kun Lee, 00.., The Middle Pawer Navies: Roles and MISsions in the Post-Cold War and
the EEZ Era, The Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy, Seoul, 1999, p. 95.
4
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in reality, a coastal defence force.' During this period of transfonnation the figure most
responsible for the development of a genuine Chinese maritime strategy was General
Liu Huaqing, commaoder of the PLA Navy from 1982 to 1987, and thereafter vicechainnao of the powerful Central Military Commission (CMC) until his retirement in
September 1997.'

Liu HlIIlI[ing and the PLA NIWJI's Offshore Active Defence Strategy
Sometimes referred to as China's Mahan, 10 Uu is perhaps more accurately described as
Chins's Gorshkov. In fact, Gorshkov reputedly bad strongly influenced Liu's career.
Although he had been a career anny officer (aod a "Long Marcher'), it has been pointed
out that Liu spent almost 30 years in "navy-related positions." These incloded shorebased naval commands aod attendaoce at Soviet naval academies (the source of the
Gorshkov influence) in the 1950s, vice ministerial posts responsible for shipbuilding
aod at the Commissioo for Scieoce, Technology, and Industry of National Oefense
(COSTIND) for PLA weapon systems development in the 1960s, and a posting as a
depoty chief of naval staff in 1970. He was also an assistant to Oeng Xiaoping (then
PLA chief of the general staff) in this period. Uu was promoted to PLA Navy
commaoder in 1982 aod in November 1987 was elevated to the CMC. He became the
CMC's senior vice chainnao and, in 1992, a member of the Politburo and Politburo
Standing Committee."
The CMC is the CCP's most powerful military body and the latter appointments,
combined with (and as a result of) his close ties to Oeng and his political credentials as
one of the revolutiooary generation, made Uu the most senior and most influential
uniformed PLA officer in China. 12 That influence allowed him to be the driving force
Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang, ''The Chinese Navy's Offshore Active Defense Strategy:
Conceptualization and Implications," Naval War College Review, VaL XLW, No. 3, Summer 1994. pp.
16~17; and Alexander Chieh·cheng Huang. ''Chinese Maritime Modernization and Its Security
Implications: The Deng Xiaoping Era and Beyond," Ph.D. dissertation, George Washington University,

11

1994, pp. 227-229.

Cote, "China's Maritime Strategy," p. 293; and Kenneth W. AlIen, "PLA Navy Building at the Start of a
New Century," Report of the Second Conference on the PLA Navy, Alexandria, VA. 28 29 June 2001,

9

M

The CNA Corpomtion, Alexandria, V A, July 2001, p. 21.
10 See, for ex_le, Jefftey B. Goldman (I.cdr., DSNR), "China', Mahan," D.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, March 1996.
11 Allen, "PLA Navy Building at the Start of a New Century," pp. 3 and 21; and Michael McDevitt
(Radm.., USN, ret),"The PLA Navy: Past, Present, and Future Prospects," Report of the Conference on
the PLA Navy, Washington, D.C., 6-7 April 2000, The CNA Corporation, Alexandria, VA, May 2000,

l'l'.4.5.
Th:is fact presented some difficulties for CCP technocrat, Jiang Zemin. after he succeeded Deng
(including the position of chairman of the CMC), as both till and the second PLA officer on the CMC,
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behind the development both of China's maritime strategy and its national military
strategy for much of the 1980s and 1990s, and was central to the elevation of maritime
fitctors to a leading role amongst China's overall strategic priorities.
Prior to the profunnd strategic and doctrinal changes of 1985, the strategy of
offshore active defence was still based on coastal defence using traditional active
defence-type tactics, inclnding gnerrilla attacks by fast attack craft." As early as 1982,
however, Liu Huaqing had enunciated his concept of "offshore defence": a significant

invasion of China from the sea was becoming increasingly less likely and China's navy
needed to refocns its attention npon other naval roles, such as securing China's interests
at sea beyond the coastal regions." When the Soviet threat was downgraded in 1985,
the PLA Navy was freed from the planning constraints which req1rired defence of the
Chinese coast against large-scale attacks by Soviet forces. As a consequence the PLA
Navy was able to expand its horizons and develop new, more extensive roles. IS Liu thus

heralded in 1987 the impending "transformation of the Chinese navy from a coastal
defense furce into a force capable of limited oceangoing operation[sj."" An expansion
of naval roles and capabilities was also a necessary requirement of the new strategic

fucns on planning for local, limited wars in the maritime periphery.
The roles envisaged for the Chinese navy in the mid to late 1980s included
defence of China's coastal and insular territory, and its related marine resources and
other economic assets at sea, the coercion of Taiwan to force the island's surrender to

the mainland, as well as the traditional (now downgraded) role of defence against largescale invasion and the longstanding; yet elusive, navy requirement to maintain a

snrvivable nuclear retaliatory furce at seal? The operational requirements resulting from
those missions, acconling to one analysis, included the ability to initiate and fight
"major" battles at sea close to China's maritime territories, blockade sea lines of
General zbang Zhen, as part of the revolutionary generation, possessed greater stature and prestige than
himself.liang by the mid 19908 was promoting his own men to consolidate his power and prestige. Those
men, particularly Genemls Chi Haotian and Zbang Wannian, eventually succeeded Lin and Zbang Zben
as the most powerful military men in China and, of course, as part of Jiang's domestic political (and PLA)
support base. See EUis 10ffe, "How Much Does the PLA Make Foreign Policy?" in David 8.G. Goodman
and Gerald Segal, eds., China Rising: Nationalism and Interdependence, Routledge, London, 1997, pp.
58 and 64.
13 Huang, "Chinese Maritime Modernization and Its Security Implications," p. 228.
141un Zhan, "China Goes to the Blue Waters: The Navy, Seapower Mentality and the South CIllna Sea,"
The Journal a/Strategic Studies, Vol. 17. No. 3, September 1994, p. 190.
U Huang, ''Chinese Maritime Modernization and Its Security Implications." p. 228.
16 Quoted inJi, ''Missions and Contributions of the PLA Navy in the Post-Cold War and the EEZ Era," p.

95.

17 Lewis and Xue, China's Strategic Seapower, pp. 226-228.
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communication (SLOes) in those same areas (with an emphasis on Taiwan), secure sea
control within localized parts of China's "offshore waters" and conduct reta1iatory

nuclear strikes. 18
The difficulty with these broad formulations is one of definition or, rather, the
lack of precise definition of what constitutes China's maritime territories and, even
more problematic, China's "offshore waters." Firstly, any requirement for the PLA

Navy to "defend" China's maritime territories is dependent on the territory in question.

If; as

it seems reasonable to assume, these territories include all claimed rather than

actual, recognized territory, the sea area involved is greatly expanded to include
virtually the entire South China Sea as well as the waters surrounding Taiwan and other
islands in the East China Sea. That extent of territorial interests quite clearly would
require a far more capable navy, with the ability to project force over considerable
distances, for example, compared to a more simple requirement to protect China's

mainland coastline, its (undiaputed) offshore islands and its exclusive economic zone
aod continental shelf resources. Initially, at least, it has heeo plausibly suggested that
the offshore defence strategy may have heeo aimed primarily at Vietnam and (possibly)
other Southeast Asiao claimaots to diaputed maritime territories in the South China
Sea. 19

Secondly, what exactly constitutes China's "offshore waters" is even more

obscure, and has heeo the subject of considerable debate in the West since the original
formulation in the 1980s, a debate whicb continues unabated today.20 China has never

declared with any precision the exact area described by the term "offshore," although
Liu Huaqing's concept of the ''two island cbsins" offers a likely explanation. In Liu's

words:
The Chinese Navy should exert effective control of the seas within the first island chain.

''OffShore'' should not be interpreted as "coastal" as we used to know it "Offshore" is a
concept relative to the ''high seas," It means the vast sea waters within the second island
chain,21

You 1i. The AnnedForces ofChina, AlIen and Unwin, St Leonards, NSW, 1999, pp. 168-169.
made by Tai Ming Cheung, Growth of Chinese Naval Power: Priorities, Goals,
Missions, and Regional Implic4tions, Pacific Strategic Paper 1, I:rurtitute of Southeast Asian Studies,
Singapore, 1990. p. 38.
20 See, for example, Allen, ''PLA Navy Building at the Start of a New Century," pp. 3-4.
21 Quoted in Huang, "Chinese Maritime Modernization and Its Security Implications," pp. 229-230
(Huang's emphasis). Huang's analysis remains the standard one. See also Huang, ''The Chinese Navy's
Offshore Active nefense Strategy," pp. 17-18; and Bemani D. Cole, "'Active Offshore Defense' and
18

I~ This claim was
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The "first island chain" is represented by the island groups running from the Kuriles,
through the Japanese home islands, the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan and the Philippine
archipelago, to Borneo and the Natunas. The "second island chain" comprises the island
groups running from the Kuriles through Japao, the Bonins, the Marianas and the
Carolines to the Indonesian archipelago (see Map 6.1 below).
Map 6.1 Cbi",,', Two Island ChAi.. Straregy

Source: Adapted from It Naval War College map reproduced in Cbris Rahman, "Defending Taiwan, and Why It
Matters," Naval War College Review, Vol. LIV, No. 4, Autumn 2001. p. 71.

China', Navy," pope< _ e d for the Second Conference on the PLA Navy. Alexandria. VA. 28·29 June
2001, esp. pp. 17-19 (permission to cite received),
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Alternatively, as postulated by Bernard Cole, "offshore" may be defined in other
ways, perhaps in combioation, such as the limitations both of PLA techoology and the
range of its military ins1rument (especially the air power components), the geographical
extent of China's maritime territorial claims, or even the identity of its potential

opponents in the East Asian maritime theatre.22 Some Chinese sources have also

referred to "offshore" as simply meaning the ocean areas within China's exclusive
economic zone and continental shelf limits allowed under the Law of the Sea
Conveotion (the sea area out to 200 and up to 350 nautical miles, respectively, from the
coastal baseline)," although, because many of Cbioa's maritime territorial and
jurisdictional claims are disputed, even this type of definition can be quite
indetermioate.
By identifYing the waters lying within the first and second island chains as the
. key to the maritime defeoce of China, Chinese maritime strategy seems once more to
have been strongly influenced by the Soviet strategy of a layered defence, organized in
a concentric pattern from the heavily-defended coast, layer by layer, farther out to sea.

In this respect, the Soviet (and in particular, Gorshkov's) influence upon Liu would
seem to be clear: in the words of Michael McDevitt, "Liu is more of an adspter and
popularizer thao an original maritime strategic thinker.""

The Soviet strategy

emphasized defence of its nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs - which formed
the heart of Moscow's second-strike nuclear retaliatory capability), based in operating
havens close to the polar ice cap. The defence of SSBN sanctuaries and the Soviet
homeland thus was to be accomplished by erecting layered defensive perimeters
reaching farther out to sea - beginning with submarines (as well as fast missile craft and
shore-based missile hatteries), then land and sea-based attsok aircraft and, finally,
surface combatants. The strategy probably would have effected significant attrition
upon Western anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft, ships and bases.25 Apart from the
SSBN-protection requiremeot (a probable PLAN mission when it fields a fully
operational SSBN-based nuclear deterrent some time in the future), contemporary
Chinese maritime strategy seems similar to the Soviet!Russian model.

22 Ibid.
23 Huang, "Chinese Maritime Modernization and lIS Security Implications," p. 231.
24 McDevitt, ''The PLA Navy," pp. 4-5. See also Cote, The Great Wall at Sea, p. 167. on the similarities
between the Soviet Union's layered maritime defence zones and Uu's two island chain concept
25 For a detailed analysis, see Ranft and Till, The Sea in Soviet Strategy, Ch. 7, esp. pp. 179 and 193.
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In another similarity to Soviet practice, the United States (and its navy) is also

increasingly becoming the ''basic justification fur [building] a strong navy" in China,
echoing Gorshkov's admonitions about the American sea-based threat during the Cold
War.'" In fact, Gorshkov's own terurioology seems to presage the transfonnation of
China's national military strategy, with its emphasis on local wars in the maritime
periphery. It is pertinent to quote Gorshkov at length, describing the U .S. naval threat:
The idea of the extensive use of naval forces in local wars and conflicts:finds expression
in the creation by the imperialists of the system of stationing the fleet and also the

choice of the areas of its permanent presence in the ocean. Together with deployment of
large nuclear missile strategic groupings of the fleet ... aggressive circles of the leading

imperialist powers are at the same time seeking to keep permanently in strategically
important areas of the globe powerful groupings of the fleet intended for waging local
wars and for provoking conflicts.27

East Asia is still one of the "strategically important areas" for the United States, and the
PLA undoubtedly perceives the forward-deployed U.S. Navy as a fleet which might
indeed wage a local war against China or its (supposedly) vital national interests,
particularly in a Taiwan contingency.
In 1988, then PLAN commander, Zhang Lianzhong, elucidated China's own

version of a layered maritime defence strategy. The inner layer would stretch out to 60
nautical miles and consist of land-based air power, shore-based missiles and fast attack

craft. The uriddle layer would reach out to 150 nautical miles, in most (but not all) cases
not reaching the first island chain. This defensive layer would consist of anti-ship
missil<>-armed air power, major surface combatants and small missile craft. The outer
layer would encompass the entire sea area out to the first island chain, consisting of

medium-range aircraft, submarines, major surface combatants and mine layers.28
Liu Huaqing also used the term "green water" to describe offshore areas." Thus,
the defence of China's green water interests would seem to involve, at a minimum, all
waters and maritime territories within the first island chain adjacent to the Chinese
coast: that is, the Yellow, East China and South China Seas. As with the term
26 Cote.

The "Great Wall at Sea, p. 169.
Gonbkov, 'l1Ie Sea Power 01 the State, p. 236. On the Soviet concept of local wars, see Andrei A.
Kokoshin, Soviet Strategic Thought. 1917-91, BCSIA and MIT Press, Crunbridge, MA, 1998, pp. 124126.
28l.ewis and Xue, China's Strategic Seapuwer, p. 230.
27
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"offshore," however, the concept of "greeo water" seeros also to have been eroployed
rather flexibly, io some cases requiring a PLA Navy sea control capability, somewhat
less credibly, up to and beyond the second island chain, perhaps out to a distance of
1,000 nautical ntiles (or more) from the Chinese coast."

China's Maritime Strategy: Denial for Control?
The above variations on the theme of geographically fixed defensive layers, startiog
from the coast and moviog progressively out to sea, betray not only their Soviet
conceptual origins but also the common contioentalist cnIture shared by both Russian

and Chinese strategists. As Bernard Cole recognizes, it is somewhat ironic for maritime
strategists to think io terms of "fixed geographic boundaries" at all when dea1iog with
the inherently formless, fluid physical properties of the sea.31 That China has
characterized the outermost boundary in terms of the second island chaio further
suggests, in Norman Friedman's words, "a land-oriented mentality that bodes ill for

Chinese naval development.,,32 Nevertheless, even though Chinese maritime strategic
thinking does not seero to fully reflect the mobility advantages afforded by sea power,
the net effect of the PLA Navy's offshore emphasis has been to push China's iotended
"strategic frontier" ever further seaward io order to extend its defensive depth, envelop
disputed territories and improve its ability to project regional influence.

As Chinese maritime strategy and capabilities reach farther out to sea, PLA
strategy becomes iocressing1y familiar to Western maritime strategic thought, reflectiog

a concern. with concepts such as "sea control" and "sea denial," in practice, if not
necessarily io name. Milan Vego has usefully defined sea control as "the ability of one's
own fleet to operate with a high degree of freedom io a sea

or ocean area, but fur

a

lintited period of time." That is: any control is likely to be dyoantic, localized and
temporary in our preaent iodustrial/post-iodustrial era, in which first the sea ntine,
followed by the submarine/torpedo and aircraft, and finally also the guided missile,
have all reached maturation as technologies that threaten any real pretensions to the

establishment of a more traditional "command of the sea" - a degree of domination on
You, The Armed Forces ojChina, pp. 165-167.
Ibid., p. 167. AccorWng to KennethAllen, if sea denial were to be pursued out to the farthest extent of
the second island chain (Palau), the PLAN would need to be able to operate effectively out to a distance
of almost 2,000 nautical miles. AlIen, "PLA Navy Building at the Start of a New Century," p. 4.
29

30

Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, p. 167.
Norman Friedman, Seapower as Strategy: Navies and National Interests, Naval Institute Press,
Annapoli.,MD,2001,p.177.
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the water which would allow almost complete freedom to use the sea for one's own
purposes without being seriously threatened."

As Vego explains, sea control on the open ocean may simply involve an area
surrounding a moving ship or group of ships. However, within such narrow waters as
the semi-enclosed sess of East Asia, the ares to be controlled tends to become ''more or
less geographically fixed" to encompass the entire sea space.

34

This is a complicating

factor for any coastal or maritime power that seeks to control East Asia's narrow seas:

io such restricted and oceanographically challengiog geographical conditions, sea
control tends to be ao ioherently contested objective. Furthermore, sea control is best
viewed not as ao end io itself, bot as a meaos by which to establish the necessary
conditions for exerting political or strategic influence ashore, most notably through
power projection operations."
The complementary strategic concept of "sea denial," as its name suggests,

seeks to deny to ooe's eneroy the free use of the sea, either as an operational end io
itself or as a meaos of winning sea control. Sea denial is often the strategy employed by

a power which is weaker at sea than its enemy, and has been described as "sporadic
warfare at Sea,,,36 and even as "guenilla warfare at sea," whereby offensive hit and run
tactics aod the use of surprise may allow • ''markedly ioferior force [to1 successfully
thwart a superior force.,~7 These types of characterizations closely match those of
Chinese active defence strategies

00

land, makiog sea denial, culturally, an obvious

choice for PLA maritime aIr.tegy.
Nevertheless, the objectives of Chinese maritime strategy mnal reach beyond
merely denying free use of the sea to an eneroy if Beijing is to use its latent maritime
power as an enabliug agent for the prosecution of its wider quest for regional primacy."
For any continental state bordering semi-enclosed seas, such as China, the strategic

J3

Milan N. Vego. Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas. Frank. Cass, London, 1999, pp. lIO-

n I; and see also GeofIi'ey Till, Maritime Strategy and tire Nuclear Age, 2'" eel., Macmi11an, London,
1984, pp. 188-192.
Vego, Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas, p. 111.
3S Till. Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age, p. 192.
36 Vego, Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas. pp. 119-120.
37 Admiral St&nsfield Turner (USN). quoted in Till, Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age, p. 191.
38 The idea ofseapower as a strategic enabler is the theme ofColin S. Gray, The Leverage ofSeaPuwer:
The Strategic Advantage o/Navles in War, The Free Press, New York, 1992. Although Gray is concerned
primarily with the leverage that superior sea power can bestow on traditional maritime powers in conflicts
with continental adversaries, there is no reason why a continental power such as China could not, over
time, develop a quality of sea power sufficient for use as a (grand and military) strategic enabler, at least
34

on a regional scale.
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goals in any conflict with a significant maritime power are likely to require more than

just "sporadic" attacks for sea denial:
The strategic objective for a major power bordering several narrow seas, but weaker at

sea than the coalition of the potential adversaries, is to obtain full control of these seas,
while contesting control of certain areas of the open ocean. 39

It is important to recognize the complementarity of sea control and sea denial. Geoffiey
Till has expressed that relationship in terms of a "sea assertion-denial spectrum,"
whereby maritime command can be viewed as "a matter of degree in time and place."
From the perspective of Soviet strategy, in particular, the

further the fleet operates from the main source of its st:rengt:h. or the weaker it is, the
less ambitious can be its aspirations for sea use and the more lilrely it would be to
content itself with a sea denial strategy rather than sea assertion. 40

Soviet maritime strategy under Gorshkov is believed to have sought, as operational
goals: sea control in the Baltic Sea, Barents Sea, Black Sea, the Sea of Japan and the
Sea of Okhotsk; and sea denial ofNATO forces in other ocean areas, particularly in the
Norwegian Sea, the North Sea and the Sea of Kamchaika. 41 Using this Soviet analogy,
Chinese maritime strategy in any conflict with a major sea power may aspire to the
achievement of sea control in the Bohai Gulf, the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, the
South China Sea and the Gulf of Tonkin; and sea denial in the Sea of Japan, the
Philippine Sea, the other semi-enclosed and marginal seas of Southeast Asia and the
waters of the western Pacific out to the second island chain. Such extensive aspirations,
however, will probably continue to be frustrated by the "doctrine-capability gap" noted
in the previous chapter.
Although we lack a definitive Chinese exposition of the PLA's maritime
strategy, a combination offactors point to a likely explanation, including Liu Huaqing's
admonition that the PLA Navy be able to establish "effective control" of those sea areas
lying within the first island chain and the analogy with Soviet maritime strategy, which
clearly has been influential with Chinese strategists. Informed strategic reasoning also

'9 Vego. Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas, p. 120.
40 Till, Maritime
41

Strategy and the Nuclear Age, p. 192,

Vego, Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas, p. 120.
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plays an important role. Firstly, the geographical nature of narrow seas, as already
noted, req1rires that operations undertaken for sea denial or control therein are likely to
encompass the entire sea area. Secondly, in that extended littoral environment, many
coastal ststes increasingly are attempting to impose localized control to create what
Jeremy Stocker has termed '''coastal citadels' of increasing size and sophistication,"
whereby
a limited capability for sea denial is used to exclude or constrain the presence and

activities of outside forces, in order to permit one's own sea control ... Looking out to.

• ea from 1he land .. they do, rather than the other way round, [coastal] .tate. may well
want to project their limited (largely shore-based) power into that sea to deny it to
others, 80 securing it for themselves. 42

In China's case, despite the "doctrine-capability gap," the PLA's sea denial capabilities

(involving both sea and land-based forces) are nevertheless becoming quite formidable,
particularly within the narrows of the Taiwan Strait and the relatively compact East

China and Yellow Seas. China's ambitious medium-tenn maritime strategy thus may be
characterized as one of sea denial for the purpose of establishing regional sea control

within the first island chain. In order to be able to impose a measure of sea control,
then, China would first have to defeat enemy maritime forces through a strategy of sea

denial. Any sea control thereby won could subsequently be used to advance China's
regional policy objectives and ambitions.
The operationally and tactically offensive nature of a strategy of sea denial,
moreover, is highly congruent with the doctrinal requirements of '1ocal, limited war

under high-tech conditions": to undertake offensive, joint operations, often pr<>emptively, utilizing speed as well as surprise and high technology weapons." The state
of current thinking on modern warfare at sea, more generally, whether concerning
conflicts between major maritime powers or littoral combat between a major mantime
power and a well-armed coastal power, also emphasizes the importance of employing
offensive tactics and operations in battles expected to be dmninated by intense, massed

42

Jeremy Stacker (Lcdr, RNR), "Nonintervention: Limited Operations in the Littoral Environment,"

Naval War College Review, VoL ll, No. 4, Autumn 1998, p. 56.
43 On the operationally and tactically offensive nature of China's maritime strategy. see You, The Armed
Forces of China, pp. 165-166; and Huang, "Chinese Maritime Modernizatioo and Ita Security
Implicatioos," pp. 234-235.
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missile exchanges which are limited in duration." Whereas maritime forces optimized
for sea deoial tend to emphasize weaponry which is inherently offensive in tactical
nature, sea control operations require large ocean.going ships also equipped with
sigoificant defensive capshilities.4S Thus, when one considers the force developments
described in the previous chapter, there coo he little doubt that the PLA Navy has been
optimized for sea denial rather thao sea control operations in recent years.
Whilst sea control ood sea deoial are essentially wartime concepts, China is, in
effect, practising a limited fonn of peacetime sea denial in its attempts both to regulate
the innocent passage rights of foreign warships through its twelve naotical mile

tenitorial sea,46 and 10 restrict foreign military operations in its exclusive economic
zone." Most notably, China's latter efforts have focused upon American intelligencegathering operations (see the following chapters for details of specific incidents).
Coastal state sea denial capabilities also serve an impottant deterrence function. 4'
China's sea denial capabilities seemingly are being designed, for example, to deter an
American military intervention in a Taiwoo conflict.

NATIONAL INTERESTS AND NAVAL DEVELOPMENT

The Developmental Phases of China's Naval Power
The two island chain and other geographical concepts that underpin current Chinese
maritime strategic thought are linked to the idea that the PLA's naval capabilities will
progress in distinct phases of development. It was envisaged during the late 1980s and
early 1990s that the Chinese navy would develop in three distinct stages, represented as
approximate timeframes. 49 In the first stage, China's aim was to be able to assert sea
control thronghout the sea areas within the first island chain by 2000. At a minimum,
the Chinese navy sought to aequire a formidable and reliable sea denial capability and to

«See Wayne P. Hughes (Capt., USN, ret.), Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, 2nd 00., Naval Institute
Press, Annapolis, MO, 2000, esp. Cbs. 6 and 11.
45 Till, Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age, pp. 190-191.
46 See Zou Keyuan, "Innocent Passage for Warships: The Chinese Doctrine and Practice," Ocean
Development and Intemational Law, Vot. 29, No. 3, Ju1y~September 1998.
47 Ji Guoxing, hian Pacific SLoe Security: The China Factor, Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Centre
Worldng Paper No. 10, RAN Sea Power Centre, RAAF Fairbaim, Canberra, Apri12002, pp. 25·30.
48 Stocker. "Nonintervention," p. 56.
49 The detail of these periods differ between sources. This analysis represents a synthesis of those
variations. See You, The Armed Forces a/China. pp. 169-170; Cote, The Great Wall at Sea, pp. 166167; McDevitt, ''The PLA Navy," p. 5; Ion Zhan, "China Goes to the Blue Waters," p. 191; and Cheung,
Growth a/Chinese Naval Power, p. 42.
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develop a reliable sea-based nuclesr deterrent. The force structure emphasis would
remain submarines and land-based aircraft, although construction oflarge missile-anned
surface ships was nevertheless planned to begio during this period.
In the second stage, Chins would attempt to expand sea contrul out to the second

island chain by roughly 2020-2030. The PLA Navy would be expected to become not
only a major player in the western Pacific, but also capable of operating farther afield
when required, especially into the Indian Ocean. This stage would require a navy
capable of sustained blue water operations, using task furces perhaps led by aircrafi

carriers or other large surfilce ships. Such task forces would maintain strong offensive
and defensive capabilities with air, surface and sub-surfilce components. The third and
final stage would, at a minimum, see the PLA Navy become a lesding pan-Pacific
power by the period 2040-2050, and possibly a truly global naval power.
It is clear that China has thus far fallen short of its ambitious goals. A
comprehensive sea contrul capacity within the first island chain remains well beyond
current PLA Navy capabilities. One significant structural geostrategic problem for
Chins's maritime strategy and naval development, and a barrier to its maritime strategic
expansion beyond the first island chain, is that the islands are occupied or contrulled by
states that are either hostile, or potentially hostile, to any Chinese expansion.
Bernard Cole has made the case that China's three stage naval development was
designed to promote offshore roles for the navy ''primarily for domestic consumption, to

win resources for the PLAN ."so Although the argument is quite plausible, Beijing's
grand strategy of increasing Chins's influence and contrul over its periphery to
accomplish the fureign policy goals outlined in Chapter 3, nevertheless demand that
Chins expands its naval and maritime power in a concerted fashion. Chins's grand
strategic requirements for enhanced maritime power and the PLA Navy's domestic selfpromotion are hardly mutnally exclusive phenomena, however. Rather, they are
mutnal\y supporting, and resulted in the rise of Chinese navaJism during the 1980s and
1990•.

Nationalism and the Sea: The Role of the South China Sea and Taiwan
The new offshore roles promoted by the PLA Navy also served a quite reasonable
Chinese interest in exploiting marine resources. In terms of timing, the 1982 Law of the

50

An argument made by Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, p.l68.
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Sea Convention (which, inter alia, set out state rights to marine resources in the
exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf), led to a flurry of diplomatic and
military activity and postoring over the South China Sea during the 1970s and 1980s, as
rival claimants to the Sea's territorial features, especially the Spratlys, asserted their
respective claims in anticipation of new riches to be derived from their (potential) rights
to matine resources.,j The link between the promotion of Chinese navalism and a

growing awareness of (and nationalism over) China's territorial claims and maritime
interests in the South China Sea is, therefore, a strong one.
The capabilities needed to "defend" China's territorial claims in both the East
China and South China Seas, bot particularly in the latter, were primary determinants of
Chinese naval development in the 1980s.52 The interaction between China's South

China Sea claims and the interests of the navy in expanding and modernizing its force
structure was well documented in the early 1990s. John Garver noted, for example, that
the PLA Navy (and Liu Huaqing in particular) strongly promoted the importance of
China's sovereignty claims and economic interests in the South China Sea from the late
1970s onward. 53
The navy's bureaucratic interests thus created new naval missions, which

required a modern force capable of operating over considerable distsnces to prosecute
China's sovereign claims in the area in order to justify increased budget allocations.
Garver has even suggested that continued PLA support of the CCP may in turn have
been dependent upon Party support for the PLA's own institutional interests, including
its ability to conduct operations in the South China Sea. 54 The process most likely was a

circular, or mutually supporting one, with a strong confluence of objectives between the
different parties. The PLA, as an organization, sought to be able to operationalize its
new national military strategy, the PLA Navy sought to modernize and expand its
SI See, for example, Greg Austin, ChituJ's Ocean Frontier: International Law, Military Force, and
National Development, Alien and Unwin, St Leonards, NSW, 1998, pp. 33-34 and Ch. 5, esp. pp. 150~
156.
52 Paul H. B. Godwin, ''Force and Diplomacy: ChiDa Prepares for the Twenty-tirst Cen~." in Samuel S.
Kim. ed., China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium, 4 ed., Westview
Press, Boulder, CO, 1998, p. 179.
53 John W. Garver, "China's Push through the South China Sea: The Interaction of Bureaucratic and
National Interests," The China Quarterly, No. 132, December 1992, pp. 1020-1027. See also Joo Zban,
"China Goes to the Blue Waters"; Cheung, Growth of Chinese Naval Power, Ch. 1; Michael Leifer,
"Chinese Economic Reform and Security Policy: The South China Sea Connection," Survival, Vol. 37,
No. 2, SUlllIIWJ" 1995; and Micbael Studeman (Leut, USN). "Calculating China', Advances in the South
China Sea: Identifying the Triggers of 'Expansionism,'" Naval War College Review, Vol. ll, No. 2,
S»ting 1998, pp. 80-83.
54' Garver, "China's Push through the South China Sea," p. 1026.

197

capabilities and the CCP increasingly sought to use nationalism as a legitimizing tool,

whilst also recognizing the potential national economic benefits of fully exploiting the
marine resources of the South China Sea."
The South China Sea territorial disputes thus played an important role in
Chinese naval modernization. However, as Tai Ming Cheung perceptively noted as
early as 1990: "Although the Spratlys is at present the most important naval priority, it
is nevertheless of short-term importance" compared to the long-term goal of
establishing China "as a major regional sea power with an expanded sphere of
influence."'" Ultithately, more capable maritime forces and a more assertive regional
naval presence will be required to achieve China's foreign policy objectives.
The PLA also recognized the importance of harnessing the momentum of
Chinese nationalism in support of its modernization goals: "It had to appeal to China's
broad economic development and core nationalist issues."" To do so hardly required a
great leap of faith by the PLA Navy, given the prevalence and strength of the nationalist

ideology within the PLA." The following 1994 statement by tiu Huaqing clearly
demonstrates the linkages between Chinese (and PLA) nationaliSm and the development
of Chinese maritime power:
History tells us that whether one has maritime sense and can pay attention to the
building of coastal defense is supremely important to the rise or decline and the honor

or disgrace of a nation.... In modem times, Chinese people suffered from imperialist
invasions.... Through the efforts of several generations, our navy has greatly improved

its military equipment, personnel, and training, but it still does not meet the needs of the
present situation. It should be foreseen that potential local war at sea in the future will

possibly be a higb-tech confrontation. We must keep these lessons of history in mind
and arouse our vigilance with a strong sense of duty. 59

Such _ements reflect a confluence between China's national maritime interests, the
PLA Navy and Chinese navalism, and the growth of Chinese nationalism. To sum up, in
5S Beijing has manipulated its claims to maritime territories to promote Chinese nationalism. See, for
example, Maria Hsia Chang, "Chinese Irredentist Nationalism: The Magician's Last Trick," Comparative
Strategy, VoL 17,No.l,lanuary-Mareh 1998.
56 Cheung, Growth o/Chinese Naval Power, p. 9.
57 Garver. ''China's Push through the South China Sea," p. 1025.
58 See Maria Hsia Chang and Xiaoyu Chen. ''The Nationalist Ideology of the CWnese Military," The
Journal a/Strategic Studies, Vol. 21. No. 1, March 1998.
S!J Liu Huaqing (Gen., PLA), "Defeose Modernization in Historical Perspective," in Michael Pillsbury,
ed., Chinese V'rews a/Future Wm:{are, rev. ed., NDU Press, Washington, D.e., 1998, p. 118.
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the words of You Ji, the Chinese navy ''now funetions as the linkage between the
populous sea power mentality and rising nationalism.,,60
Whilst the South China Sea provided initial impetus for the prmuotion of naval
interests, deteriorating relations across the Taiwan Strait in the 1990s changed Beijing's
strategic priorities, particularly after the missile crises of 1995-1996: there is no issue as
vital to the propagators of Chinese nationalism than the future status of Taiwsn.

,

Planning for operations against Taiwan snd potential Americsn intervention has become
the primary driver of naval modernization and the development of the PLA's maritime
capabilities, more generally. Tbe change in strategic priorities has tangibly affected the
emphasis of both PLA maritime strategy snd. Chinese naval development programmes.

Whereas South China Sea operations required an emphasis upon contesting sea control
and projecting power fur from Chinese territory and the development of general pwpose
warships, long-rsnge Isnd-based air power and even an aircraft carrier capability,
Taiwan operations call for a sea denial strategy using submarines, land-based air power
and a combination of sea, land and air-launched missile power. In particular, Chinese
strategy seeks to use "a combination of missiles and submarines [to] keep the United
States at arm's length while the PLA deals with Taiwan."" From the perspective of
operational doctrine, lsnd-based littoral warfare forces are inherent to the PLA's plans
fur both deterrence and combat across the Taiwan Strait.

Naval Development in the Post-Liu Huaqing Era
One potential drawback for PLA Navy development is its conjectured loss of influence
at the highest political level since the retirement of Lin Huaqing. Bemard Cole has
argued that the current navy commander, Admiral Shi Ynnsheng, is a less senior and
influential figure by comparison, who does not enjoy a "personal relationship" with
Jiang Zemin: even within the navy Shi's influence and leadership may be limited by the
fact that he is a naval aviator by trade, not a sailor, having no shipboard experience'"
Moreover, apart from Shi and the current PLA Air Force commander, all other current
members of the PLA High Command are ground force officers with careers spent
mostly in "regional field commsnds deep in the interior of China," who are ill-equipped
You Ii. "A Blue Water Navy: Does It Matter?" in Goodman and Segal, eds., China Rising, p. 85.
Douglas Porch, ''The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996: Strategic Implications for the United States Navy,"
Naval War Col/ege Review, Vol. UI, No. 3, Summer 1999, pp. 30 and 43 (quotep. 43).
6()
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to fulfil the expectations of current strategy to prepare for, and fight, limited wars along
China's maritime periphery, in joint operations using advanced technology weaponry.63
Yet there are also reasons to suggest that the recent trends of PLA Navy
modernization and China's maritime strategic focus are likely to remain undiminished.
Firstly, as Cole himself allows, Shi has been able to maintain the PLA Navy's relatively
large share of the defence budget, still at a disproportionately high level at roughly onethird of the total." Secondly, according to a leading expert on the PLA leadership, Shi's
career has benefited from close links to General Zhang Wannian, a vice chairman of the
CMC and currently the most powerful military leader in China (and developer of the
local, limited war uuder high-tech conditions strategy). Sbi's other patrons probably
include Liu Huaqing; bis predecessor as naval commander, Zhang Lianzhong; and,
contra Cole's assertion, Jiang Zemin. 6' These links would seem

to imply that China's

navy and its maritime strategic expansion, not to mention Sbi's career advancement,
will continue: possessing the right patrons may well serve to compensate for Shi's

perceived lack of personal prestige and influence.
Admiral Sbi's own background also suggests that the impetus for greater
regional influence through naval development will continue unchecked. As a
practitioner, he has been at the forefiont of Chinese efforts to develop a power
projection capability over the past 15 years. Sbi's responsibilities have included, inter

alia: command of the South Sea Fleet's naval air force, with a focus on extending its
range for power projection purposes; command of the PLA Navy Air Force (and flying
combat missions) during the 1988 conflict with Vietnam over the Spratly Islands;
development of training for aircraft carrier aircrew aod commanding officers in
aoticipation of the establishment of a PLAN carrier capability; development of a shipbased heliborne assault capability; the enhancement of the South Sea Fleet's airlift
62 Bemard D. Cote, ''The Organization of the People's Liberation Anny Navy (PLAN)," paper prepared
for 1he CAPS-RAND Conference on 1he PLA, Airli. Hous., VA, 4-6 August 2000, p. 26 (permissioo to
cite received); and Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, pp. 72-73.
63 David Shambaugh, "The People's Liberation Army and the People's Republic at 50: Reform at Last,"
The China Quarterly, No. 159, September 1999, p. 668. Shambaugh does note, however, that the next
generation of PLA leaders, ''who will manage the PLA in the early 21 st century," are "completely
opposite" to the current generation. outward looking and attuned to the requirements of the PLA's
strategic and doc1rinaI -.formation.
64 Cote, ''The Organization of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)," pp. 47-48. The PLAN's
relative bureaucratic and political influence within the PLA remain8 uncertain. See Alien, ''PLA Navy
Building at 1he Start of. New Ceotury,"pp. 6-7 .
.6' David Shambaugh, ''China's Post-Deng Military Leadership," in James R. Lilley and David
Shambaugh, eels., China's Military Faces the Future, AEI and M.E. Sbarpe, Armonk, NY, 1999, esp. p.
27.
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capacity, presumably fur use across the extended distances of the South China Sea io
support of Chinese bases and territorial claims in the Paraeel and Spratly island groups;
and command of naval forces talring part io the PLA's 1996 exercises io the Taiwan

Strait.66 The increased urgency of the Taiwan situation, moreover, also ensmes a
contioued modernization emphasis upon the coercive iostrwnents of China's maritime
power. More generally, the foreigo policy objectives requiring the expansion of China's
maritime power are unlikely to change.
Thus, with the new national military strategy seemiogly firmly embedded io
place, and with a targeted PLA weapon system procurement programme that
emphasizes maritime capabilities for sea and area denial already under way, the
maritime emphasis of China's security strategy looks set to be a permanent fuature of
the twenty-first centurY Asian strategic landscape. Sioce the early 1980s, China's navy
builders have been required not only to develop a new Chinese maritime strategy, but
also to construct the necessary force structure to implement it Winning the resources to

do so, however, io a country where the national economy remains underdeveluped and
the continentalist tradition strong (especially among the most senior - meaniog elderlypolitical and military elite), has required navy self-promotion, the development of

national "ocean consciousness" and Chinese nationalism-inspired navalism.
Maritime Strategy and Naval Roles
Navies are able to fulfil a wide range of roles in support of national policy and are
ioherently the most flexible of the military services io the ways io which they may be
used. To illustrate the diversity of naval roles, Ken Booth developed his trinitarian
analysis of the functions of navies: unified by the ''underlyiog consideration" of the
national ''use of the sea." navies may be employed io policiog, diplomatic or military
roles'" Admiral Shi Yunsheng has elucidated the PLA Navy's missions thus: ''Contain
66 !bid. [Note _ subsequent to the above analysis, Admiral Shi and his chief political commissar were
forced to resign in order to take responsibility for a submarine accident involving a Ming-class boat in the
Bohai Gulf in late April 2003, in which all 70 crew perished. It is not known how or if that will affect
naval development. See "China Replaces Top Navy Officers over Sub Disaster," The Washington Post
~onlimJ cd.), 13 June 2003.]
The policing role involves "coastguard responsibilities" (covering sovereignty. resources and good
order at sea) and "nation-building" (contnbuting to internal stability and development). The diplomatic
role involves the ability to use navies to negotiate from a position of strength. manipulate international
politics and to enhance prestige. And the military role involves both ''balance of power" (deterrence,
defence, protection of national interests and either upholding or challenging international order at sea) and
force projection functions. Ken Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, Croom. Helm, London, 1977. Ch. l.
Booth's trinity has been :further developed (and improved) by Eric Grove, The Future of Sea Power,
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and resist foreign aggression from the seas, defend China's territory and sovereignty,
and safeguard the motherland's unification and marine rights."" When one considers
China's expansive vision of what constitutes Chinese territory and sovereignty at sea, it
is apparent that to fully enforce those claims (which would entail overturning the
regional geopolitical ststus quo), the Chinese navy is likely to be developed primarily
for specific, war-fighting, rather than coast guard-type roles.

6

'

In fact, much of the policing in China's coastal waters is cartied out by nonnaval paramilitary agencies, although the PLA Navy haa a greater role in aaserting
China's claimed jnrisdiction in disputed ar..., especially in the Spratly archipelago (see
Chapter 7). As China constructs more surface combatants with greater range and
sustainability, the PLA Navy will continue to increaae its presence in Eaat Asian seas
and possibly also the Indian Ocean, a process which is sptly demonstrated by a growing
prognmune of port visits and the navy's first global circumnavigation in 2002.70
Although China would be loathe to admit it, given its own historical experiences and its
opposition to perceived foreign naval encroachments, the PLA Navy is also increaaingly
likely to employ coercive naval (or "gnoboat'') diplomacy in the waters around Taiwan,

the Spratlys and the South China Sea, the Senkakus and the Eaat China Sea and Japan."
There is no evidence that China views SLOC secutity aa a priority role for the
PLA Navy: naval furce structure development haa focused more on capabilities to
interdict or blockade shipping in the Chinese littoral than on the long-range escort
vessels and maritime patrol aircraft needed to defend shipping over great distances. Like
other Northeast Asian states, China haa thus far been prepared to "free ride" on the
implicit American protection of shipping and sea lanes connecting the Persian Gulf and
Naval Institute Press, Anaapolis, MD, 1990, pp. 232-234; and in Royal Australian Navy, RAN Doctrine

1, Australian Maritime Doctrine, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2000, Ch. 7. Also relevant is
Geofftey Till, ''Maritime Strategy and the Twenty-first Century," in Geofftey Till, ed., Seapawer, Theory
and Practice, Fnmk c..~ Newbury Parl<, I1ford, Essex, 1994, esp. Figure 1 (''The Spectrum of Naval
Tasks"), p. 180.
68 Quoted in David M. Finkelstein, ''China's National Military Strategy," in James C. Mulvenon and
Richard H. Yang, eds., The Poop/e's Liberation Army in the Information Age, CF-145-CAPP/AF, RAND,
S_Monica, CA, 1999,p.1I8,n. 42.
69 There has been a general tendency for Asian navies to concentrate force structure development in

recent years upon the war fighting role, whilst separate coast guards are being developed for sovereignty
protection and offshore policing. See Sam Bateman, "Dangerous Waters Ahead," JaneJs Defence Weekly,
28 March 2001, esp. p. 26. China maintains separate paramilitary offshore policing agencies, noted in the

lirevious chapter.
See "Chin<:se Naval Ship Formation', First Global Navigation," People's Dally (onlinc ed.l, 28
September 2002.
71 On. gunboat diplomacy, see Malcolm H. Murfett, ''Gunboat Diplomacy: Outmoded or Back in Vogue?"
in Aodrew Donnan, Mike Lawrence Smith and Matthew R. Uttley, eds., The Changing Face ofMaritime

Power, Macmillae, London, 1999, esp. pp. 87-88.
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Northeast Asia. 72 And, as argued in other chapters, China's response to its growing
vulnerability to clisruption of seaborne oil supplies from the Middle East has been to
develop alternative sources of sopply rather than the naval forces needed to secure its

vital sea lanes.
The PLA's current emphasis on the Taiwan issue and its consequent maritime
strategy of sea (and access) denial (and deterrence) have resulted, therefore, in the
development of focused littoral war-fightiog capabilities based around tactically and
operationally offeosive aoti-ship cruise missiles, submarines, land-based air power aod
ballistic missiles. The near-term demand for specialist sea denial assets has restricted
the development of general purpose warships and an aircraft carrier capability amongst the most flexible of platfonns. The constraints of the sea denial _ g y on
naval development are reflected by uonamed "Chinese experts on military strategy,"
who defend the deferment of the carrier programme on the basis of ''the nation's navy
strstegies and its strategic military demand": 73 that is, carriers are not a priority for sea
denial and Taiwan operations. The PLA Navy's new class of air warfure destroyers are
also likely to be employed in support of the denial strategy, although the ships may be
capable of independent actions farther afield.
The PLA Navy's potentially independent role in support of China's regional
foreigo policy objectives has, to some degree, been limited by its suborclination to the
demands of the Northeast Asia-focused littoral denial strategy. Nevartheless, the PLA's
curreot naval and other maritime-focused modernization efforts pose a more potent and
shorter-tenD challenge to the traditional maritime powers in Asia than would a more
balanced naval development programme in service of a wider range of naval roles. The
natore of China's maritime strategy and evolving maritime forces thus seem to be
acceleratiog Beijing's quest for regional primacy by threatening the forces of the United
States and its allies should they interfere with Cbiaese ambitions.

See Ji, Asian Pacific SLoe Security, p. 36; Evan A Feigenbaum. "China's Militruy Posture and the
New Economic Geopolitics," Survival, VoL 41, No. 2, Swnmer 1999, pp. 81-83; and Cote, The Great
Wall at Sea, p. 18l.
73 See ''Why China Chooses Not to Build Aircraft Carrier?" People's Daily (online ed.), 6 December

12

2002.
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7

China's Strategic Agenda in Southeast Asia

The previous chapters of this dissertation have set out both the theoretical and
geopolitical contexts for the expansion of Chinese maritime power and the policies and
strategies that require the development of maritime power; evaluated China's
comprehensive maritime power; and identified China's maritime strategy. The
following chapters document China's external behaviour and the responses of other

atates to that behaviour, with particular emphasis plaeed upon Beijing's activities
throughout maritime East Asia and those aspects of China's international behaviour
which are closely linked to the maritime elements of Beijing's grand strategy and the

demand for maritime power.
This chapter demonstrates how China iB pursoing the three foreigo policy goals
identified in Chapter 3, in Southeast Asia: territorial integrity and sovereigo rights,
economic development and regional political leadership. It also assesses how successful
China has been thus far in secoriog its longer-term maritime strategic interests in
Southeast Asia. The following sections aoalyse China's role in the South China Sea
disputes, and China's growing political, economic and military relationships with
Southeast Asia. China's expanding maritime activities in Southeast Asia are not limited

to the South China Sea, however, with the Andaman Sea and Bay of Bengal also
important areas of concern. The analysiB places China's maritime activities along
peninsular Southeast Asia's western littoral within a context of Beijing's strategic
interest in Indian Ocean sea lines of communication (SWCs) and its competitive
relationship with India. Finally, by geographical extension, China's relevant activities in

the South Pacific are briefly exaroined.
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CHINA AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

China's interests in the South China Sea have beeo dominated by the political concern
to defend its territorial claims and a longstsnding strategic concern with frontier
defence, although economic resources and strategic oil-carrying sea lanes have added to
the area's importancel Although the South China Sea territorial disputes involve a
number of parties, the central role of China must be aclrnowledged. In strategic and
geopolitical terms, the disputes would have little relevance abseot Beijing's
involvement. When, for example, Southeast Asian claimants occasionally clash in
isolated, lintited incidents in the Spratlys,2 the wider regional strategic situation is
hardly endaogered. On the other hand, there is a wholly different qnality to China's
participation in the disputes. Becaose China is • rising major power with extensive
revisionist geopolitical ambitions, its expansion into the South China Sea aod its
military activities in the Spratlys are inherently more troublesome to the region as a
whole: consequently, China's actions have truly important strategic implications.
The centrality of China's role as a claimant state, and the linkages between its
interests in the South China Sea and the development of Chinese matitime power, thus
make the disputes important beyond the limited face value of • few small, scattered
islands, rocks and reefs. It is difficult to improve upon Marwyn Samuels' identifieation,
over 20 years ago, of those underlying factors, when he ststed that "the assertion of a
new Chinese ocean policy aod presence is perhaps the most profound dimension of the
contest for the South China Sea." Samuels argued that that contest

reveals much about one critical factor - the re-emergence of China as a "great power

participanf' in regional and world affairs .... This, in turn, has affected and is effected by
the contest for what, in Chinese terms, is China's '<vital and strategic" southern

maritime frontier .... China's role in the dispute is profoundly linked to wider domestic
and foreign policy goals, the most immediately relevant of which is the assertion of a
new and vigorous Chinese presence at sea. 3

1 For a Chinese perspective on these factors, see 1i Guoxing, ''China versus South China Sea Security,"
Security Dialogue, VaL 29, No. 1, March 1998.
2 For example, Vietnamese forces occupying Tennent Reef in the Spratly Islands fired on a Philippine
military aircraft which was attempting to observe a Vietnamese military installation in October 1999. See
''Calming the Sea of Troubles," The &o1'lomist, 6 November 1999, p. 32.
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Based on the analysis in previous chapters of this dissertation, that early 1980s
observation leads to two preliminary conclusions, when considered from our early
twenty-first century perspective. Firstly, the fact that we are still arguing over China's
strategic re-emergence and its prospects of becoming a major sea power 20 years on,
reflects the fact that the process of China's maritime strategic modernization and
expansion has been relatively slow. But, secondly, that process has been inexorable, aod
has created real improvements in Chinese maritime power, both commercial aod
military.

Chinll's South Chinll Sea Qaims
Geography and Claims
The South China Sea is a large semi-enclosed space linking southern China aod Taiwao
to peninsular and arehipelagic Southeast Asia, and peninsular and continental Southeast
Asia to arehipelagic Southeast Asia. It also constitotes a vital section of the seaborne
trade route linking both Europe and the Middle East to Northeast Asia; Southeast Asia
to Northeast Asia; aod much of Southeast Asia to the Pacific Ocean and North
America. 4 There are four island groups claimed by China in the South China Sea: the
Paracel (Xisha) group, the Spratly (Nansha) group, the Pratas (Dongsha) group aod
Macclesfield Bank (the Zhongsha group).' The various territorial claims over the
islands and other features of the South China Sea also provide a basis for the region's
coastal states to mai<e claims on the Sea's hydrocarbon and fisheries resources.'
The four island groups sit astride the major South China Sea SWCs. Although
the Spratly group itself is avoided by shipping, bases in the islands conceivably could be
used to disrupt shipping (as was the case in World War II when Japan based submarines
in the Spratlys for that purpose). Northeast Asia-bound shipping mostly sails west of the
Spratlys, passing between the Paracels and Scarborough Shoal and close to the Pratas
Islands to the north, proceeding either through the Taiwao Strait or the Bashi Channel
(between Taiwan and Luzon).
3 Marwyn

S. Samuels, Contest/or the South China Sea, Methuen. New York. 1982, pp. 5-6.

See John H. Noer with David Gregory, Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia,
NDUPress, Washington, D.e., 1996, Figures 17·20, pp. 63-66.
S See "Law of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone," 25
February 1992, Article 2, in Office of Policy, Law and Regulation, State Oceanic Administration,
4

Collection

of the Sea Laws and Regulations of the People's Republic of China, State

Oceanic

Administration, Beijing, 1998, p. 186.
6 A basic principle of international law is that sovereignty over Oand) territory entitles a state to claim
appropriate maritime zones and certain rights over the marine resources in those zones.
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The Paracel group is situated roughly 278 km south of Raman, 1,334 km
southwest of Taiwan and 445 km east ofVie1l1an1 (see Map 7.1).' Taiwan and Vie1l1an1
also claim the Paraeels, although the group is curreutly occupied by China. (It should be
noted that the People's Republic of China inherited the Republic of China's South
China Sea claims: the two states in fact make the same claim.')
The Spratly archipelago covers a widespread area, stretching over a distance of
1,000 km north to sonth. The Spratly group of well over lOO sma11 islands, reefs, shoals
and sandbanks lies in the southeastern part of the Sonth China Sea, approximately 160

km west of Sarawak, eastern Malaysia, 100 km west of the Philippines (palawan
Island), 750 km south of the Paracels and 650 km east ofVie1l1an1 (see map).' China,
Taiwan and Vie1l1an1 each claim the entire Spratly gronp, whilst the Philippines claims
most of the festures, except those in the far southwestern part of the Spratlys, and
Malaysia claims only some features in the sonthern part of the gronp closest to eastern
Malaysia. 10 Cnrrently, Vietnam occupies around 25 festures (including Spratly Island),
the Philippines eight (including Thitu Island), Malaysia three and Taiwan one (Itu Aba
Island)." China is thought to occupy at least eight features: Subi, Gaven, Johnson,
Chigua/Keunan, Fiery Cross, Cuarteron, North Danger and MischiefReefs. 12

7 The Paracels are made up of two sub~groups: the Amphitrite group (consisting of seven small islands
and numerous rocks, shoals and sandbanks); and the Crescent group (consisting of eight islands and
several reefs and sandbanks). The most important feature is Woody Island, the largest island in the
Amphitrite group, but which is still only 2 km long and 1.1 km wide. The physical descriptions used here
are 80urced from the gazetteer in Samueis, Contest/or the South China Sea, pp. 183-187.
8 See Greg Austin, China's Ocean Frontier: International Law, Military Force and National
Development, Alien and Unwin, St Leonards, NSW, 1998, p. 44. It can only be a matter for speculation
whether, or how much. the claims of Taiwan and China will diverge in the future, now that the Taiwanese

government no longer maintains pretensiODB to sovereignty over mainland China. For analysis, see YWlllHuei Song, "One China, but Two Sets of Maritime Legislation: Developments, Implications, and
Challenges for the United States" in Harry N. Scheiber, ed., The Law of the Sea: The Common Heritage
and Emerging Challenges, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2000; Cheng-yi Un. "Taiwan's South
China Sea Policy," Asian Survey, Vol. xxxvn, No. 4, April 1997; and Mark J. Valencia, China and the
South China Sea Disputes, Adelphi Paper 298, Oxford University Press for the IISS, London. 1995, pp.
39-42.

.

most important tenitorial features of the Spratly group all lie in the western part of the archipelago,
including Itu Aba (Taiping) Island (which is just 1 km long, 400 metres wide and lies within the Tizard
Banks and Reefs complex), Spratly Island (750 metres long and 400 metres wide), and Thitu Island (1.5
km long and 1 km wide). Samuets, Contest for the South China S~, pp. 188-194.
10 For details see Austin., China's Ocean Frontier, pp. 206-220; and Bradford L. Thomas and Daniel J.
Dzurek, "The Spratly Islands Dispute," Geopolitics and International Boundaries, Vol. 1, No. 3, Winter
1996, pp. 304-306. Although it is often stated that Brunei claims one feature, Louisa Reef, there does not
seem to have been any formal claim made.
II Clive Schofield, "A Code of Conduct for the South China Sea?" Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 12,
No. 11, November 2000, p. 37.
12 Austin, China's Ocean Frontier, pp. 132 and 380-381.
9 The
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Map 7.1 China'. South Cblaa Sea Claim

1------' CHINA

The Pratas group lies 315 km southeast of Hong Kong, 445 km southwest of
Taiwan, and 500 km nor1h of the Paraeels. The group consists of Pratas Island and two

small banks." Only China and Taiwan claim the Pratas group, which is occupied by
Taiwan.
The least important of the territorial groupings is Macc1esfield Bank, a
submerged atoll approximately 100 km east of the Paracels. China includes two
otherwise unconnected shoals as part of Macclesfield Bank: Scarborough Shoal

(includitig a rock that is not submerged), some 300 km east of Macclesfield Bank and
200 km west of the Philippines; and Truro Shoal, 166 km nor1hwest of Scarborough

13

Samuels, Contest/or the South China Sea, p. 183.
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Shoal.

I4

The Macclesfield Bank group is claimed by China and Taiwan, whilst the

Philippines also claims Scarborough Sboal

In addition to China's claim over all territorial features of the four island groups,
there remaios some confusion over the meaning of a 1947 map associated with the
original Republic of China claim, and endorsed by Cnmmunist China, which shows a ushaped dashed line seemingly claiming most of the water space of the South China Sea
as Chinese maritime territory (see map). The map supposedly demonstrated China's
historic right to the territorial features of the South China Sea and the Sea's resources. 15
One Chinese academic, now Director of the China Institute for Marine Affairs at the
State Oceanic Administration, argues that "China never has claimed the entire water
column of the South China Sea, but only the islands and their snrrounding waters within
the line.',I6 It is not clear, however, wbether China's political or military leadership
necessarily shares the views ofits law oftbe sea eaperts. Moreover, by claiming straight
baselines around the Paracel Islands (the lines from which the 12 nautical mile
territorial sea and other zones of national maritime jurisdiction are measured), Beijing is
setting a precedent for claiming similar baselines around the Sprstly Islands, which it
evidently intends doing in the future, according to at least one analysis.'? Because the
features of the Spratly group are spread over a total area of approximately 240,000

km2,18 by enclosing the archipelago within straight baselines and claiming a 12 nautical
mile territorial sea beyond those baselines, China may be able to claim a considersble
part of the waters within the u-sbaped line, if not the entire area, as its territorial sea.

14 Ibid.,

pp. 1'87-188.

The Republic of China map may date back to the mid 19308 and may have been the work of academics
or low level officials with no official government endorsement. See Austin, China's Ocean Frontier, pp.
14-15, n. 6, and 207-210. rftreated as an ''historic waters" claim. China would theoretically be able to
enclose the entire area as Chinese territory.
16 Zhiguo Gaa, "The South China Sea: From Conflict to Cooperation?" Ocean Development and
InternationalLaw, Vol. 25, No. 3, July 1994, p. 346.
17 Austin, China's Ocean Frontier, pp. 180-184. China's straight baseline claims for the ParaceIs would
seem to exceed that which is allowable under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
China published its baseline claim for the Paracels in 1996, leaving its baseline claims for the other South
China Sea island groups to be announced at a later date (presumably when it is able to resolve the
disputes by occupying or controlling all of the claimed territoIy). China's 1958 territorial sea declaration
makes it all the more likely that Beijing will attempt to draw straight baselines around the Spratlys, as it
claimed stmight baselines for all the claimed South China Sea island groups, as well as for Taiwan. See,
respectively. "Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Baselines of the
Territorial Sea of the People's Republic of China," 15 May 1996, and ''Declaration of the Government of
the People's Republic of China on China's Territorial Sea," 4 September 1958, both in Collection of the
Sea Laws and Regulations ofthe People's Republic of China.
18 'The figure is quoted in Schofie1d, "A Code of Conduct for the South China Sea?" p. 36.
15
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Further, assuming that China will claim straight baselines for lbe Spratiys, lbe

Pratas group and Macclesfield Bank, and were Beijing to also claim a 200 nautical mile
exclusive eoonomic zone (also measured to seaward from lbe territorial sea baselines),
lbe sea area claimed to be under its jmisdiction would be greater still. Such an area
would encompass virtually lbe entire area within lbe u-shaped line. Wbilst it remains
highly debatable under intemationa1law whether tiny islands such as lbose of lbe Soulb
China Sea could be eligible for lbeir own exclusive eoonomic zones,19 it must be stated
clearly that lbe South China Sea territorial disputes are primarily political, not legal, in

nature. What is importaot to this analysis are lbe contentions and claims of China; and
lbe Chinese position seems to be that at least some of lbe Soulb Cbina Sea islands,
including some within lbe Spratiy group, are eligible for exclusive economic zones.'"
China's 1998 exclusive economic zone law is not particularly enlightening, as it
does not specify lbe areas claimed by China as its exclusive economic zone. What may
be of relevance, however, are lbe law's references to China's "exclusive right to
construct and to aulborize and regulate lbe construction, operation and us. of artificial
islands, installations and structures in its exclusive eoonomic zone and on its continental

shelf," and to China's "exclusive jurisdiction" over such artificial islands, installations
and structures.21 The references may well be to China's installations in lbe SpratIy
Islands, all of which have been built on reefii that are normally submerged at high tide. 22
I!J Ian Townsend-Gault, ''Preventive Diplomacy and Pro-activity in the South China Sea," Contemporary
Southeast hia, VaL 20, No. 2, August 1998, pp. 177-180, for example, provides a sceptical view of the
possible exclusive economic zone entitlements of Spratly features (rocks that cannot sustain human life
on their own are not entitled to an exclusive economic zone), He also notes that many of the territorial
features of the South China Sea are not technically islands, and thus not even entitled to a 12 nautical mile
territorial sea.
20 A number of Chinese law of the sea experts interviewed in Shanghai and Beijing, July 2000, some with
official CODDeCtions to either the State Oceanic A.dministrati0ll or the Ministry of Agricu1tme, were
uniformly adamant that some of the Spratly islands could have exclusive economic zones. Interestingly,
Taiwanese academics interviewed in Taipei, August 2000, took the opposite view. For the perspective of
one unofficial Chinese analyst, see Ji Guoxing, "Maritime Jurisdiction in the Three China Seas: Options
for Equitable Settlement," in Dalchoong Kiln et al., eds.• UN Convention on the Law a/the Sea and East
Asia, Seoul Press for the Institute of East and West Studies, Yonsei University, Seoul, 1996, pp. 116-117.
21 ''Law of the People's Republic of China on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf:"
26 June 1998, Article 8, in Office of Policy. Law and Regulation, State Oceanic Administration,
Collection a/the Sea Laws and Regulations o/the People's Republic o/China, 3111 ed., State Oceanic
Administration, Beijing, 2001, p. 213.
22 Moreover, the law continues to state that China has ''the right to establish safety zones" around such
artificial islands, installations and structures, which may be a recognition that artificial structures built on
normally submerged natural features are not entitled to the USWll maritime zones of jurisdiction. This
interpretation is explained in Townsend-Gault, ''Preventive Diplomacy and Pro-activity in the South
China Sea," p. 178. Legally, however, maritime safety zones may only be applied around offshore oil and
gas installations. China, therefore, seems to have no legitimate grounds upon which to apply the concept
to military outposts on disputed reefs. This point was made by Martin Tsamenyl. in a pmonal
conversation with the author.
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If the law is referring to (or including) China's Spratly claim, then it would seem likely
that Beijing is, at the very lesst, claiming exclusive economic zones for the island (as
opposed to the non-island) featores in the Spratlys.
It is probable that political and strategic considerations will trump international
law of the sea practice, when necessery. That certainly seems to be the case with
China's strsight baselines claim in the Psracels, which may have been driven by the
Chinese navy and the navy's strategic interests.23 It also is possible that "safety zones"
established around Chinese installations in the Spratlys may amount to military

exclusion zones of a size of China's own choosing. One further clue to the extensive
natore of China's South China Sea claims is provided by a recent report in the People's
Daily, which stated that "both Indonesia and Vietnam are forcibly exploiting oil and

natoral gss in the territorial sea belonging to China.'024 That the report explicitly
mentions Indonesia may be significant. China's u-shaped line passes close to
Indonesia's Natuna Islands at its southern extremity, and it is believed that China has
informed Indonesia that, while it does not claim the island itself, the two states would
still need to demarcate a common maritime boundary.25 It would thus seem that China is

either still using the u-shaped line as the basis for its maritime claims, or making the
most extensive claims possible for maritime jurisdiction based on its claims to the
Spratly Islands. Such jnrisdiction would seem to include claims to exclnsive economic
zones se extensive as to be virtnally commensurate with the u-shaped line.

Historical Background to the Claims

China's territorial claims in the South China Sea are based on a contention that it has
historic rights over the tesOurces of the Sea, and that the Sea's islsnd groups have been

Chinese territory since ancient times. To say the least, that is a somewhat imaginative
claim. The Western concept of severeignty itself was a fureign notion to Confucian
China., whose imperial order was bssed upon a hierarchical system of human
relationships, not territorial space: "The very idea of uninhabited places, natural
landscspes sans man, or empty space wss anathema to the Confucian geopolitical
23 This claim was made in an interview with law of the sea experts at Shanghai Fisheries University, July
2000. Although some Chinese experts interviewed in Shanghai and Beijing, July 2000, admitted that
China's straight baseline claim for the ParaceIs exceeded the allowable limits of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, all were unanimous that Beijing would not change its position. Some
Wrectlyattributed China's position to the influence of the PIA
24 "China's Oil Security Faces Tests of War," People's Daily (online eel.), 20 October 2002.
2S See Austin, China's Ocean Frontier, p. 219.
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framework.',26 Although the territorial features of the South China Sea were known and
used by Chinese fishermen (and those of other coastal states), and many of the islands

and reefs were noted on Chinese charts as navigation hazards, there is no record of any
occupation or formal possession of any of the islands until the nineteenth century. The
Vietnamese kingdom of Annam (theoretically a tributary state of China) formally
annexed the Paracels in 1816, and was itself incorporated into the French Empire in the
1870s. Chinese opposition to French imperial expansion on its southern frontier led to
the Sino-French War of 1884-85, including the destruction of the Qing Dynasty's
southern fleet at Fuzhou in 1884. China demonstrated little attention to the. islands
before that periud, and any renewed interest it had shown in the South China Sea seems
to have been limited to the defence of its southern tributary empire.27
China's first official claim to sovereignty over the islands of the South China
Sea was made in 1887, and it ostensibly incorporated the Paraeels into Guaugdong
Province fur administrative purposes. French claims to the Parace1s during the 1930s,
culminating in a declaration of ownership and occupation in 1938, as well as occupation
of some of the islands of the Spratly group, were short-lived before Imperial Japan
nccupied the Pratas, Paracel and Spratly Islands during World War IT." Todsy's
disputes in many ways result from the ambignous nature of the 1951 San Francisco
Peace Treaty, whereby Japan renounced any claims to the islands of the South China
Sea but no successor owner-state was named. The Republic of China claimed all four
island groups in 1947, incorporating them formally into Guangdong Province.
Communist China staked its own claim following its vietory in the Chinese Civil War
(reiterated in its 1958 territorial sea declaration, its 1992 territorial sea law and in many
other protests and pronouncements), whilst Vietnam also claimed the Paracel and
Spratly Islands, each country's claim based on ''historic'' rights. The Republic of China
occupied Itn Aba Island in the Spratlys and Pratas Island, whilst in the Paraeels China
occupied the Amphitrite group and Vietnam the Crescent group. In 1971, the
Philippines announced a formal claim to 53 of the features of the Spratlys based on an
earlier private claim made by a Filipino businessman, deploying truops to occupy some
features, including Thitn Island. The predictsble protests from China, Taiwan (Republic
Samuels, Contest/or the South China Sea, p. SI.
On the Sino-French War of 1884-85, see Bruce A. Elleman, Modern Chinese Waifare, 1795-1989,
RDutledge, London, 2001, Ch. 6; cad Richard NJ. Wrigbt, The Chinese Steam Navy, 1862-1945,
Chatham Publishing, London, 2000, Ch. 6.
23 Samue1s, Conlestfor the South China Sea, Ch. 4.
26
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of China) and (South) Vietnam ensued, and led S!rlgon to occupy several features in
1973, including Spratly Island itself."
Malaysia's Spratlys claim first appeared in 1979 based on the features lying
within its claimed maritime zooes of jurisdiction, ood it begao to occupy some of those
fealores during the 1980s." Both the MaJaysian aod Philippine claims, to a coosidersble
extent, were influeoced by the evolving law of the sea ood, in particular, the jurisdiction

over marine resources allowed for under the regime of the exclusive economic zone.
Contemporaoeoualy, the oil shocks of the 1970s had elevated the desire by all states to
develop independent sources of oil, either to reduce dependence upon iroported sopplies
or to cash in on high world prices. High oil prices also made it increasingly viable to
explore and exploit at least some of the oilfields of the South China Sea, many of which
had not previously been considered economicalIy worthwhile. The poteotial
hydrocarbon wealth of the South China Se. thus became a ''principal factor" for mooy
of the cl!rlmoots during the 1970s.31
Grog Austin's unconvincing legalistic analysis argoes that China has "superior
rights" in the Paracels and at least "equal rights" in the Spratlys.32 That cootention may
be questionsble even from a legal perspective, but looking through a strategic lens,

China's "superior rights" in the Paracels are now irrelevant. China occupies the entire
archipelago and, as the ascendant regioual power, will not be budged. With respect to
the Spratlys, perhaps it would be more accurate to state that China's claims are at least

as dubious as those of the other claimant nations. In the words of one legal expert,
no State has a pre-eminent claim to sovereignty over the Spratly Islands. If anything,

this demonstrates the limitations of relying on international law to resolve the dispute ...

Ibid., Ch. 5.
Austin. China's Ocean Frontier, pp. 154-156. Malaysia's claim thus attempts to reverse accepted
principles of intemationallaw by claiming that maritime jurisdiction can be used as a basis for claiming
sovereignty over maritime territorial features.
11 See Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, Appendix A (quote from p. 154). See also SeIig S.
HarriSOD, China, Oil, and Asia: Conflict Ahead?, Columbia University Press, New York, 1977, esp. Ch.
8.
32 Austin, China's Ocean Frontier, esp. Chs. 4-5 and pp. 327-338. Austin's argument rests on a
questionable assumption that Taiwan's occupation ofItu Aba since 1956 (as the Republic of China) can
be treated as It. (mainland) Chinese occupation based on the rhetoric of "one China" (pp. 7-8, 29-32 and
328). Although Taipei officially maintains the original Republic of China claim, quite clearly its
occupation of Itu Aba is now a Taiwanese, not Chinese, one. For a Chinese perspective see Lin Jinzbi,
Arguments Showing Foreign Recognition of Chinese Sovereignty over the Paracels and Spratlys, Centre
for Asian Pacific Studies, Lingnan College, Hong Kong, February 1993.
29
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and whatever resolution might be possible, it is probable that it will be a political mther
than legal solution. 33

AB argued by Robyn Lim: ''The Spratlys are a strategic issue with a legal face."" The
situation is, in effuct, being "solved" by the very act of occupation. Mark Valencia sets
out the argument thus:

All the claimants, including China, now realise that their claims to features are weak

under modern international law and that sovereignty is likely to be awarded to those
who can demonstrate the longest continuous effective control, occupation and

administration of particular islands. Thus we can expect more occupations, as well as
other unilateral actions. 3~

China's "solution" since the early 1970s, as discussed in a later section, has been to

expand its military presence in the Paracels aod into the Spratlys, ao expaosion
inexorably tied to the growth of Chinese maritime power aod geopolitical ambition. 36

China's Political and Strategic Interests ond the South China Sea
China's overtiding political interest in the South China Sea has been to defend its
tertitotial claims over the four disputed island groups. The nationalistic 1980s concept
of "sea as national tertitory," perhaps fittingJyrepresented in the South China Sea by the
u-sbaped line lbat, in effect, would enclose the entire sea space within Chinese
jurisdiction, expaoded Beijing's policy objectives. The South China Sea is thus
important for all three foreigu policy goals identified in Chapter 3: tertitorial integrity
aod sovereigu rights, economic development aod primscy in East ABia.
Strategically, China has long been wary of the strategic presence of opposing
begemonic powers in Southeast ABia, wbo might exploit Chinese weakuesses at sea to
spply strategic pressure on China from its southern maritime periphery.37 Since 1949,

first the United States, then the Soviet Union in collaboration with Communist Vietnam,
~~ Stuart B. Kaye, "The Spratly Islands Dispute: A Legal Background," Maritime Studies, No. 102,
Septembor-October 1998, pp. 23-24 •
.. Robyn Lim ''The ASEAN Regional Forum: Building on Sand," COnUmporary Southeast Asia, VoL 20,
No. 2, August 1998, p. 123.
3' Mark: J. Valencia, "Building Confidence and Security in the South China Sea: The Way Forward," in
Andrew T.R Tan and 1.0. Kenneth Boutin, eds., Non-traditional Security Issues in Southeast Asia, Select
Publishing for the Institute ofDefunce and Strategic Studies, Singapore, 2001, p. 538.
36 AB just one example, see ]un Zhan, "China Goes to the Blue Waters: The Navy, Seapower Mentality
and the South China Sea," The Journal ojStrategic Studies, Vol. 17, No. 3, September 1994.
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and now the United States once more, have played the role of southern maritime threat.
As argued in previous chapters, China's interests in the South China Sea were primary
drivers of China's strategic transformation in the 1980s and, until the Taiwan crises of
the mid 1990s, those interests were the leading iniluences on Chinese maritime strategy
and navai modernization.
China's strategic interests in the South China Sea, therefore, involve the

extension of its defensive perimeter, countering the strategic presence of other major
powers, countering threats to its territorial interests by other claimants and, ultimately,

seeking some measure of maritime command over the area to enforce its hegemonic
pretensions in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, China also has an abiding interest in being
able to exert control over East Asian sea lanes, both to safeguard its Middle Eastern oil
supplies and to threaten the economic lifelines of Taiwan and Japan. A permanent
strategic presence in the South China Sea, particularly if it can successfully enforce its
territorial claims, might conceivably provide China the ability in the future to control
shipping on the north-south route throughout the first island chain.

China's Economic Interests and the South China Sea
South China Sea resources also played a central role in China's marine development
strategy in the 1980.: economic and strategic iniluences combined to elevate the

importance of the southern maritime region in China's national consciousnesS. 38 South
China Sea resources are intended to comprise part of China's maritime Lebensraum or

"survival space" for future national development, as outlined in Chapter 3, thus also
playing a prominent role in the promotion of Chinese nationalism. Oil and gas resources
are the most important of those resources, although fisheries and the shipping carried
across the South China Ses's sea lanes are also economically notable.

Hydrocarbon Resources
There is a wide discrepancy between Chinese and Western estimates of the hydrocarlJOn
resources of the South China Sea. Chinese sources have estimated that the potential
See, for example, Shee Poon Kiln, ''1he South China. Sea in China's Strategic Thinking,"
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 19, No. 4, March 1998, pp. 372~373.
38 On the linkages, See Michael Leifer, "Chinese Economic Reform and Security Policy: The South China
Sea Connection," Survival, Vo!. 37, No. 2, Summer 1995; and 10hn W. Garver, ''China's Push through
the South China Sea: The Interaction of Bureaucratic and National Interests," The China Quarterly, No.
132, December 1992. Garver has also demonstrated the linkages between naval interests and the
economic interests ofHainan (p. 1026).
37
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resource around the Spratly and Paraeel groups alone could amount to at least 105
billion barrels (bb) of oil and up to 900 trillion cubic feet (Tct) of gas. Those sources
also estimate that the entire seabed of the South China Sea might contsin up to 213 bb
of oil and more than 2000 Tcf of gas. The Chinese figures are both disputed and
unproven, however. 10 fact, due to only limited exploratioo activities so far, there are no
proven commercially viable hydrocarbon resources within the disputed archipelagos.
The U.S. Geological Survey and other Western sources estimate oil and gas resources in
the SpratIys to be in the vicinity of 10 bb and 35 Tcf, respectively, and for the entire
South China Sea, abeut 28 bb of oil and 266 Tcf of gas." To pnt those figores into
perspective, China's oil consumption (including Hoog Kong) in 2000 was around five
million barrels per day (approximately 1.75 bb annually), and its imports amounted to
approximately 650 million barrels." The oil resources in the disputed aress of the South
China Sea, therefore, are likely to be substsntial, but hardly sufficient to satisfy longterm Chinese demand or turn the area into a new Persian Gulf (or even another North
Sea): by compatison, the Middle East (not including North Africa) produces over eight
billion barrels of oil per year. 41
Most offshore oil and gas activities in the South China Sea occur in the
cootinental shelves of the coastal states. 10 China's esse, its South China Sea offshore
oil and gas projects are concentrated around ,Hsinan Island, south of the Pearl River
mouth and in the Tonkin Gulf." Moreover, the costs of exploration and exploitation in
the Spratly area may be relatively high due to the mostly deep waters. It is likely that
world oil prices would have to be sustsined at high levels and the proven volumes
substantial to make extraction viable'" Nevertheless, it is possible that China views the
hydrocarbon resources of the South China Sea as something of an untspped Chinese
strategic reserve, even if China is forced to either jointly develop or purchase outright
some of the area's production from Southeast Asian producer countries.

31' See U.8.- Energy Information Administration, "South China Sea Region," January 2000, available on
the World Wide Web at: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabslschinafull.html.
., BP Statistical Revkw a/World Energy, BP, London, June 2001, pp, 9-10 and 18.
41 Ibid., p. 6.
42 See U.8. Energy Information Administration, "China," April 2001, available on the World Wide Web
at: htI:p:llwww.eia.doe.gov/emeulcabslchina.html.
43 Valencia, China and the South China Sea Disputes, p. 11.
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Fisheries
The South China Sea accounts for ten per cent of the world's annual fisheries catch.44
The major species exploited in the South China Sea include tuna, mackerel, scad and
shrimp. Increased pressure on coastal fisheries has led to greater competition for the fish
resources in deeper water, such as skipjack tuna. Overfishing, however, threateos the

future of the entire fishery, and minor conflicts involving fishermen from different
countries (and sometimes enforcement authorities) have been cornmon.45 Fish species
within the Spratly area are sedentsry and uorelated to the stocks outside the archipelago,
aod the Spratly fishery is relatively small.'" Exclusive economic zones drawn aronod
only the larger islands of the westero Spratlys wonld eocompass important fisheries
beyond the archipelago, however, including deeper parts of the South China Sea which
cootain valuable highly migratory species such as tuna. Although China maintains
important economic interests in the fishery, fish stocks lack the strategic cachet enjoyed
by oil, and will tend to be of greater importance to the states of Southeast Asia thao to

China. China has also tsken an ecologieally responsible attitude by implementing
periodieal baos on fishing in the South China Sea by Chinese fishermen. 47

Shipping and Trade

China's third economic interest in the South China Sea is its seaborne trade, especially
its oil supplies from the Middle East. Oil, gas and other raw resources from Southeast
Asia and Australia are also important components of China's seaborne imports, all of
which will continue to grow strongly as the Chinese economy further expands. All of
this maritime traffic must travel past the Spratly Islands. However, the sea lanes do not
pass close to the archipelago as it is a navigation hazard. Virtua1ly all of the oil traffic
sails northwards, from the eastero exit of the Malacca Strait, through the South China
Sea to the west of the Spratlys, a sea lane which is 150 nautical miles wide. The only
complication for the main route is that it passes close to the Vangoard Bank area at the
southwestero extreme of the archipelago, where China and Vietnam have each granted
rival oil exploration coocessions. The second route is narrower (although still a safe
distance from the archipelago), passing betweeo the eastero side of the Spratlys and the
"Cooling South China Sea Competition," PacNet Newsletter. No. 22A, 1 June 2001.
See Daniel Y. Coulter, ''South China Sea Fisheries: Countdown to Calamity," Contemporary Southeast
Asia, Vol. 17, No. 4, March 1996.
46 Interview at Shanghai Fisheries University. July 2000.
017 See "Plenty More Fish in the South China Sea." China Daily (online ed.), 2 August 2000.
ok Brad Gtosserman,
4S
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Philippine island of Palawan, and carries mainly bulk cargoes from Australia through

the Lombok and Makassar Straits to Northeast Asia. Aoy limited, localized conflict in
the Spratly archipelago is unlikely, therefore, to adversely affect the safety of
conunercial shipping. 48
A second potential threat to Chinese shipping is piracy, which occurs in the
Malacca Strait and elsewhere throughout the Indonesian archipelago, in the Philippines
archipelago and in the Hong Kong-Luzon-Hainan triangle'" However, the piracy threat
is a limited, law and order at sea problem, not an inherently strategic issue and should
not be exaggerated. 50 A third threat is the possibility of atracks on shipping by Islamic
terrorists, especially in the Southeast Asian choke pointS.'1
China may become more concerned with protecting its shipping in the future as
its oil and gas shipments from the Middle East and Southeast Asia increase, and as its
shipping companies become ever more prominent as major players in the world
shipping market. Increased trade with Southeast Asia, in general, also will have an

impact as China attempts to integrate the region's economies under Chinese political
leadership (discussed in a later section below). As noted in the previous chapter,
however, SWC security has thus far not been a major driver of Chinese maritime
sttstegy or force structure development. Furthermore, China's vu1nerabilities to
disruptions to shipping in the South China Sea also will remain considerably lower than
those of its rivals in Northeast Asia, Taiwan and Japan.

China's Strategic Behaviour in the South China Sea: The Relentless March South
China's strategic behaviour in the South China Sea has been influenced by changing

priorities and capabilities over time: its assertiveness in the region has grown as its
interests have intensified, and as its military capshilities have improved.

48 See Henry J. Kenny, An Analysis of Possible Threats to Shipping in Key Southeast Asian Sea Lanes,
CNA Occasional Paper, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, VA. February 1996, pp. 30~32.
49 On the regional piracy problem, see Hatnzah Abroad and Alcira Ogawa, eds., Combating Piracy and
Ship Robbery: Charting the Future in Asia Pacific Waters, The Okazaki Institute, Tokyo and Kuala

Lumpur,2001.
so The response to piracy may have strategic implications, however. The issue is discussed in Chapter 9.
51 See, for example, "Attack against U.S. Widens Fears in Southeast Asia," International Herald Tribune
(onIine ed), 14 September 2001; and 'CSouth-east Asian Sea Lanes Vulnerable to Terrorist Attacks," The
Straits Times (online od.), 23 November 2001. Tb<: al-Qaeda-a1igned Abu Sayyaftem>rist group in the
.outhem Philippine, has tbreatened attacks against shipping in the archipelago (al-Qaeda afliliates have
already conducted two such attacks in and around Yemen), whilst Acehnese separatists in northern
Sumatra have made explicit threats to shipping in the Malacca Strait.
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Countering the Soviet-Vietnamese Maritime Threat
China's strategic activities in the South China Sea in the post-War period were
relatively limited until January 1974, when PLA fun;es seized the Crescent group of
islands from South Vietnam to take total control of the entire Parace1s archipelago.
Partly, the earlier inactivity may have been a function of Chioa's weaknesses and

continental preoccupations. As noted in the previous chapter, China's maritime forces
bad been !asked with coastal defence against Nationalist forces on Taiwan and their
American allies. However, as argued by John Garver, the increasing likelihood that
South Vietnam would fall to Hanoi, which was drawing ever closer to China's Soviet
rival, raised the spectre for Beijing that the Soviet Union would hoost its strategic
presence in Vietnam. 52 Beijing feared that an enhanced Soviet presence in the South
China Sea would pennit the strategic encirclement of China by the Soviet bloc and
notably increase China's vulnerability to attsck, or other furms of strategic pressure,
through its poorly guarded southern maritime frontier. This concern emerged at the very
time when the Soviet Navy was beginning to exert itself more vigorously in East Asian
seas, the Indian Ocean and around the world. 53 Tbe growing strategic threat interplayed
with the political requirement to defend China's territorial claims against South
Vietnamese advances in the South China Sea, which included negotiating oil
exploration contracts with Western companies, nomina1ly incorporating the Spratiy
Islands administratively under South Vietnam's authority and occupying five islands in
the Spratiys, including Spratiy Island, in the last qnarter of 1973."
Tbe Chinese response in the Paraeels was to forcibly eject the South Vietnamese
from the Crescent group in January 1974. Although there are differing accounts of the
conflict, it seems to have been a well-planoed offensive action to gain control of the
entire Paracel group. Making use of a harbour and wharf constrocted in 1971 on Woody
Island (in the Amphitrite group) large enough for medium-sized warships, on 19-20
January the PLA Navy (PLAN) dispatched a force of fuur fast attack craft, two
minesweepers and two fishiog boats plus perhaps 500 troops to seize the Crescent
group, with air support from combat aircraft based on Hainan Island. Tbe PLA defeated

a force of three South Vietnamese destroyers and one corvette (sinking one vessel),
S2

See Garver, "China's Push through the South China Sea," p. 1001. Austin, China's Ocean Frontier, pp.

73~77,

is sceptical of such strategic explanations for China's aggressive behaviour. Austin's own analysis,
however, tends to lack sufficient regard for strategic context and meaning.
j3 Bruce Swanson, Eighth Voyage of t~e Dragon: A History of China's Quest for Seapower, Naval
Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1982, pp. 262-263.
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successfully expelling the Vietnamese from the Paracels. The United States avoided any
involvement, effectively cementing a nascent relationship of anti-Soviet strategic
cooperatioo with Beijing, despite the fact that South Vietnam was still nominally an
ally." Marwyu Samuels has argued that China's actions in the Paracels also represented
the manifestation of a more assertive foreigo policy, which even by that time included a
greater emphasis upon China's maritime interests and the pursuit of maritime power.S6

One initial reaction to China's invasion of the Crescent group was a reflexive
reinforcement by Saigon, Taipei and Manila of their respective Spratlys garrisons,57 but
China itself did not capitalize on its easy Paracels victory by immediately advancing
into the Spratly Islands. Whilst Grog Austin suggests that the PLA easily could have
evicted South Vietnamese forces from the Spratlys with minimal risk," it is far from
certain that that was really the case. Although there had been no American goarantee to

defend the Spratly Islands claims (and possessions) of its three allies, Beijing may not
have been wi1Iing to push the limits of its new strategic relationship with Wasbingtoo
too far. The PLA Navy's extremely limited capabilities also need to be factored into the
equation. As noted by Marwyu Samuels, moving amphibious forces and resupplying
them across a distance of over 1,000 km (from Hainau - or 750 km plus from the
Paracels) would have been a "Iogistical nightmare" for the PLA." And that was at a
time when the PLA Navy never deployed more than 200 miles from the Chinese coast. 60
It mnst be remembered that China's navy was still a coastal force in the early 1970s,

with very basic major surface combatants (such as Luds-class destroyers and liaugoanclass frigates) only beginning to enter service. There were no underway replenishment
capabilities and amphibious capabilities had been run down, even to the point that
training for amphibious landings had ceased.61 Opposed landings of occupied features
in the Spratlys would, therefore, contra Austin, have been a very difficult proposition
fur a Chinese military ill-equipped for maritime power projection.
54 Samuels, Contestfor the South China Sea,p. 99.
ss Garver. ''China's Push through the South China Sea," pp. 1001-1005. See also Samuels, Contest for the
South China Sea, pp. l00-lOl; Swanson, Eighth Voyage of the Dragon. pp. 268·269; and David G.
Muller, China as aMaritime Power, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1983, pp. 152~153.
SIi Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, Ch. 7.
s'lbid., pp. 101~104.
S8 Austin, China's Ocean Frontier, p. 77.
59 Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, p. Ill.
60 Muller, China as a Maritime Power, p. 152.
1i1 Ibid., pp. 108~109. Although Chinese bombers bad sufficient range to reach the Spratlys, Chinese
escort fighters did not, making such operations difficult if opposed by the South Vietnamese air force. See
HIIIrison, China, Oil, and Asia. p. 198.
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Chinese fears of a Soviet-Vietnamese threat in the South Chiua Sea were, in the
event, well-founded. With the fall of South Vietnam to the North in April 1975, the
forces of Hanoi replaced those of Saigon on all of the Vietnamese-occupied Spratly
featores. A united Vietnam subsequently succeeded to the South Vietnamese claims to
both the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos. Vietnam alsc signed a security pact with the
Soviet Union, invaded Cambodia (replacing the pro-China govenunent) and, from 1979,
the Soviet Navy established a permanent presence at the fonner American uavaJ base at
Cam Raob Bay.62 Chiua was so concerned, in fact, that it launcbed a limited, punitive
invasion ofVielnam in February 1979. 63

Preparing/or Further Territorial Aggrandizement
The next stage of China's South China Sea expansion was initially one of consolidation
and preparation for further advances, this time into the Spratlys. Harbours, wharves and
other facilities were constructed in the Paraceis, including a large harbour fashioned by
the PLA Navy at Triton Island, the southemmost feature of the Paracel group, in 1982.
An airstrip was built on Woody Island in 1978, allowing regolar air communications
with Hainan and, in 1979, long-range bombers were deployed to the Paracels from the
mainland in a significant exercise. In further developments, the first submarine
deployment to the Paracels area occurred in 1977, signals intelligence facilities were
established in the Paracels to monitor shipping, and the first brigade of the PLA Navy's

re-established Marine Corps was stationed on Hainan. 64
Chiua began to expand its South China Sea activities into the Spratly Islands in
late 1980, when two B-6 bombers carried out a photo-reconnaissance mission over the
archipelago. Chinese aerial patrols over the Spratlys increased in frequency in
subsequent years. Chinese oceanographic research activities in and around the Spratlys
also began to expand from 1983. In May 1983 two (non-combatant) PLAN ships
conducted extensive surveying as far south as James Shoal, the southernmost featore of
the Spratly group, and Indonesia's Natuna Island. A more comprehensive survey
followed in 1984:' In general terms, in the years following China's successful action to
gain control of the entire Paracel group, the PLA Navy's South Sea Fleet was
Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, pp. 108-110. Hanoi had, when it still needed Chinese
support before victory seemed certain in its wars to unite Vietnam under Communist nu.e, accepted
Chinese sovereignty over both the Paracels and the Spratlys.
63 See Ellemall, Modem Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989, Ch. 17.
64 Garver, "China's Push through the South China Sea," pp. 1005-1007.
62
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lransfonned from being the weakest of China's three fleets to being <at least) equal in
strength to the others. 66
The PLA Navy also established two satellite communications ground stations in
the Paracels in 1986, and a larger survey of the SpratJy area was given priority status in
the 1986-1990 Five Year Plan. If all of this activity was not evidence enough to
demonstrate China's new strategic emphasis upon the South China Sea, the Chinese
Communist Party Secretary-General symbolically visited the Paraeels with PLAN
commander, Admiral Liu Huaqing, in late 1985. 67 The increased pace of China's
advances into the South China Sea may have been influenced in the early 1980s by
slowly improving economic circumstances and PLA capabilties. It may also be
significant, however, that Admiral Liu was appointed PLAN commander in 1982, as he
was China's leading advocate ofmarltime strategic development

The Advance into the Spratly Islands
The fiual preparations for the establisbment of a permanent Chinese presence in the
SpmtJys took place amidst a flurry of activity in 1987, when another survey of the area
was undertaken from April to May, accompanied by a PLAN destroyer. From May to
June the South Sea Fleet deployed a large flotilla for the first time to patrol the Spmtiys,
accompanied by a research ship of the State Oceanic Administration. The resulting
report made to the State Council and Central Military Commission in August contained

plans for the constroction of observation posts on specified reefs. From October to
November ships of the East Sea Fleet conducted a significant long-range deployment to
the Spratlys for the first time, and approval was given in November for the construction

of an outpost on Fiery Cross Reef <a 26 km-long, 7.5 km-wide reef in the western
Spratlys, submerged at high tide but mostly above water at low tide), which had been

subject to the particular attention of Chinese surveys.68
Constroction began on Fiery Cross Reef in February 1988, supported by
warships of the South Sea and East Sea Fleets and aerial patrols by aircraft of the South
Sea Fleet, whilst forther surveys and preparatory work were undertaken on other reefs.
Ibid., pp.-l008-1009.
You Ji. "A Test Case for China's Defence and Foreign Policies," Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.
16. No. 4, March 1995. p. 385.
61 Austin, China's Ocean Frontier, pp. 81-82.
68 Garver, "China's Push through the South China Sea," pp. 1009-1010; and ChenHumg-yu, ''The PRC's
South China Sea Policy and Strategies of Occupation in the Paracel and Spratly Islands," Issues and
Stvdie., VD!. 36, No. 4, July/AlIgU8t 2000, pp. 99-100.
65

66
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Two concrete buildings were constructed atop steel

caissons above Fiery Cross Reef,

guarded by a detachment of marines aod regular PLA Navy patrols. Several
confrontations occurred with Vietnamese forces during Jaouary aod February, but in
each case the Vietnamese were turned away without resorting to force. 69
In March, however, confrontation turned to deadly conflict at Johnson Reef. A
Clrinese survey tearn at Johnson Reef was confronted by two supply ships and an
amphibious landing ship of the Vietnamese navy, which landed 43 troops. When the
Clrinese demanded that the Vietnamese leave, the Vietnamese opened fire with machine

gnns, resulting in a twenty minute gun battle. During the battle, ships of the PLA Navy
sank one supply ship and damaged the other two Vietnamese vessels, and Vietnam
claimed to have suffered hwnao losses of three dead, 74 missing (presnmably killed)
and nine captured. Throughout the remainder of the year and into 1989, the dispute
between Hanoi and Beijing seemed likely to escalate as each state strengthened its
Spratly positions aod accelerated the militarization of the archipelago, although no new
military action eventuated. By the end of 1988 Chloa had successfolly occopied seven
reefs aod, in 1989, the PLA expanded the air base on Woody Island.'o
One interesting feature of the establishment of outposts in the Spratiys was that
the PLA, rather than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, seemed to be in control of Chloa's
South Chioa Sea policy, with the explicit support of Deng Xiaoping.71 Nevertheless,

China's Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, also took an aggressive line following the
March 1988 con1lict by threatening further military against Vietnam in the Spratiys,
statiog "that there will be no war in that area if Vietnam refrains from provocstions

" Ibid., pp. 100-101; and Garver, "China', Push through the Soufu China Se.." pp. 1010-1012. Chen
states that the aerial patrols were canied out by the PLA Air Force. Subsequent construction on Fiery
Cross Reef has effectively turned it into a "S,OOO square meter island" with a 102 metre-long concrete
dock. See Lee Ngok, "Fishing in Troubled Waters? Chinese Strategic Considerations in the South China
Sea," American Asian Review, Vel. 12, No. 4, Winter 1994, p. 114. Valencia, China and the South China
Sea Disputes. p. 9. claims that the dock is actually 300 metres long, in addition to a helicopter pad and the
oceanographic station.
70 Chen, ''The PRC's South China Sea Policy and Strategies of Occupation in the Paraee! and Spratly
Islands,." pp. 101-103; and Garver. ''China's Push through the South China Sea," pp. 1013-1015. Vietnam
did. however. allege that a PLAN destroyer fired upon a Vietnamese naval vessel near Great Discovery
Reef in August 1988, although China denied the incident Garver notes that China may have been
planning renewed actions against Vietnam in the Spratlys in late 1989, but was probably constrained by
fiscal problems and the diplomatic fallout over the Tiananmen massacre at the time.
71 Ibid., pp. 1013-1014. It is also interesting to note that, in 1974, a recently politically rehabilitated Deng
Xiaoping had shared command responsibility with the defence minister for the operation in the Paracels
(ibid, p. 1003). Deng's personal interest in the South China Sea may have been a significant factor in
China's strategic machinations, and his promotion and sponsorship of Liu Huaqing to senior PLA
positions may have both ensured PLA support and increased PLA influence over South China Sea policy.
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against China and stops the seizure and occupation of the islands, and withdraws all its
troops from these islands and reefs.,,72
China continued the consolidation of its SpratJys possessions into the 1990s. In
1992 the China National Offshore Oil COIJloration let an exploration contract to
Crestone Energy Corporation, a small American oil company, for the Vanguard Bank
area in the southwestern Spratlys. Crestone was evidently assured that the operation

would be protected by the PLA, if necessary.73 Vietnam responded in early 1994 by
letting a contract to Mobil Oil Corporation for the Blue Dragon oilfield, within China's
historic claim line and close to the Crestone concession. In April 1994 Vietnamese
naval vessels chased a Chinese exploration ship from the area,74 and in July Vietnam
seized three Chinese fishing boats whilst Chinese ships fired on a Vietnamese patrol
boat."

Expansion, Consolidation and Defence ofthe Southern Maritime Frontier
China's next significant advance into the SpratJys was to occupy Mischief Reef in the
second half of 1994, a feature only 135 nautical miles from Palawan (within the
Philippine exclusive economic zone) and, thus, of particular political and strategic
importsnce to the Pbilippines. China's Mischief Reef occupation and construction was
discovered by the Philippines in early 1995, whereQPOD Manila protested over the
establislnneot of a Chinese naval base on the featore. Beijing unconvincingly replied
that the structures - cousisting of octagonal bunkers built on raised platforms above the
reet; flying the Chinese flag and equipped with satellite communications facilities were merely shelters for Chinese fishermeo. 76
Qian Qichen, quoted in '''Treacherous Shoals," Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 August 1992, p. 15.
Qian also claimed that the construction of observation posts by China was approved by UNESCO,
although UNESCO domed the cWm.
73 Garver, "Onna's Push through the South China Sea," p. 1017.
74 Chen, "The PRe's South China Sea Policy and Strategies of Occupation in the Pameel and Spratly
Isbmds,"p.l04.
75 Valencia. China and the South China Sea Disputes, p. 36.
76 See "Tenitorial Imperative," Far Eastern EcoIWmic Review, 23 February 1995, pp. 14-18; Chen. ''The
PRC's South China Sea Policy and S1rategies of Occupation in the ParaceI and Spratly Islands," pp. 105109; Valencia, China and the South China Sea Disputes, pp. 44-45; Ian James Storey, "Creeping
Assertiveness: China, the Philippines and the South China Sea Dispute," Contemporary Southeast Asia,
VoL 21, No. I, April 1999, p. 97; and Austin. China's Ocean Frontier, pp. 88-89. The United States
declined to become involved on Manila's be~ arguing that im defence treaty with the Philippines did
not apply to the disputed feature. of the Scuth China Sea. Furthermore, in March 1995, the Philippine
Navy destroyed Chinese sovereignty markers on several other reefs, repeating the exercise in June. In
May, two Philippine Navy ships and a civilise vessel carrying reporters sailed to Mischief Roof. and
made several passes over the feature in an embarked helicopter. Following harassment by two Chinese
fishing boats, the Philippine craft withdrew on the arrival of two PLAN vessels.
12
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There has been some speculation that the occupation of Mischief Reef may bave
been a PLA operation carried out by regional commanders without the knowledge of the
Chinese political leadership, possibly to posb China's leaders into a more assertive
stance over the SpratJy Islands. Whether or not that was the case, there is some evidence
that Liu Husqing, by then Vice-Cbainnan of the Central Military Commission, bad lent
his sopport to the operation.77
Manila and Beijing also clashed over Scarborough Shoal. In 1996 Philippine
forces destroyed a Chinese sovereignty marker that bad been placed on the feature five
years earlier. And, in May 1997, the Philippine Navy forced three vessels of the State
Oceanic Administration approaching the shoal to withdraw.78
In October 1998 China was discovered conatrocting a new, larger (five-storey),
permanent concrete strocture on Mischief Reef. The discovery prompted the Philippines
to increase its naval and sir patrols of the area, and to order its naval patrols to fire
warning shots to stop any Chinese ships from getting too close." Aerial
photoreconnaissance imagery has clearly demonstrated the military features of the
Mischief Reef outposts, including armour shielding, shrouding, communications
eqnipment and a probable weapon platfonn (thought to be an anti-aircraft and/or antiship system). Various PLAN ships bave also been photographed, including yuting-class
amphibious warfare ships and numerous smaller armed craft of different classes. 80 The
Mischief Reef installation is also believed to bave electronic intelligence-gathering

capabilities for communications intercepts,SI

Ibid., pp. 90-91; but see also Storey, "Creeping Assertiveness," p. 100.
Chen, "The PRe's South China Sea Policy and Strategies of Occupation in the Paracel and Spratly
Is1ands," p. 113.
~ "China-Philippine Ties Calm Despite Dispute," The Straits Times, 13 November 1998, p. 35; and "'Tis
the Season," Far Eastern Economic Review, 24 December 1998, pp. 18-20.
80 For analysis and images, see Vipin Gupta and Adam Bernstein, '"Keeping an Eye on the Islands:
Cooperative Remote Monitoring in the South China Sea," in John C. Baker. K.evin M. O'ConneU and Ray
A Williamson, eds., Commercial Observation Satellites: At the Leading Edge of Transparency, RAND
and ASPRS, Santa Monies, CA, and Bethesda, MD, 2001, pp. 333-345. Similar imagery of lhe Chinese
outpost on Subi Reef (near Itu Aba and Thitu Islands in the western Spratlys), pp. 348-351, show a threestorey forti.fied structure, with communications equipment and four naval guns. Despite the pictorial
evidence to the contrary, the Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines, Fu Ying, still claimed in May 1999
that China had only carried out "repairs" to the existing structures on Mischief Reef and that the
structures were "only for civilian use." Quite clearly, she was either misled by her own people or simply
not telling the truth. See "China's Gentler Face," Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 June 1999, p. 29.
Even China's own state media acknowledges the military nature of China's Spmtlyoutposts, which are
manned by the South Sea Fleet's ''Nansba [Spratly] Garrison Force." See "Soldiers Make Reefs Home,"
China Daily (oDline 00.), 8 May 2000.
SI See ''The Spying Game Heats Up," Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 May 2001, p. 23.
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The confrontation with the Philippines continued to simmer, with the Philippine
Navy arresting 20 Chinese fishennen fishing ''illegally'' near Mischief Reef in
Novemher 1998. 82 In May 1999, a Chinese fishing boat was sunk in a collision with a
vessel of the pursuing Philippine Navy in heavy seas off Scarborough Shoal. 83 At the
time, the Philippine Defense Secretary clearly summed up Manila's fears (and probably
those of the other Sontheast Asian claimants) by terming China's continuing push into

the South China Sea "China's creeping invasion.,,s4 Tensions further increased in
November 1999 when a Philippine Navy ship ran aground on Scarborough Shoal,
leading Beijing to demand its removal." In the first five months of 2001 alone, the
Philippine Navy boarded 14 Chinese fishing boats near Scarborough Shoal and
confiscated their catches. 86
In a move to consolidate its presence in the Sonth China Sea, China established
a new maritime law eoforcement force in November 1998 to ''protect its rights and
interests" in the area, and in May 2000 changed the name of the force to South Sea
Marine Surveillance Force. 87 Another report suggests that the PLA is patrolling the
Sonth China Sea in specially built 100 metre patrol boats sporting the colours of the
Customs Service. 88
China has not yet occupied or constructed military installations on Scarborough
Shoal, as some observers predicted would occur in mid 2001 following the deployment
of PLAN ships to the area. 89 However, the Chinese navy has continued to consolidate
its presence in the South China Sea., including the deployment of pOwer projection
assets, whilst carrying out more complex military exercises and adopting more
aggressive tactics in defence of its expansive territorial claims.

The most explosive incident to date has been the 1 April 2001 collision between
a U.S. Navy EP-3E electronic intelligence-gathering aircraft and a PLA F-8 fighter

Storey, "Creeping Assertiveness," p. 98.
''Reef-stricken,'' The Economist, 29 May 1999, p. 24.
84 Orlando Mercacio, quoted in ''Mischief Makers," The Weekend Australian, 13-14 March 1999, p. 21.
115 "A Storm at Sea." Far Eastern EconomicReview, 9 December 1999, p. 24.
86 ''Philippine Navy Tracking Ships near Scarborough Shoal," Radio Australia News (online ed.), 24 May
2001.
81 ..Sbips Stick to Normal Patrol," China Daily (online ed.), 8 June 2000.
88 "South China Sea Patrols Boosted," Jane's Defence Weekly, 26 September 2001, p. 11. These craft are
the 20-24 Qui-M-cla8s
noted in Chapter 5.
" See, fur example, "China DepIO)'l! Warships," The Washington 1lm.. (online ed.), 25 J1Jru) 2001. The
report also notes that the Philippine military had shot dead a Chinese :fisherman in 2000.
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akcraft, 70 nautical miles southeast of Hainon,'· which caused a brief crisis in SinoAmcrican relations. The incideot was the unwitting culmination of a growing
aggressiveoess by Chinese interceptor pilots toward similar surveillance flights over the
preceding two months!' There have been unconfirmed suggestions that the EP-3E had
been flying over one of the PLA Navy's two Sovremenny-c1ass destroyers at the time,
recording the ship's unique radar sigoatures!2 Despite the fact that the cOllision
occurred in international akspace, China has asserted a right to keep foreigo

surveillance aircraft and warships out of its 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone,
although there seems no legitimate basis for that claim. AB Mark Valencia has argoed,
although China does not yet possess the capability to exclude foreigo vessels from its

exclusive economic zone under such a preclusive regime. "when it is strong enough, it
may try to do 80.,,93
Although China's official position holds that it will not interfere with freedom of
navigation and overflight in the South China Sea,94 the EP-3E incident indicates that its
practice is not entirely consistent with this claim." Because China seems still to be
clakning some kind of jurisdiction over most of the South China Sea (i.e., all of the

waters within the u-shaped line), any regime that attempted to exclude foreigo militsry
akcraft and warships from the entire area, albeit uneoforceable in practical tenns, would
indeed seem to reflect a Chinese desire to turn the South China Sea into a Chinese lake.
There has been no compunction on Beijing's part, however, in sending similar

flights over the South China Sea, often across the exclusive economic zones of other
90

The damaged EP-3E managed to land on Hainan, whilst the Chinese fighter pilot was never found.

There is no doubt that reckless flying by the Chinese pilot caused the incident AB Commander of the U.S.
P",ifio Fleet, Admiral Dennis BJak, stated: "Big airplanes Iiko [the EP-3E]lly sIraigbt and level on their
path, little aeroplanes zip around them. Under international airspace rules, the faster and more
manoeuvrable aircraft has an obligation to stay out of the way of the slower aircraft. It's pretty obvious
who bumped into who." See ''Trapped behind the Lines," The Australian, 3 April 2001, p. 1. The
Chinese impounded the American aircraft (and detained its crew), managing to remove valuable systems
before handing it back See "'Spyplane' Loss a Big Blow for U.S. Intelligence," Jane's Navy
International, Vol. 106, No. 4, May 2001, p. 8.
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!bid.

See Norman Friedman. ''World Naval Developments," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 2001, p.
100. Friedman also alleges that the PLA may have intentionally attempted to force down the American
surveillance aircraft, although there is no publicly available evidence to support the claim.
93 Mark J. Valencia, ''Tension in the South China Sea," Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 April 2001, p.
31. Valencia notes that China's South China Sea claim seems to be taking the form of treating the entire
sea area as ''historic waters," where freedom of navigation and overt1ight rights do not apply.
94 See Ji Guoxing, Asian Pacific SLOC Security: The China Factor, Royal Australian Navy Sea Power
Centre Working Paper No. 10, RAN Sea Power Centre, RAAF Base Fairbairn, Canberra, Apri12002, pp.
28-29; IUld Ji Guoxing, ''Rough Waters in the South China Sea: Navigation Issues and Confidencebuilding Measures," AsiaPacific Issues. No. 53, August 2001.
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littoral states. One unnamed "senior Chinese diplomat" has unconvincingly attempted to
defend China's own surveillance activities, whilst attacking America's: "Everybody
knows that China has territorial disputes in the South China Sea. In that context it is
pnssible that China operates some reconnaissance flights. But the U.S. has no reason to

do that because the U.S. does not bave territorial disputes with China."% Surveillance
flights in internatioual airspace are a conunon and necessary practice carried ont by a
large number of states around the world. There is nothing particularly special about
either Chinese or American aerial surveillance activities. What is significant, though, is
Cbina's aggressive respnnse to U.S. flights, reflecting Beijing's desire to push its
defensive perimeter farther to seaward, establish a more dominating presence in the seas
of East Asia and squeeze America's own strategic presence in the region.
The PLA has also increased both the complexity and frequency of its maritime
exercises in the South Cbina Sea in recent years, including joint exercises on and around
Hainan and Woody Islands. China has also based some of its converied B-6 airborne
refuelling aircraft on Rainan and further improved faci1ities on Woody Island, including
the construction of fuel storage tanks in 1999, enhancing the island's utility as a staging
area fur long-range operations over and into the Spratlys.97 In one exercise held in late
2002, near Rainan, China was reported to have amassed 50 warships, including its two

Sovremenny-class destroyers, nine submarines, 19 amphibious landing ships and
"several thousand" marines!' The PLA has also deployed HY-2 anti-ship cruise
missiles to Woody Island." Manila has expressed a particular concern that Cbina may
construct an airstrip on Mischief Reet; 100 although that pnssibility has yet to eventuate.
Nevertheless, the continued ntilitarization of the South China Sea islands under its
control is perhaps further evidence of China's intent to exert its will over the entire area.

9$

There have also been other incidents in the East China Sea and Yellow Sea, described in the following

chapter.
% Quoted in "The

Spying Game Heats Up," Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 May 2001, p. 23.
See "Beijing Readies China Sea Exercises," The Washington Times (onIine cd.), 17 May 2001.
98 These claims were made in ''Inside the Ring," The Washington Times (onIine ed.), 8 November 2002.
" "China Deploys Warships; The Washingron TImes (onIine ed.), 25 lune 2001. The report does not
state which variant of the missile has been deployed. The air-launched version carried by the PLA Navy's
B-6D bombers would certainly have the greatest utility, as it would allow the Chinese navy to conduct
airborne strike missions against the warships of its lesser adversaries throughout the South China Sea, and
assist in a blockade of Taiwan.
100 "'Tis the Season,» Far Eastern Economic Review, 24 December 1998. p. 18.
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China'. Political Tactics in the South China Sea
Once China had established a permanent presence in the Spratly group, it demonstrated
a greater willingness to negotiate (or at least disenss) the issue with the other claimants.
In Augnst 1990, Chinese Premier Li Peng proposed that the Spratly claimants shelve the
sovereignty issue in favour of joint development of the disputed area's resources. IOI
Beijing did not include the Paracels in its diplomatic gambit, however, reflecting the
fact that China already had effectively settled the P",acels issue by its strong militllIy
position in the group. As Eric Hyer notes of China's political behaviour over the South
China Sea, Beijing seems only willing to cooperate with other claimants when it "doea
not control the territory in question."I02 loint development has been opposed by
Vietnam, the Philippines and, presumably, also Indonesia in its Natuna waters. 103
Ontwardlyat least, China's stsnce seemed to harden once more in 1993, when it
explicitly couched the issue of joint development only in terms of China's overall
sovereignty of the Spratly Islands. However, it is likely that China's policy had never
changed, nor its strategy of opportunistically occnpying territorial features when able to
do so and when the risks were low. Only Beijing's diplomatic tactics were new. In the
words of one Chineae commentator, China's willingness to politically engage the
Southeast Asian claimants over the SpratIys represented "a concession only in
procedure rather than in substance."I04 China's emphasis upon sovereignty has been
demonstrated further by the explicit listing of the disputed island groups in its 1992

territorial sea law as Chinese territory.
China has also consistently favoured a bilateral approach to negotiations to

avoid being outnumbered by the Southeast Asian claimants,105 and to use its position of
strength to maximize its position against its smaller rivals, includiog the use of divide

'"ReefK.nots," Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 August 1990, p. 11.
Eric Hyer, "The South China Sea Disputes: Implications of China's Earlier Territorial Settlements,"
Pacific Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 1, Spring 1995, p. 53.
103 The attitude of those states is probably well summed up in a 1994 statement by Vietnam's Vice-Foreign Minister. Vu Khoan: ''China's intention in proposing the joint development of the Spratly Islands
is an attempt to justify its presence in Vietnam's territorial waters under the name of joint development.
Would you accept an invitation to dinner from a person who was trying to steal a 100 U.S. dollar bill
from your pocket?" Quoted in S.D. Muni. China's Strategic Engagement with the New ASEAN: An
Exploratory Study of China's Post-Cold War Political, Strategic and Economic Relations with Myanmar,
Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. lOSS Monograph No. 2, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies,
Nanyang Technological University. Singapore. 2002, p. 68.
104 Gao, ''The South China Sea," pp. 353-354.
105 Ibid., pp. 354M355.
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and conquer tactiCS. I06 Beijing has participated in infonnal Track 11 fora, such as the
Indonesian-initiated series of Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South
China Sea, largely because they are relatively harmless to its interests and avoid dealing
with the hard questions relating to sovereigaty.107
China's reiteration of its sovereignty claim may also have been a response to
ASEAN's July 1992 Declaration on the South China Sea which, in addition to calling

for the disputant parties to uexercise restraint" and refrain from the use of force,
represented an attempt by the ASEAN stales for the first time to take a united,
multilateral approach to the issue. 108 Following China's occupation of Mischief Reef,
ASEAN reiterated its declaration, this time specifically mentioning the recent incident,
urging all parties to "refrain from taking actions that destabilize the region" and calling
for the "early resolution of the problems caused by recent deVelopments in Mischief

Reef. nlO' By garnering explicit ASEAN supper! for its concerns, the statement
represented a diplomatic victory for the Philippines. no Manila also concluded a bilateral
agreement with Beijing to build confidence, trust and to "continue consultations" in the
wake of China's Mischief Reef occupation. lll China's lack of genuine commi1ment to
either the spirit or the substance of its consultations with Manila, or the ASEAN
declaration, were demonstrated in starlc relief, however, by its renewed military
construction programme on Mischief Reef in 1998. In a continuation of its familiar
strategy of occupation, militarization and, then, engagement from a position of streng1h,
Beijing restarted its consultations with Manila during 1999. 112

106 There has been a general sense amongst many analysts spoken to in the region. including in China, that
Beijing and K.uala Lumpur may have come to some sort of short-term, informal accommodation over
their respective Spratlys claims. Instead" they would pursue their interests largely at the expense of other
claimants, especially the Philippines, which is the weakest of the claimant states. There is no way to
confirm this suspicion, however.
107 The Workshop process has dealt mainly with coopera.t:i.on on technical environmental and other marine
scientific research issues, and proposals for joint development and resource assessment. The process is
built on a bighly questionable neo-functionalist argument that the very process of cooperation may
eventually lead to a resolution of the disputes. For an optimistic appraisal from a regular participant in the
Worbhops, see Townsend..oault, "Preventive Diplomacy and Pro-activity in the South China Sea," pp.
182-187. More convincing, however, is the sceptical critique of Valencia, ''Building Confidence and
Security in the South China Sea." pp. 536-537.
108 See «ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea," Manila, 22 July 1992.
109 "St.ateDJ.ent by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers on the Recent Development in the South China Sea," 18
March 1995.
110 Sec Storey, "Creeping Assertiveness," pp. 107-108.
III "Joint Statement on PRC-RP Consultations on the South China Sea and Other Areas of Cooperation,"
Mani1a, 9-10 August 1995.
m Beijing and Manila reportedly agreed not to hold military exercises in which the other is the imaginary
enemy and that they would notify one another before undertaking military exercises in the Spradys. See
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Since 1999, the ASEAN states have pressed China to sign a code of conduct for
the South China Sea, a confidence-building measure committing all parties to the
dispntes to take a peaceful approach in defending their claims and settling their
differences. The process has involved a series of largely unsuccessful negotiations, with
various drafts proposed by the different parties,'!' The resultant, underwhehning
November 2002 declaration is a compromise accord which demonslrates that the gulf
between the ASEAN states and China remains wide. The docoment is not a code of
conduct as origioally intended by ASEAN: rather, it is merely a declaration of
principles, the last of which is to continue to work toward a code of conductY'
The 2002 declaration is weaker than earlier ASEAN drafts, with mere principles
replacing formal measures and standards of behaviour. China succeeded in removing a

reference to the need to refrain from "erecting structures" on unoccupied features from a
paragraph that states that parties should not take action to inhabit such features. Beijing
failed in its call for the restraint of military exercises "directed against other countries"

in the disputed area (Le., against China) and "close-in military reconnaissance,"
although the declaration does require prior notification of 'jointicombined" military
exercises, bnt only 00 a ''voluntary basis."lIS Presnmably, China has in mind combined
U.S.~Pbilippine

exercises, exercises involving other outside powers, as well as exercises

between those ASEAN members concerned with Chinese strategic behaviour. China
had previously warned the Southeast Asian states against holding combined military

exercises in the are~ especially with their alliance partners. I 16
China did compromise, bowever, by referring only to the South China Sea rather
than to any specific island group(s), whicb was a minor victory for Vietnam. Previously,
Beijing's drafts made reference only to the Spratlys, thus specifically excluding the

PamceIs. Further, China's favoured approach of joint resource development was not

Chen, 'The PRe's South China Sea Policy and Strategies of Occupation in the Paracel and SpratJy
Islands." pp. 111-113.
113 Schofield. "A Code of Conduct for the South China Sea?" p. 40; and Valencia, '"Building Confidence
and Security in the South China Sea," pp. 534-535.
114 See The Governments of the Member States of ASEAN and the Government of the People's Republic
of Chlna. ''Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea," Pbnom Penh, 4 November
2002.
liS Ibid. The parties also made a commitment to :freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China
Sea according to the principles of internationa11aw.
116 See "China Warns ASEAN on Joint Military Exercises," The Philippine STAR, 16 March 2000, p. 3;
and Valencia, '"Building Confidence and Security in the South China Sea," p. 534.
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broached. 117 Nevertheless, the declaration has formalized two aspects of the disputes in
China's favour. Finrtly, the declaration (and negotiations) seem to accept a structure of
bilateralism for dealing with the disputes, with China on the one side and the ASEAN
states on the other, thus giving China a special status amongst interested parties.'"
Secondly, Taiwan has been frozen out of the process, despite being a claimant state with
the longest record of continuous occupation in the Spratiys.1l9
CHINA AND THE INDIAN OCEAN

Tbe Indian Ocean is an important secondary oceanic interest for China, which has been

included within the ambit of China's future Lebensraum or "survival space," as noted in
Chapter 3 of this dissertation. If Indian Ocean resources are viewed as a potential source
of China's future economic development, so too is the Indian Ocean important for the
development of greater strategic depth and access to the ses. for China's western
provinces. Chinese oil imports from the Middle East also must transit the Indian Ocean.
Although the Chinese navy does not normally operate in the Indian Ocean, and is
unlikely to do so on a regular basis over the short to medium term, 120 China's political,
strategic and economic activities and interests in Southeast Asia, South Asia and the
Middle East detennine that its matitime strategy will increasingly have Indian Ocean
applications.
Chinese Economic Interests in the Indian Ocean

China's primary economic interest in the Indian Ocean is the passage of its oil imports.
That vital trade mostly passes through the Malacca Strait on its way to Northeast Asia
However, all matitime traffic voyaging through the Malacca Strait must also pass
through the Andaman Sea, which is framed on its western side by India's Andaman and
Il7 ''Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,"; but compare with "Regional Code of
Conduct in the South China Sea," dmft as of March 2000; and "Code of Conduct in the South China
Sea," draft ofilie Chinese side (no date).
118 In this respect, the declaration is bilateral rather than multilateral. whether China is deaIing with
ASEAN as a whole or with individual ASEAN states. The declaration does not represent a common
ASEAN position on the various claims themselves; the ASEAN claimant states obviously still have
disputes with each other. whilst at least some of the non-claimant states simply do not have direct stakes
or interest!! in the disputes.
119 For a Taiwanese perspective, see Yann-huei Song, "The Signing of the SCS Declaration on Conduct
of Parties and Its Implications: Taiwan's Perspective," paper prepared for the 12th Meeting of the CSCAP
Maritime Cooperation Working Group, Singapore,l0-11 December 2002.
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Nicobar Island chain. 121 The routes between those islands connect the Indian Ocean to
the Andaman Sea and Malacca Strait, and represent short maritime choke points in
addition to
archipelagos.

those nnrmally asaociated with the Indonesian and
l22

Philippine

The same routes are important in the non-energy seaborne trade

between China (and the other Northeast Asiao states), and both Europe and Africa.
The forging of land and riverioe traosportation links from westero China to the
Indian Ocean is becoming a key aspect of the economic development of these western
provinces, enabling their access to world markets. It is cheaper and faster to carry goods
from China's impoverished and landlocked southwestern Yunnan Province, for
example, through Burma to the Bay of Bengal, than it is to carry them across the
Chinese mainland to the ports of aouthern and eastern China. To facilitate Yunnan's
trade access to the sea, China has constructed new roads in Bunna, including one from
RuiIi in Yunnan to Bbamo, a Burmese port on the Irrawaddy River. China has also
assisted Bunna to dredge the Irrawaddy, thus allowing larger ships to use the river and
complete the ronte to new port facilities on the Bunnese coast. 123 China has alao
assisted in the coostruction of new port and shipyard facilities near Rangoon designed to
cater for larger Chinese vessels up to 10,000 toos,l24 and a deep-water port near Mergui
on the Andaman Sea. 125 There may be further opportunities for northwestern China to
access the Indian Ocean via Pakistan, although the overland route remains extremely
difficult. Nevertheless, Chins concluded a deal with Pakistan in May 2001 to construct a

120 A PLAN officer (Commander) interviewed in Shanghai, July 2000, stated that it was part of China's
medium-term strategy to be able to operate in the Indian Ocean.
121 Refer to map in Chapter 1.
122 The main passages from the Middle East to the Malacca Strait pass through the Eight Degree Channel
in the northern Maldives. past Dondra Head at the southern tip of Sri Lanka, and then either through the
Ten Degree Channel between the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, or through the Great Channel between
the southern island of the Nicobar group and the northern tip of Sumatra. depending on the season. It is
somewhat curious that studies of Southeast Asian SLOCs tend to neglect the Andaman section. The
Andaman Sea is, after all (as with the eastern part of the Bay of Bengal), part of the Southeast Asian
littoral; to neglect the Andaman and Nicobar choke points seems to be an oversight. For examples of such
studies, see Noer, ChokepomfS; and Kenny, An Analysis ofPossible Threats to Shipping in Key Southeast
Asian Sea Lanes.
123 See <'Friends of Necessity," Far Eastern EcoMmic Review, 27 December 2001-3 Janumy 2002, pp.
24-26; "Danger: Road Works Abead," Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 December 2000, pp. 26-27; and
"Burma Road," Far Eastern Economic Review, 6 November 1997, pp. 16-17. One figure quoted in ibid.,
p. 17, is that the Burma route is some 5,800 km shorter than that linking Kunming, the capital ofYmman,
with the ports of Shanghai.
124 "Friends of Necessity," Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 December 2001-3 January 2002, p. 24. A
Chinese report states that the first stage of the shipyard project at Thilawa, 25 km south of Rangoon, was
completed in early 2002. See "Chinese-built Shipyard Delivered for Service in Myanmar," Peoples Daily
(online ed.), 3 February 2002.
25 "Burma's Reliance on China," BBC News (online), II December 2001.
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new deep-water port in Gwadar, western Pakistan, close to the Straits ofHormuz, whilst
Beijing continues

to aid improvements to Pakistan's road system. l26

China also has significant fishing interests in the Indian Ocean. In particular,
China has a stake in the Indian Ocean tona fishery and is a member of the Indian Ocean
Tuna Commission. China's tona catch in the Indian Ocean grew to 6,500 tonnes in 2000

from less than 450 tonnes in 1995, whilst its Indian Ocean tona ±leet increased from just
twelve boats to almost 100 over the same period. 127 China's growing range of Indian
Ocean economic interests is illustrated by its dialogue statos membership of the Indian
Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation. 128
China's Political and StrtItegic Interests in the Indian Ocean
South Asia

China's relationship with India may have improved outwardly since the days of the
Cold War, when it launched a brief border war in 1962,129 yet it remsins one ofmutoal
suspicion, if not necessatily outright hostility, with the territorial disputes still.
unresolved. China's growing power in Asia clashes with India's own Asian ambitions,

and their respective geopolitical interests compete both in Southeast Asia and Central
Asia The most immediate clash between the two, however, remsins Pakistan. Pakistan
is perhaps China's closest military partner, with Beijing being Islamabad's primary

arms supplier. But, as Mohan Malik points out, China is an important weapons supplier
to most of the states in India's wider neighbourllOod, including Burma and the Islamic
states oflran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. China's arms exports to those countries are part of
its loogstanding "policy of contaimnent of India and encirclement by proxy" to prevent
the rise of India as a peer competitor in Asia. 130

126 ''China to Develop Major Deep-sea Port in Pakistan," indya.com (online), l1W1e 2001. Any Chinese
nava11inb to the port, to be constructed by 2006, remain speculative.
127 Dai Xiao lie and Xu tiu Xions. ''National Report of China," WPDCS-Ol-ll, report to the Indian
Ocean Tuna Commission Working Party on Data Collection and Statistics, 'Third Session. Victoria,
Seychelles, 3 December 2001, p. 2.
128 Bemani D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China's Navy Enters the Twenty-first Century, Naval
Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2001, p. 35. As a non-Indian Ocean state, China is not entitled to full
membership.
12!1l On the 1962 conflict, see Elleman, Modern Chinese War/are, 1795-1989, Ch. 15.
1301. Mohan Malik, ''India Goes Nuclear: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications," Contemporary
Southeast Asia, Vol. 20, No. 2, August 1998, pp. 194-195. China's strategy in South and Central Asia
have been hugely complicated, however, by the American response to the September 11 terrorist attacks.
See Mohan Malik, Dragon on Terrorism: Assessing China's Tactical Gains and Strategic Losses PostSeptember 11, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, October 2002.
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The India-Pakistan conflict cannot realistically be appraised without taking into
account the role of China. India's emergence as a declared nuclear power, symbolized
by its May 1998 nuclear weapon tests, was thus primarily aimed at balancing China in a

post-Soviet

era.131

Pakistan's own nuclear tests, in reply, were only possible with the

technical assistsnce of China. China has supplied Pakistsn with nuclear weapons
technology and production equipment, ballistic missiles, missile parts, entire missile
factories, blueprints and technology.l32 China continues to export a wide range of

conventional weapons, as well as the more dangerous missile and nuclear technology, to
pakistan.133
In addition to protecting its economic interests in (and across) the Indian Ocean,
therefore, China maintains an abiding strategic interest in containing India's geopolitical
influence throughout Asia. China's proliferation activities with Pakistsn and the other
Islamic countries on the western rim of the Indian Ocean serve not only to

coWlter

India, however. By building closer relations with Persian Gulf states China also hopes
to secure its oil supplies, whilst contemporaneously frustrating American efforts to
contain the region's "rogue states" and counter unwanted proliferation. 134 China's
interest in doing so may be to keep the United States preoccupied in the Middle East,

131 See Malik, ''India Goes Nuclear," p. 193; and Th6rese Delpech, "Nuclear Weapons and the 'New
World Order': Early Warning from Asia?" Survival, Val. 40, No. 4, Winter 1998-99, India's Defence
Minister, George Femandes, openly stated that China was the greatest threat facing India, whilst New
Delhi justified its tests due to the presence of an "overt nuclear State" on India's border. See "China
Weighs in for pakistan," The Australian, 21 May 1998, p. 7. Beijing's diplomatic response stated that
India's "gratuitous accusation ... against Chlna is solely for the purpose of finding excuses for the
development of its nuclear weapons," which were aimed at obtaining ''hegemony in South Asia."
''China's Statement on India's Nuclear Tests," Beijing Review, 1-7 1une 1998, p. 7. India tested its
primary nuclear weapon delivery platform in April 1999. The Agm 11 mediumwrange (2,500 km) ballistic
missile is capable of reaching "deep inside China." See "Show of Strength," Far Eastern Economic
Review, 22 April 1999, p. 16. A version of the intennediafe..range Agm ill is being developed with a
reported range of 5,000 km, thus placing all of China within Indian missile range. See ''India Plans Longrange Nuclear Missile Test, Worries U.S.," Difence-aerospace.com (online), 7 February 2003.
132 Shirley A. Kan, ''China's Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Current Policy
Issues," m92056, Congressional Research Service Issue Brief for Congress, 1 March 2002, pp. 2-6.
China has also exported nuclear technology, ballistic missile technology, anti-ship cruise missiles and
chemical weapons components to Iran (pp. 6-10). It is suspected that China has used North Korea as a
surrogate missile proliferator to Pakistan and elsewhere. See ibid., p. 5; and Delpech, "Nuclear Weapons
and the 'New World Order,'" pp. 64-65. There have even been allegations that Pakistan's nuclear tests
were in fact carried out by China, and PLA generals evidently term Pakistan ''China's lsrael." See Mohan
Malik, "China Plays 'the Proliferation Catd,'" Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 12, No. 7,1uly 2000, p.
35.
133 See, for example, ''Seijing Narrows Pakistan Arms Gap," The Australian, 10 lanuary 2002, p. 9; and
''Beijing Arms Pakistan," The Washington Times (onIine ed.), 6 August 2001.
134 See China Security Review Commission. "The National Security Implications of the Economic
Relationship between the United States and China," Report to Congress Pursuant to Public Law 106-398

(30 Octob... 2000), July 2002, Ch. 7.
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thus leaving China more freedom of action in East Asia, 135 as well as providing a
(potential) bargaining chip to limit American arms supplies to Taiwan. In addition to
Pakistan, China has aIao cultivated strong relations with both Bangladesh and Sri Lanka
in maritime South Asia. China is a leading armourer to Bangladesh, including the
supply of frigates, and a siguificant arms exporter to Sri Lanka. 136 In December 2002
Bangladesh signed its first comprehensive defence cooperation agreement with Chiua,
inclnding provisions for the "exchange of infurmation.,,137 It has also been reported that
China is developing Iran's Bandar Abbas naval base. m
When viewed within the context of its strategic rivalry with India, China's
improved access to the Indian Ocean talces on strategic as well as economic
connotations. The route through Burma may provide an alternative link to the sea
should China ever suffer a blockade or disruptions to its shipping in East Asiao seas. l "
However, by developing its commercial maritime power in the Indian Ocean, China
may be laying the groundwork fur a more substantial naval presence in the future.
Chiuese strategists are both aware 01; aod concerned with, the potentially dominaot role
that the Indian Navy could play in the Indiao Ocean, either unilaterally, or in a
cooperative relationship with the U.S. Navy. An adversarial India (or United States)
could quite easily endaoger China's Indiao Oceao interests. A senior PLA general thus
argned in 1993 that China could not accept Indiao naval dominaoce of the Indian Oceao

and would seek to check India's naval growth, stating that "we are not prepared to let
the Indian Oceao become India's Ocean."l40 Chinese aoalysts are particularly concerned
that the Indian Navy may be able to exert choke point oontrol over the Straits of
Hormuz and Malacca in the future. 141
At present, however, the PLA Navy lacks the espabilties to operate in the area
on a regular basis. The PLA's priorities also remain in East Asia, whilst both the Indian
Navy and the U.S. Navy, with its mid-Indiao Ocean base at Diego Oarcia (south of the
''China Plays 'the Proliferation Card.'" p. 36.
136 Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, India's Maritime Security, Knowledge World in association with the Institute
for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, 2000, p. 100. China also sells arms to other Indian Ocean
littoral states in Arabia and East Africa.
l37 "'Bangladesh to Sign First Defence Cooperation Agreement with China." Dejence-aeTospace,com
online), 22 December 2002.
38 See 1i, Asian Pacific SLOe Security, p. 35.
139 A factor noted by Mohan MaIik, "Burma Slides under China's Shadow," Jane's Intelligence Review,
VoL 9, No. 7,1uly 1997, p. 321.
140 General Zbao Nanqi. PIA (then director of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences), quoted in
ibid.
135 MaIik,

f
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Maldives), remain formidable obstacles. The nascent naval rivalry between India and
China will remain on slow burn unless either the PLA Navy deploys more frequently or
aggressively in the Indian Ocean, or the Indian Navy similarly deploys east of the
Malacca Strait. The Indian Navy, like the Chinese, depends on Russia for much of its
weapons technology and has also suffered historically from poor budgets compared to
its rival land-bssed services. Whereas the PLA Navy now receives proportionally high
budgets, however, the Indian Navy still lags behiod its sister services. India too has been

encumbered with an excessively continentalist strategic tradition. 142 Yet, in most
respects, the Indian Navy remains a more impressive force than the PLA Navy,
including an aircraft carrier power projection capability and more experience than the
Chioese of operating ss an oceanic force. Only in the area of nuclear snbmarines (and
perhaps indigenous satellite support) is the Indian Navy noticeably wesker. The prestige
factor should not be dismissed ss a motivating force for at least part of the competitive
naval force structnre ambitions affecting the Sino-Indian relationship, especially for

naval glamour weapons such as aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines.

Burma
Since its bloody suppression of pro-democracy protestotS in 1988 and subsequent
international isolation, Burma's nrilitary junta has increasingly moved into China's
sphere of influence. Initially, China sold Burma Halnan-clsss patrol boats and

communications, radar and electronic warfare equipment. 143 Bmma has so far received,
inter alia, two Jianghu-class frigates, ten Hainan-class boats, six Homo-class missilearmed attack craft, aronnd 50 F-7 combat aircraft and numerous tanks and other
armoured vehicles. l44 China has also sssisted Burma develop its naval base
infrastructure, and India hss claimed that Chinese engineers and "naval-operations

141 See Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment, NDU Press, Washington,.
D.e., 2000. pp. 142-144.

142 On the modem Indian Navy, see Roy-Chaudhwy, India '8 Maritime Security, Ch. 4. The Indian Navy
receives only around 15 per cent of the country's defence budget (p. 145). compared to the PLA Navy's
assumed funding level of roughly one-third of the Chinese defence budget. For historical background on
India's navy, see James Goldrick, No Easy Answers: The Development of the Navies of India. Pakistan,
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, 1945-1996, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No. 2, Lancer Publishers,
New Delhi, 1997.
143 Desmond Ball, Burma's Military Secrets: Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) from the Second World War
to Civil War and Cyber Waifare, White Lotus Press. BaDgkok, 1998, pp. 219-220.
144 International Institute for Strategic Studies (llSS), The MUitary Balance 1999-2000, Oxford University
Press for the 1ISS, London, 1999, pp. 181 and 199-200.
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officers" bave beeo seen at many of those bases. 14' One Indian analyst has suggested
that the new nava1 base at Hainggyi (west of Rangoon and near to the point where the
northern part of the Andaman Sea meets the Bay of Bengal) may be too small to host
larger Chinese warships, but "could be used to support Chinese submarine operations in
the area." The same analyst argues that the deployment of a Chinese submarine to
Burma in 1999 gives credence to the ide.. !46
Currently, perhaps the most significant aspect of the Sino-Burmese relationship
for China's matitime interests is secret agreements for intelligence sharing, including
the joint operation of signals intelligence (SIGINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT)
facilities along the Burmese littoral.!'7 In 1992 China constructed an important facility
on Great Coco Island, just 50 km north of India's Andamao Islands, involving SIGINT
systems, a radsr system and an optical telescope for viewing the northern Andsmans.
The Great Coco Island station is believed to he capable of, inter alia, monitoring air and
naval communications and activities in the eastem part of the Bay of Bengal and in the
Andaman Sea, including the Indian military facilities in the Andaman base of Port Blair,
and Indian ballistic miBsile tests over the Bay of Bengal and eastem India. The station is
controlled by Burma, but partly manned by Chinese personnel, with the intelligence
product shared.!48
Chinese personnel are also stationed at four coastal SIGINT facilities (also
constructed by China): Ramree Island (220 km south of the Bangladesh border);
Hainggyi Island; Monkey Point (Rangoon); and Zadetkyi (St Matthew'S) Island (off the
southernmost tip of Burma and relatively close to the entrance of the Malacca Strait).
Burma's Hainan-class patrol boats also are equipped with ELINT capabilities. 14' The
shared intelligence thus provides China with an electronic surveillance capability not
only to morutor Indian (and other) ntilitary activities in the eastern Indian Ocean, but
also commercial and naval shipping entering and exiting the western entrance of the
Malacca Strait. Chinese intelligence-gathering vessels also bave beeo active in the

Andaman Sea and, in 1994, China was discovered covertly collecting oceanographic

See "... But Stay on Guard," Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 July 1998, p. 16.
Roy-Chaudhury,/ndia's Maritime Security, p. 101.
141 Ball, Burma's Military Secrets, p. 219.
148 Ibid., pp. 221-222.
149 Ibid.. pp. 222-226.
145

146
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data in Indian waters near Narcondam Island (an Indian possession lying between the

Andaman Islands and Bunna).'so
CHINA'S STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT WITH SOUTHEAST ASIA

China's engagement with Southeast Asia gathered pace once the Cold War ended; the
ASEAN states all opened fonnal diplomatic relations with Beijing, and SinoVietnamese relations became less belligerent. Trade flows increased and the ASEAN
states coaxed China into the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in an attempt to bind the
ascendant regional power into a regional cooperative secnrity system. Cbina, for its part,

has become increasingly comfortsble with the role of the ARF as an ASEAN (rather
than American or Japanese) initiative not directed against Chinese interests. IS' Although
ASEAN had managed to demonstrate an outwardly united face over the South China
Sea with its declarations of 1992 and 1995, as well as (eventually) forming an agreed
position on the South China Sea code of conduct, the Southeast Asian grouping has, in
general, fonnd it difficult to find unified positions in its dealings with China. That
problem became more obvious once ASEAN expanded its membership to include
Burma and the three Indochinese ststes, thus exacerbating internal differences by adding

new sets of often divergent national interests. 1S2
It can plausibly be argued, as Robyn Urn has done, that China has learnt how to

manipulate the ARF process and the divisions within ASEAN to its own advantage,
dispelling aoy concerns it may have had of a united opposition to its advance into the
South China Sea. As Lim states, the Chinese "see time as a strategic asSet":'S3 as China
grows ever more powerful over time, it increasingly will be able to exert its would-be
hegeroonic influence over Southeast Asia. As part of that effort, China has deepened its
fonnal engagement with ASEAN (including as one of the three "ASEAN+1" dialogue
partners), and is promoting tangible political, security and economic linkages in ao

ISO See Roy-Chaudhury,lndia's Maritime Security, p. 101; and "... But Stay on Guard," Far Eastern
Economic Review, 16 July 1998, p. 16. India caught three Burmese-flagged fishing boats suspected of

illegal fishing offNarcondam Island in August 1994, but found no fishing gear. Instead, the Chinesecrewed boats carried communications and depth-sounding equipment.
151 See, for example, Yong Deng. ''Managing China's Hegemonic Ascension: Engagement from
Southeast Asia," The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 21, No. I, March 1998; and AlIen S. Whiting,
"ASEAN Eyes China: 1he Security Dimension." Asian Survey, Vol. xxxvn, No. 4, Apri11997.
1S2 Carlyle A Thayer, ''New Fault Lines in ASEAN'?" Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, FebruarylMarch
2000.
IS)

Urn "The ASEAN Regional Forum," p. 124.
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attempt to tie Southeast Asia closer to China,!" The fullowing sections are not intended

to provide a comprehensive onal)'llis of China's deepening relations with Southeast
Asia, but to briefly demonstrate how Beijing is slowly attempting to pull Southeast Asia
into a Chinese sphere of influence, with particular attentiou paid to those factors most

relevant to China's maritime power and position in the region.
Building a New Chinese Sphere ofInfluence in Southeast Asia

Political Relations
At the same summit during which ASEAN aod China issued their declaration on
conduct in the South China Sea, the parties also issued a declaration ou cooperation in
"non-traditional security" areas, which seems to detive from similar efforts within the
ARF. The declaration covers cooperation to combat different fonns of transnationa1
crime, inclnding piracy and terrorism. Although there are few real specifics in the
agreement, China aod the ASEAN states agreed to a number of practical measures,
including "infunnation exchange," "personnel exchange and training" and 'Joint

research" in such non-traditional secmi.ty issues. 155
China has also engaged Laos, BU11IUI, Thailand, Cambodia and Vieloam over
developing the Mekong River basin.!56 Beijing has begun projects to deepen parts of the
Meko!18 to eoable larger Chinese ships to trade aloog the river and to build eight dams,
starting in Yunnao Provioce, to supply electricity to the Mekoug states through ao

integrated power grid. These projects will give China the ability to maoipulate the water
flow of the river and gain greater control over the economies of the Mekong states.!S? It
is clear that China's political aod econontic influence over the Mekong states, especially
Bunna aod Indochina, is growing, despite the workings of Burmese natioualism aod

For some details of the growing links, see "ASEAN-China Relations," background paper, 7fh ASEAN
Summit, Brunei Dar1l8sa1am, 2 November 2001; and ''Press Statement by the Chainnan of the 7th ASEAN
Summit and the Three ASEAN+ 1 Summits," Bandal Seri Begawan. 6 November 2001, paras. 2-9.
m See ''Text of China-ASEAN Declaration on Cooperation on Non-traditional Security Issues," ~
China-ASEAN Summit. Phnom Penh, 4 November 2002, available at People's Daily (onIine cd.), 13
November 2002.
136 ''Premier Zhu Makes 3-point Proposal on Cooperation between China, ASEAN," People's IJajiy
lS4

{onllire ed.), 5 November 2002.

57 See "'Dams May Give China Control over Mekong,'" The Straits Times (online ed.), 15 November
2002; and '"Mekong River Power Project Goes ahead Despite Objections," South China Morning Post
(onIine ed.), 21 January 2002. The downstream states are also concerned about the environmental impact
of the projects. For an analysis highlighting China', upper band over the Mekong, see Evelyn Gob, ''The
Hydro-politics of the Mekong River Basin: Regional Cooperation and Environmental Security," in Tan
and Boutin, eels., Non-traditional Security bsues in Southeast ASia.
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Vietnam's predictable resistance to foreign eocroacInneot. l58 Although Hanoi and
Beijing did conclude boundary delimitation and fisheries agreements for the Tonkin
Gulf (Beibu Bay) in December 2000,159 their conflict over the ParaceIs and the Sprat\ys
has continued unabated.
China's economic resilieoce and responsible behaviour during the Asian
economic ctises of 1997-1998 also improved both its economic credibility in the region
and its relative power position. China contributed U.S.$I billion to the ThaIland relief
fund and used its strength and positive image during the ctisis to its political advantage,
expanding its own influeoce in Southeast Asia largely at the expeose of the United
States, but possibly also of Japan."o

Economic Relations
China's trade with Southeast Asia has blossomed since the normalization of political
relations was successfully completed in the early 1990s. China's total trade with the teo
Southeast Asian states grew almost two-and-a-halftimes betweeo 1993 and 1999, from
U.S.$11.6 billion to U.S.$27.2 billion. Over that period, China's exports to Southeast
Asia expanded from $5.3 billion to $12.3 billion, and imports from Southeast Asia from
$6.3 billion to $15 billion."1 China-ASEAN trade was reported to have growo further in
2001 to U.S.$41.6 billion, and to U.S.$43.5 billion over the first ten months 0[2002 (an

increase of over 28 per cent on an annual basis), whilst investment and other economic
ties also are expanding. l62
There is a major concern amongst the ASEAN states that foreign direct
investment and important manufacturing jobs are being sucked away from Southeast

Asia into China 163 However, the ASEAN states' own economic fortunes are becoming
inexorably tied to China's economy. A senior official from the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development has expressed the view that China has replaced
us See, for example, Muni, China's Strategic Engagement with the New ASEAN.
U9 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "China's Maritime Demarcation and
Bilateral Fisheries Affairs," (c. 2000), available at: ht1p:llwww.finprc.gov.cnieng!14698.html.In1999 the
two states had agreed a common land boundary.
160 See, for example, ''China Steps in Where U.S. Fails," Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 November
2000, pp. 20-22; "Softly, Softly," Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 June 1999, pp. 28-30; and ''Imperial
Inlrigue," Far Eastern Economic Review, 11 September 1997, pp. 14-15.
161 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Direction a/Trade Statistics Yearbook, 2000,1MF, Washington,
D.C., 2000, p. 164. The figures are for mainland China only (i.e., excluding Hong Kong and Macau).
162 "China, ASEAN Economic, Trade Ties Speed Up," ," People's Daily (online ed.), 17 December 2002.
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the United

states

as the engine of economic growth in Asia 164 Certainly, ASEAN's

trade with China increased by over five per cent in 2001 compared to the previous year,
in contrast to a reduction in trade volumes with its other major trading partoers, due to
the global economic slowdown following the September II terrorist attacks of that year.
Another important factor to cousider is that China's imports from Southeast Asia are
growing faster than its exports to the ASEAN ststes, with China-ASEAN trade expected
to grow by an irilpressive ten per cent annuslly over the next three years alone.'"
Although China is still only the ASEAN region's sixth largest trading partoer, trade
growth patterns make it likely that Southeast Asia as a whole will become increasingly
dependent upon the demand created by China's domestic economy. That prospect will
be enhanced following the agreement in November 200 I to set up a China-ASEAN free
trade zone by the end of the decade.!66 In November 2002, the two parties signed the
Framework Agreement on ASEAN-China Economic Cooperation, which aims to

establish an ASEAN-China Free Trade Area by 2010. Barriers to free trade will be

reduced graduslly over the decade, with trade expected to grow by around 50 per cent
once the agreement is fully operational.!67

As China grows more wealthy, it will increasingly be able to buy the resources

reqnired to foel its expanding economy, perhaps ameliorating the need to urgently
develop resources in dispnted waters. Access, especially preferential access, to
Southeast Asia's hydrocarbon resources may be sufficient to satisf'y Beijing. By
developing long-term investments and supply arrangements with regional states, it will

create deepening economic links and dependencies that have genninely strategic
implications. Such arrangements can not be viewed as being merely financial in nature,
and may assist China in its quest for geopolitical primacy in East Asia. Chinese offers to
temporarily shelve sovereignty disputes and jointly develop the oil and gas resources of
the South China Sea thus ought to be viewed through the contextual lens of the region's
unfolding geopolitical equation.
163 Almost 80 per cent of foreign direct investment in East Asia (excluding Japan) is going to China. See
"China's Economic Power: Enter the Dragon." The Economist, 10 March 2001, p. 22; and "China's
Growth Weighs on Neighbouring Countries." International Herald Tribune (online ed.), 18 Angust 200 I.
164 See "China Provides Impetus to Asian Region: UNCTAD," People's Daily (online ed.), 10 January
2003. The report cites UNCfAD Assistant Secretary-General, CarIos Fortin.
16S ''China. ASEAN Economic, Trade Ties Speed Up," People's Daily (online ed.), 17 December 2002.
166 "ASEAN Free-trade Area Agreed," South China Morning Post (online ed.), 7 November 2001.
167 "Historic SlOp 10 Win-win Deal fur China, ASEAN," People', Daily (on1ine ed.), 5 November 2002.
Even if the free trade agreement is not fully implemented (free trade even within ASEAN has proved
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The most notable arrangement thus far has been Chlna's energy relationship
with Indonesia. In March 2002, Beijing and Jakarta agreed to economic cooperation in
four areas, including offshore oil development. PetroChina and Indonesia's Pertamina
oil company signed a partnership agreement, whilst in January, the China National
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) added to China's oil interests in Indonesian waters
by purchasing the Indonesian assets of Spanish company, Repsol-YPF.'68 A larger deal
was struck in September 2002, when China signed a 25 yesr, U.S.S8.5 billion liquefied
natural gas (LNG) contract with Indonesia to supply Fujian Province with 2.6 million
tons of LNG annually from 2007. CNOOC also took a 12.5 per cent stake in the
offshore Papuan Tangguh gas field as part of the deal.'" Only slightly farther afield,
Chlna also signed a larger, 25 yesr deal for LNG from Australia's Northwest Shelf in
August to supply three million tons of LNG annually to Gnangdong Province. The
contract is worth up to U.S.$13 billion, and CNOOC will acquire a five per cent stake in
the Australian gas fields.'7o
In addition to Chinese-led cooperative resource exploitation and infrastructure
projects in Southeast Asia, such as dams, electricity generation and distribution schemes
and ports, all of which will bind the area closer to China, there are plans to expand land
communications to farther improve trade. China's road and riverine projects in Burma
have already been noted above, as has the dredging of the Mekong. China, Laos and
Thailand agreed in 2000 to build a highway from Kunming, in Yurman Province,
through Laos to Bangkok, which is expected to be completed by 2006.171 Work on
another project, the grandiose-sounding Pan-Asia Railway is set to begin in 2003. The
project will link Kunming to Singapore by rail: a 5,600 km route running through
Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand and Malayaia. '72 Although those links will be important
more difficult to achieve than initially hoped), China-ASEAN trade will nevertheless continue to grow
strongly.
168 See <'Loans 8 'Motivation' for Megawati in China," CNN.com (online), 25 March 2002; and
"Megawati in China. to Push Trade," CNN.com (online), 24 March 2002. China also promised Indonesia
U,S.$400 million in preferential loans.
169 The deal was signed during the First Indonesia-China Energy Forum in BaB. See "China, Indonesia
Sign U.8.$8.5 Billion LNG Contract," People's Daily (online 00.), 27 September 2002. Jakarta was
nevertheless disappointed to lose the competition for a larger LNG contract to Australia.
170 "Australia Wins 25-year Deal to Sell Gas to China," The New York Times (online eel.), 9 August 2002;
"Chinese Oil and Gas Company to Buy into Australian Fields," The New York Times (online ed.). 24
August 2002; sod "Australia Wins Bidding to Supply LNG to China," People's Daily (online od.), 8
August 2002.
171 ''China to Build Highway to Link China sod Thailand," People's Dtdly (online od.), 8 February 2002.
172 "Construction of Pan-Asia RailWay to Start in SW China in 2003," People's Daily (on1ine ed.), 18
December 2002; and "Asia Countries to Build Railway Linking China and Singapore," People's Daily
(online ed.), 2 July 2002.
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fur the development of southwestern China, the volume of trade carried over such routes
will nevertheless be limited by the difficult terrain, the limited load capacities of road,

rail and riverine transport, and the distance ofYuunan from the major economic centres
of China. With the exceptions of Burma, Laos and, perhaps, northem Vietnam,
therefore, most of China's trade with Southeast Asia will continue to be carried by
marine shipping. Expected increases in trade will increase the region's reliance on

shipping and, in line with global shipping trends noted in Chapter 4, ever grester
proportions of that trade will be carried by Chinese shipping companies, thns further
cementing Southeast Asia's economic ties with China. China may also be using its

national shipping companies to undercut the opposition on price to win new business,

and strengthen both its strategic position as a commercial maritime power and its
political-economic inlluence within the region. l73

Military Relations

China's military diplomacy in Southeast Asia expanded rapidly during the 1990. as the
pace of China'. overall political and economic engagement with the region accelerated.
Until recently, China's military links in Southeast Asia were limited mainly to one
closely aligned state (Burma) and to supplying weapons (including frigates) to
Thailand. However, the PLA has since built up its relations with its counterparts in
Southeast Asia (as well as in South Asia, Anstralasia and the South Pacific), although
mostly on a strictly bilateral basis. The increasing array of linkages has included
frequent visits by high-level military delegations to regional countries (and receiving
similar visits from regional counterparts), and a grester use of port visits by the PLA
Navy. Such exchanges have not been limited to those slates most friendly to China, and
have included sueh rivals (or potential rivals) as India, the Philippines and Indonesia. l74
For example, in 1997, coseo began new services from eastem Thailand which claimed to undercut
the rates of the nuijor shipping conferences for services to Japan and America by as much as 30-40 per
cent. See «AFriend in Need," Far Eastern EcorwmicReview, 10 July 1997, p. 32.
174 For example, China's defence minister led a large delegation to the Philippines and Indonesia in
September 2002. See, respectively, "RP, China Affirm Defense Cooperation," Manila Bulletin (online
ed.), 26 September 2002; and "Chin... Defense Mini_ M.... with Indonesian President," People's
Daily (onIine ed.), 20 Sept=ber 2002. For a list of China's high-level political-military exchanges in the
period 2001-2002. see Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China,
"China's National Defonse in 2002," Beijing, December 2002, Appenw. IT C'Major Military Exchanges
with Other Countries in 2001-2002',). Available on the World Wide Web at:
http://english.people,com.CIl/featureslndpaper2002lnd£btmL China also is involved in a consultation
process with certain states in the Southeast Asian and Indian Ocean areas, including regular border talks
with India, consultations with Pakistan and an annual strategic dialogue with Australia. In December
2001, the first ministerial defence meeting with Thailand took place. Ibid., Appendix ID (''Participation in
173
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China's increasing involvement in regional military cooperation has been a
function of Beijing's growing self-confidence on the international stage, its geopolitical
requirement to counter the activities of rival states and because, as the PLA modernizes
and China grows ever richer, Beijing simply has more to offer regioual states in terms
of financial assistance and modern weapons and technology. China has generally been
suspicious of participating in multilateral fonns of military cooperation, although it has
become more involved since 2000. Thus far, Chin. has only participated in multilateral
exercises in an observer capacity. China has not been a particularly active member of
the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS),175 for example, although in June 2001
the PLA sent officers to observe the First Western Pacific Mine Countermeasure
Exercise, hosted by Singapore. l7' China also sent observers to the second such exercise
in Singapore in January 2002 and the Second Western Pacific Submarine Rescue
Exercise, Pacific Reach 2002, hosted by Japao in April 2002. 177
Alnng with other ARF members, China sent nti1itary observers to the Cobra
Gold 2002 anoual military exercise between the United St.tes, Thailand and Singapore,
held in May 2002 in Thailand. l78 Australia, Canada, France and Britain have also been
active in encouraging China to become more involved in multil.teral peacekeeping
processes,l79 whilst China's own 2002 defence white paper states that it ''intends to
selectively and gradually participate in more multilateral joint military exercises in the
non-traditioual fields of seentity in the future."I80 In another example of Chinese
engagement, members of the PLA's Naval Research Institute began to participate in the
Track IT Council for Secnrity Cooperation in the Asia P.cific (CSCAP) Maritime
Security ConsultatiOll8 in 2001-2002''). For a comprehensive swvey of the PLA's international
engagement, see Kenneth W. Allen and Eric A. McVadon. China's Foreign Military Relations, The
HenryL. Stimson Center Report No. 32, Washington, D.C., October 1999.
175 The WPNS was created in 1988 to promote multilateral. non-political naval cooperation. It has often

been descnbed as a ''Track I-and-a-half' forum because, although official - members are represented at
symposia by their respective Chief of Navy or his representative - policy issues are not discussed. The 17
members are: Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China. Indonesia. Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New
Guinea, the Philippines, South Korea, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, Tonga, the United States and
Vietnam; and the four observer states are Canada, Chile, France and India.
176 For more detail on WPNS activities, see ebris Rahman, Naval Cooperation and Coalition BUilding in
Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific: Status and Prospect, Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Centre
and Centre for Maritime Policy Working Paper No. 7, RAN Sea Power Centre, RAAF Base Fairbairn,
Canberra, October 2001, pp. 29-32.
177 "China's National Defense in 2002," Part VI ("International Security Cooperation"). China also sent
observers to Pacific Reach 2000 in Singapore in October 2000, although that was not held under WPNS
auspices. The active participants in the Pacific Reach exercises have been the United States, Australia.
Sipgapore, Japan and South Korea.
178 Ibid.
179 "China Rethinks UN Role," Jane 'slJtdence Weekly, 8 May 2002, p. 21.
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Cooperation Working Group meetings in 2002,''' although CSCAP is not itself a
military forum.
None of the above activities is likely to change China's geopolitical ambitions
and behaviour in Southeast Asia, however, and China will remain opposed to militsry
exercises between the United States and its core regional allies or between members of
ASEAN who view China as a potential threat. China has not yet managed to forge
strategically valusble military links with Southeast Asian states other than Burma,
although it may try to do so. Suggestions made in 2001 that China was interested in
"developing" Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay naval base, once the Russians withdrew,
probably were never realistic given the uoderlying distrust in Sino-Vietnsmese
relations. l82 However, China's deepening links with Cambodia have led to speculation
that the PLA Navy may seek to obtain the use of the deep-water port ofSihanoukville in
the future. I" China has also made repeated attempts in the last few years to convince
Singapore to move its Taiwanese training bases to Hainsn. Although primatily aimed at
isolating Taiwan, such a move inevitably would deepen military links between China
and Singapore. l84

China in the South Pacific
By geographical extension from Southeast Asia, Beijing is also attempting to increase
its influence in the South (and Central) Pacific. China's main economic interest in the
South Pacific at present is the region's rich fisheries. Although China is only a minor
player compared to the other Northeast Asian states, its fishing interests are growing,
particnlarly in Fijian waters and in Micronesia (see Chapter 4). Beijing's primsry
political interest in the region has been to couoter Taiwan, engaging in an uoseemly
competition with Taipei to bribe regional island states over diplomatic recognition.
Defense in 2002," Part VI (''lntemational Security Cooperation'').
Personal conversation with Sam Bateman, co-chair of the CSCAP Maritime Cooperation Working
Group. Although supposedly B Track IT fol'llln, there is no pretence from Chinese participants that they
are anything other than officials acting in an official capacity. Chinese delegations to the Working Group
are led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and usually include an official from the State Oceanic
Administration.
182 See "Cam Ranh Bay Manoeuvres," Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 December 2000-4 January
2001, pp. 21-23. Russia was to have completed its withdrawal by July 2002. The most likely fate for the
facility is development into a commercial transportation hub. The identity of any foreign investors or
developers may have interesting geopolitical implications, depending upon their nationality.
183 "China Forges Closer Ties with Cambodia," Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 13, No. 8, August 200l.
184 Taiwanese sources claim that Singapore has already decided to move some facilities to Hainan,
although the report has yet to be confirmed. See "Singapore's Military Training Facilities to Go to
China," Taipe/1lmes (on1ine ed.), 23 September 2002.
180 "China's National
181
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Taiwan has bought recognition from the Marshall Islands, the Solomon Islands and
Nauru, although in July 2002 Nauru switched its recognition from Taiwan to Chinal "
Papua New Guinea also briefly flirted with Taiwan in 1999, but eventually managed to
win large increases in aid from China, whilst China has deepened its relations also with
Fiji, Kiribati and Tonga. Papua New Guinea and Tonga both receive military aid from

China. I86
Arguments have been made that Chiua may attempt to use its new links in the
South Pacific to establish military outposts able to disrupt sea lines of communication
between the United States and its allies in Australia and Southeast Asia in the event of a
Sino-U.S. conflict. l87 At present, such arguments are not only apecolative, but farfetched. l88 The encroachment of a major outside power into the South Pacific
nevertheless poses genuine concerns for Australia, New Zealand and the United States
over the longer tenn, especially if Chinese influence were to exclnde the local powers or
if China established naval, air or ballistic missile bases on the islands. Presently, there is
only one Chinese strategic facility in the South Pacific, the China Space Tracking
Telemetry and Command Station, a satellite and missile-tracking station on Tarawa, the
main island ofKiribati. l89 The location of the island, on the equator, makes it perfect for
this task. One possible role for the station may be to track American ballistic missile
and missile defence tests at Kwajalein Atoll in the MarshalI Islands, some 1,000 km

north ofTarawa. l90

185 "China, Nauru Sign Joint Communique on Establishing Diplomatic Relations," People's Daily (onIine
ed.), 21 July2002.
186 See "Canberra Uneasy as Beijing Woos South Pacific," Asia Times (onIine), 16 August 2001; and
'"China Looks to the South Pacific," Stratjor.com (onIine), 21 May 2001. Beijing has reputedly engaged
in talks with the independence movement of Indonesia's West Papua province. Beijing's tactics and goals
in West Papua are uncertain. but one can speculate that China may have been manipulating the linkage to
~ressure Indonesia over oil and gas contracts and access to other resources.
87 See ibid., for such an argument.
188 The idea that land-based anti-ship missiles could be used to disrupt shipping over such a large expanse
of ocean is unpersuasive, although such a strategy might be possible in archipelagic Southeast Asia. South
Pacific air andIor naval bases, on the other hand, might be more creruble.
181' See ''Pacific Outpost," Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 April 1998, pp. 26-27; and "Chinese
Satellite Base Causes a Stir in Kin'bati:' Yahoo! News Singapore (online), 10 October 2002. Anecdotally,
the Chinese embassy on Tarawa is the largest building in Kio'bati.
190 On the importance of Kwajalein to the United States, see U.S. General Accounting Office, ''Foreign
Relations: Kwajalein Atoll Is the Key U.S. Defense Interest in Two Micronesian Nations," GAO-02-119,
Report to Congressional Requesters, January 2002.
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CHINA, MARITIME POWER AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

Previous chapters have explained the influential role of South China Sea factors in the
development of Chinese naval power and military strategy. This chapter has
demonstrated that China's strategic advance into the South China Sea since the early
1970s has been slow, but relentless, and that Beijing has been williug to use force to
achieve its goals when necessary.
China's strategy has often been descnDed as opportunistic, taking advantage of
the international enviromnent when it seemed benign and favourable to Chinese
action.!91 China has also been forced, at times, to delay its advaoce uotil it was
financially aod militarily strong enough to act decisively. Yet the advance deep into
ntaritime Southeast Asia, and occupation of territory not traditionally controlled by
China, has demonstrated a co:os.iateot policy and strong will to act to secure new
territory in the South China Sea, a design intimately associated with the reign of Deng
Xiaoping aod the influence of his chief PLA lieuteoant, Liu Huaqing. There has been no
evidence to date that Deug's successors are willing to compromise amtnegotiate away
Chinese gains or discontinue the militsrization of China's position in the South China
Sea.
China has consiateotly taken a conciliatory approach when dealing with ASEAN
over the South China Sea,!92 only to disregard ASEAN declarations calling for restramt
and the spirit of its own bilatersl agreements once the time was deemed right to further
enhance its position. China's policy of joint development on the basis of recognition of
Chinese sovereignty is uaderstandably unacceptable to the Southeast Asian claimants,
especially Vie1nam and the Philippines, and to some extent makes China's behaviour
seem like an uoseem\y grsb for the region's resources. It is even more uoderstandable
that Indonesia would oppose China's highly extravagant aod dubious claim to even a

share of the resources within Indonesian waters. However, China's growing economic
leverage has led to the use of more conventional, commercial means to harness
191 Garver, "'China's Push through the South China Sea," p. 1028; and Valencia, ''Building Confidence
and Security in the South China Sea," pp. 537-538. For example, in 1974 the United States and China
were entering into a tacit coalition against the Soviet Union and Washington had already withdrawn from
South Vietnam; in 1988 Vietnam was diplomatically isolated over Cambodia and the Soviet Union was in
serious decline, whilst Sino-Soviet relations were warming. and in 1994 American forces had already
been forced to leave the Philippines at a time of more general post-Cold War force structure reductions.
See Chen. "The PRC's South China Sea Policy and Strategies of Occupation in the Paracel and Spratly
Islands," pp. 130-131.
192 China had taken a hard line with Vietnam, however, prior to Hanoi's accession to the ASEAN club.
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Southeast Asian resources, making development of disputed waters less urgent. The
stronger China's political and economic influence becomes io East Asia, the more
comfortable Beijiog is likely to be to enter into financial patron state-client state

arrangements to guarantee access to, and perhaps even some control over, the region's
raw resources. Increasingly, eoergy supplies will become one of the factors eomeshing
Southeast Asiao economies with the economy of the aspiring regional hegemon. As a

consequence, those linkages may serve not only to aid China's economic development
aod reduce its oil security concerns, but also improve its staoding in the geopolitical
contest for influence in Southeast Asia. China's free trade agreement with ASEAN, for
example, should be viewed primarily in geopolitical, rather thao economic, terms.
Thns, China's political-economic dynamism is beginning to alter the
geopolitical equation in Southeast Asia in ways perhaps similar to previons eras of

Chinese expansionism. As one scholar notes: "It would be remarkable if the
mercaotilism of late twentieth century Chins was not, like that of 1,000 years ago, to
have major effects on the southern border and the polities beyond."l93 Another analysis
has suggested that China may attempt ''to reinstate some of the traditional pattems of
control and deference it has enjoyed in the past" over peripheral alates, if it cao increase

its relative power. l94
China's comprehensive national power has, without doubt, made significaot
advaoces relative to the Southeast Asian atates - or even ASEAN as a whole - and also
relative to the other Asian major powers, Japan aod India. China continues to expand its
political, economic and strategic influence in Southeast Asia, not only in areas
bordering southern continental China, where cross-border land communications are
being improved, but also throughout the South China Sea and the Andaman Sea/eastern
Bay of Bengal maritime regions. Beijing's economic influence aod limited military
presence astride the region's sea lanes and close to vital maritime choke points may
eqnate to a contemporary version of traditional Chinese control over its periphery,
which has been described as often being ''restricted to commanderies on importaot

communication and trade routes" rather than actual physical occupation or control of

193 Geeft' Wade, <'The Southern Chinese Borders in History," in Grant EvaDs, Christopher Hutton and
Kuah Khun Eng, eds., Where China Mee~ Southeast Asia: Social and Cultural Change in the Border
Regions. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2000, p. 45.
194 Michael D. Swaine and Asbley J. Tellis, Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Post, Present, and
Future, MR-1121-AF.RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2000,p.129.
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surrounding territory.l95 Tight Chinese political control over regional states is nnlikely
to occur due to the workings of Southesst Asian nationalism and the probable
unwillingness of ASEAN states to become too closely aligned with anyone major
power. Furthermore, whilst China's geopolitical influence in the region and its assured

access to raw resources are growing, the strategic consequences of the ''war on
terrorism" may have attenuated Chinese compelitive gains relalive to those of its great

power rivals, at least temporarily.l%
China's military presence in the region has increased steadily, but its capacity
fur decisive action in anything more than limited conflicts with wesker states remains
minimal. The PLA Navy's ability to control or defend shipping along the length of the
sea lanes linking Northeast Asia to Europe, Africa and the Middle East has not been
notably improved. However, China now has in place significant SIGINT and ELINT
surveillance coverage, from the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea to outposts in both
the western and eastern Spratlys, the Paraeels and Hainan, which most likely provides
the PLA with the ability to track all shipping entering and leaviug the Malacca Strait
and tranaiting the South China Sea. Although the PLA Navy has yet to achieve a
credible sea denial capability throughout the first island chain, it is enhancing its
strategic reach by improving its military outposts, especially Woody Island, as staging
areas for military operations deeper into the South China Sea. Those capabilities may
improve China's ability to implement a blockade of commercial shipping (particularly
oil tankers) in the futore, possibly using a choke point strategy, should it ever desire to
pressure Taiwan or Japan in that way.
A combination of growing political, strategic aod economic ties to Southeast
Asia and beyond may provide China with access to naval (or other military) bases aod
facilities in the future. Potentially, China could obtain access to bases goarding vital
maritime choke points from the Straits of Hormuz to the Taiwao Strait. It certainly is
unlikely that China's maritime expansion in Southeast Asia and into the Indian Ocean

will be able to effectively challenge the current Americao-led Western maritime
dominance in the Indian Ocean and East Asian seas, although it may be able to at least

See Wade, '''The Southern Chinese Borders in History," p. 36.
On China's relative strategic losses in the region due to the American~led "war or terror," see Malik.
Dragon on Terrorism, esp. pp. 28-31 and 35-42.
195
196
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compromise that dominance."7 Maritime power and presence nevertheless are at the

forefront ofBeijing's strategy to win greater geopolitical influence in Southeast Asia.

197 Norman Fri~ has made an interesting point about Soviet strategy in the Cold War which has
relevance to China's position today. Moscow had cultivated certain client regimes in the Third World
which lay outside the choke points constraining the access of SOViet sea power w the sea., were situated
astride key Westem sea lanes and may have helped to restrict Western access to African resources.
However, Friedman states that «we still do not know whether there was any maritime design behind
Soviet cultivation of particular client states," but that there was a known desire to gain control over
revolutionary movements around the world (in competition with. ironically, China). See Norman
Friedman. Seapower as Strategy: Navies and National Interests, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD,
2001, pp. 205-206 and331, n. 17.
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8

China and Maritime Northeast Asia

Littoral Northeast Asia is China's foremost maritime area of national interest. The
region contains China's new economic heartland (the booming coastal provinces of
eastern and southern China), the leading object of China's strategic desires (Taiwan),
the main long-term threat to China's regional interests as perceived by Beijing (Japan),
and the primary short to medium-term constrainer of Chinese geopolitical ambitions and
defender of both Taiwan and Japan (the United States). Excluding the Bohai Gulf,
which is not the subject of contending claims, there are three bodies of water in
Northeast Asia over which China maintains a direct strategic interest: the East China
Sea, the Taiwan Strait and the Yellow Sea. The Sea of Japan is also strategically
important, albeit less directly.
The chapter begins by briefly assessing China's strategic interests in the Yellow
Sea and Sea of Japan. Next, the Taiwan issue is evaluated, with particular attention paid
to the island's growing role in China's strategic priorities and how Taiwan most likely
constitutes a vital part of Beijing's longer-term maritime strategy. Thirdly, the chapter
assesses the strategic importance of the East China Sea within the context of SinoJapanese relations. Finally, the chapter offers some conclusions on how Chinese
strategic behaviour in Northeast Asia provides pointers to its geopolitical ambitions.

CHINA, THE YELLOW SEA AND THE SEA OF JAPAN

The Yellow Sea is important to China for both commercial and strategic reasons.
Commercially, the Yellow Sea coast is the location of the cities driving the economy of
northern China, including important ports and shipbuilding facilities. Yellow Sea sea
lanes, therefore, are essential for the economy of northern China, which includes the
major economic centres of Beijing and Tianjin. The Yellow Sea contains some oil and
252

China has unresolved continental shelf boundaries with both North and South Korea,
but there are no maritime territorial disputes in the Yellow Sea involving Beijing. 1 In
August 2000, China and South Korea signed a bilateral fisheries agreement to conserve
Yellow Sea fish stocks and promote "orderly fishery relations.,,2 China's traditionally
close political relationship with North Korea and growing economic and political
relations with South Korea mean that China's strategic concerns in the area are focused
on other actors. 3 South Korean defence analysts are wary of China's rising power, yet
4

do not perceive a direct threat from it. Whether or not Korean unification occurs in the
near term, South Korean analysts are increasingly aware of the impending need to strike
a balance between its security relationships with the United States on the one hand, and
a rising China on the other. s
The ability to control the Yellow Sea, or at least to deny the body of water to a
potentially hostile U.S. Navy, is a requirement of China's offshore active defence
strategy to defend China's coastal regions and to keep hostile forces away from the
Bohai Gulf (which could be used to threaten Beijing). Moving eastwards, the Korea
Strait links the Yellow Sea to the Sea of Japan. According to one Taiwanese analyst, the
Korea Strait "has long been regarded by Chinese as the doorway to Japan.,,6 In a
regional conflict with the United States or Japan, the PLA most likely would attempt sea
and area denial operations against military bases in Japan and naval forces in the Sea of
Japan, and is already increasing its maritime surveillance activities there (see later
1 See Ji Guoxing, "Maritime Jurisdiction in the Three China Seas: Options for Equitable Settlement," in
Dalchoong Kim, Choon-ho Park, SeD-Hang Lee and Jin-Hyun Paik, eds., UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea and East Asia, East and West Studies Series 40, Seoul Press for the Institute of East and West
Studies, Yonsei University, Seoul, 1996, pp. 90-93; and Greg Austin, China's Ocean Frontier:
International Law, Military Force and National Development, AlIen and Unwin, St Leonards, NSW,
1998, pp. 185-193.
2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "China's Maritime Demarcation and
Bilateral Fishery Mfairs" (c. 2000), available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cnlengI14698.html.
3 On the rapidly improving post-Cold War relationship between South Korea and China, see Victor D.
Cha, "Engaging China: Seoul-Beijing Detente and Korean Security," Survival, Vol. 41, No. 1, Spring
1999.
4 Nevertheless, South Korean defence analysts do not seem to welcome China's expanding naval power,
or its potential to upset the regional status quo and potentially control Korean SLOCs in the longer term.
Interview at the Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy (KIMS), Seoul, August 2000.
5 See, for example, Chung Min Lee, "Contemplating Korea's Strategic Choices," in Chung-in Moon and
Chung Min Lee, eds., Air Power Dynamics and Korean Security, Yonsei Monograph Series on
International Studies 6, Yonsei University Press, Seoul, 1999, p. 47; and Taeho Kim, "The China Factor:
th
The Underlying Driver in East Asia's Future Strategic Configuration," paper prepared for the 29 SinoAmerican Conference on U.S.-China Relations in the Year 2000, Taipei, 28,30 May 2000, p. 27.
6 Kuen-chen Fu, "Chinese Naval Strategy in the Yellow Sea," in Choon-ho Park, Dalchoong Kim and
Seo-Hang Lee, eds., The Regime of the Yellow Sea: Issues and Policy Options for Cooperation in the
Changing Environment, East and West Studies Series 11, Seoul Computer Press for the Institute of East
and West Studies, Yonsei University, Seoul, 1990, p. 160.
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section below). China also maintains ambitions to secure direct access to the Sea of
Japan for its northeastern provinces: the province of Jilin is cut off from the sea by a
narrow strip of Russian land. China has been frustrated, however, by both Russian and
North Korean opposition. 7 Potentially, China's maritime expansion might threaten
Russia's isolated far eastern provinces in the future, although China's strategic priorities
currently lie elsewhere.
China's sensitivities in the current era to foreign, particularly American, naval
activity in or near Chinese offshore zones was first demonstrated in October 1994 in the
Yellow Sea. The American aircraft carrier, USS Kittyhawk, had been observing Chinese
naval exercises in the East China Sea when it detected a Han-class nuclear submarine
near Qingdao. The submarine subsequently trailed the Kittyhawk for two days as the
carrier headed towards South Korea, coming to within 21 miles of its quarry. When the
submarine itself was tracked by carrier-borne anti-submarine warfare aircraft and
targeted by the active sonars of American surface combatants, the PLA Navy's North
Sea Fleet commander scrambled naval fighters to ward offthe carrier battle group.8
TAIWAN: CHINA'S NEW STRATEGIC PRIORITy9

The lifting of martial law in Taiwan in 1987 and subsequent democratization of the
island's politics has played an important role in remaking China's strategic priorities.
Yet, political evolution on the island itself is only half the story. The adoption of
strident Chinese nationalism to legitimize Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule during
the same period inevitably has re-emphasized the strategic importance of Taiwan to a
level not seen for forty years. That change was symbolized by China's ballistic missile
diplomacy in 1995-1996; and the American reaction to Beijing's belligerent behaviour
seemingly has convinced China that it must develop both military strategy. and forces,
based around a maritime strategy of access denial, to be able to deter or defeat any
future American military intervention on behalf of Taiwan. Taiwan, moreover, has

7 See Jennifer Anderson, The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, Adelphi Paper 315, Oxford
University Press for the IISS, London, 1997, pp. 29-30 and 45. China and Russia negotiated navigation
rights for Chinese shipping along the Tumen River, which empties into the Sea of Japan, but the final
stretch would require agreement from an uncooperative North Korea.
8 See John Downing, "China's Evolving Maritime Strategy. Part 1: Restructuring Begins," Jane's
Intelligence Review, Vol. 8, No. 3, March 1996, p. 132.
9 Some parts of the following sections of this chapter have been adapted from Chris Rahman, "Defending
Taiwan, and Why It Matters," Naval War College Review, Vol. LIV, No. 4, Autumn 2001.
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assumed importance amongst Chinese strategists beyond the obvious dispute over
sovereign legitimacy. The island also comprises an essential element in China's grand
and military strategies for regional geopolitical pre-eminence, and China has adopted an
aggressive combination of strategies to weaken Taiwanese resolve.

History and the Taiwan Conflict
There can be no doubt that Taiwan today is a de facto independent state. Gary
Klintworth has aptly described Taiwan as an emerging

independent regional actor after an ambiguous existence as a colony and a refuge for
more than a century.... Taiwan has established itself with an international identity as the
Republic of China on Taiwan, a successful international trading nation that is as distinct
from China as Singapore. Had Taiwan been located anywhere else in the world, it
would have been entitled to ... recognition [as an independent nation].10

Location, as argued in a later section, is a driving force behind Taiwan's newfound
strategic significance: the island is part of the first island chain that restricts China's
open access to the ocean, and lies astride important sea lanes.
China has nevertheless persisted in its claim to sovereignty over the island,
stating in its 2000 Taiwan white paper that "Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese
territory."lI Beijing's position on Taiwan's history is that the island has always been
Chinese territory but was "forcibly occupied" in 1895 by Japan, following that
country's defeat of Chinese forces in a "war of aggression against China.,,12 China's
view of its own history, however, is both distorted and self-serving. 13 It is beyond the
scope of this dissertation to provide a detailed history of the island, but it is important to
understand the historical background to China's tenuous claims given the centrality of
the Taiwan issue to China's regional ambitions.

10 Gary Klintworth, New Taiwan, New China: Taiwan's Changing Role in the Asia-Pacific Region, St.
Martin's Press, New York, 1995, p. 1.
11 The Taiwan Affairs Office and the Information Office of the State Council, People's Republic of
China, "The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue," Beijing, February 2000, reproduced in Beijing
Review, 6 March 2000, p. 16.
12 Ibid.
13 See Thomas Bartlett, "The Role of History in China's View of the World Today," Pacifica Review,
Vol. 13, No. 1, February 2001, esp. pp. 124-126.
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Taiwan from Pre-colonial Times to Japanese Occupation

Until the late sixteenth century, Taiwan had been the almost exclusive preserve of
several warrior-like aboriginal tribes, whilst both Chinese and Japanese traders and
pirates made increasing use of the island's ports and harbours from the late fifteenth
century. Although the Portuguese gifted the island's European name, Formosa, in the
early sixteenth century, they instead made Macau their regional base, whilst repeated
Japanese attempts to subjugate Taiwan between 1598 and 1628 were rebuffed by the
local inhabitants. It was not until the arrival of the Dutch that Taiwan was successfully
colonized.!4 When the Dutch threatened to use force to establish a trading post on the
mainland in 1622, the governor-general of Fujian and Zhejiang instead directed them to
Taiwan. He hoped that they would pacify the island and relieve the population pressures
in Fujian by allowing Chinese emigration to Taiwan, which indeed eventuated under
Dutch rule.!S
Dutch rule ended in 1662 when a Ming Dynasty loyalist, Zheng Chenggong
(also known as "Koxinga"), captured the island for use as an offshore base of operations
against the Manchu, who had established the Qing Dynasty in 1644 (foreshadowing
Chiang Kai-shek's similar retreat in 1949). The Ming rebels were finally defeated by the
Qing in 1683 and Taiwan was nominally made a prefecture of Fujian Province. 16 It is
interesting to note that the invasion was carried out by a foreign (Le., non-Chinese)
dynasty, with one senior Chinese court official arguing against the invasion on the
grounds that "since ancient times, Taiwan has always been outside our civilisation."!?
Even the Qing emperor at the time stated that Taiwan was "a trifling place - taking it
would add nothing, relinquishing it would not be a loss": defeating the Ming rebels was
the only imperial concern. I8
Qing rule was brutal and generally ineffective: there were several large
rebellions and frequent lesser revolts, creating a wild and dangerous frontier land.
Thomas Bartlett argues that many Chinese immigrants were struck with the sense that
"Taiwan was as much like other Southeast Asian locales outside Chine Proper, to which

14 See Simon Long, Taiwan: China's Last Frontier, Macmillan, London, 1991, pp. 2-8; and Klintworth,
New Taiwan, New China, p. 5.
15 Bartlett, "The Role of History in China's View of the World Today," p. 124.
16 Long, Taiwan, pp. 11-13.
17 Unnamed official, quoted in Bartlett, "The Role of History in China's View of the World Today," p.
124.
18 Quoted in Klintworth, New Taiwan, New China, p. 7.
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Chinese emigrated, as it was like their homeland." I 9 China only ever exerted its tenuous
control (or even interest) over the cultivated lowlands in the western third of the island.
Beginning in the 1850s, Britain, France, Russia, Prussia, the United States and Japan all
indicated commercial and/or strategic interest in the island. And, when aboriginal
tribesmen beheaded several Japanese sailors .in 1871, leading to Japanese protests,
China responded that it maintained sovereignty only over the "civilized" third of the
island. When Japan sent a naval expeditionary force to Taiwan in 1874, China expanded
its sovereignty claim to include the entire island - but only at the insistence of the
British, who wanted to preclude a potential threat to Britain's Far Eastern sea lanes from
Taiwan~based Japanese naval forces. 2o
Taiwan nominally became a Chinese province in 1885, when China formalized
its sovereignty claim to the entire island, partly as a response to Japanese ambitions. In
Bartlett's words, this change "disrupted the balance of influences [prevalent] in Taiwan
during the previous two centuries.,,21 However, the balance of influences in Taiwan was
reversed following China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, which was
fought primarily in northern China over contested influence in Korea and which
involved significant naval engagements. As a result of China's defeat, Taiwan was
ceded to Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895, although it took around a decade
for Japanese forces to pacify its first colony.22 Defeat by Japan, including the "loss" of
Taiwan provided a significant stimulus thereafter to the development of Chinese
nationalist ideology on the mainland. 23

Taiwan in the Post-1945 World

During the Second World War, foreign forces continued to detennine Taiwan's future,
with the Allies declaring at Cairo in 1943 and Potsdam in 1945 that territories occupied
by Japan would be "restored" to China at the conclusion of the conflict. The Nationalist
Bart1ett, "The Role of History in China's View of the World Today," p. 125.
Long, Taiwan, pp. 17-20. The claim that Chinese sovereignty extended only over the "civilized" part of
Taiwan conforms to the Chinese notion of sovereignty noted in the previous chapter: that sovereignty
involves only those areas occupied by Chinese people using a common Chinese culture, rather than mere
territory alone.
21 Bartlett, "The Role of History in China's View of the World Today," p. 125.
22 Long, Taiwan, pp. 23-26. The Taiwanese initially declared independence following China's defeat, but
were eventually subdued by Japanese forces. The Liaodong Peninsula on China's eastern Yellow Sea
coast was also ceded to Japan, but Russian-led European pressure ensured that this territory was returned.
On the war itself, see Bruce A. Elleman, Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989, Routledge, London, 2001,
Ch. 7; and Richard NJ. Wright, The Chinese Steam Navy, 1862-1945, Chatham Publishing, London,
2000, Chs. 8-9.
19

20
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- or Kuomintang (KMT) - forces of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek were at first
welcomed by the Taiwanese in 1945. The honeymoon was short-lived, however, as
KMT administrators treated the island merely as war booty "captured" from the
Japanese, and the locals with contempt. The clash of cultures culminated in the "228"
massacre of 28 February 1947, when a minor incident involving local protests against
poor treatment by KMT occupation forces led to the (KMT) military killing up to
30,000 Taiwanese. The massacre wiped out any political resistance to KMT rule and
still exerts a powerful influence upon the evolving Taiwanese national consciousness
today.24 The defeat of the KMT on the mainland in 1949 and their retreat to Taiwan
resulted in a somewhat unique situation: 25 the colonization of the island by outside
forces who were now exiled from their own homeland.
Gary Klintworth has characterized Taiwan's development during the Cold War
as occurring in three stages. Firstly, the period 1950 to 1972 was one of American
domination, during which time the island developed an "internationalised economy and
as a modern, Westernised society," including the restoration of close economic links
with Japan, under American protection. Washington initially had been uninterested in
the fate of the island, until the outbreak of the Korean War. As a consequence of the
Korean War and the need to contain Chinese, as well as Soviet Communism, Taiwan
became an important part of America's East Asian anti-Communist defences, with the
U.S. Navy twice deploying to the Taiwan Strait, in 1954 and 1958, to guard against
possible Chinese invasion attempts. In the second, post-1972 period, Taiwan has had to
adapt to its downgraded diplomatic status following Beijing's rapprochement with the
United States. And, in the third period, since the late 1980s, Taiwan has democratized
and taken an increasingly independent international posture, whilst developing new
economic and social ties with China without downgrading its ties to the United States
26
and Japan. That progression has only been possible, however, with the continued

Bartlett, "The Role of History in China's View of the World Today," p. 125.
Klintworth, New Taiwan, New China, p. 13. The figure of 30,000 killed is based on contemporary
estimates by Taiwanese historians. The incident remained a taboo subject until after the lifting of martial
law in 1987. See "Remembering 228: Facing a Violent Past," Taipei Times (onIine ed.), 28 February
2003.
25 Taiwan's population by 1949 consisted of five million Taiwanese and two million KMT mainlanders.
Klintworth, New Taiwan, New China, p. 13.
261bid., pp. 14-16.
23

24
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protection of the United States, as set out in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979.27 •
Although the Act does not explicitly require the United States to actively defend
Taiwan, the implication is that it would assist through anns sales and in other,
unspecified ways. Moreover, it seems clear that the Taiwan Relations Act takes
precedence over the Sino-American communique of August 1982 limiting arms sales to
Taiwan. 28
Contemporary Taiwan, as expressed by Gary Klintworth, thus is a country that is
predominantly Chinese in ethnic and cultural tenns, with some Japanese cultural
influences, and which has also been Westernized during the period of "American
domination.,,29 Yet, Klintworth was premature when he wrote in 1995 that Taiwan had
been "almost destined" to become both independent and secure due to its location
between the "three dominant Pacific powers," because
Japan, China and the United States have each pulled back from contesting the claims to
Taiwan of the other two. All three powers seem satisfied with the current power balance
around Taiwan, at least for the time being. 30

China's dissatisfaction with the power balance around Taiwan in fact was to become
clear in that very same year and into 1996, with its ballistic missile diplomacy in the

"Taiwan Relations Act," 10 April 1979. Public Law 96-8 96th Congress. The Act effectively replaced
the abrogated defence treaty between the United States and the Republic of China once Washington
switched its diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. The Act includes the following provisions:
SEC.2.(b) It is the policy of the United States
(4) to consider any effort to detennine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful
means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the
Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States;
(5) to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and
(6) to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other
forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system,
of the people on Taiwan.
SEC.3.(a) In furtherance of the policy set forth in section 2 of this Act, the United States
will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such
quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense
capability.
(c) The President is directed to inform the Congress promptly of any threat to the
security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan and any danger to the
interests of the United States arising therefrom. The President and the Congress shall
determine, in accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate action by the United
States in response to any such danger.
28 At the same time (August 1982), President Ronald Reagan gave Taipei "six assurances" on arms sales,
Taiwan's status and the Taiwan Relations Act. See Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "China-Taiwan: U.S.
Debates and Policy Choices," Survival, Vol. 40, No. 4, Winter 1998-99, p. 154.
29 Klintworth, New Taiwan, New China, p. 17.
30 Ibid., p. 16.
27
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Taiwan Strait. What is clear is that Taiwan has never been effectively integrated with
mainland China. The island was nominally a Chinese province for only about a decade
until it became a Japanese colony in 1895, and again between 1945 and 1949. At other
times Taiwan has either been the (often unruly) colony of a variety of powers or the
base for rebel mainland groups to contest political control of China. When discussing
Taiwan, therefore, the term "reunification" is politically loaded, inaccurate and
inappropriate. 31

The Taiwan Missile Crises of 1995-1996
Democratization

Taiwan's rapid democratization under the influence ofKMT President Lee Teng-hui - a
native Taiwanese32 - since early 1988, including the rise of the (then) opposition, proindependence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), has been a significant achievement.
The world's first genuine Chinese democracy, under liberal Taiwanese leadership for
the first time, thus began to diverge from its conservative, mainland KMT roots. An
important symbolic step towards Taipei's acknowledgement of its own de facto
independence occurred in May 1991, when Lee dropped the KMT's pretensions to
sovereignty over the mainland, even though Taiwan continued to pay "lip service" to
the "one China principle.,,33 Taiwanese politics have not only become democratized, but
nativized. 34 In effect, in its own unique way, the process has also been one of
decolonization: Taiwan is now very much ruled by Taiwanese for Taiwanese. 35
Lee's "mainstream" KMT faction and the DPP increasingly came to take a
similar view on Taiwan's political status, which has been described as being one of

Bartlett, "The Role of History in China's View of the World Today," p. 126, makes essentially the
same point. It is also interesting to note that, although Taiwan shares many of its cultural traditions with
China, Taiwanese culture itself is unique, differing significantly from China's own. See Shelley Rigger,
"Competing Conceptions of Taiwan's Identity: The Irresolvable Conflict in Cross-Strait Relations," in
Suisheng Zhao, ed., Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 Crisis,
Routledge, New York, 1999, esp. p. 239.
32 The tenn "native" is used in the sense of being born on the island, but not necessarily of indigenous
Taiwanese ethnic origin. Ethnically, Lee is Chinese - but a Taiwanese native, as is also current president,
Chen Shui-bian.
33 Jean-Pierre Cabestan, "Taiwan's Mainland Policy: Nonnalization, Yes; Reunification, Later," The
China QuarJeriy, No. 148, December 1996, p. 1261.
34 See Michael Yahuda, "The International Standing of the Republic of China on Taiwan," The China
Quarterly, No. 148, December 1996, pp. 1321-1323.
35 Many Taiwanese, particularly conservative KMT mainlanders, would no doubt disagree with this
characterization of democratization qua decolonization. Lee Teng-hui has made a similar point, however,
speaking of Taiwan's liberation not only from colonization by foreign countries but also the "alien regime
of the KMT." See "Lee Seeks Change of the Nation's Name," Taipei Times (online ed.), 16 March 2003.
31
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"normalization" between Taiwan and China. "Normalization" included improved
economic and social links, under the assumption that the two sides were separate
political entities, yet overlaid by the slogan of "one China," the meaning of which
remains both esoteric and disputed. 36 The United States was highly supportive of
Taiwanese democratization and, during the 1992 American presidential election
campaign, the Bush Administration agreed to sell Taiwan 150 F-16 fighter aircraft, the
most significant arms sale in over a decade, at least in part to counter China's
acquisition ofSu-27s from Russia. 3?
The Missile Crises 38

Beijing had always been suspicious of Lee Teng-hui, and unsuccessfully attempted to
influence the Taiwanese electorate against his re-election in 1990. 39 The tempo of
Beijing's attempts to intervene in Taiwan's internal political affairs increased markedly
in September and October 1994, when the PLA held major joint exercises north of
Kinmen (Quemoy), a small Taiwanese island possession close to the Chinese coast. 40 In
January 1995, Jiang Zemin made his "eight point proposal" on Taiwan, threatening to
Cabestan, "Taiwan's Mainland Policy," pp. 1261-1266.
Some (including Beijing) have suggested that the sale was motivated by an American desire to
undermine the 1982 communique. See the discussion in Tucker, "China-Taiwan," p. 157. A recent report
alleges that the United States pressured Taipei into buying F-16s when it discovered that Taiwan was
negotiating with Russia to buy 100 Su-27s. See "U.S. Pressured Taiwan into Aborting Russian Fighter-jet
Deal: Report," Defence-aerospace.com (online), 22 December 2002. Taipei also successfully negotiated
with France around the same time for 60 Mirage 2000-5 fighter aircraft and six frigates. Sheng Lijun,
"China Eyes Taiwan: Why Is a Breakthrough So Difficult?" The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 21,
No. 1, March 1998, p. 69, alleges that Washington in fact had actively attempted to counter President
Chiang Ching-kuo's (Chiang Kai-shek's son) attempts to politically engage Beijing in the 1980s, and
supported Lee Teng-hui during the period of political transition following Chiang's death.
38 There has been a large body of literature generated on the missile crises. See, for example, James R.
Lilleyand Chuck Downs, eds., Crisis in the Taiwan Strait, NDU Press, Washington, D.C., 1997; Greg
Austin, ed., Missile Diplomacy and Taiwan's Future: Innovations in Politics and Military Power,
Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 122, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian
National University, Canberra, 1997; John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan's
Democratization, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1997; Zhao, ed., Across the Taiwan Strait;
Douglas Porch, "The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996: Strategic Implications for the United States Navy,"
Naval War College Review, Vol. LII., No. 3, Summer 1999; Andrew Scobell, "Show of Force: Chinese
Soldiers, Statesmen, and the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis," Political Science Quarterly, Val. 115, No.
2, Summer 2000; Robert S. Ross, "The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and
the Use of Force," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2, Fall 2000; Andrew Nien-Dzu Yang, The 1996
Missile Exercises: China's Political Manipulation and Taiwan's Crisis Management, CAPS Papers No.
27, Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies, Taipei, March 2000; and Yann-huei Song, "China's
Missile Tests in the Taiwan Strait: Relevant International Law Questions," Marine Policy, Vol. 23, No. 1,
January 1999.
39 Parris H. Chang, ""Beijing's Relations with Taiwan," in Parris H. Chang and Martin L. Lasater, eds., If
China Crosses the Taiwan Strait: The International Response, University Press of America, Lanham,
MD, 1993, p. 10.
40 Song, "China's Missile Tests in the Taiwan Strait," p. 82.
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use force against "foreign forces" who acted to prevent unification.

41

In May, Lee Teng-

hui was granted a visa to visit his Alma Mater, Cornell University in the United States,
a visit which occurred in June, infuriating Beijing. On 18 July, China announced
unprecedented ballistic missile tests near another country (that is: Taiwan). Between 2123 July, China fired six DF-15 (M-9) short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) into the
sea about 85 miles north of Keelung, Taiwan's second largest port, located at the north
of the island. And, in August, approximately 20 warships and 40 combat aircraft carried
out anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile tests in a large area just to the north of the SRBM
splashdown site, whilst China also conducted its second underground nuclear test for
the year. 42
The PLA conducted further maritime exercises, including amphibious landings
on Dongshan Island, to coincide with Taiwan's parliamentary elections in December
1995, whilst preparing for new large-scale exercises and missile tests during Taiwan's
presidential elections in March 1996. The second series of missile tests was more
provocative, with the two target areas, one to the north and one to the south of the
island, both intersecting sea and/or air lanes. In effect, Beijing was attempting a limited,
partial blockade of Taiwan. On March 8 three DF-15s were fired: two into the southern
target zone, less than 50 miles west of Taiwan's largest port, Kaohsiung; and one to the
northern zone, just 30 miles east ofKeelung. A fourth DF-15 was fired into the southern
zone on March 13, and large-scale joint exercises were conducted in two locations on
the Chinese coast, one opposite northern Taiwan (18-25 March) and one opposite the
south of the island (12-20 March). It is also believed that another 20 missiles were to
have been fired but for the intervention of foul weather. 43 Overall, the PLA's exercises
demonstrated real advances in complex joint operations, the largest joint/amphibious
exercises held by China for 20 years. The integration of ballistic missiles and Su-27
fighters indicated the significant evolution of Chinese doctrine and tactics. 44
Ultimately, the tests did not achieve the desired result: Lee's KMT won the
parliamentai'y election, albeit with a reduced vote, and Lee gained a resounding absolute

41 See Scobell, "Show of Force," p. 23l.
42 See Richard D. Fisher, "China's Missiles over the Taiwan Strait: A Political and Military Assessment,"
in Lilley and Downs, eds., Crisis in the Taiwan Strait, pp. 169-171. One of the two missiles fIred on 21
July malfunctioned and crashed in China.
43lbid., pp. 171-174. None of the missiles are believed to have been armed.
44 Porch, "The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996," p. 21.
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majority in the presidential vote. 45 The American reaction to Beijing's provocative
behaviour was significant. In December 1995 the USS Nimitz carrier battle group sailed
through the Taiwan Strait, the first American carrier to do so since 1979, eliciting a
diplomatic protest from Beijing but clearly not altering China's plans for further
military intimidation of Taiwan. For the March tests the United States sent the carrier

Independence to the vicinity of Taiwan and also ordered the Nimitz battle group to the
area, although it is not clear whether those deployments had much of a deterrent effect
on the extent and nature of the exercises. 46
Andrew Scobell has argued, however, that China's coercive diplomacy was
successful, in that it resulted in a "chastened and less boisterous Taiwanese
independence movement," whilst Washington became increasingly aware of the dangers
of escalation in any future crisisY Washington certainly seemed to weaken its support
for Taiwan following the crisis. In July 1998, President Clinton articulated a vacuous
"strategic partnership" with Beijing and acquiesced in Chinese pressure to publicly state
a policy of "three noes" toward Taiwan: opposing Taiwanese independence, the
concepts of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan," and Taipei's membership in
international organizations that require statehood as a condition for membership.48 The
Clinton Administration's pretence of strategic partnership was both unnecessary and
misleading, serving to alienate or confuse allies and friends. 49 In addition, by
heightening U.S. strategic ambiguity over the extent of its commitment to Taiwan,
Washington weakened deterrence of future Chinese aggression across the Strait. 50

Beijing publicly stated that its intimidation had been successful, but privately was frustrated by the
results and American intervention. See Jean-Pierre Cabestan, "The Mainland China Factor in Taiwan's
1995 and 1996 Elections: A Secondary Role," in Austin, ed., Missile Diplomacy and Taiwan's Future, p.
18.
46 Porch, "The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996," pp. 19-21.
47 Scobell, "Show of Force," pp. 243 and 246. In January 1996 PLA general, Xiong Guangkai, made an
implicit nuclear threat against the United States, warning a former American diplomat and Defence
official that "you care a lot more about Los Angeles than Taipei." Quoted in ibid., p. 241, The obvious
retort would have been that China cares a lot more about Beijing, Shanghai ... and so on, than it does
about either Los Angeles or Taipei. Interestingly, General Xiong was admonished for his remarks almost
eight years later by D.S. National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice, at a meeting in Washington in
December 2002. See "Chinese General Told Threat against D.S. Unacceptable," The Washington Times
(online ed.), 11 December 2002.
48 See "The Crying Game," Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 July 1998, p. 16.
49 In addition to Taiwan, Japan and India also were alarmed by Washington's inconsistent East Asia
policy. See ibid.
50 See, for example, Jaw-ling Joanne Chang, "Lessons from the Taiwan Relations Act," Orbis, Vol. 44,
No. 1, Winter 2000; and Rahman, "Defending Taiwan, and Why It Matters," pp. 82-86. Several leading
American China analysts are in favour of a policy of strategic ambiguity at the expense of deterrence,
however. See Robert S. Ross, "The Stability of Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait," The National Interest,
45
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China's tougher stance over Taiwan also managed to unite the post-Deng
leadership under Jiang, and enhanced both the institutional political influence of the
PLA and their nationalist agenda, and gave them a greater role in determining China's
Taiwan policy.51 In particular, senior military men such as Liu Huaqing, Zhang Zhen
and Zhang Wannian (who commanded the exercises) were leading figures in the
crises. 52 There is a strong case to be made that Jiang Zemin intentionally exploited the
Taiwan issue once he took charge of the Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group in 1992,
taking a new, tougher line specifically to win PLA support for his post-Deng leadership
ambitions. 53 In one analysis, Sheng Lijun argues that Lee Teng-hui's perceived drive for
a state of formal independence, rather than democratization itself, was responsible for
China's belligerent actions. 54 However, it is important to understand the longer-term
process of Chinese nationalism amongst the Dengist elite and PLA, as described by
Edward Friedman, which has made the usurpation of Taiwan a political priority. He
writes of ''two decades of unremitting pressure by post-Mao superpatriotic forces to
compel Taiwan to surrender its autonomy, a post-Mao aggressiveness that threatens
democratic Taiwan's very survivaL,,55
Friedman is certainly correct to draw attention to the consistent, nationalist
political agenda in the Deng and post-Deng eras to pressure Taiwan, from Deng's "one
country, two systems" approach to Jiang's eight point proposal, and continued in the
2000 Taiwan white paper. Taiwan did not become the leading driver of Chinese military
strategy and force structure development, however, until the 1990s.56 Tai Ming Cheung
was thus able to write in 1990 that, with normalization of Sino-American relations and
the opening of cross-Strait economic and social linkages, ''military tensions across the
Taiwan Straits ... have been significantly relaxed ... As a consequence, Taiwan's

No. 65, Fall 2001; and Andrew J. Nathan, "What's Wrong with American Taiwan Policy," The
Washington Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 2, Spring 2000.
51 See You Ji, "Missile Diplomacy and PRC Domestic Politics," in Austin, ed., Missile Diplomacy and
Taiwan's Future; and Edward Friedman, "The Prospects of a Larger War: Chinese Nationalism and the
Taiwan Strait Conflict," in Zhao, ed., Across the Taiwan Strait, p. 262.
52 You, "Missile Diplomacy and PRC Domestic Politics," pp. 44-46; and Scobell, "Show of Force."
53 See Tai Ming Cheung, "Chinese Military Preparations against Taiwan over the Next 10 Years," in
Lilleyand Downs, eds., Crisis in the Taiwan Strait, pp. 46-47.
54 Sheng, "China Eyes Taiwan," p. 75.
55 Friedman, "The Prospects of a Larger War," p. 258.
56 The title and contents of Chang and Lasater, eds., If China Crosses the Taiwan Strait, published in
1993, are indicators of the growing military threat posed to Taiwan by China, even before the mid-decade
missile crises.
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importance in Chinese naval priorities has dropped."s7 The rise of a democratized, postcolonial regime on the island, however, posed an inherent threat to the new Chinese
nationalism, and threatened to reverse the trend of China's political gains in cross-Strait
relations and its programme of maritime expansionism.
China also has become hypersensitive to the distant possibility that formal
independence for Taiwan might exacerbate separatist tendencies within China itself Yet
the two issues are not genuinely connected. However one views the plight of separatists
in Tibet or Xinjiang, the stark political reality is that those areas are currently, rightly or
wrongly, constituent parts of the People's Republic of China. Taiwan, quite clearly, is
not, even if Chinese propaganda and the dissembling habits of international diplomatic
practice might suggest otherwise. The new "threat" posed by an openly (and proudly)
autonomous Taiwan has nevertheless repositioned the island as China's number one
strategic priority.

Taiwan after the Missile Crises

The missile crises did not dampen Taiwan's drive to attain international recognition of
its de facto independence. In July 1999 Lee Tengwhui described the state of cross-Strait
relations, quite accurately, as a "special kind of state-to-state relations."s8 In March
2000 the DPP candidate, Chen Shui-bian, won Taiwan's presidential election, thus
breaking the KMT monopoly on power and despite the usual threatening bluster from
Beijing. Chen immediately refused to enter into any talks with China based on the oneChina principle, stating that "Taiwan's sovereignty has to be maintained forever."s9
And, in December 2001 legislative elections, the DPP supplanted the KMT as the
largest party, with a new party backed by Lee Teng-hui, the Taiwan Solidarity Union
(TSU), also faring well and becoming a natural coalition partner for the DPP. 60 Chen
further riled the Chinese in August 2002 when he described Taiwan as "an independent

57 Tai Ming Cheung, Growth of Chinese Naval Power: Priorities, Goals, Missions, and Regional
Implications, Pacific Strategic Paper 1, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1990, p. 14.
58 Quoted in "What State Now?" Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 July 1999, p. 20.
59 See "Voters Defy China to Pick Chen," The Sydney Morning Herald, 20 March 2000, p. 10; and ''No
Talks on One China, Warns Chen," The Australian, 21 March 2000, p. 8.
60 See, for example, "Nationalists Are Routed in Taiwan Legislative Election," The New York Times
(online ed.), 2 December 2001; and "New Party's Loss to Help Converge Opinion on Identity," Taipei
Times (onIine ed.), 3 December 2001. The vote for the pro-unification New Party collapsed.
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sovereign state" and that "both Taiwan and China are a country on either

sid~

of the

strait.,,61
Whether or not (or rather, when) the KMT regains power in democratic
elections, Taiwanese public opinion seems to be relatively consistent under the constant
pressure of Chinese threats. Over 50 per cent of the electorate prefer to maintain the
status quo, more than double those wanting either (formal) independence or unification,
whilst increasingly (constantly over 40 per cent), the Taiwanese identify themselves as
being Taiwanese, with just less than 40 per cent identifying themselves as being both
Taiwanese and Chinese and only a small percentage as being primarily Chinese. 62 Even
if a future KMT government readopted an intentionally vague policy of "one China," it
would not likely lead to unification as long as the CCP remained in power in China,
especially given the nativist trends in Taiwanese public opinion, or what Lee Teng-hui
has termed the ''New Taiwanese consciousness.,,63

Taiwan in Chinese Strategy
Dengist nationalism is an essential driver of China's current Taiwan policy, yet there are
also important, not unrelated strategic rationales that must be considered. Firstly,
defence against external threats from the sea requires that potential enemies need to be
deterred or prevented from using Taiwan as a base of operations against the mainland.
China's 2000 Taiwan white paper, for example, recognizes by implication the potential
military (as well as political) threat of Taiwan joining a regional theatre [ballistic]
missile defence (TMD) system as signifying "an attempt to establish [an anti-China]
military alliance of a disguised form with the United States and Japan. ,,64 Were China to

usurp Taiwan, it would not only prevent hostile forces from using the island (as the
United States did during the Cold War until 1979, Japan during the Pacific War,

61 "President Chen Shui-bian's Speech," BBC News (online), 5 August 2002. Chen also called for an
eventual referendum to decide Taiwan's formal status.
62 See the polling results in Mainland Affairs Council, "Seeking Constructive Cross-Strait Relations:
Taipei's Current Mainland Policy Documents," Mainland Affairs Council, the Executive Yuan, R.O.C.,
Taipei, January 2002, pp. 14-1-15-3. More recent polls show over 50 per cent of Taiwan's people
identifying themselves as Taiwanese. See "DPP Poll Shows Taiwanese Identify More with Taiwan,"
Taipei Times (online ed.), 22 August 2002.
63 See Lee Teng-hui, ''Understanding Taiwan: Bridging the Perception Gap," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78,
No. 6, NovemberlDecember 1999.
64 "The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue," p. 20. For analysis of Taiwan and the TMD issue, see
Thomas J. Christensen, "Theater Missile Defense and Taiwan's Security," Orb is, Vol. 44, No. 1, Winter
2000.
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Koxinga's Ming loyalists in the seventeenth century and the KMT after 1949), but also
extend China's defensive depth significantly to seaward.
A second strategic rationale influencing the drive to incorporate Taiwan is the
importance of the island to China's wider regional geopolitical ambitions. Beijing's
ambitions for regional primacy require that China's strategic influence is extended far
offshore. However, Taiwan's geographical position hinders China's free access to the
Pacific Ocean. Whilst a Taiwan under foreign control or influence could be used to
threaten China and Chinese shipping, a Taiwan under China's control would allow the
PLA to more effectively threaten Japan-bound shipping, and improve China's ability to
contest regional sea control. And, if the "recovery" of Taiwan represents part of the
rationale for adopting an offshore strategy of sea denial, in the longer term, possession
of the island would itself play a leading role in the execution both of that very same
strategy and China's sea control ambitions.
Chinese strategists well understand the relevance of the island to the
accomplishment of China's wider maritime goals and the prospects for a successful
national maritime strategy. Two PLA Navy officers have argued clearly the view that
China is semi-concealed by the first island chain. If it wants to prosper, it has to advance
into the Pacific, in which China's future lies. Taiwan, facing the Pacific in the east, is
the only unobstructed exit for China to move into the ocean. If this gateway is opened
for China, then it becomes much easier for China to manoeuvre in the West Pacific. 65

The Taiwanese are amongst the best informed about Chinese strategic thinking, and
Taiwan's 2002 National Defense Report mirrors China's own belief in the renewed
strategic significance of Taiwan in the current era of Chinese maritime expansion:
Located halfway in the West Pacific's "first Island Chain," Taiwan serves as a gateway
to [the] Pacific Ocean to the PRC, and is in a controlling position over the Taiwan
Strait, the Bashi Channel, and the adjoining Pacific waters, connecting the southernmost
end of Northeast Asia and the northern end of Southeast Asia and the South China Sea.

65 Jiang Minfang and Duan Zhaoxian, quoted in You Ji, The Armed Forces ojChina, AlIen and Unwin, St
Leonards, NSW, 1999, pp. 212-213. The same view was proffered by a middle-ranking PLAN officer
(Commander) in an interview with the author, Shanghai, July 2000. See also Alexander Chieh-cheng
Huang, "Taiwan's View of Military Balance and the Challenge It Presents," in Lilley and Downs, eds.,
Crisis in the Taiwan Strait, p. 282.
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Therefore, Taiwan is of immense geostrategic significance to the PRC's eastward
expansion. 66

Another section of the Report states that "The key to implement [China's] off-shore
defense strategy for consolidating 'the first island chain' is the resolution of the Taiwan
Issue.,,67 Whether China's concerns with island "barriers" are exaggerated or not, it
seems clear that the strategic rationale for gaining control of the island is finnly
embedded into the PLA minds et.
It is also worth noting that, although the disputed territories of the South China

Sea now take second place in China's strategic priorities to the Taiwan issue, Taiwan's
possessions in the South China Sea are also of considerable value to China. In
particular, ltu Aba in the Spratly group has good harbour facilities and is large enough
to build an airstrip, which would enhance the PLA's power projection ability in the area
if it could gain control of the island. 68 Were China to supplant Taiwan as the occupying
state on ltu Aba, it may also enhance the legitimacy of Beijing's Spratly claims, given
that Taiwan (as the Republic of China) has the longest continuous record of occupation
in the Spratly group. Pratas Island also is a useful outpost for monitoring or threatening
shipping moving between the South China Sea and the East China Sea. The island will
become more valuable when Taiwan finishes construction of a new port specifically
designed to house a frigate-sized warship.69
Moreover, in addition to the geopolitical advantages that would inevitably
accrue to China, the incorporation of Taiwan would add considerable wealth, industrial
strength, technology and technical knowledge, including in the military sphere, to
China's comprehensive national power. 70 The potential commercial additions to China's

Ministry of National Defense, Republic of China, "National Defense Report," July 2002, Part 2, Ch. 1.
Available on the World Wide Web at: http://www.mnd.gov.tw/reportl. The Bashi Channel is the body of
water separating Taiwan from the northern Philippines island of Luzon.
67lbid., Part 1, Ch. 4.
68 Although Taiwan shifted the administration of its South China Sea islands from the Ministry of
National Defense to the civilian Coast Guard Administration in February 2000, it has not demilitarized
the islands. See Cheng-yi Lin, Yann-huei Song, Victor Yu and Fu-Kuo Liu, "Taiwan's Current South
China Sea Policy and Proposed CBMs," paper prepared for the South China Sea CBM Workshop,
Jakarta, 10-11 March 2000. ltu Aba was used as a submarine base by the Japanese during World War n.
69 See ''Taiwan Presses Claim over Atoll," Taipei Times (on line ed.), 9 November 2002. The money to
build the new port facility will not be appropriated until 2004.
70 Despite Taiwan's increasing economic integration with China, the mainland surely would accrue
greater benefits if it could gain control of Taiwan, particularly in terms of technology transfer, which is
currently restricted. China would also gain access to American military technology. Arguably, a situation
in which Taipei appeared likely to submit to Chinese demands for unification might provide the strongest
66
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own growing economIC power include Taiwan's considerable maritime industries,
including shipping and deep-water fishing, each of which could be exploited for
political as well as commercial influence, and the marine resources lying within
Taiwan's exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. 71 The addition of Taiwan's
shipping industry to those of China and Hong Kong, for example, would boost China's
strategy of dominating both intra-regional seaborne trade and also East Asia's shippingbased trading relations with extra-regional trading partners. And the addition of
Taiwan's fishing interests would expand China's influence in the South Pacific, where
Taiwan is a major player in the harvesting of tuna species and where some small island
states still maintain fonnal diplomatic ties with Taipei. Andrew Wilson has gone so far
as to argue that the
only foreseeable event that might radically accelerate China's unsteady climb to the
ranks of regional seapowers would be the peaceful integration of Taiwan into a
mainland polity. If Taiwanese liquidity were tied to mainland resources, China could
achieve many of its maritime aspirations. 72

That may be a slight overstatement: China is already building a significant level of
maritime power in East Asia within its dual fiscal and strategic-cultural continentalist
constraints. Nevertheless, Wilson is correct to identify the vital role that Taiwan would
play in the expansion of Chinese maritime power if the island surrenders to the
mainland in the future, and demonstrates once again the central importance of Taiwan to
Chinese maritime strategy.
As part of its campaign to increase the pressure on Taiwan and to improve its
intelligence and military readiness, China has increased the frequency and scope of its
maritime activities around the island in recent years. Since Lee Teng-hui's "special
state-to-state" definition of cross-Strait relations in July 1999, Chinese combat aircraft
have increasingly sortied across the imaginary mid-point of the Strait. Similar flights
were made soon after the March 2000 presidential election and PLAN warships also
(and perhaps the only defensible) rationale for limiting the transfer of American military technology to
the island, lest it end up in the hands of the PLA.
7l On Taiwan's claimed maritime jurisdiction and sea laws, see Yann-huei Song, "One China, but Two
Sets of Maritime Legislation: Developments, Implications, and Challenges for the United States," in
Harry N. Scheiber, ed., The Law of the Sea: The Common Heritage and Emerging Challenges, Kluwer
Law International, The Hague, 2000, pp. 213-215.
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approached the median line. Another incident occurred in July 2000, when around eight
Su-27s sortied across the median line, prompting Taiwan to fly a similar mission across
the line towards China, which was followed in turn by another Chinese mission in
August, this time comprising F-8 aircraft. 73 Such flights have continued, with the first
sorties into the Strait of China's advanced Su-30 long-range strike aircraft occurring in
2002. 74
In mid October 2002, a PLAN Luhu-class destroyer passed within 100 nautical

miles of Taiwan's east coast on a voyage from Qingdao to military exercises near
Hainan. That may sound innocuous, yet it was evidently the first time a PLAN warship
had transited relatively close to the east coast of the island. Normally, the PLA Navy
uses the Taiwan Strait to make such transits. 75 Quite clearly, by making the longer
voyage around Taiwan rather than through the Strait, the PLA Navy increased Taiwan's
sense of insecurity and embattlement, symbolically demonstrating both its growing
maritime presence and its ability to pose a threat to Taiwan from beyond the island's
eastern flank. Chen Shui-bian has summed up the effect of China's maritime expansion
upon Taiwan thus:

China recently has made an aggressive military expansion and shifted its defense focus
from the coastlines to the nearby seas, moving its military force closer to the ftrst island
chain. This move has seriously affected ... regional stability and our national security. 76

China has also carried out extensive marine surveying and intelligence-gathering
operations in the waters surrounding Taiwan since the early 1980s. 77 During the course
of 2002, a marine research vessel of the State Oceanic Administration, the Xiang Yang
Hong 14, was caught near Taiwan on three separate occasions. In April the ship was

tracked by Taiwanese warships and ships from Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration
72 Andrew R. Wilson, "Chinese Seapower in the Twenty-fust Century: Aspirations and Limitations," in
Geoffrey Till, ed., Seapower at the Millennium, Sutton Publishing, Phoenix Mill, Gloucestershire, 2001,
p.157.
73 See "Chinese, Taiwanese Fighters Play Tit-far-Tat," Taipei Times, 23 August 2000, p. 3; and "MND's
Denials May Have Been False," Taipei Times, 29 August 2000, p. 4.
74 "Tang Says All of Taiwan Threatened by China's Military," Taipei Times Coniine ed.), 18 November
2002.
75 Ibid.; and "Naval Manoeuvres Send Out Ripples" (editorial), Taipei Times (online ed.), 3 November
2002. An American report claims that several warships and one Song-class submarine in fact made the
transit. See "Inside the Ring," The Washington Times (oniine ed.), 8 November 2002.
76 Quoted in "Chen Shui-bian Warns Navy of Chinese Threat," Taipei Times (oniine ed.), 17 February
2003.
77 "Military Needs Better Data on Maritime Conditions," Taipei Times (oniine ed.), 18 February 2003.
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(CGA), although it never actually entered Taiwan's territorial waters. In October the

Xiang Yang Hong 14 was chased by the CGA from within the Taiwanese territorial sea
near Lanyu (Orchid Island), a small island possession southeast of Taiwan, and again in
November from a similar location. 78 The Xiang Yang Hong 14 is believed to be a
permanent fixture in the waters around Taiwan and is used to gather signals
intelligence,79 just part of China's constant surveillance activities against the island. The
CGA has also increased its enforcement activities against illegal fishing by Chinese
boats in Taiwanese waters.

80

Most of those boats are probably genuinely engaged in

fishing, but it is worth noting that China uses approximately 80 converted trawlers for
intelligence-gathering purposes. 8I

China's Political Strategy toward Taiwan
China's stated strategy towards Taiwan has been consistent since Deng enunciated his
"one country, two systems" formula in 1979. That formula involves peaceful
negotiations and an increased pace of economic, social and cultural linkages, yet under
the ever present threat of punitive military action. Supposedly, "any matter can be
negotiated" under the auspices of the "one-China principle," and China promises a
"high degree of autonomy" to Taiwan should it surrender, including maintenance of the
current economic system. Of course, Taiwan can maintain its economic system and
enjoy an even higher degree of autonomy by refusing to submit to China's neo-colonial
agenda. Beijing also states that it would not "send troops or administrative personnel to
be stationed in Taiwan.,,82 Part of China's "reunification" formula has also included the
provision that Taiwan could keep its own armed forces, as reiterated by Jiang Zemin in
1995: Taiwan "may ... retain its armed forces and administer its party, governmental
and military systems by itself. ,,83 However, the 2000 Taiwan white paper insists that
other countries should not arm Taiwan or assist Taiwan to produce its own weapons, or
See ''Navy Trails Suspect Vessel from China," Taipei Times (online ed.), 16 April 2002; "Chinese Spy
Ship in Taiwan Waters," Taipei Times (online ed.), 4 November 2002; and "Taiwan 'Drove Away
Chinese Spy Ship,'" The Straits Times (online ed.), 4 November 2002.
79 See Desmond Ball, "Intelligence Collection Operations and EEZs: The Implications of New
Technology," paper prepared for the Tokyo Meeting, The Regime of the Exclusive Economic Zone: Issues
and Responses, Tokyo, 19-20 February 2003, pp. 19-21.
80 "Coast Guard Steps Up Patrols against Chinese Fishermen," Taipei Times (online ed.), 30 November
2002.
81 Jane's Fighting Ships 2001-2002, Jane's Information Group, Coulsdon, Surrey, 2001, p. 139.
82 "The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue," p. 18.
78
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enter into military alliances "of any fonn" with the island. 84 It is clear that a Taiwan that
ceded its sovereignty to China would be unable to sustain a modern, independent
military capability for very long under those conditions: the Taiwanese anned forces
would slowly wither once China starved them of the modem weaponry, spare parts and
military technology of their regular Western (especially American) suppliers. And, if
Taiwan did agree to cede its sovereignty, there could be little future prospect of
American military intervention on the island's behalf.
A KMT proposal for a confederation, whereby Taiwan would control not only
its own domestic affairs but also its own defence and foreign policy would clearly be
opposed by China, which demands that Beijing control Taiwan's external affairs under
a "one country, two systems" arrangement. 85 Unless there is a hidden KMT unification
agenda guiding the proposal, it would seem to be both naive and potentially dangerous
for Taiwanese autonomy. 86
In effect, China is attempting to alter the regional strategic landscape in its own
favour by removing Taiwan from its current status as a de facto member of the extant
American security system in East Asia, and placing the island within an enlarged
Chinese sphere of strategic influence. Even if China did not initially base military forces
on the island after a transfer of sovereignty, at the very least unification would remove
one hostile barrier to the PLA Navy's access to the Pacific Ocean. Yet it is barely
credible to suggest that China would desist from utilizing Taiwan as an asset to realize
its strategic ambitions for regional primacy for very long, particularly if Japan felt
threatened enough by China's geopolitical expansion to attempt to counter Chinese
maritime strategic advances in a more robust manner.
Although China states that it would apply a "looser fonn" of the "one country,
two systems" fonnula than used for Hong Kong and Macau,87 Beijing's credibility
following its political dealings with Hong Kong are already questionable. Just five years
into a supposedly 50 year transition period for the fonner British colony, Beijing
intends to impose a sedition law which will abolish many of the rights and freedoms

83 Quoted in Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, Taiwan's Security in the Changing International System,
Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO, 1997, p. 9. Beijing's 2000 Taiwan white paper does not explicitly include
that part of the formula, however.
84 "The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue," p. 23.
85 On the proposal, see "Taiwan's Opposition to Shift China Stance," The Washington Post (online ed.), 9
July 2001.
86 The loyalty of conservative KMT leaders to a distinct Taiwanese identity is highly questionable.
87 ''The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue," p. 23.
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currently enjoyed in Hong Kong and outlaw groups not approved by China. 88 And, in a
speech delivered in Hong Kong, Jiang Zemin implored the people of Hong Kong to
demonstrate greater loyalty and patriotism to China, stating that they "should '" keep
enhancing their sense of the country and of the nation, make conscious efforts to
safeguard the security and unification of the motherland and endeavor to defend its
overall interests.,,89 The portents for democratic Taiwan under any future Chinese rule
do not seem especially positive.
China's political assault on Taiwan is unrelenting. Throughout the peaks and
troughs of day-to-day cross-Strait political relations, China's policy of isolating Taiwan
internationally continues unabated. In fact, the idea of "peaceful unification" in the
current circumstances is somewhat of a misnomer. Not only does Taiwan live under the
constant threat of military coercion, China's political tactics also involve a constant
barrage of cross-Strait political, economic, social, psychological and information
"warfare," designed to undermine the Taiwanese government and the confidence of its
people and economy.90 For example, Taiwanese businesses on the mainland are used by
China to influence Taipei, whether through coercion or bribery, leading Taiwan's Chief
of the General Staff to state that such Chinese tactics are "aimed at suppressing our
economic development and competitive power. It is just part of the proof that shows
China has never changed its intention to destroy Taiwan [as an independent entity].,,91
Taiwan's growing economic dependence on China as a market and a low-cost
manufacturing base has thus been exploited by Beijing to reduce Taipei's political
options for dealing with the mainland: 92 indeed, increasing that dependence is a part of

"Sedition Proposal Troubles Hong Kong," The Washington Times, (online ed.), 14 September 2002.
See "Full Text of Jiang's Speech at H.K.'s 5th Anniversary Celebrations," available at People's Daily
(online ed.), 2 July 2002.
90 "National Defense Report," Part 2, Ch. 1.
91 General Tang Yao-ming, quoted in "Tang Warns of Beijing's Threat," Taipei Times (online ed.), 4
September 2001; and also "Editorial: Walking into China's Trap," Taipei Times (online ed.), 1 November
2001.
92 One analysis predicts, for example, that Taiwan's increasing economic dependence upon the mainland
will constrain Taipei's continued pursuit of its own national identity and place in the world, although such
an argument may overstate economic factors to the detriment of political, ideological, cultural and
strategic ones. See Heather Smith and Stuart Harris, "Economic Relations across the Taiwan Strait:
Interdependence or Dependence?" in Austin, ed., Missile Diplomacy and Taiwan's Future. Denny Roy,
"Tensions in the Taiwan Strait," Survival, Vo!. 42, No. 1, Spring 2000, p. 82, argues that "globalization"
may have reduced Taiwan's vulnerability to economic pressure, as many foreign companies are involved
in cross-Strait commercial exchange: by using the economic instrument China would indirectly involve
other countries in the conflict. That is a fair point to make but it should not be overstated due to the
singular importance that Beijing has now attached to "resolving" the Taiwan issue. China may well be
prepared to suffer short-term economic losses in return for re-establishing mainland control over the
88
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Beijing's Taiwan strategy. China has also actively courted the KMT and People's First
93
Party (PFP - a KMT offshoot) opposition parties to undermine the DPP govemment.

In another example of China's ongoing intimidation, the PLA Navy has been accused
by Taiwan of the "harassment" of Taiwanese fishing boats at the rate of over 200
incidents per year. 94
Another element of China's Taiwan strategy, that regarding third parties, has
been described as one of posing a sufficiently credible military threat "which others do
not resist for fear of war.,,95 As with other aspects of China's grand strategy, there
seems to be a general feeling in China that time is on their side, yet there is also a
common belief that war over Taiwan, if not necessarily inevitable, remains a strong
possibility.96 A Cabinet-level report by Taiwan's Research, Development and
Evaluation Commission has raised the possibility, however, that China might already
97
have set a timetable within which to enforce Taiwan's capitulation - possibly by 2010.

China's Military Strategy toward Taiwan

China has several military options available to it to coerce a Taiwanese surrender. These
options include a full-scale amphibious invasion; a terror campaign of military strikes
targeted to crush the morale of the Taiwanese people and induce a surrender; a blockade
of the island; and non-conventional attacks involving such instruments as special forces,
undercover agents (a Chinese "fifth column") planted into Taiwanese society and cyber
warfare. 98 Potentially, combinations of the various options could be employed. As

island. One can also speculate on the extent of China's mutual economic dependence on Taiwan, although
as its domestic economy continues to grow that question will decline in salience.
93 "Shifting Alliances Shape Taiwan Status," CNNcom (onIine), 19 November 2001.
94 See Scott Snyder and Ralph A. Cossa, "Measures to Manage Potential Disputes in the South China
Sea," PacNet Newsletter, No. 22,1 June 2001.
95 Robyn Lim, "China Pursues the Sudetenland Strategy for Taiwan," paper prepared for the International
Forum on Peace and Security in the Taiwan Strait, Taipei, 26-28 July 1999, pp. 1-3.
96 See, for example, Yang Fan, ''How Can China 'Subdue Its Enemy without Fighting'? - On the
Significance of Readjusting Economy and Culture for the War of National Unification," Century China,
18 July 2001, trans. by the U.S.-China Security Review Commission. Chinese analysts interviewed at the
China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) in Beijing, July 2000, however, were
strongly of the belief that the Taiwan situation would not be resolved without the use of force.
97 "Report Forecasts a More Assertive Beijing by 2010," Taipei Times (onIine ed.), 17 December 2002.
Capitulation before the 2008 Beijing Olympics may also be part ofBeijing's timetable.
98 The following works collectively cover the full range of China's military options toward Taiwan. See
Paul H.B. Godwin, "The Use of Military Force against Taiwan: Potential PRC Scenarios," in Chang and
Lasater, eds., If China Crosses the Taiwan Strait; Roy, "Tensions in the Taiwan Strait," pp. 82-88;
Cheung, Chinese Military Preparations against Taiwan over the Next 10 Years," pp. 55-61; Eric
McVadon, "PRC Exercises, Doctrine and Tactics toward Taiwan: The Naval Dimension," in Lilley and
Downs, eds., Crisis in the Taiwan Strait; David Shambaugh, "Taiwan's Security: Maintaining Deterrence
amid Political Accountability," The China Quarterly, No. 148, December 1996, pp. 1309-1317; Peter Yu
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described in Chapter 5, China's amphibious capabilities are not especially impressive.
The PLA Navy alone lacks sufficient carrying capacity to mount a full-scale invasion,
although some capabilities have been developed with a Taiwan contingency in mind,
such as PLAN hovercraft, which are ideally suited for landings over the shallow mud
flats common to the island's western coast. Those same topographic features, in
addition to difficult currents and weather conditions in the Strait, nevertheless make
conventional amphibious landing operations extremely difficult. 99 Both naval and
civilian vessels used for amphibious operations also would be highly vulnerable to
defensive operations conducted by Taiwan (and potentially, the United States),lOO
influencing Western analysts generally to conclude that China is unlikely to be able to
mount a successful amphibious invasion or seize a Taiwanese port. 101
Alternatively, China could invade Taiwan's island possessions near the Chinese
coast or in the South China Sea, although there probably be would be little military
advantage in doing so. An invasion of the Penghu (Pescadores) island group in the
Taiwan Strait, roughly halfway between the middle line of the Strait and Taiwan, might
enable China to increase its pressure on Taiwan or act as a precursor or "stepping stone"
to an invasion of Taiwan itself. 102 China is known to have conducted surveys of the
Penghu area in recent times.103 One People's Daily commentary has argued that once
China seizes Penghu in any conflict, the islands could be used as staging posts for an
invasion of the island of Taiwan, noting that it would take less than two hours for the
PLA Navy to sail from Penghu to Taiwan and only ten minutes for air force aircraft to
fly the short distance. 104

Kien-hong, "Taking Taiwan: How Would China Set About Recovering the Republic?" Jane's
Intelligence Review, Vol. 10, No. 9, September 1998; and Richard L. Russell, "What if. .. 'China Attacks
Taiwan!'" Parameters, Vol. 31, No. 3, Autumn 2001.
99 David Shambaugh, "A Matter of Time: Taiwan's Eroding Military Advantage," The Washington
Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 2, Spring 2000, pp. 122-123.
100 Taiwan's defence strategy revolves around operations to gain control of (or at least superiority in) the
air and sea in the Taiwan Strait and around the island, to protect national military and civilian
infrastructure from attack and to protect Taiwan's SLOCs from blockade operations. See "National
Defense Report," Part 2, Ch. 4.
101 See Michael O'Hanlon, "Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2,
Fa112000, esp. pp. 62-73; and McVadon, "PRC Exercises, Doctrine and Tactics toward Taiwan," pp. 252256. Cheung, "Chinese Military Preparations against Taiwan over the Next 10 Years," p. 66, estimates
that the PLA would require two years notice prior to an invasion to build a sufficient, dedicated
amphibious fleet capable of mounting a large-scale cross-S trait invasion.
102 See, for example, Piers M. Wood and Charles D. Ferguson, "How China Might Invade Taiwan,"
Naval War College Review, Vol. LIV, No. 4, Autumn 2001, p. 57.
103 "Beijing Said to Be Mulling Penghu Claim," Taipei Times (online ed.), 23 Apri12002.
104 "Commentary: Taiwan Independence No Easy Thing (I)," People's Daily (oniine ed.), 13 August
2002.
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A sea (and potentially also air) blockade of Taiwan is a second, more measured
military option to coerce Taipei into submission. As a small island trading nation,
Taiwan is especially vulnerable to being cut off from the outside world, including a total
dependence upon imported oil. 105 PLA submarines, surface ships, aircraft, mines and
ballistic missiles could be employed in various levels of intensity, from limited
exclusion zones (such as were used in the March 1996 missile tests), to blockades of
Taiwan's main ports, to a full quarantine involving the interdiction of Taiwan-bound
shipping. 106 Submarines would likely play a leading role in a blockade strategy, 107 and
anti-submarine warfare is notoriously difficult in the mostly shallow waters of the
Taiwan Strait and along the Chinese coast. 108
Potentially, a blockade could be a low-cost and effective strategy to coerce
Taiwan to surrender. However, any threats to international shipping would likely bring
the forces of the United States, and potentially other countries - including Japan, into
play to safeguard regional sea lanes.109 The Taiwan Relations Act certainly would seem
to require that indirect American assistance be given to Taiwan in even a partial
blockade attempt. Nevertheless, one Chinese report argues that, because Taiwan is
dependent on only a small number of ports and airports, "it is highly possible that the
three major ports will be blockaded or completely destroyed, as long as a few missiles
are fired or a certain number of mines are discharged."llo
The use of measured degrees of military coercion involving air andlor missile
strikes and possibly sabotage by special operations forces against key military targets or
important civilian infrastructure, such as air bases, ports or Taiwan's command, control
and communications capabilities, might also be employed short of an invasion to
enforce Taipei's submission. Yet such an attack surely would elicit an American
intervention and ensure that Beijing suffered unwanted international opprobrium.
Exactly how resolute the Taiwanese population would be under such aggression is
105 Taiwan's oil reserves currently would only last 30 days in the case of a blockade. See "Warnings on
Taiwan's Oil Stocks Given," Taipei Times (online ed.), 18 December 2002.
106 See, for example, Shambaugh, "Taiwan's Security," pp. 1311-1314.
107 See Lyle Goldstein and Bill Murray (Ledr, VSN), "China's Subs Lead the Way," V.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, March 2003.
.
108 For details, see three articles published in Taiwan Defense Affairs, Vo!. I, No. 3, Spring 2001: Wenchung Chai, "Anti-submarine Warfare and Taiwan's Security"; Bo Rask, "Submarine Operations in
Taiwan Waters"; and Michael M. Tsai and York W. Chen, "Submarines and Taiwan's Defense."
109 O'Hanlon, "Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan," pp. 75-79, also argues that, although the prospect
of a Chinese blockade is potentially amongst the most troubling of scenarios, a combined Taiwanese and
American response ought to be adequate to defeat it.
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unknowable, although previous experience

In

other conflicts suggests that air and

missile strikes alone may have limited effectiveness. 111 Nevertheless, following the
experience of 1995-1996, which witnessed widespread panic and a flight of both people
and capital from the island, there have been questions raised over the willingness of
Taiwan's people to endure actual attacks. Il2
Taiwan is also developing its own "multi-layered missile defense system" to
counter Chinese missile coercion. Although the intended system will not create an
impregnable shield, it will improve Taiwan's defensive capabilities generally, and thus
also deterrence of a Chinese attack; increase China's costs by reducing the PLA's
effectiveness; and offer psychological support to the Taiwanese people. Taiwan already
possesses limited-capability Patriot PAC-2 Plus anti-ballistic missile systems, and
intends to add advanced Patriot PAC-3 systems, long-range early warning radars and
sea-based systems. The intended naval systems will be based on four second-hand Kiddclass guided-missile destroyers which Taiwan expects to deploy from 2005, and
eventually newer ships equipped with the Aegis radar and targeting system. The Patriot
PAC-3 is believed to be capable of countering not only China's DF-15 and DF-ll
SRBMs, but also its more advanced DF-21 medium-range ballistic missiles
(MRBMs).113 The Taiwanese government seems committed to deploying effective
missile defences, although there is some resistance from parts of the Taiwanese
military.114 The involvement of Taiwan in a V.S.-Ied regional TMD system is a real fear
110 "Commentary: Taiwan Independence No Easy Thing (I)," People's Daily (onIine ed.), 13 August
2002.
111 Ibid., pp. 74-75. The United States struggled to coerce Serbia in 1999 by the aerial method in a
prolonged campaign, and the PLA's offensive air and missile power is considerably less advanced than
that of America's armed forces.
Il2 See, for example, Ray, "Tensions in the Taiwan Strait," pp. 87-88.
113 See "Military Slowly Preparing for MDS System," Taipei Times (onIine ed.), 26 February 2003; ''New
Missiles Threaten Taiwan," Taipei Times (onIine ed.), 13 February 2003; "Taiwan Targets $30m for
Radar Modernisation," Jane's Defence Weekly, 8 November 2000, p. 14; and "Jane's Reports Military
Mulling Two Radar Systems," Taipei Times (onIine ed.), 3 September 2001. Taiwan also has an
indigenous anti-missile system, the Sky Bow n. See "Experts Urge Bigger Anti-missile Budget," The
China Post, 16 August 2000, p. 19.
II4 A strong case for a Taiwanese TMD system is made by DPP parliamentarian, Parris Chang, in
"Taiwan Should Join TMD System," Taipei Times (onIine ed.), 12 March 2003. On the other hand, for
example, deputy commander-in-chief of Taiwan's air force, Lieutenant General Fu Wei-ku, has argued
against the system on the grounds of cost effectiveness and instead advocates the development of
offensive capabilities as a cheaper deterrent. See "Offense Best Defense, Officer Says," Taipei Times
(online ed.), 10 January 2003. This disagreement mirrors the debate encountered during interviews in
Taiwan in August 2000. For example, at a meeting at the Republic of China Air Force Academy,
Kangshan, Kaohsiung, five interlocutors (civilian and military) could not agree on the issue, with some
positive about missile defences and others believing that it was a waste of effort. Similar disagreements
were evident over the development of offensive capabilities and even on Taiwan's political future. The
offence versus defence debate is also discussed in Yang, The 1996 Missile Exercises, pp. 15-20. Taiwan
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in Beijing,115 yet Taiwan's president is actively promoting a regional missile shield to
protect America's allies from Chinese and North Korean missile threats. 11 6
A fourth military option is one of coercion by unconventional means, such as
operations by special forces, political assassination or cyber attacks, although whether
any of these means alone would be sufficient to defeat Taiwanese resistance is
questionable. Taiwan already has been the victim of constant information attacks by
computer hackers from across the Strait,117 and cyber attacks potentially might be used
to assist a blockade by closing down port operations or disrupting shipping at sea. 118
Although some Western analysts have concluded that China lacks the means to
defeat Taiwan,119 others are not so sanguine. David Shambaugh has pointed out that
China's improving military capabilities will reduce Taiwan's relative advantages in
weapon systems over time,120 whilst Richard Russell has warned of complacency
against the possibility of surprise attack or even the use of weapons of mass
destruction. 121 Another analysis argues that a phased invasion that gradually increases
the scale of offensive operations might be possible.1 22 It may be relevant that many of
"-

the PLA's newly promoted military leaders and regional commanders have served in the
First Army Group of the Nanjing Military Region, opposite Taiwan. The personal and
factional links between those officers might enable easier coordination of any PLA
attack on the island. 123 The V.S. Department of Defense has warned that

seems to be on the brink of adopting a more balanced approach to its defence strategy, combining
"passive" defensive capabilities with greater strike capabilities, including ballistic and cruise missiles and
enhanced strike packages for its F-16s. See "Tang Looks at Offensive Capabilities," Taipei Times (online
ed.), 22 October 2002; and "Deterrence Stressed in Tang Speech," Taipei Times (onIine ed.), 14
November 2002.
115 See Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, "China's National
Defense in 2000," Beijing, October 2000, supplement to Beijing Review, 23 October 2000, p. ii.
116 See "Asia Needs a TMD: Chen," Taipei Times (onIine ed.), 26 February 2003.
117 See Damon Bristow, "Cyber-warfare Rages across Taiwan Strait," Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol.
12, No. 2, February 2000.
118 See Wei-Ming Ma, "Cyber-threats to Maritime Trade ahd Port Infrastructure;" paper prepared for the
th
13 International Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) Conference, The Strategic Importance of
Seaborne Trade and Shipping: A Common Interest ofAsia Pacific, Canberra, 3-4 April 2001; and John E.
Rothrock, "Observations on Cyber-threats to Maritime Commerce and Associated Issues," presented at
the same conference.
119 See, for example, O'Hanlon, "Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan."
120 Shambaugh, "A Matter of Time."
121 Russell, "What if ... 'China Attacks Taiwan! '"
122 See Wood and Ferguson, "How China Might Invade Taiwan."
123 Many of the new commanders have links to Zhang Wannian and former Chief of the General Staff, Fu
Quanyou. See "Elite Generals Take Charge of Taiwan Front," The Straits Times (onIine ed.), 29
November 2002.
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The PLA likely would encounter great difficulty conducting ... a sophisticated
campaign [against Taiwan] throughout the remainder of the decade. Nevertheless, the
campaign likely would succeed - barring third-party intervention - if Beijing were
willing to accept the political, economic, diplomatic, and military costs that such a
course of action would produce. 124

The Pentagon report continues to state that, at present, "Taiwan's ability to defend
against ballistic missiles is negligible," and that
The PLA believes that surprise and deception are crucial for the success of a military
campaign. China likely would not be willing to initiate any military action unless
assured of a significant degree of strategic surprise. A surprise missile and air strike on
Taiwan most likely would damage severely most of Taiwan's combat aircraft and
degrade both its air defense and C4ISR systems. Concurrently, the PLA Navy also
could attack major Taiwan surface combatants with little or no warning. If successful,
these attacks could enable the PLA to protect a large cross-Strait sea and air fleet and
land troops in sufficient strength to achieve a foothold on the island. If the PRC
effectively incorporates these concepts into its doctrine, Taiwan could become
increasingly vulnerable to PRC strategic and operational-level surprise. 125

It is important to be aware of the potential for Chinese deception. It is impossible
to know for certain whether Chinese threats are genuine or merely aimed at preventing a
fonnal declaration of independence. Perhaps China's SRBM deployments opposite
Taiwan and other Taiwan-focused military modernization represent a stratagem to deter
such a declaration. However, as argued by Mark Stokes, China deliberately disguises its
real capabilities as "a fundamental approach to deterrence"; 126 the same forces
constructed to deter formal independence may also be employed in anger against
Taiwan. As indicated in Chapter 3, surprise is emphasized in China's modernized
military strategy and operational doctrine, and the use of stratagems has been a central
pillar of Chinese strategic culture since ancient times. 127 Surprise and deception, for
example, were fundamental to Sun Tzu:
124 (U.S.) Department of Defense, "Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of
China," July 2002, Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, p.
48.
125 Ibid., p. 51.
126 Mark A. Stokes, China's Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States, Strategic
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 1999, p. 145.
127 See Sun Haichen, trans., The Wiles of War: 36 Military Strategies from Ancient China, Foreign
Languages Press, Beijing, 1993.
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Warfare is the Way (Tao) of deception. Thus although [you are] capable, display
incapability to them. When committed to employing your forces, feign inactivity. When
[your objective] is nearby, make it appear as if distant; when far away, create the
illusion of being nearby. 128

Because the incorporation of Taiwan plays a central role both in driving contemporary
Chinese nationalism and in enabling China's regional ambitions - which in turn require
the expansion of Chinese maritime power - future Chinese military inaction can not be
assumed. 129 The analysis does suggest that complacency based on eithe~ overly
sanguine evaluations of the cross-Strait military balance,130 or the mechanistic
oversimplicity of neorealist international relations theory,131 is at the very least,
imprudent.
CHINA, JAPAN AND THE EAST CHINA SEA

Sino-Japanese relations historically have been fraught with mistrust and competition,
with each party at various times attempting to dominate or conquer the other. 132 Japan's
humiliation of China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, which involved the cession of
territory, and Japan's subsequent twentieth century imperial misdeeds in China and
elsewhere in Asia have left deep scars on the Chinese psyche. The Japanese record of
imperial aggression from the 1890s to 1945 has made China hypersensitive to Japan's
role in the region, only partly tempered by strong economic linkages between the two
East Asian powers. Japan, equally, is concerned with the rise of Chinese power and
Beijing's more assertive and ambitious regional agenda. Contemporary Sino-Japanese

Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. and intro. by Ralph D. Sawyer, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1994, p.
168. The first line of the quote is often translated as "All warfare is based on deception." See Sun Tzu,
The Art of War, trans. and intro. by Samuel B. Griffith, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1971 (fIrst pub.
1963), p. 66. For a general discussion, see Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic
Thought, 2nd rev. ed., Frank Cass, London, 1996, Ch. 12.
129 See, for example, Porch, ''The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996"; and Jianxiang Bi, "Managing Taiwan
OperatiollScin the Twenty-fIrst Century: Issues and Options," Naval War College Review, Vol. LIl, No. 4,
Autumn 1999.
130 See, for example, O'HanIon, "Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan"; and Ross, "The Stability of
Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait."
131 See, for example, Robert S. Ross, "The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-ftrst
Century," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4, Spring 1999, esp. pp. 113-114.
132 See, for example, Bartlett, ''The Role of History in China's View of the World Today," pp. 122-124.
128
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relations thus are a mix of economic cooperation and, increasingly, political and
strategic competition. 133
As the two major East Asian powers, there is an underlying competitiveness in
their mutual relations over influence in post-Cold War East Asia. That natural
competitiveness has been exacerbated by continental China's ongoing maritime
expansion, which increasingly threatens insular Japan's security within its own,
maritime realm. The following sections describe how China's views of Japan have
become ever more overtly suspicious over the past two decades as the result of changing
strategic circumstances, conflicting nationalisms and Japan's role as a barrier to Chinese
geopolitical ambitions. Tensions between Beijing and Tokyo are also affected by the
Sino-Japanese territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands, disputes over maritime
jurisdiction and Chinese maritime activities, and the future status of Taiwan.

China's Changing Views of Japan

Although Chinese suspicions of Japan are deep-seated and longstanding, Beijing's
Japan policy has in practice been rather pragmatic since the process of political
nonnalization began in the early 1970s. Beijing has instead based its policy toward
Japan on near-tenn strategic requirements.

For example,

Japan's strategic

modernization programme, beginning in the late 1970s, entailed substantial
improvements to its maritime strategic capabilities in order to be able to take
responsibility for sea lane defence out to a distance of 1,000 nautical miles from the
Japanese home islands, as part of the burden-sharing arrangements for regional security
under the umbrella of the U.S.-Japan alliance. 134 Yet, not only did China not object to
Japan's naval expansion, Beijing actually encouraged it as part of the infonnal SinoAmerican coalition to contain the Soviet Union in Asia. Thus, in 1979 Deng Xiaoping
stated that China, the United States and Japan should unite in order to "place curbs on
the polar bear." And, in 1980, China's Deputy Chief of Staff, Wu Xiuquan, declared
that "I am all for Japan's increasing its self-defense capabilities .... Generally speaking,

133 See, for example, June Teufel Dreyer, "Sino-Japanese Relations," Journal of Contemporary China,
Vol. 10, No. 28, August 2001; and David Shambaugh, "China and Japan towards the Twenty-first
Century: Rivals for Pre-eminence or Complex Interdependence," in Christopher Howe, ed., China and
Ja,t,an: History, Trends, and Prospects, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996.
I3 See Peter J. Woolley, Japan's Navy: Politics and Paradox, 1971-2000, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO,
2000, Ch. 4.
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Japan is one of the economic powers and it is entitled to become a big power militarily,
toO.,,135
That position did not last, however, once the Soviet threat began to decline
during the 1980s. China's leaders also began to promote Chinese nationalism more
stridently and a mild nationalism in Japan was interpreted in China as the forerunner to
renewed Japanese militarism in Asia, leading to anti-Japan protests by Chinese students
in 1985. 136 Nevertheless, trade and Japanese overseas development assistance to China
grew strongly in the 1980s. Over the final two decades of the twentieth century, Japan's
financial aid and soft loans to China amounted to more than U.S.$23 billion. 137 Japan
was also prompt to resume economic aid following brief cessations in the wake of the
Tiananmen massacre and China's 1995 nuclear weapon tests. 138 Despite the strong
economic relationship (Japan is China's largest trading partner),139 Chinese analysts
increasingly view Japan as a potential (or actual) threat to China's regional ambitions,
and often believe that Tokyo wishes to prevent China's rise to great power status. 140 The
benefits of economic cooperation seem to be subordinated to rivalry and distrust as
determinants of Sino-Japanese relations, based on "deeply-ingrained cultural, historical,
and perceptual factors."I41 In the current regional environment, strategic factors also
play an overriding role in the relationship.
Chinese perceptions of a revived Japanese militarism tend to lack sympathy for
Japanese concerns about China, whose own nationalism has been both more assertive
and supported by actions which threaten Japanese security. It is China's maritime

Quoted in AlIen S. Whiting, China Eyes Japan, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1989,
129-130.
6 Ibid., pp. 5-6 and 134-141. Incidents included Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone's visit to the
Yasukuni war shrine, revision of textbooks concerning the Pacific War and the raising of Japan's defence
budget ceiling. Despite those events, and contrary to the prevailing view in Beijing, Japan's strong postWar anti-militarist culture had never been seriously in danger. See Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to
Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism," International Security, Vo!. 17,- No. 4, Spring
1993. Continued visits to Yasukuni by successive Japanese leaders nevertheless is a constant irritant to
Sino-Japanese (and Japan-Korea) relations. See, for example, "Don't ever Visit War Shrine Again,
Chinese President Tells Koizumi," The Straits Times (online ed.), 29 October 2002.
137 "Japan and China Eye Each Other Warily - As Usual," The Economist, 2 September 2000, p. 27.
138 Donald W. Klein, "Japan and Europe in Chinese Foreign Relations," in Samuel S. Kim, ed., China and
the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium, 4th ed., Westview Press, Boulder, CO,
1998, pp. 139-140.
139 China is also Japan's second-largest trading partner. See "Sino-Japan Bilateral Trade Expected to Hit
U.S.$95b this Year," People's Daily (online ed.), 3 August 2001.
140 See, for example, Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment, NDU Press,
Washington, D.C., 2000, pp. 113-138; and Rex Li, "Partners or Rivals? Chinese Perceptions of Japan's
Security Strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region," The Journal ofStrategic Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4, December
1999.
141 Kim, "The China Factor," pp. 9-10.
135
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expansion and activities, above all else, that have prompted Japan to take prudent
measures to counter that expansion, for example, by negotiating a revitalized security
treaty with Washington and participating in the development of a TMD system. 142 One
Japanese politician perhaps overstepped the bounds of prudence in 2002, by claiming
that Japan could develop nuclear weapons in a short space of time to counter China, if it
chose to do so. Such developments in turn heighten China's distrust of Japan; 143 yet it
must be reiterated that it is Beijing's actions and ambitions that lie at the root of the
process.
Japan's response to China's maritime expansion does not directly threaten China
itself, but it does complicate Beijing' s regional ambitions. The official Chinese media
has repeatedly accused Japan of inventing and disseminating the ''theory of China
threat" in an attempt to contain China and facilitate Japan's own drive to regional
military domination. One People's Daily article, for example, claims that

the ambition of some Japanese politicians and ultra-right forces is swelling with each
passing day, they are bent on "breaking away from Asia and joining the United States."
On the basis of being an economic and high-tech power, they are trying to turn Japan
into a military and political power. In order to secure their "position as the elder" in
Asia, they slander that China has [become a] "potential threat" to Japan, they even look
upon China as a "power" that may "challenge" Japan's strategic superiority in Asia. l44

China is also sensitive to Japan's expanding security role, including its regional antipiracy initiatives. 145 Another People's Daily article views such Japanese initiatives as
"sounding the bugle call for Japan's military advance into Southeast Asia." It continues
to state that Japan has a

142 See AureIia George Mulgan, "Beyond Self-defence? Evaluating Japan's Regional Security Role under
the New Defence Cooperation Guidelines," Pacifica Review, Vol. 12, No. 3, October 2000; Banning
Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, "Chinese Apprehensions about Revitalization of the U.S.-Japan Alliance,"
Asian Survey, Vol. XXXVII, No. 4, April 1997; and Kori J. Urayama, "Chinese Perspectives on Theater
Missile Defense: Policy Implications for Japan," Asian Survey, Vol. XL, No. 4, July/August 2000.
143 See, for example, Deng Haipeng, "After the Cold War, Where Is Japan Headed?" Beijing Review, 3-9
March 1997, p. 9; Xu Zhixian and Yang Bojiang, "New Acts - A Historical Retrogression," Beijing
Review, 14 June 1999, pp. 12-14; Gu Ping, "Japan: Find a New Excuse to Participate in Constructing
TMD," Beifing Review, 21 August 2000, pp. 10-11; and "Don't Regard Politician's Clamor as Ravings,
How Far Japan Is away from Nuke," People's Daily ConIine ed.), 10 April 2002. For Liberal Party leader,
Ichiro Ozawa's nuclear remarks, see "Japan Can Be Nuclear Power: Ozawa," The Japan Times ConIine
ed.), 7 Apri12002.
144 "'Theory of Threat' Is Groundless, Erroneous: Analysis," People's Daily (online ed.), 6 June 2002.
See also '''China Threat' Masks Japan's Military Expansion," China Daily (onIine ed.), 18 July 2001.
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strategy for external expansion ... to place Southeast Asia under the wings of the
Japanese economy ... thereby controlling the economic security lifelines of these
countries .... Japan does attempt to build a new "Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere,"
the heart of which is to protect Japan's so-called economic benefits in Southeast Asia by
military means.

The military means used by Japan

to really extend its military tentacles to the Southeast Asia region [involve the
deployment of] Japanese war vessels to the Southeast Asian water areas under the
pretext of attacking pirates .... It can thus be seen that Japan's aim is to realize military
expansion toward Southeast Asia, while the entry of patrol boats made a breach for this
expansion. 146

As argued in the next chapter, there is some measure of truth to these otherwise
exaggerated claims, insofar as Japan, like India, is engaged in a competition with China
for political and economic influence in Southeast Asia. Japan is not an aggressive power
that "covets Southeast Asia militarily," however: rather, Japan's Southeast Asian coast
guard activities are, at least in part, a response to the pressures being exerted on its sea
lanes by an expansionist and potentially hostile China.

Sino-Japanese Maritime Disputes
The Senkaku Islands Dispute
The Senkaku Island group (or Diaoyu Islands

In

Chinese and Pinnacle Islands in

English) consists of eight small features located approximately 200 km northeast of
Taiwan, 300 km west of Japan's Ryukyu island chain and 400 km east of China. 147 The
group comprises five barren rocks and three islets, the largest of which is only 4.5 km2

in area. 148 In historical terms, the dispute can be traced back to a question of whether the
islands were part of the Ryukyu (Liuqiu) islands, an independent kingdom that paid
tribute to China until the nineteenth century (Japan formally annexed the island chain in
1879), or owned by China (or Taiwan). The islands themselves were not of any real
The Japanese anti-piracy initiatives are examined in the following chapter.
"Japan Covets Southeast Asia, Diplomatically and Militarily," People's Daily Coniine ed.), 13 June
2002.
147 Refer to map in Chapter 6.
145
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interest to anyone until a private Japanese citizen "rediscovered" them in 1884 and
began economic development there. The economic development of the Senkakus was
never protested by China and, in 1932, the Japanese developers purchased the four
largest islands from the Japanese government. 149
The Senkakus were abandoned in the late 1930s, partly as an indirect result of
the Sino-Japanese conflict on the mainland, and were not used again until the 1950s,
when the United States, under the terms of the 1951 San Francisco peace treaty with
Japan, took control as part of the American post-War administration of the Ryukyus.
The islands were occasionally used as firing ranges by the U.S. Navy, but otherwise
went unnoticed until a survey of the East China Sea, sponsored by the United Nations in
1969, pinpointed the Senkaku area as a potentially rich source of offshore oil and gas
resources. ISO It may be significant that China's 1958 territorial sea declaration did not
specifically mention the Senkakus.
The current dispute over ownership can be traced to a claim made by the
Republic of China following the favourable results of the geological surveys. It was
only after Taipei made its claim that Beijing followed suit, causing Japan to suspend its
exploration activities. The Senkakus were included in the Reversion Treaty between
Japan and the United States, which returned the Ryukyus to Japanese control in 1972.
However, when Beijing protested the inclusion of the islands in the Treaty, at a time of
Sino-American rapprochement during which Washington was anxious not to offend
China, the United States declared a neutral position in the dispute. lSl It can be argued, in
fact, that the United States is at least partly to blame for the problem: Washington's
immediate desire to woo China into an anti-Soviet coalition clearly was allowed to
trump the intent of the Reversion Treaty.
Although China proposed to shelve the dispute and to jointly develop the
islands' offshore resources with Japan, Tokyo has consistently refused to agree. That
position has ensured that Japan itself can not unilaterally exploit the Senkaku resources,

The total area of all eight features is only about 6.5 km2• See Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and
Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the DiaoyulSenkaku Islands, University of
Hawai'i Press, Honolulu, 2000, pp. 12-13.
149 Ibid" pp. 116-119. China claims that the Senkakus were annexed by Japan under the terms of the
Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, whilst Japan claims that the islands had been unoccupied territory
belonging to no one (terra nullius). See Austin, China's Ocean Frontier, pp. 168-170.
150 Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations, pp. 119, 121-122 and
129-131.
151 Ibid., pp. 131-135.
148
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even though it effectively controls the islands. 152 In fact, there seems little valid basis
for either the Taiwanese or Chinese claims. Even Greg Austin's legal analysis of
China's maritime territorial claims, which is generally sympathetic to China's interests,
concludes that Beijing "has no defensible claim" to the Senkakus, based on effective
Japanese sovereignty since 1895. 153 The dubious nature of China's claim has not altered
Beijing's official position, however: "China enjoys indisputable sovereignty over these
islands and the natural resources in its affiliated sea areas. China's sovereignty ... is
fully proven by history and is legally well-founded.,,154
The Senkakus have become an important irritant in Sino-Japanese relations and
Taiwan-Japan relations, with nationalist or opposition groups in each country
exacerbating the conflict during the 1990s. 155 Although the governments concerned
have generally taken a low-key approach to the dispute, there have been periodic flareups initially caused by nationalist groups, but increasingly involving official
intervention. In 1990, the Japan Maritime Safety Agency recognized a lighthouse that
had been repaired by a small right-wing Japanese nationalist group as an official
navigation aid, drawing protests from Taiwan and Hong Kong, and Taiwanese protest
boats were repelled by Japan. However, although Beijing reasserted its claim to the
islands, it was actually lambasted by protesters in Hong Kong and within China itself
for not taking a strong stand in support of its sovereignty claim.156 In 1992 Beijing itself
exacerbated the situation by asserting Chinese ownership over the Senkakus in China's
new territorial sea law, causing deep concern in Tokyo. In particular, Tokyo was
offended by the impression that China had reneged on Deng Xiaoping's offer to shelve
the dispute, and the potential implications of parts of the law which assert rights to
interfere with maritime traffic in seas claimed by China. 157 Interestingly, China's

Ibid., pp. 136-139.
Austin, China's Ocean Frontier, pp. 176 and 338.
154 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "The Issue of Diaoyu Islands" (c.
2000), available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cnieng/3790.html.
155 See Erica Strecker Downs and Phillip C. Saunders, "Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China
and the Diaoyu Islands," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3, Winter 1998/99; and Phil Deans,
"Contending Nationalisms and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Dispute," Security Dialogue, Vol. 31, No. 1, March
2000.
156 Downs and Saunders, "Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism," pp. 127-132. The Japan Maritime
Safety Agency is now called the Japan Coast Guard (in English only).
157 Dreyer, "Sino-Japanese Relations," pp. 375-376. Downs and Saunders, "Legitimacy and the Limits of
Nationalism," p. 133, n. 86, claim that the inclusion of the Senkakus in the territorial sea law was
"reportedly at the behest of the PLA."
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territorial sea law lists the islands as territory "appertaining" to Taiwan. 158 Therefore, it
can be argued that even if the Chinese claim in fact had any validity, the islands would
rightfully belong to de facto independent Taiwan, not China.
China raised the stakes in August 1995 (the month following the PLA's first
round of missile intimidation against Taiwan), when PLA Air Force Su-27 fighter
aircraft confronted Japanese fighters in Senkaku airspace, prompting Japan to improve
its air defence system in the area, including the introduction of more capable fighters to
its aerial patrols. 159 Just days prior to Japan's July 1996 exclusive economic zone
declaration, which included the waters surrounding the Senkakus, the right-wing Japan
Youth Federation erected a new lighthouse in the island group and, in August, another
group planted a wooden Japanese flag on one of the islands. One Hong Kong protester
drowned when the Japan Maritime Safety Agency tried to prevent his boat from landing
in the Senkakus. China's response was more assertive than in 1990, although diplomacy
dampened down the conflict once more. 160 Beijing again received thousands of
complaints that it was not taking a strong enough line, this time reportedly including the
objections of a group of 35 PLA generals. It has been claimed that PLA nationalists
organized maritime exercises off the coast of Liaoning in September as a warning to
both Japan and the CCP leadership over the army's interests in the Senkakus. 161 For its
part, Washington's position remains somewhat ambiguous: in 1996 the American
ambassador to Japan denied that the terms of the U.S.-Japan alliance applied to the
Senkakus, only to be subsequently contradicted by officials from the Department of
Defense. 162
The Senkaku dispute flared again in September 2002, when Taiwan's former
president, Lee Teng-hui, told a Japanese newspaper that the "land of the Senkaku
Islands belongs to Okinawa, therefore it is a territory of Japan," and that there is "no

"Law of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone," 25 February
1992, Article 2, in Office of Policy, Law and Regulation, State Oceanic Administration, Collection of the
Sea Laws and Regulations of the People's Republic of China, State Oceanic Administration, Beijing,
1998, p. 186.
159 Dreyer, "Sino-Japanese Relations," p. 377. August was also the month of China's nuclear weapon
tests, which caused a temporary halt in Japanese economic aid.
160 Downs and Saunders, "Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism," pp. 133-139.
161 Ibid., p. 139.
162 See "Security Alliance Redefined after End of Cold War," The Japan Times (online ed.), 24 August
2001; and Michael J. Green, "The Forgotten Player," The National Interest, No. 60, Summer 2000, p. 47.
A State Department official has also alluded to Washington's likely support for Japan in a conflict over
the Senkakus. See "U.S. Hints at Support for Japan on Senkaku Isles," Japan Today (onIine), 11
December 2001.
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evidence for China's territorial claim.,,163 Greater controversy occurred at the end of
2002, however, when Japan leased three of the islands from their private Japanese
owner to prevent their potential sale and other parties from landing there. 164 In response,
Taiwan reiterated its own claims,165 whilst China lodged an official protest. 166 Around a
week later, Japan renewed a separate lease on a fourth island in the group, Kubashima.
The island had originally been leased in 1972, with the rent paid by Japan's Defense
Facilities Administration Agency.167 The Agency stated that, although the V.S. military
had not used the island since 1978, they were maintaining the lease "as a possible
exercise ground for American troopS.,,168 A People's Daily report reiterated that the
islands are the "inherent territory of China. The Chinese governments of all times have
all along exercised ... sovereignty over the islands." And, "Japan has never in the least
slackened its pursuit for ... actual control" over the islands, which are being guarded by
the Japan Coast Guard. 169 China, for its part, has intensified its own maritime activities
around the Senkakus in the last few years, perhaps as a precursor to further action, as
discussed in a following section.

Sino-Japanese Maritime Boundaries
In addition to the Senkakus dispute, China and Japan have overlapping exclusive
economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf boundary claims in the East China Sea,
although the Senkaku and Taiwan issues complicate negotiations. The breadth of the
East China Sea between China and Japan at no point exceeds 400 nautical miles, thus
170

In 1997 the two sides agreed to what Greg
Austin calls a "joint control zone" in the central part ofthe East China Sea. 171 The Sino-

ensuring overlapping maritime zones.

Japanese Agreement on Fishery came into effect in January 2000 to guarantee mutual

163 Quoted in "Japan Owns Senkaku Isles: Taiwan's Lee," The Japan Times (onIine ed.), 25 September
2002. Taiwan's foreign ministry reasserted Taiwan's claim following Lee's interview. See "Ministries
Assert Claim over Islands," Taipei Times (onIine ed.), 26 September 2002.
164 "Govt. Renting 3 Senkaku Islands," The Daily Yomiuri (onIine ed.), 1 January 2003.
165 "Taiwan Mfrrms Tiaoyutai Claim," Taipei Times (onIine ed.), 2 January 2003.
166 "China Lodges Protest over Senkaku Lease," The Japan Times (onIine ed.), 6 January 2003.
167 "Govt. Leasing 4th Senkaku Island," The Daily Yomiuri (onIine ed.), 8 January 2003. The original lease
had never been registered or publicized.
168 Quoted jn "Japan Says It Has Leased Disputed Island for Decades," Taipei Times (onIine ed.), 9
January 2003. China, of course, protested again, with the usual litany that it had been "a part of Chinese
territory since ancient times."
169 "To Occupy China's Diaoyu Islands, Japan's Fond Dream for Long," People's Daily (onIine ed.), 9
January 2003.
170 Ji, "Maritime Jurisdiction in the Three China Seas," p. 94.
171 Austin, China's Ocean Frontier, pp. 193-205.
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access to the zone's fisheries,l72 illustrating that economic cooperation can continue
even though political relations are becoming increasingly tense.

Chinese Maritime Surveillance Activities in the East China Sea and near Japan
China began to increase the pace of its maritime surveillance and research activities in
the waters around Japan in 1996. Such activities probably included signals and
electronic intelligence gathering and oceanographic and environmental surveys of the
waters and seabed for either military and/or economic purposes. There is significant
disagreement between states as to exactly what activities are allowable in the exclusive
economic zones of other countries under international law. In general, Western
interpretations of the Law of the Sea Convention seem to suggest that military
operations such as surveillance and marine surveying are allowable "exclusively for
peaceful purposes," but that surveys for economic purposes without the permission of
the coastal state are not. I73 In this respect, one problem with Chinese activities is that
the vessels and agencies involved (especially the State Oceanic Administration) collect
data for both the PLA and for economic exploration. Thus, it may be difficult to discern
the actual purposes of Chinese survey activities in any specific situation.
In 1998 Chinese vessels were spotted in Japan's claimed East China Sea
exclusive economic zone 16 times, according to Japan's National Institute for Defense
Studies (NIDS - part ofthe Japan Defense Agency). In the first six months of 1999,24
such incidents were recorded, including four in the "territorial sea" around the Senkaku
Islands. When ordered to leave the Senkaku waters by the Japan Coast Guard, the
Chinese vessels refused, leaving the NIDS study to speculate that the survey ships were
surveying marine resources. 174 Technically, because sovereignty over the islands and
their maritime zones was disputed, China can argue that its surveys were permissible,
although such activities around the Senkakus do seem to be in breach of Deng' s formula
for shelving the dispute for consideration by later generations.

172 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "China's Maritime Demarcation and
Bilateral Fishery Affairs" (c. 2000), available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cnleng/14698.html.
173 For a discussion of the issues and positions ofleading parties to disputes over activities in the EEZ, see
Jon M. Van Dyke, "Military Ships and Planes Operating in the Exclusive Economic Zones of Other
Countries," paper prepared for the Tokyo Meeting, The Regime of the Exclusive Economic Zone: Issues
and Responses, Tokyo, 19-20 February 2003. What constitutes "exclusively peaceful purposes" is open to
a wide range of interpretations.
174 The National Institute for Defense Studies, East Asia Strategic Review 2000, NIDS, Tokyo, 2000, pp.
104-105.
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In May 1999 twelve PLAN ships, including a frigate, were spotted in Japan's

exclusive economic zone 110 km north of the Senkakus and, in July, ten more were
observed, including three Luda-class destroyers, in Japan's exclusive economic zone
130-260 km north of the Senkakus. The NIDS study believes that the deployments may,
at least in the short term, have been designed to "restrain the passage of bills related to
the Guidelines for Japan-V.S. Defense Cooperation, support [Chinese] survey activities
... or show China's disapproval of the 'special state-to-state relationship' statement
made by President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan." I 75 It is not known whether the parts of the
Japanese exclusive economic zone in question are in the area of overlapping EEZ
claims with China, or in undisputed waters.
In the year 2000 up to August, 17 more incidents of Chinese maritime
"intrusions" were recorded, whilst PLA Navy vessels passed through the Tsugaru Strait
between Honshu and Hokkaido and the Osumi Strait at the bottom tip of Kyushu,
causing considerable anger and leading one politician from Japan's ruling Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) to label China's actions as an "apparent provocation," placing
a large low interest infrastructure loan to China at risk.176 Another LDP member was
quoted as saying that "Those [Chinese] vessels may be searching for places to illegally
enter Japanese territory. Japan's sovereignty has been violated."l?? One of the ships
passing through both the Tsugaru Strait and the Tsushima Strait (eastern channel of the
Korea Strait) between Kyushu and the Tsushima Islands (which lie in the waters
between Japan and the bottom of the Korean peninsula) in "May 2000, was the 4,420 ton
PLAN intelligence-gathering vessel Yanbing (No. 723), a deployment termed
''unprecedented'' by one leading analyst of regional intelligence-collecting activities and
capabilities. And, in August, another Chinese electronic surveillance ship was reported
to have entered Japan's territorial sea during a PLA Navy exercise. 178 According to the
Japan Defense Agency, at least some of China's marine surveys around Japan have
involved seabed mapping to improve the effectiveness of PLA Navy submarine

Ibid., p. 105.
"China Yen Loans at Risk, Says LDP" Asahi Evening News, 10 August 2000, p. 2.
177 "LDP Members Want Government to Shelve ¥l7.2 Bil. in Infrastructure Loans to China," The Daily
Yomiuri, 9 August 2000, p. 2. Such statements reflect both a growing concern with China's strategic
expansion and Japanese frustration that the Chinese public have not been informed of Japan's huge
contributions to China's infrastructure growth by the same government that continues to castigate Japan
in the state-controlled media, whilst taking credit itself for Japanese-funded projects.
178 Ball, "Intelligence Collection Operations and EEZs," p. 20.
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operations. 179 Japan's loan package was subsequently released only after Japanese
protests led to Chinese "concessions" over its "naval incursions.,,18o
Those "concessions" included consultations over marine research activities in
the exclusive economic zones of the East China Sea. The consultations in turn led to the
establishment in February 2001 of a scheme to provide mutual advance notification of
such activities. I8I One potential problem with the arrangement is the vagueness of the
areas included within the framework, due to a fundamental disagreement over the
delimitation of the East China Sea. A 2002 NIDS report claims that, although the
agreement has improved the situation, a number of Chinese violations have nevertheless
occurred. These "self-righteous activities by China" in 2001 mostly seem to have been
in the Senkaku and Ryukyu areas. 182 One of the vessels observed was Xiang Yang Hong
09, 37 km north-northeast of Kubashima in the Senlmkus, in August 2001. Desmond

Ball has noted that this same ship was used to make preparatory surveys of Fiery Cross
Reef in the Spratlys in late 1987, immediately prior to the PLA occupation ofthe reef in
March 1988. 183 The 2000 NIDS report may, therefore, have been prescient when it
warned that

The naval power of a country can establish its presence and exercise its influence on
international affairs only by showing the flag in the sea and by repeating exercises and
other operations over a long period. The significance of establishing a presence in the
sea lies basically in demonstrating a nation's power to win or protect its maritime
interests. In the case of China's advance to the Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands, first,
it declared its sovereignty on these islands, and after conducting marine scientific
research, the navy carried out an exercise and then landed on the islands. 184

To be sure, using the same strategy against Japan over the Senkakus is a far more
daunting proposition than it was, for example, to capture reefs in the Spratlys of prime
interest to, firstly, Vietnam in 1988, and to the Philippines in 1994-1995. Nevertheless,

179 Cited in "In Its Own Neighborhood, China Emerges as Leader," The Washington Post (online ed.), 18
October 2001,
180 "China Shows Belated Gratitude to Japan for $46 Billion in Aid," The Sydney Morning Herald, 14
October 2000, p. 24; and "Friends Indeed," Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 October 2001, p. 21.
181 "Japan, China Agree to Swap Ship Info," The Daily Yomiuri (online ed.), 9 February 2001.
182 The National Institute foe Defense Studies, East Asia Strategic Review 2002, NIDS, Tokyo, 2002, pp.
213-215.
183 Ball, "Intelligence Collection Operations and EEZs," p. 20.
184 East Asia Strategic Review 2000, pp. 105-106.
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it is still worth noting what may be a common pattern of behaviour to China's survey
activities around disputed territories.
China's maritime surveillance activities around Japan are not illegal. Yet, when
placed within the overall context of China's maritime expansion, the deliberate nature
of the increased pace and scope of the activities, especially around the Senkakus and
through Japan's politically sensitive straits, make those operations greatly concerning to
Tokyo.

Taiwan and Japanese Security

Japan and Taiwan maintain close economic and, to some extent, political ties, albeit
unofficial ones. Taiwan is also important to Japanese security, lying astride Japan's key
sea lanes, which carry oil and other raw materials mostly through the Bashi Channel
past the east coast of Taiwan, or through the Taiwan Strait itself. Given Tokyo'S evident
concerns with China's maritime expansion, ensuring Taiwan's continued freedom from
Chinese control would seem to be an important strategic geopolitical objective for
Japan. 185 When Tokyo and Washington revised the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-D.S.
Defense Cooperation in 1997, passed into Japanese law in May 1999, the revised
document included a provision for "cooperation in situations in areas surrounding Japan
that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security.,,186 The revised
Guidelines were intended to rejuvenate the alliance in the post-Cold War era, enhance
cooperation and expand Japan's roles within the alliance "in areas surrounding Japan,"
including: humanitarian relief, non-combatant and search and rescue operations; the
provision of facilities and rear area support for D.S. forces; and operational cooperation,
to include surveillance and minesweeping in support of American forces both "in
Japanese territory and on the high seas around Japan," and also sea and airspace
management. 187
The undefined status of "situations in areas surrounding Japan" has caused
particular consternation in Beijing, which believes that such a loose geographical
definition might include Taiwan. China has argued that the new Guidelines have

185 For a fuller discussion of the importance of Taiwan for Japanese security, see Rahman, "Defending
Taiwan, and Why It Matters," pp. 78-81.
186 Japan Defense Agency, "The New Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation," Tokyo (no date:
c. 1998), p. 12.
187 Ibid., pp. 23-25.
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failed to explicitly undertake to exclude Taiwan from the scope of "the areas
surrounding Japan" referred to in the Japanese security bill that could involve military
intervention. These actions have inflated the arrogance of the separatist forces in
Taiwan, seriously undermined China's sovereignty and security and imperiled the peace
and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. 188

China's fears were realized when Japanese officials agreed that the new Guidelines did
include the Taiwan area,189 with one former Japanese Foreign Ministry official stating
that ''No one has denied that the Taiwan Strait is included. Japan has a great interest in
stability and peace in the Taiwan Strait.,,190 Japan has attempted to diplomatically fudge
the issue by stating that the term refers to "situations that will have an important
influence on Japan's peace and security. The concept is not geographic, but
situational.,,191 The difficulty lies primarily not in vague definitions, however, but in a
fundamental clash of interests between Japan and China over Taiwan's future, interests
that centre on maintaining or changing the strategic status quo, respectively, in East
Asian seas.

Chinese Actions against American Maritime Surveillance Activities

There has been an increasing level of Chinese resistance to V.S. surveillance activities
along the Chinese littoral, including a number of incidents involving PLA attempts to
counter those activities since the Kitty Hawk incident in the YeHow Sea in 1994, most
notably the April 2001 EP-3E incident in the South China Sea. In June 2002, two PLA
F-7 fighters "came within 150 feet" of an EP-3 aircraft which was gathering intelligence
on a large-scale Chinese military exercise opposite Taiwan. 192 The People's Daily
responded to the incident by stating that, after the April 2001 collision, the United States

flagrantly resumed its reconnaissance over ... Chinese coastal areas within one month
[whilst the PLA] also carried out all-weather warning cruises over the Yellow Sea, the
East China Sea and the South China Sea in order to "counter-control" US. planes.

193

"China's National Defense in 2000," p. ii.
See Tucker, "China-Taiwan," pp. 156-157; and Li, "Partners or Rivals? p. 11.
190 Yukio Okamoto, quoted in "Menage A Trois?" Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 October 1997, p. 24.
191 "The New Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation," p. 20.
192 "Chinese Fighters Fly near U.S. Spy Plane," The Washington Times (online ed.), 27 June 2002.
193 "Chinese and US. Military Planes 'Encounter' Again: Washington Times," People's Daily (onIine
ed.), 2 July 2002.
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In September 2002, the USNS Bowditch, an American naval oceanographic research

ship, was harassed by Chin~se ships and Y-8 and Y-12 maritime patrol aircraft whilst
conducting surveys around 60 nautical miles from the Chinese coast in the Yellow
Sea. 194 The Chinese continue to insist that they enjoy territorial sea rights in the
exclusive economic zone and that any foreign military ship requires prior approval to
make an innocent passage through the 12 nautical mile territorial sea - and thus also
through the exclusive economic zone. 195 Both positions are contrary to the Law of the
Sea Convention. The same ship had reportedly been forced to leave China's exclusive
economic zone in March 2001 by a PLAN frigate, which closed within 100 metres of
it. 196 In November 2002, two F-7 fighters flew to within 250 feet of an EP-3
surveillance flight off China's "northern coast.,,197 In December, a Chinese fighter
closed to within 300 feet of another EP-3 flight. 198 And, following North Korea's
aggressive interception of an American RC-135 surveillance aircraft in the Sea of Japan
in March 2003, it has been reported that intercepting Chinese fighters have again been
flying close to V.S. surveillance flights. 199
As a result of mounting incidents, Beijing and Washington signed an agreement
in January 1998 to set up a consultation mechanism to promote "common understanding
regarding activities undertaken by their respective maritime and air forces when
operating in accordance with international law.',20o Most notably, however, the
agreement is not a fully-fledged incidents at sea (INCSEA) arrangement that sets
guidelines for avoiding potentially dangerous activities by military ships and aircraft in
peacetime and procedures to follow should incidents or accidents actually occur. Rather,
it is simply an agreement to consult and to establish regular meetings to exchange views
on relevant issues. The agreement had no impact whatsoever on either the April 2001
EP-3 incident or its immediate aftermath. And, although the consultations are ongoing,
and despite the fact that the Chinese have not recklessly endangered surveillance flights

194 "Inside the Ring," The Washington Times (online ed.), 20 September 2002; and "China Complains
about U.S. Surveillance Ship," The New York Times (online ed.), 27 September 2002. Initial claims that
the Bowditch had collided with a Chinese vessel were false.
195 "What's U.S. Vessel Up to on Chinese Waters?" People's Daily (online ed.), 29 September 2002.
196 Van Dyke, "Military Ships and Planes Operating in the Exclusive Economic Zones of Other
Countries,:' p. 18.
197 "Inside the Ring," The Washington Times (online ed.), 22 November 2002.
198 "Inside the Ring," The Washington Times (online ed.), 27 December 2002.
199 "Inside the Ring," The Washington Times (online ed.), 14 March 2003.
200 "Agreement between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of
National Defense of the People's Republic of China on Establishing a Consultation Mechanism to
Strengthen Military Maritime Safety," Beijing, 19 January 1998, Article 1.
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since the Hainan collision, the number of subsequent incidents nevertheless demonstrate
Beijing's palpable unwillingness to accept American intelligence-collecting activities.
In a further indication of China's intent to halt American surveillance flights,
Beijing enacted a new law in December 2002 which seeks to overturn the international
right to carry out surveillance in China's exclusive economic zone and limit the freedom
of navigation and overflight that all states are entitled to under international law.
Specifically, the law states that survey and mapping activities carried out by "foreign
entities" must be approved by China's civil and military authorities and must be part of
a joint venture with a Chinese company. No such activities would be allowed if they
harmed Chinese national security, which would rule out any military surveys or
intelligence collecting. 20 !
In a different category of incident, Chinese warships also challenged two frigates
and a replenishment ship of the Royal Australian Navy within China's territorial sea in
the Taiwan Strait in late April 2001. The PLA Navy challenge and subsequent
diplomatic protest went largely ignored by Australia, whose ships were making an
innocent passage from Pusan to Hong Kong through international shipping lanes, in
accordance with internationallaw. 202 But the incident demonstrated China's intent to
enforce its excessive jurisdictional claims to limit or regulate the innocent passage of
foreign warships through its territorial sea in order to expand its control over the
adjacent maritime environment,203

CHINA'S NORTHEAST ASIA STRATEGY AND THE SEA

China has consistently built-up its maritime presence in Northeast Asian seas over a
period of over twenty years. Much of that maritime presence was initially commercial,
although China also improved its maritime defensive capabilities. From the early 1990s,
however, there has been a greater strategic emphasis on the Taiwan Strait and the East
China Sea, as China's strategic priorities have evolved to make Taiwan the PLA's
"China Enacts Law Extending Its Control: ZOO-mile Economic Zone Concerns U.S.," The Washington
Times, 27 January 2003, reproduced in "The Regime of the Exclusive Economic Zone: Issues and
Responses," background materials for the Tokyo Meeting, Tokyo, 19-20 February 2003.
202 See "PM Defends 'Innocence' of Ships in China Row," The Sydney Morning Herald, 27 April 2001, p.
201

5.
China is not the only country to try to enforce such restrictions, however. See Martin Tsamenyi and
K wame Mfodwo, Analysis of Contemporary and Emerging Navigational Issues in the Law of the Sea,
Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Centre and Centre for Maritime Policy Working Paper No. 8, RAN
Sea Power Centre, RAAF Fairbairn, Canberra, November 2001, esp. pp. 23-25.
203
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primary external preoccupation. China's increasing pressure on Taiwan over the past
decade, using both military and non-military means, its assertive programme of
intelligence-collection and other military activities in and around Japanese waters, and
its aggressive approach to countering similar surveillance activities by the United States,
together suggest that China intends to push its defensive depth and areas of maritime
control farther to seaward, steadily toward the first island chain.
Should China either successfully usurp or neutralize Taiwan, its access to the
ocean will be more secure. And, by controlling the island itself, China would add
greatly to its comprehensive maritime power and make the expanded Chinese empire
inherently more "maritime" in nature. That would enhance China's ability to fulfil its
regional commercial and geopolitical ambitions, and allow PLA development to
concentrate on conducting future sea control and power projection operations, including
into the South China Sea. Taiwan would thus play a central role in China's ability to
operationalize its maritime strategy and greatly improve its prospects for controlling
vital sea lanes between Northeast and Southeast Asia. That all suggests that the
importance of Taiwan for both China's long-term grand strategy and regional security
ought not to be downplayed.
There is also evidence that China wants to assert its place atop the regional
hierarchy, above Japan. In addition to its slowly growing military challenge to Japan's
place as East Asia's leading sea power, China is also trying to assert its leadership over
Japan in other ways. For example, Beijing has proposed to follow its free trade deal
with ASEAN with another deal to include China, Japan and South Korea. 204 Not only
does China intend to politically counter American economic influence throughout Asia,
but also Japan's.205 The creation of a Northeast Asian economic bloc would clearly be
led by China, despite the fact that Japan's economy is still four times larger than
China's.206 Although there may well be mutual economic benefits to be had from such a
deal, China ultimately would use it as an instrument to assert its political power. There
is almost no circumstance, on the other hand, in which China today is likely to accept

204 See "East Asia Trade Bloc to Emerge within 20 Years," People's Daily (online ed.), 1 December
2002. South 1<.orea is also pushing to include China in any Japan-Korea free trade arrangement.
205 See "China Is Using Its New Economic Weight to Outmaneuver Japan," The New York Times (onIine
ed.), 6 December 2002; and "China Races to Replace US. as Economic Power in Asia," The New York
Times (onIine ed.), 28 June 2002.
206 See "China Hub of the World's Next Bloc," Taipei Times (onIine ed.), 25 November 2002.
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Japanese economic leadership of such a grouping. 107 Over time, economic and political
leadership would surely also become strategic leadership, including maritime leadership
in East Asia.

207 A similar attitude was encountered in interviews with a leading Chinese maritime security expert and a
PLAN officer in Shanghai, July 2000, regarding Japan's initiatives for regional anti~piracy cooperation.
Whilst Chinese participation in such cooperation to protect shipping was not ruled out (in fact, the general
idea was received positively), both interviewees rejected outright not only any scheme led by Japan, but
also any scheme proposed by Japan.
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9

Countering China: The Consequences of China's Maritime
Advance

The dissertation thus far has evaluated the rise of China as a regional maritime power
within the context of China's growing comprehensive national strength and geopolitical
ambitions. This chapter analyses the consequences of China's growing maritime
presence, power and ambitions, focusing on attempts by other states to either counter
China's maritime advance or at least to hedge against it.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF CmNA'S RISE AS A MARITIME POWER

China's rise as a regional maritime power has induced both direct attempts to counter
this expansion, and less direct (and less effective) attempts by regional states to bind it
into the evolving regional security architecture as a responsible player. The two effects
might be characterized as "containment" versus "engagement," but to do so would be
misleading. 1 Each term is inaccurate and simplistic - often representing little more than
slogans - and neither reflects the realistic policy choices for dealing with China. 2 In a
1 See Gerald Segal, "East Asia and the 'Constrainment' of China," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4,
Spring 1996; and Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China, Vintage
Books, New York, 1998 (fIrst pub. 1997), pp. 203-204.
Z For arguments over the options for dealing with the rise of China from a range of national and regional
perspectives see, for example, ibid., "Conclusion"; Segal, "East Asia and the 'Constrainment' of China";
Roy C. Howle, "An Inevitable War: Engaged Containment and the U.S.-China Balance," Parameters,
Vol. XXXI, No. 3, Autumn 2001; Owen Harries, "A Year of Debating China," The National Interest, No.
58, Winter 1999/2000; June Teufel Dreyer, "The US. Response to China's Increasing Military Power:
Eleven Assumptions in Search of a Policy," testimony before the House Armed Services Committee
Hearings, 19 July 2000; Ted Galen Carpenter, "Managing a Great Power Relationship: The United States,
China and East Asian Security," The Journal a/Strategic Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1, March 1998; Mark T.
Clark, "Should the United States Contain China?" Comparative Strategy, Vol. 16, No. 3, July-September
1997; Michae1 J. Green and Benjamin L. Self, "Japan's Changing China Policy: From Commercial
Liberalism to Reluctant Realism," Survival, Vol. 38, No. 2, Summer 1996; AlIen S. Whiting, "ASEAN
Eyes China: The Security Dimension," Asian Survey, Vol. XXXVII, No. 4, Apri11997; and Yong Deng,
''Managing China's Hegemonic Ascension: Engagement from Southeast Asia," The Journal a/Strategic
Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1, March 1998.
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more sophisticated analysis, Gerald Segal has coined the term "constrainment" as a way
to cope with a rising China, using economic and political incentives to engage China
whilst maintaining a posture of military deterrence and the means to punish it should
deterrence fail. 3
By contrast, Robert Ross has argued that the United States already maintains
sufficient naval power in East Asia for the successful "maritime containment" or "naval
encirclement" of China's predominantly continental power. 4 Not only does that
argument underestimate the extent to which China is making a concerted effort to
counter American naval capabilities, should hostilities break out, but it also overstates
the ease with which Chinese maritime strategic power can be "contained" - at least in
peacetime. As Colin Gray notes: "Unlike the unlamented, erstwhile USSR, China is not
a landlocked power, and she cannot be landlocked by a prudent U.S. containment
policy."s
China's advance as a maritime power thus can not be "contained" in times of
peace. Even in wartime, the extent of China's coastline and its advantageous
geographical proximity to potential regional theatres of operations mean that containing
the Chinese navy would not be easy. Although the offshore island chains restrict
China's options, they are not the equivalent of the very narrow straits that guard the
exits to the Baltic, Mediterranean and Black Seas, for example. Were China to gain
control of Taiwan, the task of restricting the operations of the PLA Navy would be
doubly difficult. The following sections describe how leading players in maritime East
Asia have attempted to counter China's maritime advance, which has created conditions
of growing strategic competition and uncertainty in the region.

ASEAN
The states of Southeast Asia each have their own interests and views on China's rise,
but China's growing military power and, in particular, its South China Sea ambitions,
combined to create considerable nervousness in the early 19908. However, naval
6

modernization within ASEAN at the time was not aimed at countering China. Instead,
the ASEAN states attempted to engage and integrate Beijing into a supposedly
SegaJ, "East Asia and the 'Constrainment' of China."
Robert S. Ross, "The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-fIrst Century," International
Security, Vol. 23, No. 4, Spring 1999, esp. pp. 100-101.
5 Colin S. Gray, "The Continued Primacy of Geography," Orbis, Vol. 40, No. 2, Spring 1996, p. 258.
3
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constraining web of multilateral cooperative security dialogues such as the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF)/ the Workshops on Managing Potential Conflict in the South
China Sea,s and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific. None of these
fora have had any success in countering China's South China Sea strategy, however,
which has been described by Mark Valencia as "a combination of dividing and
dominating; obfuscation and ambiguity; careful timing; and selective assertiveness.,,9
Indeed, there is little reason to suggest that cooperative security mechanisms can
constrain China or even "manage" its rise in the abstract, let alone in practice. 10
The ASEAN states have made more tangible efforts, both collectively and
individually in bilateral arrangements with outside actors, to counter - or at least hedge
against - China's maritime ambitions in Southeast Asia. For example, following
China's occupation and military consolidation of reefs in the Spratlys in the late 1980s,
ASEAN made its 1992 Declaration on the South China Sea as a united, non-military
response. According to one Malaysian analyst, the Declaration may also have been a
response to China's 1992 territorial sea law, which reasserted China's South China Sea
claims. ll The declaration was ineffective, however, as was ASEAN's 1995 declaration
following China's occupation of Mischief Reef (and a bilateral declaration between
China and the Philippines): China continued its South China Sea strategy unchecked.
Vietnam's entry into the ASEAN club has commonly been viewed as an
opportunity for a relatively weak Vietnam to co-opt its fellow members to counter an
increasingly strong China in the South China Sea. However, Vietnam also has
competing claims with other ASEAN members, and it is important to remember that
ASEAN is not a military bloc. 12 The most recent effort to tie China into cooperative

6 J.N. Mak, "The ASEAN Naval Build-up: Implications for the Regional Order," The Pacific Review,
Vol. 8, No. 2,1995, pp. 315-316.
7 See, for example, Deng, "Managing China's Hegemonic Ascension," pp. 31-39.
8 See, for example, Craig A. Snyder, "Building Multilateral Security Cooperation in the South China
Sea," Asian Perspective, Vol. 21, No. 1, Spring-Summer 1997, pp. 28-30.
9 Mark J. Valencia, "Building Confidence and Security in the South China Sea: The Way Forward," in
Andrew T.R. Tan and J.D. Boutin, eds., Non-traditional Security Issues in Southeast Asia, Select
Publishing for the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, 2001, p. 538.
10 For a strong critique see Robyn Lim, "The ASEAN Regional Forum: Building on Sand,"
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 20, No. 2, August 1998. See also Chris Rahman, "Linking Maritime
Regimes to Regional Security: Some Caveats and Observations," in Sam Bateman, ed., Maritime
Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region: Current Situation and Prospects, Canberra Papers on Strategy
and Defence No. 132, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University,
Canberra, 1999.
11 Mak, "The ASEAN Naval Build-up," p. 308.
12 Stein nmnesson makes that important point in "Vietnam's Objective in the South China Sea: National
or Regional Security?" Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 22, No. 1, Apri12000, pp. 215-216.
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habits, the ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea
of November 2002, represented rather the opposite: an inability to get Chinese
agreement on regulating activities in the disputed territories. Moreover, the expansion of
ASEAN, with no effective lead nation, has weakened further an already slim likelihood
that the states of Southeast Asia would make a united stand against Chinese maritime
encroachment. China's policy of tying Southeast Asian economies to its own in a
dependent relationship will also limit that possibility. Individual Southeast Asian
nations have nevertheless made attempts to hedge against a wider sense of regional
insecurity and uncertainty resulting from China's growing strategic profile.

Vietnam

Vietnam, once the most bitter of China's adversaries in the South China Sea,
increasingly has had to accommodate China's growing power due to its own relative
weakness, and the gap between the two former belligerents continues to widen in
China's favour. Hanoi has, as noted above, attempted to exploit its ASEAN membership
to gain diplomatic leverage over China in the South China Sea disputes, but to little
avail. Vietnam has also reoriented its own military modernization plans since the mid
1990s, placing a high priority on naval and air forces for possible use in the South China
Sea or Tonkin Gulf. Despite the new maritime emphasis, however, Vietnam's strategic
modernization is severely constrained by its ongoing financial limitations. 13

Indonesia

The Australia-Indonesia Agreement on Maintaining Security (AMS) of 1995 was a
significant shift by Jakarta away from its traditional non-alignment. Indonesia is widely
viewed as having been motivated by fear of Chinese encroachment on its large offshore
gas fields northeast of the Natuna Islands. 14 To make its intentions perfectly clear,
Indonesia held a major military exercise in the Natunas in 1996 and subsequently
increased its maritime patrols in the area, detaining 50 Chinese fishing boats. IS
Indonesia's foreign policy direction in the post-Soeharto era is as yet unclear, although
13 For details of Hanoi's modernization efforts, see ibid., pp. 204~205; and Mark Farrer, "Stresses in the
South China Sea - Vietnam and China," Asia~Pacific Defence Reporter, January 2000, pp. 14~15.
14 Lim, "The ASEAN Regional Forum," p. 125; and Whiting, "ASEAN Eyes China," pp. 304~308. The
AMS was unilaterally abrogated by Indonesia in 1999 following Australia's lead role in promoting and
assisting East Timor's transition to independence.
15 Anton Nugroho (Capt., TNI), "The Dragon Looks South," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March
2000, p. 76.

301

its large LNG supply contract with China may be a sign of a longer-term
rapprochement. Indonesia and the Vnited States, on the other hand, are beginning to

rebuild military ties following the disruption caused by the 1999 East Timor crisis.
Those ties reportedly include American plans to build a naval dockyard in Bitung at the
northern tip of Sulawesi, near the confluence of the Celebes and Molucca Seas, to
service warships from several countries, including the United States, Indonesia and,
perhaps most notably (if the report is accurate), Japan. 16

Malaysia

Malaysia's behaviour may be instructive. Although a rival claimant to China in the
Spratlys, Kuala Lumpur's diplomatic strategy has been to integrate and engage China
politically and economically in a recognition of its own relative military weakness. 17
Despite continuing chauvinistic anti-Western statements by Malaysia's leaders over the
years, however, Malaysia continues to hedge against external threats by building a
programme of close, yet low key and rarely publicized military cooperation with the
United States. In addition to the annual naval CARAT exercises and Malaysian
participation in the multilateral security cooperation programmes of the V.S. Pacific
Command,18 further Malaysian defence cooperation with the United States was revealed
during a visit to Washington by the Malaysian defence minister in 2002. Ships of the
V.S. Navy frequently use Malaysian port facilities: more than 75 American ships had

made port calls in the two years to May 2002. The V.S. Anny has conducted field
exercises with the Malaysian army, U.S. Navy Seals train in Malaysia twice a year and
American forces use a Malaysian base to conduct jungle warfare training. Intelligence
sharing increased following the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States and,
since that time, Malaysia has also provided security for American ships passing through
the Malacca Strait. 19

16 "V.S. to Build Naval Dock in Indonesia," People's Daily (onIine ed.), 1 September 2002. The dock
supposedly is to be operational by 2005, although in personal discussions with Indonesian Navy officers
at SESKOAL (the Indonesian naval college) in Jakarta, April 2003, doubts were raised over the report's
accuracy. The idea evidently originated with a local or provincial government and does not have central
~overnment support.
7 "Territorial Imperative," Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 February 1995, p. 15.
18 See the later section on American security cooperation and coalition building for further discussion.
19 See "K.L. Shows Extent of Defence Ties with V.S.," The Straits Times (onIine ed.), 3 May 2002. The
Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), wherein Australia, Britain and New Zealand guarantee the
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Singapore

Singapore's concerns with China's expansion lie primarily in maintaining peace in the
Taiwan Strait, as any cross-Strait war would harm Singapore's important economic
interests in both countries. There are also longstanding political and security links
between Taiwan and Singapore. 2o Singapore maintains large army training facilities in
Taiwan and conducts regular exercises with Taiwanese forces. The Republic of
Singapore Navy holds annual bilateral exercises with the Taiwanese navy (Exercise
Sealight), whose training squadron also visits Singapore annually.21 Singapore also
continues to sell military technologies to Taiwan,z2 The army training links may weaken
or even end, however, if Singapore shifts its training base to Hainan. In any case, there
is no prospect of Singapore becoming directly involved in a cross-Strait conflict or an
overtly anti-China coalition: Singapore does not view China as a direct threat. 23
Nevertheless, Singapore does view the continued D.S. strategic presence in East
Asia as an important stabilizing force and has deepened its defence links with the
United States, including construction of a dock at its new Changi naval base specifically
large enough to accommodate American aircraft carriers. Singapore's deputy prime
minister and defence minister, Tony Tan, explained the Singaporean position in 2001,
stating that "it is no secret that Singapore believes that the presence of the V.S. military
in this part of the world contributes to the peace and stability of the region. To that
extent, we have facilitated the presence of V.S. military forces.,,24 Singapore has also
taken low-key independent action to build a security relationship with Bunna,
seemingly to counter Chinese influence there?S Such policies may signify that, whilst
China is not viewed as a threat, the expansion of Beijing's influence throughout the
region may not be viewed as entirely benign. Above all else, Singapore needs to
maintain an open trading environment and secure sea lines of communication (SLOCs):
external security of Malaysia and Singapore, and which involves regular combined exercises, has never
had any focus on China as a potential common threat.
20 See Whiting, "ASEAN Eyes China," pp. 308-311.
21 Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces a/Singapore, AlIen and Unwin, St Leonards,
NSW, 2000, pp. 198-200.
22 For example, Singapore has sold Taiwan the design for a towed anti-aircraft artillery system and a
Singaporean company converted six of Taiwan's F-5E fighters into RF-SE reconnaissance aircraft. See,
respectively, "Military Purchases Know-how for the Production of Guns," Taipei Times (online ed.), 23
May 2002; and "Air Force to Show Off Top-secret Unit," Taipei Times (online ed.), 22 August 2002.
23 Huxley, De/ending the Lion City, pp. 36-37.
24 Quoted in "Singapore Welcomes U.S. Aircraft Carrier," International Herald Tribune (online ed.), 22
March 2001.
25 William Ashton, "Burma Receives Advances from Its Silent Suitors in Singapore," Jane's Intelligence
Review, Va!. 10, No. 3, March 1998, p. 34.
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that makes the island wary of a potential Chinese "two-pincer strategy" to control Asian
SLOCs by developing strategic bases in Burma and the Spratlys.26

The Philippines
The Philippines has been most concerned with countering China's advance in the South
China Sea, especially after Beijing occupied Mischief Reef in 1994-1995. Although
Manila has been a leading driver behind the negotiation of a South China Sea code of
conduct, Chinese unwillingness to abide by previous agreements has also led to a
revitalization of Philippine-D.S. defence ties.27 That revitalization is somewhat ironic
when one considers that China may only have decided to occupy Mischief Reef once
the United States had been forced to close its Philippine naval and air bases by Manila.
The Philippine Senate's decision to pass a new Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with
the United States in 1999, which allowed the resumption of combined military exercises
with the United States on Philippine territory, was aimed primarily at countering the
perceived threat from China's continued advance into the South China Sea?8 The first
exercise under the VFA was held in July 1999 in Palawan, near the eastern part of the
Spratly Islands. 29 The Balikatan series of bilateral joint exercises is held annually and
seems to be increasing in scope and size, including the addition of anti-terrorist training
elements since 11 September 2001. 30 The Philippine government has made no secret of
the fact that they wish to deepen security ties with the United States under the auspices
of the Philippine-D.S. Mutual Defense Treaty,31 and have floated the idea that the
fonner U.S. naval base at Subic Bay could be used as a commercial facility to service
and repair American warships. 32

Taiwan
Taiwan is the state most immediately concerned with China's maritime expansion and
territorial ambitions. Taipei' s strategy to counter the increased mainland threat has been
See ''Nations across Asia Keep Watch on China," The Washington Post (online ed.), 19 October 2001.
For analysis see, for example, Ian James Storey, "Creeping Assertiveness: China, the Philippines and
the South China Sea Dispute," Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 21, No. 1, April 1999.
28 See "Growing Up," Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 June 1999, p. 27; and "Philippines Agrees to
Allow U.S. Military Exercises," The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly Edition, 31 May-6 June 1999, p.
26

27

4.
"Manila to Resume Military Drills with U.S. near Spratlys," The Straits Times Weekly Edition, 31 July
1999, p. 11.
30 See, for example, ''New U.S.-Philippine War Games Begin," CNN.com (online), 21 April 2002.
31 "Broader Security Ties with U.S. Imperative: Arroyo," The Straits Times (online ed.), 12 July 2001.
29
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to improve its defensive capabilities, particularly its maritime forces,33 strengthen its
security links with the United States and its political links with Japan, and reduce its
growing economic dependence on the Chinese market.

Military Modernization

The previous chapter has already noted Taiwan's interests in building both a layered
ballistic missile defence capability and new offensive capabilties to enhance deterrence
of Chinese aggression. Taiwan has been forced to adopt a new maritime defensive focus
as a direct consequence of China's growing maritime power. Taiwan's defence minister,
Tang Yao-ming, announced in August 2002 that 49 per cent of Taiwan's defence
budget over the next decade would be allocated to naval spending. 34 Following on from
the large defence outlays on combat aircraft in the 1990s,35 Taiwan's new naval
priorities indicate that the restrictive, traditional emphasis on land forces seems to have
been overcome.
Particular Taiwanese weaknesses, such as submarine and anti-submarine
warfare,36 will be addressed by the purchase of eight diesel electric submarines and
twelve P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft. Other new capabilities planned include four
ex-U.S. Navy Kidd-class guided missile destroyers (DDGs), new amphibious assault
vehicles and MH-53E mine countermeasures helicopters,3? a new indigenous class of30
stealthy missile-armed fast attack craft/ 8 a new indigenous supersonic anti-ship cruise
"Subic Bay May Be Up for Rent," International Herald Tribune (online ed.), 13 July 2001.
It is worth noting that the Republic of China armed forces under the Kuomintang (KMT) followed a
traditional mainland Chinese model, with a strong emphasis on land forces and with army loyalty fmnly
tied to the party (KMT) rather than the nascent Taiwanese state. In many ways the Taiwanese armed
forces were, until recently, a transplanted mainland force that originally expected to reconquer China. As
a result, Taiwan's military had many similarities to the PLA: a mostly conscript force designed for largescale land warfare rather than the type of maritime-focused force one might expect for an insular state.
Times have changed, however, with the Taiwanese government leading a drive for smaller, more
professional, politically independent forces under civilian control, with a strong joint, maritime focus.
Ironically, that drive comes as a response to the new maritime, joint operations focus and increased
professionalism (and thus also effectiveness) of the PLA.
34 See ''Navy Pushed to the Front Lines of Defence Spending," Taipei Times (online ed.), 16 August
2002.
35 Taiwan's modem fighter fleet of 150 F-16s, 60 Mirage 2000-5s and 130 domestically-built indigenous
defense fighters (IDFs) became fully operational by the end of 2001. See "Second Generation of Jet
Fighters Ready: Air Force," Taipei Times (online ed.), 7 August 2002.
36 Taiwan currently has two World War 11 U.S. Guppy II-class, and two Dutch Zwaardvis-class boats
purchased in the 1980s.
37 "Taiwan Faces Problems with U.S. Arms Package," Jane's Navy International, Vol. 106, No. 5, June
2001, p. 7; and "Military to Allot NT$600 Billion for Next 10 Years," Taipei Times (onIine ed.), 20
August 2002.
38 The first of the Kuang Hua No. 6 boats was launched in September 2002. "Taiwan Launches First
Stealth Boat," The Straits Times (onIine ed.), 27 September 2002.
32

33
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missile and a land-attack cruise missile. 39 Taiwan still hopes that the Kidd-c1ass DDGs,
to enter service in 2005, will be a precursor to a future purchase of more capable Aegisequipped ships,4o although the Kidd-c1ass itself offers an improved ocean-going
41
capability to counter the PLA Navy's expanding area of operations. Noting the PLA
Navy's recent passage off the east of the island, Minister of National Defense Tang
promoted the purchase of the Kidd DDGs in October 2002 by stating that "the navy
should no longer confine its operations to the Taiwan Strait. It should go to the open
seas.,,42 Taiwan's navy also hopes to build a submarine base inside a mountain on the
island's eastern coast, similar to the Chiashan air force base, which can house up to 200
combat aircraft inside a hollowed-out mountain. 43 Even other, non-naval military
procurement priorities often have maritime functions: for example, Taiwan's army will
buy 30 AH-64D Apache Longbow attack helicopters for use in the Taiwan Strait against
PLA amphibious landing operations. 44
There remain doubts, however, over how, when and where the new submarines
will be built. Although the United States has promised to sell Taiwan the new boats, it
has not built conventional submarines itself for decades, and European and Australian
governments quickly refused to allow their designs to be used for fear of Chinese
retaliation, particularly denial of access to the Chinese market. 45 Nevertheless, the
project is proceeding, with four American defence companies being invited to compete

39 See ''Taiwan to Spend 570 Million on Supersonic Anti-ship Missile," Defence-aerospace.com (onIine),
6 October 2002; and "Classified Defense Spending Drops," Taipei Times (online ed.), 10 September
2002.
40 Washington initially deferred a decision to sell Aegis DDGs to Taiwan when it announced its large
maritime arms package in 2001. If Washington does agree to sell Aegis ships, new-build ships will not be
immediately available. Alternatively, Taiwan may be able to buy second-hand Aegis DDGs or cruisers
should they become available, or build a smaller warship equipped with the Aegis system. See "Officials
Say V.S. Ready to Sell Taiwan Aegis-equipped Destroyers," Taipei Times (onIine ed.), 29 September
2002; ''Navy Must Wait to Get Second-hand AEGIS Ships," Taipei Times (onIine ed.), 11 October 2002;
and "Mini-AEGIS Ship Scheme reconsidered," Taipei Times (onIine ed.), 26 December 2002.
41 The Kidd DDGs, although over 20 years old, are large, highly capable warships with an area air
defence capability, including a three dimensional air defence radar and advanced Standard SM-2 Block
IIIA surface-to-air missiles. It will be interesting to see if Taiwan is able to successfully commission all
four ships, however. When the Royal Australian Navy expressed an earlier interest in the ships, their
surveys discovered that the lead ship of the class - USS Kidd - was in such poor condition that, had they
purchased, the vessels, Kidd would have been used only as a floating spare parts bin. Personal
conversation with an RAN officer.
42 Quoted in ''Tang Prods Legislature over Kidds," Taipei Times (onIine ed.), 30 October 2002.
43 ''Navy Planning to Build a Submarine Base in Mountain along East Coast," Taipei Times ConIine ed.),
10 June 2002.
44 "U.S. Military Officials Confirm Sale of Apaches," Taipei Times ConIine ed.), 26 May 2002.
45 "Diving for Cover Costs Billions," Far Eastern Economic Review, 17 May 2001, p. 18.
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to become prime contractor to build the submarines in December 2002. 46 A Pentagon
spokesman made the American position clear in February 2002, stating that "We made a
commitment to the Taiwanese Government to help them acquire diesel-electric
submarines. We intend to deliver on it.',47 Taiwan has already made a U.S.$500 million
down payment,48 although it seems that the first boats will not be delivered before 2010,
meaning that a full operational capability could be ten to 15 years away.
There is, however, a question mark hanging over Taipei's willingness to fund all
of its current and looming defence needs at a time of slow economic growth: Taiwan's
defence budget has actually been falling. 49 A further point to be made is that Taiwan's
defence shortcomings are not all related to weapon systems. The U.S. Department of
Defense has pinpointed a range of what it calls "functional nonhardware" shortcomings
in "defense planning, C4I, air defense, maritime capability, anti-submarine warfare,
logistics, joint force integration, and training." 50 There is some frustration in
Washington, however, over Taiwan's tardiness to implement the recommendations on
how to fix those weaknesses and the declining Taiwanese defence budget. 5l

Taiwan's Political Strategy
Taipei's political strategy has been to build closer defence ties with the United States,
and political ties with Japan. Thomas Robinson has identified several strands to
Taiwan's strategy toward the United States, particularly after the mid-1990s missile
crises. The strategy has been to emphasize the close political and ideological links
between Taiwan and the United States, particularly liberal democratic values, strong
economic and social links, and a common strategic interest in defending Taiwan against

46 "USN Acquisition of Diesel Submarines for Taiwan," Defence-aerospace.com Coniine), 19 December
2002. The German Type 214 or Type 209 designs are preferred by Taiwan, although designs from France,
Spain, Israel, the Netherlands and Britain have also been mentioned. "Navy Will Reveal Details of New
Submarine Plans," Taipei Times (oniine ed.), 4 January 2003. For discussion, see Charles A. Meconis and
G. Jacobs, "Submarines for Taiwan?" The Defence Reporter, August/September 2001, pp. 24-26.
47 Lcdr Jeff Davis, quoted in "Pentagon Set to Deliver on Arms Sales to Taiwan," South China Morning
Post (onIine ed.), 15 February 2002.
48 The total cost of the programme could run to U.S.$6 billion. "Taiwan Has already Paid U.S.$500m for
Submarine Contract," Taipei Times (onIine ed.), 29 September 2002.
49 See "Budget for Defense Hits 8-year Low," Taipei Times (onIine ed.), 4 September 2002. The tight
fiscal situation has led Taiwan to consider delaying the purchase ofP-3C anti-submarine warfare aircraft,
for example, in favour of extending the lives of its old S-2T aircraft. "Navy Hopes to Add Some Life to
S-2Ts," Taipei Times (onIine ed.), 12 August 2002.
50 (U.S.) Department of Defense, "Executive Summary of Report to Congress on Implementation of the
Taiwan Relations Act," Report to Congress Pursuant to Public Law 106-113, 18 December 2000, p. 2.
51 "U.S. Completes Review of Defence Ties," Taipei Times Coniine ed.), 20 January 2003.
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an expansionist China. 52 Taiwan maintains a substantial lobby in Washington and has
considerable political support there. President Chen Shui-bian has attempted to exploit
Taiwan's geopolitical role as part of the first island chain that constrains China's
maritime expansion, as a means by which to strengthen American support for Taiwan,
stating that
The crescent-shaped American defenses against China in the Pacific, without Taiwan,
would be forced back to Saipan and Guam, even Hawaii ... We must make good use of
this bargaining chip, and make good use of our strategically important position under
the U.S. strategic goals in the western Pacific. 53

There is also an increasing level of activity at both the official and second track levels to
boost trilateral security cooperation between Washington, Taipei and Tokyo. For
example, officials from Taiwan and the United States, as well as Japanese delegates
from the Okazaki Institute (a well-connected think tank that specializes in security
issues), conducted a trilateral security dialogue in Washington in December 2002,
following a similar meeting in August in Tokyo.54
Another part of Taipei's plan is to strengthen political links by deepening
economic ties through the pursuit of free trade deals with both Japan and the United
States. 55 Taipei also hopes that, by deepening trade relations with Japan and the United
States, it may lessen its growing dependence on the Chinese market. The same rationale
lies behind a renewed push to divert Taiwan's trade and investment priorities away from
China, and towards Southeast Asia: the so-called "go south" policy. 56 Taiwan is already
negotiating a free trade agreement with Singapore,57 and is actively courting Japan for a
combined approach to increase economic integration with Southeast Asia as a means of
countering China's growing economic strength. The secretary-general of Taiwan's
52 Thomas W. Robinson, "America in Taiwan's Post-Cold War Foreign Relations," The China Quarterly,
No. 148, December 1996, esp. pp. 1353-1356.
53 Quoted in Andrew J. Nathan, "What's Wrong with American Taiwan Policy," The Washington
Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 2, Spring 2000, p. 98.
54 See "Security Officials See Ways to Boost Regional Security," Taipei Times Coniine ed.), 19 December
2002.
55 See "Chen Seeks Triangular Trade Pact," Taipei Times (onIine ed.), 12 April 2002; "Envoy Plugs Trade
Pact with Japan," Taipei Times (onIine ed.), 30 April 2002; "U.S.-Taiwan Pact Needed for Security,"
Taipei Times (onIine ed.), 24 May 2002; and "Study Looks at Taipei-Tokyo FTA," Taipei Times (onIine
ed.), 28 November 2002.
56 "Foreign Ministry Seeking to Improve Ties with Countries in Southeast Asia," Taipei Times Coniine
ed.), 21 August 2002.
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National Security Council, Chiou I-jen, thus stated at the 2002 Taiwan-Japan Forum
that

If Japan is determined to build a new economic order in Asia by developing the

Southeast Asian region so as to answer China's growing economic threat, Taiwan will
be her best partner in helping her to realize this goaL... If democracy is our common
goal and Asia's stability and prosperity is our common responsibility, then Taiwan and
Japan should work together hand in hand at all levels from regional security to trade to
"go south" development. 58

Japan

As explained in the previous chapter, Japan's security is directly threatened by China's
maritime advance, particularly when that advance is viewed within the context of
China's seeming detennination to become the leading Asian power. One Japanese
commentator thus perceives an impending China threat which is being driven by
China's ''ultimate objective" of becoming the region's sole superpower. 59 The pressure
being placed on Japan by China's military build up and maritime "intrusions" in and
around Japanese waters, the potential threat to Japan's sea lanes, China's designs on the
Senkakus and Japan's interest in Taiwan's continued strategic independence have all
been noted in Chapter 8. Japan is many times more dependent on the sea lines of
communication running through the South China Sea than is China: over 40 per cent of
Japan's total imports (and over 80 per cent of its oil supplies) use those SLOCs, whilst
over 27 per cent of the shipping (by tonnage) passing through the Malacca Strait is
owned by Japanese interests. 6o That interest in South China Sea SLOCs means that
Japan is not immune to any widespread conflict over the Spratlys,61 however unlikely
such a conflict may seem.

"Taiwan Urges China Not to Interfere in Deal with Singapore," Taipei Times (online ed.), 17
September 2002.
58 Quoted in "Taiwan, Japan Encouraged to Head to SE Asia," Taipei Times (online ed.), 1 July 2002. See
also ''NSC Head Asks Japan to Influence Asia," Taipei Times (online ed.), 20 September 2002.
59 See Hideaki Kaneda, "A View from Tokyo: China's Growing Military Power and Its Significance for
Japan's National Security," in Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel, eds., China's Growing Military
Power: Perspectives on Security, Ballistic Missiles, and Conventional Capabilities, Strategic Studies
Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, September 2002, p. 73.
60 John H. Noer with David Gregory, Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast ASia,
NDU Press, Washington, D.C., 1996, pp. 24 and 67-68.
61 On Japan's interests and political approach to the Spradys dispute, see Lam Peng Er, "Japan and the
Spratlys Dispute: Aspirations and Limitations," Asian Survey, Vol. XXXVI, No. 10, October 1996.
57
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Japan's strategy for dealing with China has centred around the rejuvenation of
the U.S.-Japan alliance and deepening defence cooperation with the United States,
including cooperative theatre [ballistic] missile defence (TMD) research and
development. Japan also has taken cautious initial steps to improve its independent
capability to cope with increasing dangers, and is pursuing diplomatic measures to
counter China's growing influence by deepening its own links with Taiwan and
Southeast Asia, including an enhanced role for Japanese maritime security forces in the
South China Sea.

The

u.s. -Japan Alliance

The initiative to rejuvenate the alliance in 1995 was primarily American,62 yet
welcomed by Tokyo in a period of increasing instability in East Asia. The process led to
the joint declaration on security of April 1996, which included an agreement to review
the guidelines on bilateral security cooperation. 63 The revised defence cooperation
guidelines, discussed in the previous chapter, were a response to crises in areas affecting
Japan, particularly the North Korean crisis of 1994 and the Taiwan Strait missile crises
of 1995-1996. 64 Although some analysts view the revised plans for operational
cooperation under the new guidelines as being "almost certainly created with Korean
scenarios, not Taiwan, in mind,,,65 it is not clear whether that is actually the case: the
original joint declaration was made just one month after China's March 1996 missile
tests off Kaohsiung and Keelung. Indeed, a senior analyst from the Japan Defense
Agency's National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) has suggested that the new
guidelines, from Tokyo's perspective, were aimed primarily at a Taiwan contingency.66
Senior Japanese defence analysts and lobbyists have also proffered the opinion that,
although security on the Korean peninsula is of concern, the main long-term threat -

See Kurt M. Campbell, "Energizing the U.S.-Japan Security Partnership," The Washington Quarterly,
Vol. 23, No. 4, Autumn 2000, p. 125.
st
63 "Japan-V.S. Joint Declaration on Security - Alliance for the 21 Century," Tokyo, 17 April 1996, in
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan-U.S. Security Alliance for the 2Ft Century; Cornerstone of
Democracy, Peace and Prosperity for Our Future Generations, Overseas Public Relations Division,
Ministry of-Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, July 1996, pp. 73-76.
64 Aurelia George Mulgan, "Beyond Self-defence? Evaluating Japan's Regional Security Role under the
New Defence Cooperation Guidelines," Pacifica Review, Vol. 12, No. 3, October 2000, p. 230.
65 See, for example, Thomas J. Christensen, "China, the V.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma
in East Asia," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4, Spring 1999, p. 68.
66 Interview at the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), Tokyo, August 2000. Note also the
discussion on the relevance of the new guidelines to Taiwan in the previous chapter.
62
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and focus of Japan's defence strategy - is China. 67 Tokyo and Washington reportedly
have agreed to an "action plan" to guide cooperation in contingencies involving an
attack on Japan or an "emergency in areas surrounding Japan.,,68
Japan's 2001 defence white paper discerned a trend of competing loose political
blocs, with the Vnited States and its allies being challenged by other states "centering
on China and Russia." Although a Cold War-style military confrontation is believed to
be unlikely, the white paper states that relations between the two competing interests
"might bring a certain confrontational structure against the V.S. and other countries in
the long run." One key to ameliorating the uncertainty and instability effected by those
trends identified in the white paper is the continued "effective functioning of the
bilateral alliances with the V.S. as a regional stabilizer based on ... military power.,,69
The president of Japan's National Defense Academy has clearly stated Japan's position:

To balance China, we need a stronger alliance with Washington .... We are not sure
where China is going and we worry that it will use its growing economic power to
become a very strong military power that would threaten Japan's interests. 70

The 2001 white paper adds that, "with respect to the recent increase in activities of
Chinese ships near Japan, it is important to pay attention to Chinese naval activities and
possible naval strategy" due to unfolding Chinese blue water ambitions. 71 A NIDS
report similarly points to an impending threat from China's slow but incessant
programme of maritime expansion:

Supported by the activities of marine scientific research vessels and naval vessels,
combined with its increasingly active fishing industry and marine transportation, China
may consolidate its position as a full-fledged sea power in the future.72

There can be little doubt that China has become the central long-term focus of Japan's
defence policy,73 despite occasional short-term North Korean threats. China's response,
67 Interview with two retired Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) admirals at the Okazaki
Institute, Tokyo, August 2000.
68 See "Defense Agency Outlines Emergency Plans with U.S.," Kyodo News (online), 3 September 2001.
69 Japan Defense Agency, "Defense of Japan 2001 White Paper (summary)," Section 3, Part 1, available
on the World Wide Web at: http://www.jda.go.jp/e/pab/wp2001l.
70 Masahi Nishihara, quoted in "Japan and Australia Expect Gains in Asia-Pacific Security," International
Herald Tribune (online ed.), 18 December 2000.
7l "Defense of Japan 2001 White Paper (summary)," Section 3, Part 4.
72 NIDS, East Asian Strategic Review 2000, NIDS, Tokyo, 2000, p. 106.
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on the other hand, typically has been to accuse Japan of using the "China threat" to
advance its own military expansionism. 74 Yet the outward strategic pressure responsible
for the growing competitiveness in the Sino-J apanese relationship emanates from China,
not Japan. As James Auer and Robyn Lim have argued, "while China has strategic
ambition, Japan has strategic anxieties.,,75
Japan's decision to participate in joint TMD research with the United States was,
according to one Japanese commentator, spurred by three significant "security shocks"
suffered by Japan in the mid to late 1990s: the Taiwan Strait missile crises; the firing of
a North Korean Taepodong I medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), over Japan's
main island, into the Pacific Ocean in August 1998; and the Indian and Pakistani
nuclear tests of 1998, followed by the U.S. decision in 1999 not to ratify the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.76 Cooperative TMD research in fact was mooted in the
April 1996 Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security.77 In an analysis on Japanese TMD
options written before the Taepodong incident, missile defence was framed squarely in
the context of the potential Chinese missile threat. 78 Thus, a professor at Japan's
National Defense Academy stated in 2000:

Even if the North Korean threat subsides, we need to be wary of China. It's easy for the
government to point a finger at North Korea's missile development, but China has more
missiles deployed. 79

Japan's joint TMD research project with the United States began in December
1998, and is focused specifically on the sea-based Navy Theater Wide (mid-course)
system, which uses a kinetic warhead to intercept incoming MRBMs outside the earth's
atmosphere.

80

Although technically difficult, when the system becomes operational it is

See, for example, "White Paper Targets China," Asahi Shimbun (online ed.), 7 July 2001.
See, for example, '''China Threat' Masks Japan's Military Expansion," China Daily (online ed.), 18
July 2001.
7S James E. Auer and Robyn Lim, "The Maritime Basis of American Security in East Asia," Naval War
College Review, Vo!. LIV, No. 1, Winter 2001, p. 43.
76 Yoichi Funabashi, "Tokyo's Temperance," The Washington Quarterly, Vo!. 23, No. 3, Summer 2000,
pp. 135-136. On the Taepodong incident, see NlDS, East Asian Strategic Review 1998-1999, NIDS,
Tokyo, 1999, pp. 64-76.
77 "Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security - Alliance for the 21 sI Century," p. 75.
78 Masahiro Matsumura, "Deploying Theater Missile Defense Flexibly," Defense Analysis, Vo!. 14, No.
2, August 1998.
79 Masahi Nishihara, quoted in "Blueprint for Controversy," Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 July 2000,
73

74

Po' ~~~ East Asian Strategic Review 1998-1999, pp. 73-76; and East Asian Strategic Review 2000, pp. 9091. For further background, see The Okazaki Institute, Introduction to BMD: Does Ballistic Missile
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estimated that just four Aegis-equipped warships with the appropriate TMD interceptors
would be sufficient to provide Japan national coverage against theatre ballistic missile
81
threats. Japan has yet to commit to deploying the system when it becomes available,
although it is reportedly considering developing a shield consisting of a sea-based midcourse system, together with a ground based equivalent, and the Patriot P AC-3 system
to combat short-range ballistic missiles. 82 A final decision to deploy a TMD system may
depend upon the results of combined U.S.-Japan missile defence tests to be held in
Hawaii over two years starting in April 2004. 83 The tests themselves will be a
significant advance in Japan-V.S. strategic cooperation.
Japan's defence cooperation with the United States has continued to deepen
following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, leading to the speedy passage of
an anti-terrorism bill that approved a Japanese support role for the war against Islamic
extremists in Afghanistan. 84 In November 2001, the JMSDF dispatched one destroyer,
one minesweeper and a supply ship to the Indian Ocean to support V.S. forces. 8s The
mission was extended and expanded to include an Aegis destroyer deployed to the Gulf
of Oman,86 whilst Japan's navy agreed to refuel ships in the Arabian Sea from another
eight nations of the anti-terrorist coalition, in addition to vessels of the V.S. Navy and
Royal Navy already being supported. 87 A further sign of closer defence ties is Japan's
agreement to allow the United States replace the Y okosuka-based aircraft carrier, VSS

Kittyhawk, with a nuclear-powered successor when the Kittyhawk is retired from service
around 2008. 88

Defense Make Sense to Japan? The Ballistic Missile Defense Research Group, The Okazaki Institute
Tokyo, 2001.
81 (US.) Department of Defense, "Report to Congress on Theater Missile Defense Architecture Options
for the Asia-Pacific Region," 4 May 1999, p. 8. Japan already operates four large Aegis-equipped
destroyers and intends to build more.
82 See "US. Missile Defense System Eyed," The Daily Yomiuri (onIine ed.), 3 February 2003.
83 "Japan, V.S. to Conduct Joint Missile-interception Tests: Report," Defence-aerospace.com (onIine), 17
February 2003.
84 See "Japan Approves New Military Powers," The Washington Post (online ed.), 18 October 2001; and
"SDF Antiterrorism Bill Wins Quick Diet Passage," The Japan Times (onIine ed.), 30 October 2001.
85 "Japan Ships Depart to Join War against Terrorism," The New York Times (online ed.), 25 November
2001.
86 "Japan Takes Active Role in War on Terrorism," The Australian Financial Review, 6 December 2002,
p. 24. The dispatch of an Aegis ship was a controversial political move in Japan. The Japanese flotilla is
under U.S. command: some Japanese believe this contravenes Japan's constitution by exercising a right to
collective defence. The United States has been hoping that Japan will decide to exercise that right to
further strengthen the alliance.
8? "Japan to Expand Refueling in Arabian Sea to 8 Countries," Japan Today (online), 18 February 2003.
88 "US. N-vessel to Be Based at Yokosuka," The Daily Yomiuri (onIine ed.), 15 January 2003. All of the
U.S. Navy's conventionally-powered carriers are due to decommissioned by about the middle of next
decade, leaving an exclusively nuclear-powered carrier force.
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Strategic Modernization

In addition to the TMD research programme, Japan's strategic modernization has been
slow, but steady. Japan's anned forces are generally modem and well-equipped, albeit
limited by a defensive posture. Specific enhancements have been pursued in recent
years to increase Japan's intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)
capabilities, and to increase the reach of the armed forces. Japan is buying, inter alia,
four B-767 air-to-air refuelling aircraft to extend the range of its air force, a class of
small (8,900 ton) helicopter carriers, new Aegis destroyers, a new class of very large
(13,500 ton) "destroyers" (with large flight decks equipped for MH-53E minesweeping
helicopter operations), F-2 fighter aircraft and long-range transport aircraft. 89 Japan's
ISR capabilities are steadily improving, with a large number of P-3C maritime patrol
aircraft and 13 E-2C airborne warning and control aircraft (AWACS) being joined by
four very advanced E-767 AWACS and five (or more) BP-3 signals intelligencegathering aircraft. 90
Since North Korea's Taepodong test in 1998, Japan has developed its own
surveillance satellites, launching the first two of four in March 2003: one optical and
one radar. 91 Although ostensibly developed to gather intelligence on North Korea and
activities in Japanese waters, there is no doubt that the capability will also be used to
watch China. Japan has explicitly developed the capability to reduce its strategic
dependence on the United States. Michael Green has discerned that the "momentum
behind a more independent Japanese security policy has become irreversible.,,92 There is
some degree of paradox involved here, as Japan is striving for greater strategic
independence at the same time as the American alliance is being constantly upgraded.
Japan has also changed its defence planning priority from one of defending
against large-scale invasions to one of preparing for more limited contingencies near
Japan, involving the reinforcement of forces in and around the Ryukyus to counter
93

Chinese maritime activities there. Another interesting development to improve Japan's

89 See "Extending Tokyo's Reach," Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 January 2001, pp. 26-27; and
"Japan Clarifies Destroyer's Unusual Design," Jane's Defence Weekly, 31 January 2001, p. 11.
90 See Desmond Ball and Euan Graham, "Japanese SIGINT Takes Off," Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol.
12, No. 12, December 2000.
91 "Spy Satellites Part of Intelligence Quest," The Japan Times (online ed.), 27 March 2003. The Japan
Defense Agency is also developing unmanned aerial vehicles for surveillance.
92 Michael J. Green, "The Forgotten Player," The National Interest, No. 60, Summer 2000, p. 43.
93 "Defense Policy Shifting from Large-scale Attacks," Asahi Shimbun (online ed.), 4 September 2001.
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maritime defences has been the initiation of joint exercises between the JMSDF and the
Japan Coast Guard (JCG - itself a large maritime security force, but not part of the
armed forces).94 That cooperation is being enhanced following an incident in December
2001 involving the sinking of a suspected North Korean spy ship by the Japan Coast
Guard inside China's exclusive economic zone. 95 New "war contingency" bills have
been designed, in part, specifically to counter threats posed by "suspicious ships," and
to promote measures to further strengthen ties between the armed forces and the Japan
Coast Guard. 96
One final aspect of Japan's push for greater strategic independence is the
growing willingness to develop an offensive capability.97 The immediate driver of the
possible policy change is North Korea's nuclear brinkmanship, although it can be
difficult to disaggregate the effects of short-term North Korean threats from long-term
Chinese ones. Similarly, there have also been increased warnings from senior politicians
in Tokyo, including the chief cabinet secretary, that Japan might one day have to build
its own nuclear deterrent. 98 Whilst Japan is unlikely to do so under current
circumstances, the very fact that such senior members of the Japanese political
establishment have raised the issue publicly indicates the level of threat being perceived
in Tokyo.

Japan's Political Initiatives

Japan, like China, has aspirations to play a greater political role in the region as a
"normal" country, including a security function. 99 Unlike China, however, Japan does
not seek to overturn the U.S.-Ied regional security order. Two scholars of Japanese
foreign policy have argued that Japan, in the post-War period, has followed a grand
strategy based on what they term "mercantile realism," whereby Tokyo has attempted to

See Fumio Ota, "Jointness in the Japanese Self-Defense Forces," Joint Forces Quarterly, No. 27,
Winter 2000-01, p. 59.
95 See "Coast Guard to Bolster Ties with the SDF," The Japan Times (online ed.), 14 May 2002; and
"Sinking Renews Debate on Japan's Military," The Washington Post (online ed.), 28 December 2001.
96 "Bills Redefine Meaning of' Armed Attack,'" The Daily Yomiuri (online ed.), 30 October 2002.
97 See "Tokyo Hints at Military Shift," BBC News (online), 27 March 2003.
98 See ''Nuclear Arms Taboo Is Challenged in Japan," The New York Times (online ed.), 9 June 2002; and
also Robyn Lim, "So Much for Japan's Nuclear Taboo," International Herald Tribune (online ed.), 13
June 2002, for an insightful commentary.
99 See, for example, Green, "The Forgotten Player."
94
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maximize its influence through the advancement of its "technoeconomic position."IOO
That strategy has made Japan a somewhat unidimensional power, with questionable
political, and virtually no strategic, influence in the world, despite its economic
prowess. Tokyo now seems to be altering that strategy by using non-economic
instruments to advance its influence, albeit gradually. Japan's changing strategy is
heavily influenced by the rise of China and the threat posed by China's maritime
expansion, not only in a direct sense to the security of Japan itself, but also indirectly, to
Japanese influence in Southeast Asia.
Even in the economic sphere, Japan's place as the economic leader in Asia is
coming under pressure from China, despite the fact that Japan is still a much richer
country than China, with an economy four times as large and directing far greater levels
of economic aid and investment to regional states. 101 Partly, Japan may be suffering
from a lack of self-confidence due to its own domestic economic inertia, especially
when compared to China's economic dynamism. There is also a sense that, in relative
terms, that dynamism is shifting the economic advantage to China. 102 If China can
sustain its economic momentum and implement its free trade initiative in Southeast
Asia, and use its commercial maritime power to dominate that trade and expand its
maritime presence in the region, China's influence over the South China Sea SLOCs so
important to Japan will only increase.
Japan's direct response to China's ASEAN free trade initiative was a free trade
offer of its own in late December 2001, barely one month after the announcement of the
China-ASEAN agreement.

103

Japan's Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi, announced a

tentative proposal for a Japan-ASEAN "economic community" in January 2002, only
days before signing a free trade deal with Singapore. 104 Negotiations between ASEAN
100 Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, "Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy," in
Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, eds., Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after
the Cold War, Columbia University Press, New York, 1999, esp. pp. 182-184.
101 See "Japanese Wage Peace with Talks and Money, Pleasing Asians," The New York Times (online
ed.), 8 December 2002.
102 See "China Is Using Its New Economic Weight to Outmaneuver Japan," The New York Times (online
ed.), 6 December 2002; and "Japan Loses Clout," International Herald Tribune (online ed.), 19
December 2001.
103 See "Japan Said to Start Drafting Asian Trade Plan," Yahoo! News Singapore (online), 31 December
2001.
104 See "Koizumi Floats 'Economic Community,''' The Japan Times (online ed.), 9 January 2002; and
"Free-trade Accord Inked," The Japan Times (online ed.), 14 January 2002. Japan later suggested that
such a deal might precede a larger arrangement to include China and South Korea, and potentially
Australia, New Zealand and the United States. See "Japan Considering Creation of East Asia Free-trade
Area before 2010," The Japan Times (online ed.), 14 Apri12002. The implication of the idea, however, is
that Japan would maintain its economic leadership role in the region, as the driving force behind the idea.
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and Japan on an agreement to set up a free trade area, possibly by 2010, were expected
to begin in 2003. 105 In another use of economic diplomacy perhaps intended as a
counter to Chinese influence, Japan has written off large yen loans to Burma. 106
Koizumi also has tentatively proposed a free trade agreement with Australia, whilst
Canberra and Tokyo have discussed deepening their defence ties within a trilateral
security dialogue with the United States. Australian Prime Minister, John Howard,
welcomed the initiative, stating that Australia and Japan "have a number of security
interests in common in the region.,,107
Japan's increasing suspicions of China have led to both a reduction in, and a
redirection of, Japanese economic aid to China, from China's rich coastal regions to the
poor

int~rior.

Japan has also become frustrated that China, itself, continues to spend

around U.S.$450 million annually upon overseas aid, to fulfil its own diplomatic
purposes, at the same time as Japan funds Chinese projects. 108 Japanese money used to
build Chinese infrastructure also represents money that China does not have to spend on
those projects, but which can be diverted to other ends, such as the military
modernization that threatens Japanese security. Thus, when Japan cut its overall
overseas development assistance (ODA) budget by 10.3 per cent in 2002, its aid to
China was slashed by 24.7 per cent. The ODA budget has been cut by a further 5.8 per
cent for the 2003 fiscal year, with aid to China to be cut by another 20 per cent. 109
Japan has begun to diversify its oil supplies, in the same way as China, to reduce
its vulnerability to sea lane disruption, including future threats to Japanese SLOCs from
China. llo Japan is negotiating for a pipeline to supply Siberian oil to the Russian Pacific

As such, it is not dissimilar to Chinese proposals that would, of course, be centred on Chinese leadership.
Japan faces a serious barrier to progress, however, in that its economy is fundamentally protectionist,
particularly in the agricultural sector, whilst China is willing to compromise to boost its influence in
Southeast Asia. See "Japan Sits as China Forms ASEAN Ties," Asahi Shimbun (online ed.), 19 June
2002.
105 "Japan, ASEAN Could Start Discussions on FTA Next Year," The Japan Times (online ed.), 8
September 2002.
106 "Japan to Write OffMyanmar's Debts," Asahi Shimbun (online ed.), 23 December 2002.
107 Quoted in Japan, Aust. Push Closer Defense Ties," CNN.com (online), 1 May 2002; and see also
"Japan in Free Trade Thrust to Foil China," The Australian, 2 May 2002, p. 2.
108 "Editorial: The Realities have changed, So Must Japan's ODA to China," Asahi Shimbun (online ed.),
2 November 2001.
109 See "ODA Budget to Shrink 5.8 per cent in Fiscal 2003," The Japan Times (online ed.), 19 December
2002; and "'Govt to Cut Yen Loan to China by 20%,''' The Daily Yomiuri (online ed.), 13 March 2003.
110 It is interesting to note that two retired JMSDF admirals interviewed at the Okazaki Institute, Tokyo,
August 2000, argued that China's own growing dependency on imported oil from the Persian Gulf was a
positive factor for Japanese security, providing a point of vulnerability that reduced the likelihood of
Chinese adventurism. It is also one of the few Chinese vulnerabilities susceptible to Japanese military
pressure.
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coast, and then to Japan, and Japanese companies have contracted with Russia to
develop offshore oil and gas fields near Sakhalin. III
Echoing Taiwan's diplomatic overtures to Japan, Japanese politicians are paying
increasing attention to Taiwan, with a growing number of visits and linkages.

112

In

January 2003, the head of Japan's "unofficial" diplomatic mission in Taiwan, Katsuhisa
Uchida, suggested that restrictions on official Japanese contacts with the island may be
eased, and that deepening business links require that "higher-level policy dialogue will
become necessary," including security talks on military contingencies in the Taiwan
Strait. 1l3 It has also been alleged that a Japanese general from an "intelligence unit" of
the Japan Defense Agency secretly attended a test-frring of a Patriot PAC-2 Plus antimissile system in Taiwan in 2001. 114 Although Japan is treading carefully in its relations
with Taiwan so as not to offend China, its relationship with the island nevertheless is
growing as Japanese become more sympathetic to democratic Taiwan's cause, and as
the two island democracies increasingly share a common perception of a Chinese threat.

Japan's Maritime Security Initiatives in Southeast Asia

In another initiative to advance Japan's influence in Southeast Asia, Prime Minister
Koizumi followed his ASEAN free trade proposal in January 2002 with a call for
enhanced ASEAN-Japan security cooperation: "I propose that Japan and ASEAN
security cooperation, including transnational issues such as terrorism, be drastically
intensified.,,115 That initial proposal has been followed by another to create a joint
Japan-ASEAN task force to fight terrorism and other transnational security problems. 1l6
Koizumi's proposal, in fact, was only the latest step in a process of Japanese strategic
engagement with Southeast Asia over a number of years, which has focused on
cooperation and coalition building for SLOe security in East Asia, especially in the
South China Sea.

111 See, respectively, "Pipeline Deal Eases Japan's Energy Fears," BBC News (online), 10 January 2003;
and "Japan to Tap Sakhalin Oil: Offshore Rigs Could Supply 250,000 Barrels per Day," The Daily
Yomiuri (online ed.), 28 October 2001.
112 See "Japanese Congressmen Pay Visit to Taipei," Taipei Times (online ed.), 21 August 2001;
"Taiwan's New Rulers Draw Diet Interest," The Japan Times (online ed.), 24 August 2001; and
"Japanese Official Presses for Taipei-Tokyo Relations," Taipei Times (online ed.), 25 September 2002.
113 Quoted in "Time to Relax Curbs? Japan May Bolster Taiwan Ties," The Japan Times (online ed.), 15
January 2003.
114 "Japanese General Witnessed Missile Test, Report Says," Taipei Times (online ed.), 21 August 2001.
llS Quoted in "Koizumi Calls for Closer Ties with ASEAN," Kyodo News (online), 14 January 2002.
116 "Japan to Propose Joint Task Force," The Japan Times (online ed.), 2 November 2002.
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The "threat" posed by piracy and sea robbery has been used as a rationale for
greater maritime security cooperation. However, despite posing a commercial risk for
shippers and marine insurers, a potential source of environmental pollution (if a
hijacked oil tanker ran aground, for example), and a significant safety issue for ships'
crews, the piracy problem is not a genuinely strategic one. 117 It is, instead, a lower-level
law and order at sea issue, wherein the CUlprits are not states but small groups of
criminals, often motivated by societal conditions of economic hardship or a long, almost
cultural tradition of committing piratical acts, especially in parts of Indonesia. 1I8 The
only conceivable consequences of the piracy problem that might have strategic
implications would be the closing of major straits for a continued period, which is
unlikely, or the long-term intervention of a major power: Japanese anti-piracy and
maritime security proposals may equate to such an intervention if fully operationalized.
There have been several proposals for maritime coalitions and maritime security
cooperation from various Japanese sources, dating back to around 1996. 119 Each version
has in common a more prominent role for Japanese maritime forces in the region, either
in a lead role or within a coalition ofV.S. allies. The proposals have been formulated by
think tanks such as the Okazaki Institute and connected individuals (often former senior
JMSDF officers),120 the National Institute for Defense Studies and Japanese politicians.
The NIDS proposal developed the concept of Ocean Peacekeeping (OPK), whereby an
OPK force comprised of "regional maritime forces" would conduct combined maritime
security patrols in the region - termed "ocean stabilization.,,121 In November 1999, then

1I7 The possibility of terrorist attacks against shipping in areas of archipelagic Southeast Asia is
potentially more significant, although the idea of a concerted, ongoing anti-shipping campaign by nonstate actors seems highly unlikely. For a useful overview of the current state of the regional piracy
problem, see Hamzah Ahmad and Akira Ogawa, eds., Combating Piracy and Ship Robbery: Charting the
Future in Asia Pacific Waters, The Okazaki Institute, Tokyo and Kuala Lumpur, 2001.
m See Jason Abbot and Neil Renwick, "Pirates? Maritime Piracy and Societal Security in Southeast
Asia," Pacifica Review, Vol. 11, No. 1, February 1999.
119 For further discussion, see Chris Rahman, Naval Cooperation and Coalition Building in Southeast
Asia and the Southwest Pacific: Status and Prospects, Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Centre and
Centre for Maritime Policy Working Paper No. 7, RAN Sea Power Centre, RAAF Fairbairn, Canberra,
October 2001, pp. 53-56; and Mark J. Valencia, ''Piracy and International Politics in Asia," in Hamzah
and Ogawa, eds., Combating Piracy and Ship Robbery, pp. 80-82.
120 See, for example, Sumihiko Kawamura, "International Cooperation for SLOC Security," in Dalchoong
Kim, Seo-Hang Lee and Jin-Hyun Paik, eds., Maritime Security and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific
toward the 21'1 Century, East and West Studies Series 46, DooiInet for the Institute of East and West
Studies, Yonsei University, Seoul, 2000; and Hideaki Kaneda, "Japanese Perspective on Regional
Security," paper prepared for the SEAPOL Inter-regional Conference on Ocean Governance and
Sustainable Development in the East and Southeast Asian Seas: Challenges in the New Millennium,
Bangkok, 21-23 March 2001.
121 See Susumu Takai and Kazumine Akimoto, "Ocean-Peace Keeping and New Roles for Maritime
Force," NIDS Security Studies, No. 1, March 2000, esp. pp. 64-67 and 76-77.
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Prime Minister Obuchi of Japan proposed that ships of the Japan Coast Guard (which
would be less controversial than JMSDF warships) conduct combined anti-piracy
patrols with other states, including China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and South
Korea, in the Malacca Strait and other Indonesian sea lanes. 122
The Obuchi proposal led to a series of meetings involving governmental
agencies from 14 regional states plus shipping interests and international organizations,
including the International Maritime Organization (IMO). The "Tokyo Appeal" was
made at one meeting, which reiterated the "firm resolve" of the participants to deal with
the problem, whilst a subsequent meeting of regional coast guard heads adopted a
"Model Action Plan" to combat piracy and sea robbery, but practical cooperation was
limited to information exchange. 123 Despite continuing regional conferences led by
Japanese interests, the initiatives have not resulted in the creation of new maritime
coalitions or new multinational maritime patrols in Southeast Asia led by Japan. China
quickly rejected the idea, both because it would create an increased Japanese strategic
presence in Southeast Asia, and because the proposal was Japanese to begin with (to
have accepted the proposal would have implicitly acknowledged a leading role for
Japan in regional maritime security): Beijing seems fully aware that the concept is, at
least in part, motivated by a Japanese desire to counter China. Several Southeast Asian
states with long memories of past Japanese aggression also disapproved of the idea of a
Japanese military or paramilitary security force patrolling the neighbourhood. 124
Nevertheless, less conspicuous Japanese involvement in regional maritime
security, such as the provision of money and training, has been welcomed in Southeast
Asia and, over time, the level of cooperation seems to be deepening. For example, a
JeG cutter, the 5,300 ton Mizuho, staged a combined anti-piracy and anti-terrorism

122 See "Foot in the Water," Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 March 2000, pp. 28-29. The invitation to
involve China was probably a way of making an expanded Japanese security presence more palatable to
Beijing and the region, although it is not clear whether Japan genuinely believed that China would agree
to participate.
123 See "Tokyo Appeal," International Conference of All Maritime Related Concerns, Both Governmental
and Private, on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, Tokyo, 28-30 March 2000; and
"Model Action Plan," Regional Conference on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships,
Tokyo, 27-29 April 2000. China was represented at the April meeting. However, Beijing refused to attend
two subsequent meetings of coast guard officials from Japan, South Korea, Russia and the United States
in December 2000 and March 2001, to discuss anti-piracy and other law and order at sea issues in the
northwestern Pacific. See Valencia, "Piracy and International Politics in Asia," p. 84.
124 Ibid., pp. 81-82; and Rahman, Naval Cooperation and Coalition BUilding in Southeast Asia and the
Southwest Pacific, p. 54. Malaysia, however, as well as India, was supportive of Japanese involvement in
anti-piracy activities in the region at the April 2000 Tokyo meeting. See "Coast Guard Seeks Jets to Fight
High Seas Piracy," Asahi Evening News, 10 August 2000, p. 1.
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exercise with the Philippine coast guard off Manila Bay in late October 2001. 125 The
Japan Coast Guard has made several such forays to conduct exercises and patrols in
Southeast Asia since the Tokyo meetings of March-April 2000. In July-August 2002,
the Mizuho and a JCG Falcon 900 jet patrol aircraft were dispatched to the region: the
sixth time a JeG ship and the third time an aircraft had been deployed to Southeast Asia
since 2000. The Falcon 900 flew to Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia to carry out
exercises and patrols,126 whilst the Mizuho sailed to Brunei for combined anti-piracy
exercises with Brunei's Marine Police and the Royal Brunei Police Force. 127 In March
2003 the Japan Coast Guard began assisting Jakarta to create an Indonesian coast guard:
three JCG officials will be posted to Indonesia's Ministry of National Development
Planning to advise the Indonesians. 128 Also in March 2003, three JMSDF warships
made a rare port visit to Port Klang, Malaysia. 129
In another interesting development, the Japan Coast Guard held a combined
exercise with the Indian Coast Guard off the coast of India in November 2000, whilst
cooperative anti-piracy patrols in the Bay of Bengal had earlier been discussed by the
two governments. 130 If the relationship were to grow, it would represent a significant
degree of security cooperation between the two major Asian powers opposed to China's
maritime expansion.

United States
David Shambaugh writes that the Sino-American relationship had "atrophied" from the
late 1980s to 1996. 131 The twin irritants in the relationship from an American point of
view, China's human rights abuses and weapons proliferation, were overshadowed by
the American naval intervention during the March 1996 Taiwan missile crisis, and the
resulting increased potential for conflict between U.S. and Chinese forces. As a
consequence, the United States attempted to improve the relationship by deepening its
engagement with Beijing, issuing the "three noes" regarding Taiwan, re-emphasizing
"Japan, Philippines in Anti-piracy Drill," Asahi Shimbun (onIine ed.), 2 November 2001.
"Japan to Send Boat, Jet to Southeast Asia to Fight Piracy," The Japan Times (onIine ed.), 17 July
2002.
127 "Japanese Coast Guard Berths for Op.," Borneo Bulletin (onIine ed.), 13 August 2002.
128 "Japan Helping Indonesia to Set Up Coast Guard," The Business Times Shipping Times (onIine ed.), 25
March 2003. Presumably, Japan will also provide significant funding for the project.
129 "Three Japanese Warships to Make Rare Goodwill Visit," The Straits Times (onIine ed.), 10 March
2003.
130 "Indian, Japanese Coast Guards to Combat Piracy," Indonesia Observer, 2 November 2000, p. 12.
125
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bilateral military exchanges and atUlouncing an unlikely new "strategic partnership"
with China. The "strategic partnership," however, was little more than hollow rhetoric:
in strategic terms, the relationship had become competitive rather than constructive. 132
China's actions had begun to match its rhetoric and ambitions of undermining the
American-led, maritime-based security order in East Asia,133 and have resulted in
American attempts to bolster its East Asian security system.

The U.S. Alliance System and Coalition Building in Asia

Since the mid 1990s the United States has worked to reinvigorate its system of bilateral
alliances in East Asia, and to develop its defence cooperation activities with other states
into infonnal coalitions centred around American maritime power. As explained in its
1998 East Asia Strategy Report, Washington

views the reaffmnation and enhancement of these alliances .. , and the concurrent and
complementary development of constructive ties with non-allied states, as evidence of
our continued confidence that an integrated network of security relations is in the
mutual interest of all Asia-Pacific nations. 134

Although the expansion of defence ties with regional states is not explicitly linked to
China or any other single state, the very act of strengthening its regional security system
serves to undermine Beijing's grand strategic objectives of reducing the American
military presence in the western Pacific and achieving regional strategic primacy. And,
as the United States becomes progressively more concerned with China's actions and
ambitions, the political strategy to enhance its regional security relationships
increasingly will have, as an implicit goal, the countering of Chinese geopolitical
expansion and strategic influence.
The U.S.-Japan alliance remains the centrepiece of the system, and the
strengthening of the alliance, including the promulgation of the new defence
cooperation guidelines, cooperative TMD research and the American encouragement of
a greater Japanese security role within the alliance, have already been discussed.
131 David Shambaugh, "Sino-American Strategic Relations: From Partners to Competitors," Survival, Vol.
42, No. 1,' Spring 2000, pp. 97-98.
132 See ibid., esp. pp. 98-101; and Denny Roy, "Current Sino-U.S. Relations in Strategic Perspective,"
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 20, No. 3, December 1998.
133 See Auer and Lim, "The Maritime Basis of American Security in East Asia."

322

Washington has also attempted to build linkages amongst its major bilateral alliance
partners: Japan, Australia and South Korea. In July 2001, a proposal for a new security
dialogue between the four states was made during ministerial-level U.S.-Australian
consultations in Canberra. 135 Although Japan reacted positively,136 little tangible
progress seems to have been made. Australia has also indicated an interest in joining the
emerging American ballistic missile defence system. 137
The U.S.-Ied regional security system is based on American maritime power,
and the enhancement and development of Washington's regional linkages has focused
on naval cooperation, although intelligence cooperation has also increased as a
consequence of the war on terrorism. Most of Washington's bilateral partners have
minimal linkages amongst each other, do not favour multilateral approaches to
security,138 and are concerned not to offend China. Therefore, the United States has
aimed its multinational coalition-building activities around non-controversial forms of
cooperation at the lower end of the spectrum of military operations, including
humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, search and rescue, constabulary and
peacekeeping operations. 139 In Northeast Asia, the focus has been on trilateral naval
cooperation between the United States, Japan and South Korea. A series of workshops
have been held,140 which also serve as a confidence-building measure between Seoul
and Tokyo, although Korean suspicions of Japan remain an impediment both to closer
operational cooperation and American alliance management.
In Southeast Asia, the United States undertakes an annual series of bilateral
maritime exercises involving the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard with the naval

134 (U.S.) Department of Defense, "The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region,"
Washington, D.C., 1998, p. 19.
135 See "Gang of Four Leaves China Out in the Cold," The Sydney Morning Herald, 31 July 2001, p. 1.
China, predictably, objected to the initiative.
136 "Japan Open to U.S. Push for Regional Security Alliance," The Sydney Morning Herald, 1 August
2001, p. 8. Japan remains somewhat constrained by its own conservatism and the restrictions of its
constitution, although deeper Japan-Australia cooperation might be possible in the future. South Korean
participation is more doubtful, however, not least because it has drawn closer to China.
137 See "China Slams Aus 'Star Wars' Plan," CNN.com (online ed.), 27 February 2003. The combined
Australian-American surveillance facility at Pine Gap, which can be used to detect missile launches,
already is likely to be playing a central role in both TMD and national missile defence (NMD)
programmes.
138 See, for example, Desmond Ball, Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region (With Some
Implications for Regional Security Cooperation), SDSC Working Paper No. 270, Strategic and Defence
Studies Centre, The Australian National University, Canberra, April 1993.
139 For a fuller treatment of naval cooperative activities in the region, see Rahman, Naval Cooperation
and Coalition Building in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific.
140 See, for example, The Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, The Center for Naval Analyses and The
Okazaki Institute, "Trilateral Naval Cooperation: Korea-U.S.-Japan," Workshop III report, October 1999.
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forces of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Termed
Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training ( CARAT), 14l the exercise series serves to
improve interoperability, enhance the operational capacity of Southeast Asian navies,
and increase American access to regional bases and facilities. The United States
probably hopes to expand or link the CARAT exercises into a more multilateral event.
The U.S. Pacific Command is already following that path by linking its separate annual
military exercises with Thailand (Cobra Gold), the Philippines (Balikatan) and Australia
(Tandem Thrust) under the auspices of an overarching exercise template named Team
Challenge. The United States hopes that Team Challenge will form the basis for greater
coordination of its bilateral exercise programme, perhaps resulting in the creation of an
annual multilateral exercise with the armed forces of the United States at its core. In the
opinion of one anonymous Philippine government official, Team Challenge is intended
to be "a counterfoil to the supposed threat posed by China in the region." The exercise
''would involve invasion scenarios, with China as the aggressor-nation, and responses to
a strong China move in the disputed Spradys territory.,,142 Already, Singapore has
become a third member of the Cobra Gold exercise (beginning in 2001)/43 whilst a
trilateral naval exercise was held in March 2001, near the disputed Scarborough Shoal
144
in the South China Sea, between the United States, the Philippines and Thailand. The
navies of the United States, Australia and Singapore also combine for the Tri-Crab
145
annual mine countermeasures and ordnance disposal exercise.
The U.S. Pacific Command has also been active in promoting other initiatives to
build links with Southeast Asian militaries such as the International Military Education
and Training (!MET) programme to educate foreign officers in U.S. military academies,
and the Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT), which consists of a series
of workshops to build interoperability and standard operating procedures for
146
Other American proposals
peacekeeping and other non-combat military operations.
have included the further development of the EXTAC 1000 series of common naval

141 See Leslie Hull-Ryde (Leut., USN), "Enhancing Naval Cooperation: CARAT 2000," Asia-Pacific
Defense Forum, Fa112000.
142 Quoted in "Gov't Studying U.S. Proposal for Multi-nation War Games," Philippine Daily Inquirer
(onIine ed.), 22 March 2002.
143 See, for example, Rahman, Naval Cooperation and Coalition BUilding in Southeast Asia and the
Southwest Pacific, pp. 26-28.
144 See Valencia, "Piracy and International Politics in Asia," p. 84.
145 Rahman, Naval Cooperation and Coalition Building in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific, p.
28.
146 Ibid., pp. 35-36.
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doctrine, and a range of initiatives to enhance communications interoperability for
coalition or other forms of combined operations. 147
Washington, like the major Asian powers, is promoting free trade arrangements
with Southeast Asia, under its Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative. Unlike Chinese and
Japanese proposals, however, the United States has proposed a more attainable network
of bilateral agreements rather than a single multilateral arrangement. Negotiations have
already been completed with Singapore. 148 It is not clear whether the proposal is a
response to the growing great power competition for influence in Southeast Asia, as the
United States is pursuing such agreements with a wide range of states around the world.
Nevertheless, because U.S. interests and influence are global, free trade agreements may
be used as instruments of influence on a global scale. The United States has also begun
to build a new security relationship with India, which is discussed in a later section.

US. Strategy and China
The effort to bolster its alliance and defence cooperation networks in East Asia is just
one part of a renewed American emphasis upon the region. China has increasingly been
viewed in Washington as the most likely future major power rival to the United States
and its interests, if not globally, then in East Asia, one of the three regions (along with
Europe and the Middle East) that is of fundamental geopolitical importance. Heightened
American unease with developments in China probably began with the Tiananmen
massacre, and has deepened over time as Beijing's ambitions and the nature of its
strategic modernization are better understood. Events such as the Taiwan Strait crises,
the alleged Chinese theft of American nuclear weapon secrets,149 and the more
aggressive posture of the PLA (as symbolized by the Hainan EP-3 incident), have
spurred the unease and growing distrust. In the 2000 presidential election campaign,
then-candidate George W. Bush stated clearly the Republican Party's belief that China
had become "a strategic competitor of the United States, not a strategic partner,,,150
whilst new Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, reportedly identified China as the

147 See Thomas B. Fargo (Adm., USN), Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, "Enhanced Regional
Cooperation," paper prepared for the 7th Western Pacific Naval Symposium, Auckland, November 2000.
148 See "U.S. Offers FTAs to ASEAN," Taipei Times (onIine ed.), 21 November 2002.
149 See, for example, "The Theft That Nobody Saw," The Economist, 29 May 1999, p. 29.
150 Quoted in "The Bush Family in China," Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 October 2000, p. 30.
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primary future strategic threat for the United States. 151 And, Bush administration
National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice, has clearly stated Washington's view of
China's strategic ambitions:
Everybody would agree that China is a rising power in the Asia Pacific, and therefore
we have a number of security issues in conflict. The Chinese do resent the American
presence in the Asian Pacific. They think China ought to be the major power in the Asia
Pacific. That's really what the EP-3 incident was all about.

152

Since the Taiwan missile crises, the U.S. Congress has required the Department
of Defense to provide it with reports on the military balance across the Taiwan Strait,153
the implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act,154 and China's military power. 155
Congress also created the bipartisan

U.S.~China

Security Review Commission in late

2000 to report on the "national security implications and impact of the bilateral trade
and economic relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of
China.,,156 China responded to the Commission's first report, delivered in July 2002, by
accusing the United States of harbouring ''very evil motives.,,157 The various reports
increasingly reflect the competitive nature of the Sino-American relationship, the
deteriorating military balance across the Taiwan Strait (i.e., in China's favour), and the
rapidly improving capabilities of those elements of the PLA that are being developed
specifically to threaten the United States and its allies in East Asia. The Commission
report readily admits, for example, that Washington and Beijing have "sharply

151 "U.S. Identifies Beijing as Its Enemy Number One," The Sydney Morning Herald, 26 March 2001, p.
8; and "Rumsfeld Says Missiles Proof of China's Global Ambitions," The Washington Times (online ed.),
7 September 2001.
152 Quoted in "China's Latest Dare" (editorial), The Washington Times (online ed.), 8 August 2001.
153 (U.S.) Department of Defense, "The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait," Report to Congress
Pursuant to the FY99 Appropriations Bill, February 1999, available on the World Wide Web at:
http://www.defenselink.millpubs/twstrait_02261999.html.
154 "Executive Summary of Report to Congress on Implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act."
155 (U.S.) Department of Defense, "Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of
China," Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, June 2000,
available on the World Wide Web at: http://www.defenselink.millnews/Jun2000/china06222000.htm; and
(U.S.) Department ofDefense, "Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China,"
Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, July 2002.
156 See U.S.-China Security Review Commission, "The National Security Implications of the Economic
Relationship between the United States and China," Report to Congress Pursuant to Public Law 106-398
(30 October 2000), July 2002, available on the World Wide Web at: http://www.uscc.goy/txanrp02.htm.
The twelve-member commission adopted the report by a vote of eleven to one.
157 ''U.S. Report Has 'Very Evil Motive': FM Spokesman," People's Daily (online ed.), 16 July 2002.
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contrasting worldviews, competing geo-strategic interests, and opposing political
systems." 158
A 2001 RAND report produced for the U.S. Air Force (USAF) identified China
as a central concern for American strategic interests in Asia and highlighted the
potential for conflict over Taiwan. The report recommended new basing options for
U.S. air power in the region to counter the growing Chinese threat to Taiwan, including
the development of the American island of Guam as a power-projection hub, which
could be used by long-range B-52 bombers armed with Harpoon anti-ship cruise
missiles to counter the PLA Navy in the Taiwan Strait; new concepts for joint
operations between D.S. Navy carrier aviation and DSAF combat support elements; and
development of new bases in the southern Ryukyus, northern Luzon or Batan Island (a
Philippine island in the Bashi Channel). 159
The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review reflected similar considerations, and
followed earlier indications from the Bush administration that Asia (from the Persian
Gulf to Northeast Asia) was becoming the highest priority area for D.S. defence
planning, with the rise of China a leading motivating factor. 160 The Quadrennial
Defense Review itself included the following deployment decisions: maintenance of
existing Northeast Asian bases; increasing "aircraft carrier battlegroup presence in the
Western Pacific," and homeporting up to four additional surface combatants plus
(potentially) basing nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) equipped with a
dedicated land-attack cruise missile capability in the region; improving contingency
basing and logistics support for the D.S. Air Force in the Pacific; and conducting
Marine Corps littoral warfare training in the region. 161
The U.S. Navy has already begun to improve its basing infrastructure on Guam,
with the island to receive the first SSNs to be homeported outside the metropolitan

158 "The National Security Implications of the Economic Relationship between the United States and
China," Executive Summary.
159 Zalmay Khalilzad et aI., The United States and Asia: Toward a New Us. Strategy and Force Posture,
MR-1315-AF, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2001, pp. 71-74. Domestic political considerations in the
Philippines make it highly unlikely that the United States would be allowed to set up new bases there,
however, although U.S. forces have already undertaken combined "training" exercises with Philippine
forces against Islamic terrorists in the southern Philippines. See, for example, "U.S. and Philippines May
Start Training Mission," The New York Times (online ed.), 1 December 2002.
160 See "Anny to Move Some Weapons Out of Europe," The New York Times (online ed.), 31 August
2001.
161 (U.S.) Department of Defense, "Quadrennial Defense Review Report," 30 September 2001, p. 27.
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United States. 162 Two Los Angeles-class boats arrived in Guam in late 2002, with a third
due in 2003. 163 The commander of U.S. Pacific Air Forces, General William Begert,
asserts that Guam is "extremely important strategically," and is planning for the
deployment of the latest generation of fighter aircraft, military transport and tanker
aircraft and airborne surveillance assets. Begert supports his argument by observing
that, not only is Guam U.S. territory, but American F-15 and F-22 fighter aircraft flying
from Andersen Air Force Base on the island are able to deliver a full combat load over a
range of up to 1,800 nautical miles (the Taiwan Strait is approximately 1,500 nautical
miles from Guam), whilst the island's distance from continental Asia makes it less
vulnerable to ballistic missile strikes from China or North Korea than bases closer to the
continent. 164
The importance of Guam was highlighted in March 2003 when twelve B-52 and
twelve B-1 bombers were deployed to Andersen in response to heightened tensions on
the Korean peninsula, whilst Defense Secretary Rumsfeld has argued that some U.S.
forces currently stationed in South Korea should ''be more oriented toward an air hub
and a sea hub" (that is: Guam).165 Although the USAF bomber deployments were aimed
at deterring North Korea, the deployment and continued air and naval build up on Guam
represent part of a developing concept of operations for the western Pacific that also
targets China's maritime expansion and military threat to Taiwan. Submarine basing in
the western Pacific most likely reflects a primary concern with China rather than North
Korea.
The development of ballistic missile defence systems can not be attributed to the
need to counter the potential missile threat posed by China or any other single state.
Rather, missile defences are a generic capability. Nevertheless, China's operational
preference for ballistic missiles as offensive strike weapons and its growing arsenal of
missiles targeting Taiwan and Japan means that American and allied missile defence
capabilities will become increasingly relevant to deterrence and defence across the
162 See Eric J. Labs, "Countering Attack Sub Shortfalls," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September
2002,p.47.
163 "Guam, Hurt by Slump, Hopes for Economic Help from Military," The New York Times (online ed.),
10 March 2003.
164 Quoted in John G. Roos, "Tackling the 'Tyranny of Distance': Air Force Considers Bolstering
Airpower in the Pacific," Armed Forces Journal, November 2002, pp. 22-28. On the vulnerability of
America's Asian bases, see Paul Bracken, Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the
Second Nuclear Age, HarperCollins, New York, 1999, esp. pp. 58-64.
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Taiwan Strait. 166 Missile defences, however, are only one part of the American
deterrence equation, which also includes, inter alia, forward-deployed conventional
forces and D.S. nuclear forces. The 2002 Nuclear Posture Review, for example,
included China as one of several influences on nuclear force sizing:

Due to the combination of China's still developing strategic objectives and its ongoing
modernization of its nuclear and non nuclear forces, China is as country that could be
involved in an immediate or potential contingency. 167

The operational focus of the D.S. Navy since the end of the Cold War has been
on littoral warfare. 168 However, V.S. naval forces, designed during the Cold War
primarily for blue water operations, are not ideally equipped to deal with many of the
threats inherent in the littoral environment, such as sea mines, diesel-electric submarines
and modem anti-ship cruise missiles. 169 These types of weapons all feature heavily in
China's increasingly impressive sea denial (or area denial) arsenal and pose potential
difficulties for future American operations in the East Asian littora1. 170 "Anti-access"
and "area denial" are terms currently favoured in the American strategic lexicon, and

165 Quoted in "Guam, Hurt by Slump, Hopes for Economic Help from Military," The New York Times
(online ed.), 10 March 2003; and see also "U.S. Bombers on Alert to Deploy as Warning to North
Koreans," The New York Times (onIine ed.), 4 February 2003.
166 A RAND report produced for the U.S. Navy in 2002, for example, hypothesizes on a future maritime
conflict involving a small island nation (i.e., Taiwan) lying off the east coast of a large state that attempts
to annex it. The aggressor state relies on submarine forces, ballistic and anti-ship cruise missiles
(ASCMs). The role of the United States in the conflict is to assist the island to defend itself primarily by
providing sea-based defence against ballistic missile attacks whilst also conducting defensive antisubmarine warfare operations and defending its own ships from potentially simultaneous ASCM strikes.
As a measure of American threat perceptions, it is significant that China (although not named explicitly)
is posed as the hypothetical adversary for future naval warfare involving the U.S. Navy. See Walter Perry
et aI., Measures ofEffectiveness for the Information-age Navy: The Effects ofNetwork-centric Operations
on Combat Outcomes, MR-1449-NAVY, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2002, esp. Chs. 2-3.
167 (U.S.) Department of Defense, ''Nuclear Posture Review" [Excerpts], submitted to Congress on 31
December 2002 (pp. 16-17), available on the World Wide Web at: http://www.GlobaISecurity.org.
168 See, for example, United States Navy, "Forward ... From the Sea: The Navy Operational Concept,"
March 1997, available on the World Wide Web at: http://www.chinfo.navy.millnavpalib/policy/fromseal
ffseanoc.html.
169 See Tim Sloth Joergensen (Cmdr, Royal Danish Navy), "U.S. Navy Operations in Littoral Waters:
2000 and Beyond," Naval War College Review, Vol. LI, No. 2, Spring 1998. U.S. Navy littoral warfare
shortcomings have been recognized, however, and new programmes are under way to improve the
necessary capabilities. See United States General Accounting Office, ''Navy Acquisitions: Improved
Littoral War-fighting Capabilities Needed," GAO-01-493, Report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority
Member, Subcommittee on Military Research and Development, Committee on Armed Services, House
of Representatives, May 2001; and "Quadrennial Defense Review Report," p. 31.
170 The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) produced three reports in 1997 detailing threats to
American littoral operations. China and its weapon systems were featured in each report. See ONI,
"Worldwide Challenges to Naval Strike Warfare," February 1997; ONI, "Worldwide Submarine
Challenges," February 1997; and ONI, "Challenges to Naval Expeditionary Warfare," March 1997.
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involve not only denial of the free use of the sea, but also denial of bases and port
facilities in theatre. l71 One of the Department of Defense's six "critical operational
goals," therefore, is to be able to project and sustain V.S. forces "in distant anti-access
or area-denial environments" and defeat such "anti-access and area-denial threats."l72
China is the most capable of the potential adversaries facing the United States in the
world's littorals (others include Iran and, to a lesser extent, North Korea), and Chinese
area denial forces increasingly are likely to be the standard against which American
forces and doctrine are designed to ensure littoral access.
American intelligence-gathering operations are another indicator that the United
States is taking active measures to counter China's strategic expansion. V.S. aircraft
now conduct over 400 intelligence-collection flights along the Chinese coast each
year. I ?3 And, as China increases its efforts to (illegitimately) subsume greater sea areas
within its national jurisdiction and control and to restrict the military activities of other
states in or over those areas, the United States is likely to resist such claims more
assertively through forward military presence and its freedom of navigation
programme. 174

Implementing the Taiwan Relations Act

China's renewed strategic emphasis on Taiwan has resulted in correspondi~g American
efforts to uphold the intent of the Taiwan Relations Act. Increased arms sales to the
island began in the early 1990s, and a policy review was initiated in 1994 to improve
those 'non-hardware" capabilities mentioned in an earlier section. The 1996 missile
crisis created further impetus to assist Taiwan, resulting in the reports to Congress also
noted above. The 2000 report on the implementation of the Act also makes it clear that
the Department of Defense views the American obligation to Taiwan to be "in our own

171 See Roger W. Barnett, ''Naval Power for a New American Century," Naval War College Review, Vol.
LV, No. 1, Winter 2002, pp. 50-53.
172 "Quadrennial Defense Review Report," p. 30.
173 Desmond Ball, "Intelligence Collection Operations and EEZs: The Implications of New Technology,"
paper prepared for the Tokyo Meeting, The Regime of the Exclusive Economic Zone: Issues and
Responses, Tokyo, 19-20 February 2003, p. 7.
174 The D.S. freedom of navigation programme aims to "ensure the stable and predictable law of the sea
regime that facilitates effective naval operations." See Dennis Mandsager, "The U.S. Freedom of
Navigation Program: Policy, Procedure, and Future," in Michael N. Schmitt, ed., The Law of Military
Operations: Liber Amicorum Professor Jack Grunawalt, Naval War College Press, Newport, RI, 1998,
(quote from p. 113).
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national interest," inasmuch as a Taiwan able to defend itself reduces the likelihood of
conflict in the region. 175
The American resolve to support the defence of Taiwan has been more overt
under the Bush administration. Shortly after the EP-3 incident in April 2001, the United
States announced a major new arms package for Taiwan, including the agreement to
supply submarines. 176 President George W. Bush unambiguously committed the
administration to the Taiwan Relations Act, thus enhancing deterrence of Chinese
adventurism, by stating that the United States ''would do everything it took to help
Taiwan defend itself.,,177 Despite Washington's attempts to engage Beijing more closely
to win cooperation and support for the war on terrorism and the political campaigns
against Saddam Hussein's Iraq and North Korea's nuclear weapons programme, both
Secretary of State, Colin Powell, and National Security Adviser Rice have' publicly
reiterated support for the Taiwan Relations Act and arms sales to the island. 178
Strong American rhetorical support for Taiwan has been backed up, not only by
arms sales, but also by increasing levels of practical defence cooperation. The Pentagon
confirmed in July 2001 that it had been holding regular talks in secret on the "defence of
179
Taiwan" with Taiwanese defence officials since 1997. Congress has also required the
administration to present a report on the state of Taiwan-American defence ties as part
of the fiscal 2003 defence authorization bill, including investigation into the possibility
of holding combined operational training and senior officer exchanges. I80 Senior
Taiwanese officers have already been sent to the United States for training,181 whilst
American military personnel and defence officials frequently advise Taiwan's defence
"Executive Summary of Report to Congress on Implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act," p. 2.
See "China Blasts Taiwan Arms Deal," The Australian, 25 Apri12001, p. 8.
177 Quoted in "Arms and Studied Ambiguity," The Economist, 28 April 2001, p. 30. The Taiwan
Relations Act does not commit the United States to defend Taiwan. Implicitly, however, the Bush
administration line seems to be that the United States will intervene to defend Taiwan against an
unprovoked attack (that is: as long as Taipei does not unilaterally declare formal independence).
178 See "U.S. Says It Won't Sacrifice Taiwan for Support from China," Taipei Times (onIine ed.), 16
March 2003. The U.S. Congress is also considering a bill that recommits Washington to the Taiwan
Relations Act as a response to China's missile build up, and also calls for a free trade agreement between
Taiwan and the United States. "U.S. Congress to Discuss Taiwan," Taipei Times (online ed.), 28 March
2003. Furthermore, Washington does not seem to be receiving real cooperation from China. Even in the
war against terrorism, Beijing seems only to be interested in limited cooperation that might help its fight
against separatists in Xinjiang.
179 "Pentagon Confirms Defense Talks between Taiwan, U.S.," The Washington Times (online ed.), 20
July 2001; "Pentagon Reveals Meetings with Officials," Taipei Times (online ed.), 20 July 2001; and
"Taiwan's Deputy Defense Minister Leaves for U.S. Conference," Defense-aerospace.com (online), 12
February 2003.
180 "Military Ties Report Will Be Done on Time: Kelly," Taipei Times (online ed.), 21 November 2002.
175

176
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forces. 182 As part of that process, American military personnel will observe Taiwan's
annual Hankuang military exercises in 2003,183 and a Taiwanese report claims that
Chinese-English bilingual versions of Taiwan's combat manuals will be produced by
184
2004 in preparation for combined exercises with "a friendly country" in 2006. An
anonymous Taiwanese defence official has stated that Taiwan's navy intends to deploy
its Kidd-class destroyers mostly off the eastern coast of the island in order to "practice
joint operations with the V.S. Navy in the Pacific .... At time of war, the Kidds will lead
the V.S. naval ships into the Taiwan Strait.,,185
Further, covert military cooperation has been ongoing for some time and seems
to be intensifying. For example, Taiwan's National Security Bureau runs a signals
intelligence (SIGINT) facility cooperatively with the V.S. National Security Agency in
a district of Taipei, which is able to intercept radio communications within a 500 km
radius, including military communications from China's Nanjing and Guangzhou
military regions. The station is evidently linked to an American SrGINT network that
includes stations in Japan and Thailand. 186 Washington has also "conditionally" agreed
to allow Taiwan to plug its Patriot missile defence system into the V.S. military satellite
system to provide extra warning time ~fChinese missile launches. 187 The D.S. Navy has
increased its marine data collection in the Taiwan area since the 1996 missile crisis to
improve its knowledge of local operating conditions. 188 A Chinese news report claims,
moreover, that Taiwan's navy and the V.S. Navy will cooperate to lay two underwater
acoustic arrays to improve surveillance of the PLA Navy: one off northeast Taiwan to
monitor the PLA Navy in the East China Sea and one to the south of the island to
monitor it in the South China Sea. 189
Chinese belligerence over Taiwan has thus created exactly the response that
Beijing did not want: the combination of American political support, arms sales and
181 "Envoy to Examine U.S.-based Training Programme for Officers of Taiwan's Forces," Taipei Times
(online ed.), 6 January 2002. Taiwan's F-16 conversion squadron is also based in the United States.
182 See, for example, "U.S. Urges Military Reform," Taipei Times (online ed.), 30 December 2001; and
"U.S. Delegation Evaluates Marines," Taipei Times (online ed.), 21 November 2002.
183 "U.S. Troops to See Hankuang Drills," Taipei Times (online ed.), 23 January 2003.
184 "Defense Ministry to Release Bilingual Combat Manual," Taipei Times (online ed.), 23 December
2002.
185 Quoted in "Pentagon Reveals Meetings with Officials," Taipei Times (online ed.), 20 July 2001.
186 "Taiwan-USA Link Up on SIGlNT," Jane's Defence Weekly, 24 January 2001, p. 16; and "Secret
Station Helps U.S. to Eavesdrop on China," Taipei Times (online ed.), 18 January 2003.
187 "U.S. to Share Early-warning Missile Data with Taiwan," Taipei Times (online ed.), 8 October 2002.
188 ''Military Needs Better Data on Maritime Conditions," Taipei Times (online ed.), 18 February 2003.
189 "U.S. Proposes Marine Cables to Spy on Mainland," China Daily Hong Kong Edition (online ed.), 2
June 2001.
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deepening military cooperation suggest that Taiwan is being (unofficially) welcomed
back into the V.S. regional alliance system as a de facto ally.

India

Sino-Indian strategic competition has been discussed in Chapter 7. India is acutely
aware that China's conversion to a capitalist economy has allowed its traditional
geopolitical rival to make substantial gains in relative material power over the past 20
years. 190 An Indian government report released in January 2003, for example - "India
Vision: 2020" - states that the "increasing economic and military strength of China may
pose a serious challenge to India's security unless adequate measures are taken to fortify
our own strengths.,,191
In addition to China's nuclear threat (including the Beijing-Islamabad axis), its
maritime expansion (particularly into the Indian Ocean) and its expansion of influence
over Southeast Asia have been identified by the Indian Navy as the primary challenges
to India's strategic interests in the twenty-first century.192 India is in the process of
improving its maritime capabilities, with advanced Su-30MK fighters and new classes
of surface ships under construction in Russia and India. India is also finalizing the
purchase of the former-Soviet aircraft carrier, Admiral Gorshkov, as well as the lease of
two Akula-class nuclear attack submarines and Tu-22M3 (Backfire-C) long-range
nuclear-capable bombers from Russia, whilst the two countries are to jointly develop a
new-generation fighter aircraft and the Brahmos, submarine-launched, nuclear-capable
cruise missile. 193
It should be remembered that India, like China, has a territorial foothold in

Southeast Asia. Whereas China holds small reefs in the South China Sea, India owns
the Andaman and Nicobar island chain which demarcates the Indian Ocean from the
Andaman Sea and Malacca Strait, and shares maritime boundaries with Burma,
Thailand and Indonesia. 194 India created a new Integrated Tri-Services Command for
the Andaman and Nicobar chain in October 2001. Based at Port Blair in the Andamans,

190 See "Once a Close Economic Rival of China, India Falls behind," The New York Times (onIine ed.), 29
November 2002.
191 Quoted in "China May Be a Threat by 2020: India," The Straits Times (onIine ed.), 24 January 2003.
192 See "Indian Navy Report Pinpoints China," Jane 's Navy International, November 1998, p. 6.
193 "India to Buy Russian Carrier, Subs," Defense-aerospace.com (onIine), 21 January 2003.
194 On India's maritime boundary agreements in Southeast Asia, see Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, India's
Maritime Security, Knowledge World for the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi,
2000, pp. 50-55.
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the joint command includes units of India's navy, army, air force and coast guard under
the control of an Indian Navy admiral. l95 India's maritime security interests in the area
include combating arms and drugs smuggling, terrorists, piracy and illegal fishing. 196
However, China's increased strategic presence in the Burmese littoral has been cited by
India's defence secretary as "one of the main reasons why a new combined command
was set up in the Andamans.,,197
A second aspect to New Delhi's heightened interest in East Asia is India's
"Look East" policy, enunciated in 1992, to build closer links as part of its own
economic liberalization programme. Strengthening linkages with Southeast Asia, in
particular, also serves as a means by which to counter Chinese influence. 198 Prime
Minister Vajpayee of India admitted as much following the first India-ASEAN summit,
stating that India has "a healthy competition with China.,,199 The first decade of the
policy saw few real gains, with Indian influence lagging well behind that of China.
However, a series of India-ASEAN summits have taken place since 2002 to boost trade.
Mirroririg China's approach, India is pursuing new land communications with Southeast
Asia, with a new highway to connect India with Thailand and Bunna already partly
constructed. 2oo New Delhi has also proposed its own free trade agreement with ASEAN,
to be in place in the next decade: 201 bilateral negotiations are already under way with
Thailand and Singapore. 202
India has also pursued closer relations with Japan, including security ties. 203 The
combined coast guard anti-piracy exercises between the two states have already been
mentioned?04 The two states have a common interest both in safeguarding the sea lanes
connecting the Persian Gulf to Northeast Asia, and in countering China. India's defence

195 See "India's New Strategic Command on Andaman and Nicobar Islands Ready by October," Yahoo!
News Singapore Coniine), 28 September 2001.
196 Roy-Chaudhury, India's Maritime Security, pp. 63-74.
197 Yogendra Narain, quoted in "Coast Guard Gets Two More Hovercraft," The Times of India Coniine
ed.), 8 December 2001.
198 See Aabha Dixit, "India Looks East: Strategic and Economic Considerations Force a Closer Look,"
Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter 1998 Annual Reference Edition, January 1998, pp. 13-14; and "Gazing
East," Far Eastern Economic Review, 1 March 2001, p. 61.
199 Quoted in "'Healthy Competition' between India and China: PM," The Times of India (online ed.), 8
November 2002.
200 '~India-Asean Slow Dance Picks Up Tempo," The Straits Times (onIine ed.), 15 October 2002.
201 "India Courts Southeast Asia for Free Trade Pact," The Times ofIndia (onIine ed.), 6 November 2002.
202 "Indian Diplomacy Looks East," BBC News (onIine), 2 February 2003.
203 See "Japan, India Sign Up for Tighter Diplomacy," The Japan Times (onIine ed.), 11 December 2001.
204 It is worth noting that the Indian CoaSt Guard successfully seized a Japanese-owned freighter that had
been hijacked by pirates in 1999, making future India-Japan maritime security cooperation seem a useful
practical proposition. On the incident, see Roy-Chaudhury, India's Maritime Security, p. 74.
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minister, George Femandes, has stated that the Indian Navy's (operational) "area of
interest ... extends from the north of the Arabian Sea to the South China Sea.,,205 The
South China Sea not only links India to the markets of Northeast Asia,206 but an Indian
naval presence in the region might serve as a countervailing force to China's own
presence in the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea. Speaking of the common maritime
interests between Japan and India and the territorial disputes in the South China Sea,
Femandes has also claimed that a "strong India ... will be a very solid agent to see that
the sea lanes are not disturbed and that conflict situations are contained.,,207
India's interest in countering Chinese influence has also led to a growing
security relationship with Vietnam, including training for Vietnam's navy and coast
guard, technical assistance and possible future weapon sales, with a focus upon naval
and air forces. 208 The Indian Navy was to have held anti-piracy exercises with Vietnam
in the South China Sea in 2000,209 whilst further bilateral exercises were planned with
South Korea and Vietnam in late 2002, after which up to five Indian warships, a Kiloclass submarine and maritime patrol aircraft were to conduct a series of unilateral drills
in the South China Sea. 21O India is also trying to improve its naval links with Indonesia,
sending a flotilla to the archipelago in October 2000. The two navies carried out
combined exercises and India offered technical assistance to maintain Indonesia's
corvettes,211 whilst the Indian Navy conducts an annual anti-submarine warfare exercise
with Singapore's navy?12 In another expression of Indian naval diplomacy, the Indian
Navy has held a biennial multinational naval meet for regional states since 1995: in
February 2003, representatives from the navies of Australia, Burma, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Thailand joined the Indian Navy for Milan 2003,
held at Port Blair. 213 India is also reported to be supplying new Russian Su-30MK
205 Quoted in "India, Vietnam Partners in Safeguarding Sea Lanes," The Hindu (online ed.), 15 April
2000.
206 India has also invested in the oilfields of Sakhalin. See "India, Russia to Develop Fighter, More,"
Defense-aerospace.com (online), 21 January 2003. Theoretically, India may try to import Sakhalin oil to
reduce its dependence on the Persian Gulf, thus increasing its strategic interests in East Asian SLOCs.
207 Quoted in "After the Bomb," Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 April 2000, p. 20.
208 Ibid.; Micool Brooke, "India Courts Vietnam with Arms and Nuclear Technology," Asia-Pacific
Defence Reporter, August/September 2000, pp. 20-21; and "India, Vietnam Partners in Safeguarding Sea
Lanes," The Hindu (online ed.), 15 April 2000.
209 See "Naval Exercise in South China Sea Worries U.S.," The Hindu (online ed.), 10 May 2000.
210 Monty Beaverbrooke, "India's Maritime Thunderbolt," Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, January 2002,
p.7.
2ll See "Indonesian Navy Reorganises," Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, December/January 2001, p. 46.
212 See Rahman, Naval Cooperation and Coalition Building in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific,
p.33.
213 ''Naval Meet 'Milan 2003' Begins," The Hindu (online ed.), 11 February 2003.
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fighters for Malaysia from the Indian production line, a version which is more advanced
than that supplied to China and which could give Malaysia an advantage in the South
China Sea. 214 In another move clearly designed to counter China, India and Taiwan
have developed covert military ties, including intelligence sharing. 2lS
Finally, India has slowly developed a new informal strategic relationship with
the United States. Although

India~U.S.

defence cooperation has burgeoned since 11

September 2001,216 the process began prior to the terrorist attacks on the United States.
The United States was intent on restoring military ties (sanctions had been imposed
following India's nuclear weapon tests in 1998), with a particular emphasis on maritime
security and SLoe protection in the Indian Ocean. 217 Admiral Dennis Blair,
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, thus couched military cooperation with India in
terms of "ensuring the free and unimpeded flow of oil that comes out of the Persian
Gulf all the way across this region.,,218 The U.S.-India Defense Policy Group meets on a
regular basis and, in addition to cooperation against terrorism, the two sides have agreed
upon combined (or at least cooperative) naval patrols of the Malacca Strait, sales of
military equipment and technology, combined exercises and ballistic missile defence
cooperation. 219
As part of the coalition against terrorism, the Indian Navy has undertaken escort
duties for ''high-value'' coalition shipping in the Malacca Strait.220 The Malabar series
of

Indo~U.S.

bilateral naval exercises have been reinstated, with the largest exercise

ever held between the two navies taking place in the Arabian Sea in September 2002. 221
The two states are also planning their first combined air combat exercise. The U.S. Air
Force has specifically requested that India fly its Su-30 fighters against USAF F-15Cs
"India, Russia to Co-produce Sukhoi 30 for Malaysia: Report," Defense-aerospace.com (online), 21
April 2002.
21 See "Taipei 'Fostering Military Ties with India,'" South China Morning Post (online ed.), 3 January
2002.
216 See, for example, Mohan Malik, Dragon on Terrorism: Assessing China's Tactical Gains and
Strategic Losses Post-September 11, Strategic Studies Institute, V.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA,
October 2002, pp. 35-38.
217 See, for example, "U.S. Seeks to Lift Sanctions on India," The Washington Post (online ed.), 12
August 2001; and "U.S. Envoy Extols India, Accepting Its Atom Status," The New York Times (online
ed.), 7 September 2001.
218 Quoted in "U.S. Raises Pace of Military Ties with New Delhi," International Herald Tribune (online
ed.),' 6 December 2001.
219 See "Joint Statement on U.S.-India Defense Policy Group Meeting," U.S. Department of Defense
news release No. 267-02,23 May 2002.
220 "Navy Replaces Vessel on Patrol in Malacca Straits," Rediffcom (online), 17 July 2002.
221 "Indo-U.S. Naval Exercises Begin in Arabian Sea," Expressindia (online), 26 September 2002. For
background, see Vijay Sakhuja, "From Malabar to Malacca: Post Cold War lndo-V.S. Naval Relations,"
Indian Defence Review, Vol. 17, No. 2, April-June 2002.
214
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from Okinawa in the exercise. 222 The implication is that U.S. Pacific Air Forces want to
train against the latest models flown by the PLA. Washington has also upgraded India's
status as an arms client, with several deals already concluded and larger deals likely,
including one for P-3C maritime patrol aircraft. 223 For both political and financial
reasons, however, Russia will remain the primary arms supplier to India. Moreover,
there are limits to the Indo-U.S. strategic relationship and a formal alliance is highly
unlikely. Yet, their common interests in combating Islamic terrorism, securing regional
sea lanes and countering Chinese expansion should ensure that the strategic cooperation
already developing will continue to flourish.

South Korea
Finally, South Korea's naval expansion is worth noting. Korean navaIists have actively
promoted a blue water naval capability and there are important naval construction
programmes under way, including the KDX destroyer programmes (especially the KDX
III Aegis-equipped ships), modem German-designed submarines and an indigenous
class of helicopter carrier. What is unclear, however, is "the relationship between
geopolitics and naval ambitions.,,224 One can speCUlate that a (possibly) united, more
strategically independent Korea may want its own ocean-going force for

SLoe security

and to hedge against the Japanese, Chinese and Russian navies in the future, and against
China-driven regional· instability.225

222 "U.S., India to Conduct Joint Air Combat Exercise," The Washington Post (online ed.), 28 January
2003. The two air forces have already flown a combined military airlift exercise.
223 See "India Enjoys Upgraded Status in U.S. Arms Deals," The Straits Times ConIine ed.), 7 February
2003.
224 James Boutilier, "Mid-sized Navies in the Asia-Pacific Region, 2000-2025: The Case of the Canadian,
South Korean and Japanese Navies," in David Wilson, ed., Maritime War in the 21'1 Century: The
Medium and Small Navy Perspective, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No. 8, Department of
Defence, Canberra, 2001, pp. 85-86.
225 See ibid., p. 86; and Choon Kun Lee, "Missions and Contributions of the Korea Navy in the Post-Cold
War and the EEZ Era, in Choon Kun Lee, ed., The Middle Power Navies: Roles and Missions in the PostCold War and EEZ Era, The Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy, Seoul, 1999, esp. pp. 188-194.
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10

Conclusion: Strategic Implications for a New Century

CHINA AS A RISING REGIONAL MARITIME POWER

China has developed into a maritime power of significance over the past 30 years. Since
the unshackling of the Chinese economy, it is beginning to realize its maritime
potential. However, despite the fact that China's marine economy has grown more
rapidly than the Chinese economy as a whole, China's economic dependence on the sea
is still relatively low. The basis for China's national strength remains primarily
continental and, as it becomes richer, its economy will increasingly be driven by
domestic demand. That is not to argue that China's seaborne trade is unimportant, only
that China will become decreasingly reliant on exports for economic growth.
China is dependent on the sea only for imported oil, although other raw
resources will need to imported by sea in greater quantities as the Chinese economy
continues to expand. China is vulnerable, therefore, to oil supply disruptions. Yet
China's near-term solution to that vulnerability has not been to develop a long-range
naval capability to protect its shipping or the security of vital sea lanes. Rather,
Beijing's response has been to develop alternative sources of oil supply. In part,
alternative supplies may be sourced from Southeast Asia, where China's relative
political and economic position is growing. Thus, Beijing may attempt to monopolize
the oil reserves of the South China Sea, not by expropriation, but by preferential
commercial supply contracts. That would be consistent with a strategy of using China's
growing commercial maritime prowess to dominate regional shipping and trade, thus
enhancing its political influence in Southeast Asia.
China's favoured alternative sources of oil, however, are continental: primarily
Siberian, but potentially also Central Asian. Continental supplies will reduce China's
vulnerability to sea lane disruption by potential adversaries, who are either leading sea
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powers (the United States and Japan), or lie astride the sea route from the Persian Gulf
(India). Nevertheless, even if China's continental oil diversification plans come to
fruition, there will likely remain some dependence upon seaborne oil imports. And,
although it may be able to source much of its non-oil energy and other essential raw
mineral imports from Southeast Asia and Australia, the Persian Gulf will continue to be
an important source of oil. But, by preferring continental rather than sea routes for
future oil supplies, China is demonstrating its continentalist traditions and strengths:
rather than developing a genuine blue water navy, China is falling back on its strategiccultural instincts and relying instead on its geopolitical preponderance in continental
Asia to guarantee security of supply, despite potentially high development and
transportation costs.
China's growing maritime interests and ambitions have influenced a new
emphasis upon offshore defence and maritime security. However, the prime driver of
China's naval expansi9n in the Deng Xiaoping and post-Deng eras has been Beijing's
nationalistic geopolitical ambitions in maritime East Asia, rather than purely defensive
concerns with national maritime security - as demonstrated by the PLA Navy's
disinterest in sea lane defence as a force development priority. It is almost inconceivable
that China itself is in any danger of seaborne attack in today's world, unless it first
launches attacks on Taiwan or American allies in the region. The fact that Beijing
actually believes in the righteousness of its own assertions of sovereignty over Taiwan,
the Senlmkus and the South China Sea - meaning that both its actions and intentions can
be justified simply as "defensive" in nature - does not alter the reality that China's
ambitions for those territories are expansionist and destabilizing. China does have
legitimate, and growing, maritime security concerns, but the long-tenn intent to oust the
United States from the region and the PLA's anti-American force structure development
focus instead signals a geopolitically expansionist strategy. That does not mean that
China is likely to become militarily aggressive in the current circumstances, although it
may be imprudent to rule out the possibility of an attack or other forms of military
coercion against Taiwan.
The dissertation thus discerned a Chinese grand strategy that seeks to expand
China's control over its periphery and, over time, exert geopolitical pre-eminence over
its regional rivals, Japan and India, and reduce American influence and the U.S.
strategic presence in Asia. The strategy conforms to the neoclassical realist assumption
that states will attempt to increase their influence over the external environment as their
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relative material strength grows, and has required the development of comprehensive
maritime power (in the Mahanian sense), and a maritime strategy to match the PLA's
transformed national military strategy. Although China remains primarily a continental
power by strategic disposition, it nevertheless has developed a maritime strategy not
atypical for a continental power.
Two general patterns to China's maritime territorial expansion can be discerned.
Firstly, the occupation of territorial features has tended to be opportunistic, at times and
in places in which international opposition would be minimal. Secondly, China's South
China Sea expansion since 1974 has been both dependent upon, and a driver of,
improvements to its military capabilities. There has undoubtedly been a consistent
desire to expand into the South China Sea and establish a strategic presence deep into
Southeast Asia over the course of the past 30 years. Deng's leading role in China's
maritime strategic expansion is important, from the time that he co-commanded the
operation to capture the Crescent island group in the Paracels in 1974, to the
appointment of General Liu Huaqing as, firstly, PLA Navy commander and,
subsequently, to the Central Military Commission as China's senior military officer. Liu
led the way during the 1980s in increasing national awareness of the importance of the
sea to China's future well-being, in particular emphasizing the importance of South
China Sea resources.
There is no evidence that China's maritime ambitions have been curtailed in the
post-Deng era, or even in the post-Liu era (since the late 1990s). One of the key
indicators of China's continuing maritime ambitions is the consistent maritime focus of
PLA military strategy and force structure development. However, the Taiwan issue
supplanted the South China Sea as the PLA's top strategic priority in the early 1990s,
leading to changes both in the PLA's maritime strategy and its force structure priorities.
During the mid to late 1980s, China's intentions were to build a sea control and power
projection force for operations in the South China Sea, including an aircraft carrier
capability. The experience of the Taiwan missile crises of 1995-1996, particularly the
diplomatic intervention of the V.S. Navy, convinced PLA strategists that military
stra~egy

must focus on a Taiwan contingency that included American intervention.

Before the PLA could develop its planned sea control and power projection forces,
therefore, the emphasis of PLA maritime strategy changed to one of sea denial against
high-technology adversaries, particularly in the Taiwan Strait and East China Sea. The
very focused nature of the PLA's modernization means that, although the PLA overall
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remains backward, the maritime (or maritime-related) capabilities in the vanguard of
PLA modernization must be taken seriously as a potentially effective instrument of
Chinese policy.
The role of Taiwan has become a central feature of regional geostrategic
developments, including the rise of China as a maritime power. Although the island
does not represent some magical strategic key with which to dominate East Asia,
Taiwan's continued strategic independence from China physically inhibits China's free
access to the Pacific, whilst threatening the political legitimacy and nationalist
credentials of the Chinese Communist Party. An important argument made in earlier
chapters is that Taiwan is not only driving the development of China's maritime
strategy, but that gaining control of the island is vital both to the development of
Chinese maritime power and to Chinese maritime strategy itself - especially in the eyes
of the PLA. Without Taiwan, Chinese maritime power will remain limited. By usurping
Taiwan, China would improve its geopolitical and geostrategic position, including a
dominating position astride the sea lanes between Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia,
and benefit from Taiwan's economic and technological resources, including those of its
maritime and military sectors. China would then be able to expand its maritime horizons
and develop sea control and power projection capabilities to further its goal of regional
pnmacy.

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

China's nse as a maritime power has produced significant negative strategic
implications for East Asia and the contiguous maritime regions. The consequences of
Chinese maritime expansion have, in many ways, been counterproductive for its own
ambitious regional plans by encouraging the very types of strategic modernization
amongst regional states and countervailing coalitions that it has long feared. If China's
fears of strategic encirclement are now beginning to be realized, it is because Beijing
has, in Douglas Porch's words, effectively "encircled itself' through its own bellicose
behaviour,! driven in part by a desire 'to satisfy the domestic political requirements of
Chinese nationalist ideology.

1

Douglas Porch, "The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996: Strategic Implications for the United States Navy,"

Naval War College Review, Vol. LIl, No. 3, Summer 1999, p. 22.
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It is important to distinguish cause from effect in this process: China's

expansionist policy goals and consequent challenge to the regional (maritime) order, not
the responses of other states, are the root cause of the problem. It is unhelpful to
describe the current situation in terms of the security dilemma, whereby the security
gains of one power "inadvertently" threatens the security of another, creating a
spiralling effect of mutual defensive preparations, thus reducing the security of all?
China's agenda is neither geopolitically defensive nor benign: it is an unsatisfied power
seeking to overturn the regional status quo. That is not to categorize China as a
rapacious, militarily aggressive state, but its long-term agenda is strategically
transformative in ways that make major war in Asia more, rather than less, likely. It is
not evident how the rise of China can be "managed" if Beijing chooses not to cooperate.
Nor is it advisable to "accommodate" China if that means rewarding China's covetous
behaviour: real, not merely theoretical, interests are at stake.
Continental China's strategic focus upon maritime East Asia thus poses an
inherent challenge to the extant regional security order. The implications, whilst not
immediately dire, nevertheless are increasingly dangerous, particularly the growing
level of major power strategic competition. Neither Japan nor India is willing to defer to
a China whose maritime expansion imperils their security: each state is increasing its
own maritime strategic presence as a counter to China. Japan and India are both
competing with China for influence in Southeast Asia (so, too, to some extent, is the
United States); and the three powers are even competing to be the pre-eminent Asian
space power. 3
The danger is especially acute for Japan, which is completely dependent upon
sea

communications.

America's

continued strategic presence

and

maritime

preponderance remains vital, therefore, to a secure regional order, both to deter China
and to constrain the Japanese response. And, whilst the United States might be able to
live with the "peaceful" surrender of Taiwan to China in purely military terms,4 in
strategic terms the damage to its regional alliance system, especially the U.S.-Japan
alliance, could be terminal, resulting in a strategically independent, more assertive

2 For the intellectual foundations of the security dilemma theory, see Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under
the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2, January 1978.
3 See, for example, "Asia's Space Race," The Straits Times (online ed.), 17 January 2003.
4 The American reaction to such a surrender remains a moot point, however. For discussion, see Nancy
Bernkopf Tucker, "If Taiwan Chooses Unification, Should the United States Care?" The Washington
Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 3, Summer 2002.
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Japan.

S

The effectiveness of American deterrence can not be taken for granted,

however, when dealing with the asymmetries in geography, interests, strategies and
doctrines and capabilities inherent in the Sino-American strategic relationship in the
East Asian littoral environment. 6 That is particularly the case when the "deterrent effect
needs to be extended from a distant protecting power.,,7 Whilst the United States seems
committed to its strategic role in East Asia, there remains a danger that it may become
diverted by secondary security challenges elsewhere. 8 Moreover, the non-linear nature
of international politics makes predictions extrapolated from current circumstances,
wherein China seemingly remains effectively constrained, imprudent. 9
However the strategic landscape might unfold, it can be stated with some
certainty that the emergence of China as a powerful continental state with growing
maritime ambitions and capabilties will increasingly challenge the regional maritime
dominance of the traditional sea powers. If China were to be ultimately successful, the
geopolitical consequences would have truly global implications. The prudent course of
action to "manage" or "constrain" China seems to be enhanced deterrence by the United
States, which will require greater attention to combat capabilties specifically focused on
China and the East Asian littoral. lO As Colin Gray axiomatically asserts: "Defense
Deters, If Anything Can."II
China's maritime prospects may be problematic, yet that does not diminish the
potential dangers to a stable regional order. It also can be confidently predicted that,
whether or not China's future maritime expansion matches the scope of its ambitions, it
is almost inconceivable that it will retreat from the sea in the manner of the Ming
Dynasty in the sixteenth century: Chinese maritime power, both commercial and
military, is likely to be a constant feature of the Asian geopolitical landscape in the
twenty-first century.
5 See Chris Rahman, "Defending Taiwan, and Why It Matters," Naval War College Review, Vol. LIV,
No. 4, Autumn 2001, pp. 81-82; and James E. Auer and Robyn Lim, "The Maritime Basis of American
Security in East Asia," Naval War College Review, Vol. LIV, No. 1, Winter 2001, p. 41.
6 Rahman, "Defending Taiwan, and Why It Matters," pp. 83-84.
7 Colin S. Gray, "Deterrence and Regional Conflict: Hopes, Fallacies, and 'Fixes,'" Comparative
Strategy, Vol. 17, No. 1, January-March 1998, p. 57.
8 Although the campaign against Islamic terrorism is important, the long-term geopolitical threat posed by
terrorism is limited compared to that by a non-status quo major power such as China. A future,
hypothetical, China-Islamic axis might be extremely hazardous for international security, however.
9 On non-linearity, see Alan Beyerchen, "C1ausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War,"
International Security, Vol. 17, No. 3, Winter 1992/93.
10 See Rahman, "Defending Taiwan," esp. pp. 82-86. Some of the necessary littoral capabilties are
already under development by the U.S. Navy.
11 Gray, "Deterrence and Regional Conflict," p. 58.
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Postscript
During the final months of writing this dissertation, the United States and its allies have
fought wars against terrorists in Afghanistan and elsewhere,12 and against Iraq. Both the
strategic studies literature and international attention have necessarily been focused on
these events. Nothing has occurred, however, that changes the fundamental arguments
made herein. Major wars and geopolitical discontinuities occur mostly as a result of
major power competition. The major power most likely to cause such ructions remains
China, with its slow but concerted expansionist drive for regional primacy; and clashing
maritime strategies - between continentalist China and the countervailing maritime
powers led by the United States - continue to drive the geostrategic dynamics of East
Asia.

Particularly relevant with regard to this dissertation is Mohan Malik, Dragon on Terrorism: Assessing
China's Tactical Gains and Strategic Losses Post-September 11, Strategic Studies Institute, D.S. Anny

12

War College, Carlisle, PA, October 2002.
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